People v. Sedillo CA2/3

Opinion

Filed 9/28/26 P. v. Sedillo CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B347261

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA072460) v.

JESUS SEDILLO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Judith Levey Meyer, Judge. Affirmed. Christina Vanarelli, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Charles Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗ In 2009, a jury found Jesus Sedillo guilty of two counts of murder and two counts of attempted murder. In 2025, Sedillo filed a resentencing petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 and requested the appointment of counsel.1 The trial court summarily denied the petition without first appointing counsel. We agree with the parties that the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel was error. However, we conclude the error was harmless. The record establishes that Sedillo is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We therefore affirm the trial court order. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 In the underlying matter, the People charged Sedillo with the murders of Manuel Lopez (count 1) and Richard Romero (count 2), and the attempted murders of Jessica Romero (count 3) and Edward Villegas (count 4). The charges arose from two drive-by shootings that were alleged to be gang-related. As to the murder counts, an amended information alleged that Sedillo personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury and death to each victim within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The information further alleged personal and intentional discharge and use of a firearm enhancements as to both counts (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c)). The information alleged two special circumstances as to counts 1 and 2: that in the proceeding Sedillo was convicted of more than one first or second degree 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 We previously granted the People’s request for judicial notice of the reporter’s transcript from Sedillo’s original trial.

2 murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), and that the murders were intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person and persons outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict death (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)). As to the attempted murder counts, the information alleged the offenses were committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation (§ 664, subd. (a)). Firearm enhancements were additionally alleged as to count 4. The information also alleged a gang enhancement as to all counts (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The People proceeded at trial on a theory that as to each of the four crimes, Sedillo had a gun, shot it, and intentionally killed or attempted to kill the victims. Sedillo testified in his own defense. He denied any involvement in either shooting. Sedillo was the only defendant at his trial. The trial court did not instruct the jury on aiding and abetting liability, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or felony murder. The jury found Sedillo guilty as charged. Specifically, and as relevant here, the jury found Sedillo committed two counts of first degree murder in that the murders were “willful, deliberate and premeditated,” and they also were drive-by murders within the meaning of section 189; Sedillo personally and intentionally discharged a firearm which proximately caused great bodily injury and death to the respective victims; and the murders were intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict death. As to the attempted murders, the jury found Sedillo guilty and found true that he committed the attempted murders willfully, deliberately and with premeditation. The jury also found true that Sedillo 3 personally and intentionally discharged a firearm which proximately caused great bodily injury or death as to one victim, and, as to both, that he personally and intentionally discharged and used a firearm. The trial court sentenced Sedillo to life without parole.3 In 2025, Sedillo filed a form section 1172.6 petition in propria persona. He checked boxes indicating a charging document was filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a now invalid theory of imputed liability for murder or attempted murder; he was convicted; and he could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of the changes made to sections 188 and 189. Sedillo asked the court to appoint counsel. The trial court did not appoint counsel. Instead, the court reviewed the petition in chambers and summarily denied it. In a written order, the court found that Sedillo was the only perpetrator “pursuant to the Information, the court file and the probation report, and the petitioner does not contradict this in his ‘form’ motion”; the jury verdict forms indicated the jury found Sedillo guilty and found true that he intentionally discharged a firearm pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d); and “[p]etitioner was the shooter in this case, any changes do not apply to him, and by operation of law he is not eligible for resentencing” pursuant to section 1172.6. Sedillo timely filed a notice of appeal.

3 The trial court imposed life without parole as to count 1; a concurrent life without parole term as to count 2; and concurrent terms of 15 years to life on count 3 and 40 years to life on count 4.

4 DISCUSSION I. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Appoint Counsel Sedillo contends, and the People concede, that the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel before ruling on Sedillo’s petition. We agree. Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and limited the scope of the felony murder rule. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708 (Strong); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The bill amended section 188, requiring that to be convicted of murder, “a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The bill also amended section 189, subdivision (e). Under the amended law, a person may be convicted of felony murder only if he or she 1) was the actual killer; 2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, aided and abetted the actual killer in committing first degree murder; or 3) “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Ibid.) Senate Bill No. 1437 created “a procedural mechanism for those previously convicted of murder under a theory amended in [Senate Bill No. 1437] to petition for resentencing.” (People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 880; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) “The process begins with the filing of a petition that declares, among other things, that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective 5 date of Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); see id., subd. (b)(1)(A).)” (Emanuel, at p. 880.) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) subsequently extended resentencing relief to any person convicted of murder based on any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,” and any person convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) These amendments to the Penal Code did not invalidate murder convictions based on the theory that the defendant intended to kill. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 707; People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1166.) Under section 1172.6, subdivision (b), once a petition is filed that includes a declaration that the petitioner is eligible for relief based on the statutory requirements set forth in subdivision (a), provides the superior court case number and year of the conviction, and indicates whether the petitioner requests the appointment of counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 963, 966.) The appointment of counsel must precede the trial court’s determination of whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief. (Id. at p. 966.) Sedillo’s petition met the requirements of section 1172.6, subdivision (b). The trial court was required to appoint counsel and erred in failing to do so.

