Rose v. Rose CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 9/28/26 Rose v. Rose CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

VICTORIA D. ROSE, B347617 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23STCV04692) v. JAMES D. ROSE et al., Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Kristin S. Escalante, Judge. Affirmed. Aldesco Law and Albert Ioan Aldesco for Defendants and Appellants. California Land Law and Richard J. Cowles for Plaintiff and Respondent. __________________________________ In 2023, plaintiff Victoria Rose filed this action for quiet title, partition, and other causes of action against her father 1 James Rose and his then-girlfriend, now wife, Regina Rose. Victoria sought to enforce provisions in a 2016 dissolution judgment between her mother and James, which awarded Victoria an interest in the family residence, where she and James lived after her parents’ divorce. At the time of trial, a recorded deed listed only James and Regina as having an interest in the subject property. The trial court found in favor of Victoria on the quiet title cause of action, determining she owned 50 percent of the subject property and James and Regina owned the other 50 percent, and ordered partition of the property by sale. James and Regina contend the trial court erred in interpreting the dissolution judgment. We disagree and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Purchase of the Subject Property Victoria’s parents, Delia Banuelos and James, married in 1993, and Victoria was born in 2000. In December 2003, James and Banuelos executed a written, notarized agreement with James’s grandfather, Raul Ybarra, stating: “I, Raul Ybarra, hereby agree to sell my house, located at 2909 Via San Carlo, Montebello, California, to [James] and [Banuelos] for the amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000). In the event that James and [Banuelos] sell the property listed above, it is agreed that Victoria[], their daughter, 1 Because these parties share the same surname, we will hereinafter refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion. We intend no disrespect.

2 is entitled to receive a sum of money equal to fifty percent (50%) of the sale price of the property listed above.” On March 3, 2004, Ybarra transferred the Property by quitclaim deed to James and Banuelos, as joint tenants. Banuelos recorded the quitclaim deed with the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office. In May 2013, James and Banuelos separated, and James and Victoria moved out of the Property and into another home. The following month, Banuelos filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In 2014, Banuelos moved out of the Property, and it remained vacant until in or around February 2016, when James and Victoria moved back to the Property.

B. Relevant Provisions of the Stipulated Dissolution Judgment In or around March 2016, when Victoria was 16 years old, James and Banuelos agreed to resolve the dissolution proceedings by stipulated judgment (hereinafter, the Judgment). At that time, James had sole physical custody of Victoria, and that continued after the divorce. Pursuant to the terms of the Judgment, Banuelos was obligated to pay James $800 per month in child support, and both parties waived spousal support. The Judgment awarded Banuelos all interest in her CalSTRS retirement account, and awarded James all interest in financial accounts in his name. James and Banuelos each retained certain vehicles as well as all furnishings and personal belongings in his or her possession at the time of the divorce, with James maintaining possession of all furnishings and personal belongings at the Property. The present action turns on the interpretation of the provisions in the Judgment relating to the Property, which is referred to in the 3 Judgment as the “former family residence.” Therefore, we quote these provisions in full: “C. Family Residence: It is the parties’ intent to enforce the agreement made at time of purchase of the former family residence and maintain a fifty percent (50%) interest in the home for the parties’ daughter, Victoria[]. The parties shall retain an estate planning attorney to draft documents necessary to preserve Victoria’s one-half (1/2) interest in the former family residence. The parties shall share the cost of said estate planning equally. Any retainer required by the estate planning attorney shall be paid by the parties within ten days of execution of the Judgment by the parties. [James]’s ownership interest in the former family residence is fifty percent (50%), and he shall not encumber more than fifty percent (50%) of the equity therein. “[James] shall have ninety (90) days to remove [Banuelos] from the loan on the former family residence and pay [Banuelos] an equalization payment in the amount of $13,000, as set forth hereinbelow. In the event [James] has not refinanced the former family residence and paid [Banuelos] the equalizing payment as set forth herein, the former family residence shall be sold. The parties may meet and confer to extend this deadline if agreed. “If the former family residence is sold, fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds will be held for Victoria as decided by the parties and an estate planning attorney. After payment of all selling costs and tax consequences, [Banuelos] shall receive the sum of $13,000 from [James]’s fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds as set forth herein, and [James] shall receive the balance. “D. Equalization: In order to equalize the division of property, [James] shall pay to [Banuelos] the sum of $13,000.00. Said sum shall be payable by [James] pursuant to a Promissory 4 Note in the amount of $13,000 secured by a Deed of Trust recorded against the former family residence.” On or about March 22, 2016, shortly before James and Banuelos signed the stipulation for the Judgment, James secured a loan against the Property in the amount of $175,000. Thereafter, he paid off the existing mortgage on the Property (approximately $41,000), and he paid Banuelos the $13,000 equalization payment required under the terms of the Judgment. On March 30, 2016, the date Banuelos signed the stipulation for the Judgment, she also signed a quitclaim deed, granting her interest in the former family residence to James. On April 1, 2016, the title company recorded the quitclaim deed and a deed of trust with the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office. James signed the stipulation for the Judgment on April 7, 2016. The Judgment was entered on June 21, 2016. James and Banuelos did not “retain an estate planning attorney to draft documents necessary to preserve Victoria’s one- half (1/2) interest in the former family residence,” as required by the Judgment. On March 24, 2016, James created a revocable trust called the J.D. Rose 2016 Family Trust, which includes provisions regarding distribution of any remaining trust property to Victoria upon James’s death. The trust document does not reference the Property, and the Property was not placed into the trust (as of the time the interlocutory judgment was entered in the present quiet title action).

