People v. Smith CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 9/28/26 P. v. Smith CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B350413

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MA081114) v.

KAYLA MICHELLE SMITH,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Lisa Strassner, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Mental Health Advocacy Services and Annie Y. Pan, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan, and Nancy Lii Ladner, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

****** Kayla Michelle Smith (defendant) appeals from the trial court’s denial of her petition for relief under Penal Code section 1203.4.1 As the People concede, the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying relief, so we must reverse. We remand to enable the trial court to determine whether defendant is still on probation for a driving-under-the-influence (DUI) offense, which would affect her present eligibility for relief. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Underlying Conduct, Charges, Plea, and Sentence On April 7, 2021, defendant set afire the bed in a Motel 6 motel room she was renting in Lancaster, California. The People initially filed a criminal complaint charging defendant with (1) arson of an inhabited structure or property (§ 451, subd. (b)), and (2) arson of the property of another (id., subd. (d)). In mid-October 2021, the People filed an amended criminal complaint adding a charge of bringing a weapon into jail (§ 4574, subd. (a)). On October 15, 2021, defendant signed a written plea agreement and thereafter pled no contest to a single count of arson of an inhabited structure or property (§ 451, subd. (b)). Consistent with the plea agreement, the trial court imposed a five-year term of formal probation that included a time-served 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 sentence as well as requirements that defendant complete a 52- week anger management course, complete six months of outpatient drug treatment, pay restitution, and stay away from the Lancaster Motel 6. Also consistent with the plea agreement, the People dismissed the two remaining counts. II. Early Discharge of Defendant’s Probation In June 2024, defendant filed a motion for early discharge from probation. At a hearing held on July 17, 2024, the trial court noted that, despite being just “slightly shy of three years of [her] . . . five-year probation grant,” defendant had completed all of the terms of her probation, which the court found to be “very commendable.” The court thus “terminat[ed defendant’s] probation early.” III. Attempts to Obtain Relief under Section 1203.4 On October 17, 2024, defendant filed a petition for dismissal of her conviction under section 1203.4 on the grounds that (1) she “ha[d] been discharged from probation prior to the termination of the period thereof,” and (2) was entitled to “relief in the interests of justice.” The court denied the request due to the “recency of the conviction and serious nature of the charge,” finding relief was “not in [the] interest of justice.” On January 15, 2025, defendant filed a second petition for dismissal under section 1203.4, this time citing only that she was entitled to “relief in the interests of justice.” The court denied the second request on the grounds that it was not “in [the] interest of justice” to grant relief because she “just got off probation in July and had picked up [a] DUI while on probation on this case.” On September 16, 2025, defendant filed a third petition for dismissal under section 1203.4, this time citing only the ground that she “ha[d] been discharged from probation prior to the 3 termination of the period thereof.” The People objected, arguing that the arson charge was a “serious felony,” that “she has only been off probation a little over a year,” and that the People “would like to see more time free of crime.” In an October 6, 2025 order, the court denied the third request, reasoning that defendant had “only been off probation slightly over a year,” and that she “violated probation” “by picking up [a] new case” “during the probation,” such that it was “not in [the] interests of justice” to grant relief. IV. Appeal Defendant timely appealed the order denying her third petition for dismissal. DISCUSSION Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her petition for dismissal of her conviction pursuant to section 1203.4. Section 1203.4 is “‘a rehabilitative provision that rewards a person who has successfully completed probation’”; as pertinent here, it authorizes a person who previously entered a guilty or no contest plea to withdraw the plea, have the charges underlying the plea dismissed, and “thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense.” (§ 1203.4, subd. (a); People v. Woodward (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 379, 398, quoting People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 803.)2 A person is eligible for section 1203.4 relief if she proves that (1) (a) she “has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation,” (b)

2 This dismissal does not, “[s]trictly speaking,” “‘expunge’ the conviction” because “[c]harges dismissed under section 1203.4 may be treated as convictions for some purposes.” (People v. Seymour (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1429.)

4 she “has been discharged prior to the termination of probation,” or (c) it is otherwise “in the interest of justice” to grant relief, and (2) she is not “then serving a sentence for an offense, on probation for an offense, or charged with the commission of an offense.” (§ 1203.4, subd. (a); People v. Holman (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1459; People v. Johnson (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 252, 263 (Johnson) [burden of proof on applicant for relief].) Although a court retains discretion whether to grant relief in the third, “interests of justice” scenario, relief is “mandatory” and must be granted in either of the first two scenarios—assuming the defendant meets the additional requirement that she is not serving a sentence, on probation, or charged with an offense at the time of her petition. (People v. Butler (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 585, 587; People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 1001; People v. E.B. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 47, 54.) As the People concede, the trial court misapplied section 1203.4 in this case. In the petition before us on appeal, defendant sought relief under section 1203.4 on the ground that she “had been discharged from probation prior to the termination of the period thereof.” It is undisputed that defendant was discharged from probation in July 2024—just a little over three years into her five years of probation—because she had “commendab[ly]” completed all of the conditions of her probation. (Cf. Johnson, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 262–263 [“early termination” of probation for reasons other than “good conduct” does not qualify as a “discharge from probation”].) Because relief in this scenario is mandatory, the trial court’s stated concerns about defendant having “only been off probation slightly over a year” and relief being not “in [the] interest of justice” have no bearing on the propriety of relief.

5 The next question is the appropriate appellate relief. Although defendant has demonstrated that her early discharge from probation renders her eligible for relief, she also has the burden of establishing that she was not serving a sentence, on probation, or charged with some other offense at the time of her petition. The trial court’s order mentions defendant “picking up [a] new case” while on probation. But the record does not support this fact. Instead, the record shows that “there are no minute orders” indicating a “new criminal offense between October 21, 2021” (when defendant was placed on probation) “and July 17, 2024” (when defendant was discharged from probation). To be sure, defendant was arrested for a DUI on March 24, 2021. But that arrest (and thus, the offense) occurred before probation commenced in this case on October 21, 2021. Thus, the last unresolved requirement for relief under section 1203.4 is whether defendant was serving a sentence for or on probation for “some other offense” when the trial court considered the merits of the petition. Because probation for a DUI offense may range between three and five years (Veh. Code, § 23600, subd. (b)(1)), a remand is necessary to ascertain whether defendant can prove that she is not on probation for this DUI at the time of the hearing on remand. (Accord, People v. Wilkinson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1574 [remanding to trial court to “finish the analysis it would have performed” if the court had not made error].)3 3 We decline the People’s request to take judicial notice of the Kern County website regarding a possible disposition of the DUI offense, as it would not resolve the open issue to be addressed on remand.

6 DISPOSITION The order is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings on defendant’s current eligibility for relief under section 1203.4. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

KUMAR, J.* We concur:

MOOR, Acting P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

* Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.