6 II. The Trial Court’s Error Was Harmless Because the Record of Conviction Establishes that Sedillo is Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law In Lewis, the California Supreme Court determined that the failure to appoint counsel as required under section 1172.6, subdivision (b) is an error of state law, subject to review under the Watson harmless error test.4 “[A] petitioner ‘whose petition is denied before an order to show cause issues has the burden of showing “it is reasonably probable that if [he or she] had been afforded assistance of counsel his [or her] petition would not have been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing.” ’ [Citation.]” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974.) Thus, although the trial court erred, we agree with the People that we do not automatically reverse but instead consider whether the error was harmless. Here, Sedillo cannot show it is reasonably probable that had he received the assistance of counsel, his petition would not have been summarily denied. The record of conviction in this case, which includes the operative information, the closing arguments, the jury instructions, and the jury’s verdicts, conclusively establishes that Sedillo is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. (People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 935.) The record demonstrates that Sedillo was not convicted of murder on a felony murder theory, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or a theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime. Nor was he convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

4 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.

7 The jury was not instructed on aiding and abetting liability, any form of accomplice liability, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or felony murder. Rather than being instructed on any form of imputed malice, the trial court instructed the jury only on several iterations of criminal liability that required findings of express or implied malice and intent to kill.5 As to murder, the jury was instructed only on express and implied malice. The court instructed the jury that “All murder which is perpetrated by any willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing with express malice aforethought is murder of the first degree. . . . [¶] If you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill . . . it is murder of the first degree.” With respect to the drive-by murder special allegation, the trial court instructed the jury that the “essential elements” were that 1) the defendant committed murder; 2) the defendant perpetrated the murder by discharging a firearm from the motor vehicle intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle; and 3) the defendant specifically intended to kill a human being. Likewise, the trial court instructed the jury that to find Sedillo guilty of attempted murder, it would have to determine whether the People proved: “[1)] a direct but ineffectual act was done by one person towards the killing of another being; and [2)] the person committing the act harbored express malice 5 The trial court instructed the jury on transferred intent. Transferred intent theories remain valid under current law because they require an intent to kill. (People v. Lopez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1249–1250.)

8 aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.” Sedillo was the only defendant at his trial. The jury was not instructed on aiding and abetting liability or presented with any theory of accomplice liability. The instructions regarding the actions of the “defendant” or the “person” committing an act necessarily referred only to Sedillo. The jury found Sedillo guilty of first degree murder because it was willful, deliberate and premeditated, and because it was a drive-by murder. The jury also found Sedillo guilty of attempted murder committed willfully, deliberately and with premeditation. The jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The jury could not have found Sedillo guilty of any of the charged crimes on an imputed malice theory. Sedillo is thus ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. (See People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1257 [jury’s true finding of drive by shooting special circumstance under former § 12034, subd. (d), coupled with findings jury was required to make to find defendant of first degree murder, conclusively demonstrated ineligibility for § 1172.6 relief].) Sedillo contends that the information did not allege that he was the only perpetrator, the jury made no such finding, and the jury’s findings do not establish that he actually killed or attempted to kill any of the victims. These arguments are unavailing. (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 567 [absent specific facts identifying someone else as the direct perpetrator, no material fact dispute arises “from mere latent, speculative possibilities . . . a hypothetical alternate direct perpetrator cannot be conjured from thin air or a legal conclusion”].)

9 Irrespective of whether Sedillo was the only person involved in the crimes, the jury instructions and the jury’s findings together conclusively establish that it found he committed the murders and attempted murders, and that he personally acted with intent to kill. (People v. Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 281–282 [defendant ineligible for § 1172.6 relief because undisputed facts in record of conviction established prosecution only pursued theory that defendant was direct perpetrator of attempted murder]; People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 893 [petitioner ineligible for relief where he alone attempted to commit murder].) Thus, the trial court’s error in not appointing counsel was harmless and we find no basis for reversal.

10 DISPOSITION The trial court order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS ADAMS, P. J.

We concur:

HANASONO, J.

ASHWORTH, J.* * Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.