C. Encumbrances on the Property and Transfer of Title to James and His Girlfriend, as Joint Tenants In March 2020, James took out a loan of approximately $300,000, secured by a100-percent-interest in the Property. After 5 using the proceeds from this 2020 loan to pay off the balance on his 2016 loan, he received a cash payment of around $90,000, less fees. In April 2021, James took out another loan secured by the entire Property, this time for approximately $400,000. After paying his debts, he received a cash payment of around $66,000. James obtained these short-term, high-interest loans because he was unemployed and on permanent disability, and he was falling behind on tax payments for the Property. 2 In or around July 2021, James began dating Regina. On December 16, 2022, he executed a grant deed, granting the Property from himself, to himself and Regina as joint tenants. Regina did not purchase her 50 percent interest in the Property; it was listed as a gift from James on the deed. Also on December 16, 2022, James and Regina secured a $490,000 loan against the Property. At that time, the appraised value of the Property was $930,000. Some of the proceeds from the loan were used to pay delinquent taxes and penalties on the Property. James and Regina also used some of the proceeds to pay their personal debts. On December 22, 2022, the title company recorded the grant deed and a deed of trust with the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office. After her parents’ divorce in 2016, Victoria lived at the Property with James until in or around March 2023, when she 2 As indicated ante, Regina’s current surname is Rose, so we will refer to her by her first name to avoid confusion with other parties who share her surname (James and Victoria). She was originally named in this action under her maiden name, Regina Dabich. At trial, the court granted Victoria’s motion to correct the record to reflect Regina’s current surname.

6 was 23 years old (except for a period of six months in 2021). Regina did not live at the Property during this time.

D. The Present Action 1. The operative first amended complaint On March 3, 2023, Victoria filed this action for quiet title, slander of title, partition and accounting, and declaratory relief against James and Regina. The same month, James and Regina married. On August 7, 2023, after the court sustained in part James and Regina’s demurrer to the complaint with leave to amend, Victoria filed a first amended complaint, asserting the same causes of action, and naming Banuelos as a defendant in addition to James and Regina. In the operative first amended complaint, Victoria alleged, in pertinent part, that the 2016 Judgment in her parents’ dissolution proceedings granted her a 50 percent legal interest in the Property and prohibited James from encumbering more than his 50 percent legal interest in the Property. She sought, among other things, an order quieting title in accordance with the Judgment, and an order for partition of the Property by sale. The court overruled James and Regina’s demurrer to the first amended complaint, denied their motion to strike and ordered them to file an answer, which they did. Prior to trial, Banuelos was dismissed from the action. 2. The bench trial On November 14, 2024, the court held a one-day bench trial in this matter. During Victoria’s opening statement, her counsel asserted it would be improper to allow James to “relitigate” the dissolution Judgment by arguing ambiguity and seeking to admit extrinsic evidence as to the parties’ intent. The court ruled that 7 in accordance with the principles of contractual interpretation, it would provisionally “receive the extrinsic evidence to consider whether there’s a latent ambiguity that’s not apparent from the face of the contract [i.e., the stipulated Judgment].” The court added, “If the language [of the Judgment] is clear enough where the extrinsic evidence isn’t helpful, then the court will just be looking at the language first as with any instrument.” James and Regina do not argue on appeal that the court precluded them from presenting evidence. During her testimony, Victoria stated her position that the dissolution Judgment granted her a 50 percent ownership interest in the Property. She testified that around the time of her parents’ divorce, when she was 16 years old, Banuelos told her that she owned 50 percent of the Property because Banuelos 3 “gave [Victoria] her half in the divorce Judgment.” In 2021, during a dispute with James over whether Victoria should continue to live at the Property, Victoria asserted her ownership interest to James, and he remained silent on the matter. In November 2022, James asked Victoria to cosign a loan, and she asked him why her name was not on the title to the Property. He responded that he owned 100 percent of the Property. She declined to cosign the loan. She testified that she did not consent to him encumbering more than 50 percent of the Property’s equity with a loan. Nor did she consent to him transferring a 50 percent interest in the Property to Regina. James acknowledged during his testimony that the Judgment states he has a 50 percent interest in the Property, 3 Banuelos testified that this conversation occurred five years later, in 2021.

8 and he may not encumber more than 50 percent of the Property’s equity. He maintained, however, that “the divorce judgment is different than what [he and Banuelos] agreed to.” He stated that during the dissolution proceedings, Banuelos wanted to sell the Property, but he and Victoria did not want to do that. He testified that he “gave up certain interest in [Banuelos’s] retirement accounts as well as spousal support in exchange for [Banuelos’s] portion of the house, her 50 percent of the house.” He noted that he signed the stipulation for the Judgment “after [he] had already received 100 percent of the property” by virtue of 4 Banuelos quitclaiming her interest to him. James testified that Victoria “has a future interest” in the Property that “doesn’t apply unless [he] sell[s] the home.” He stated that when he created his trust in 2016 (described ante), he intended to leave the Property to Victoria if he died, but he conceded that the Property was never placed into the trust. During his testimony, he confirmed his understanding that under the current arrangement, with he and Regina listed on the record title as joint tenants, if he were to pass away, the entire Property 4 Similarly, in his trial brief, James stated: “James’s belief at the time of executing the stipulation, notably on April 7, 2016, a week after [Banuelos] had quitclaimed legal title to him, was that he had negotiated, and been awarded, an absolute (100%) ownership interest in the property. It was not until after he read the dissolution [J]udgment, dated June 21, 2026, that James noticed the [J]udgment, albeit ambiguous, seemed different from what the parties had agreed to. Whereas James believed that his ownership of the Property following the dissolution of his marriage would be unqualified and absolute, the [J]udgment read that he had ‘[a] fifty percent (50%) interest in the former family residence.’ ”

9 would go to Regina. He testified that he added Regina to the title because he could not qualify for the $490,000 loan on his own. He stated that at the time of trial, the loan was current, the outstanding taxes were paid, and the Property was not at risk of foreclosure. Regina testified that at the time she agreed to obtain the $490,000 loan with James, she was aware that if the property were ever sold, Victoria would receive half of the proceeds, and Regina was “fine with” that arrangement. It was not until after the present action was filed that Regina saw a copy of the Judgment stating that James’s ownership interest in the Property is 50 percent. Regina indicated that she “went on title to the Property only to help get the loan and not as an actual owner.” She acknowledged that if James passed away before her, she would be the owner of the entire property, and she confirmed that Victoria was not a beneficiary of her estate. Regina also indicated that she “never intended to receive anything from being on title to the Property.” The loan she and James took against the Property paid off some of her and James’s personal debts that were not secured by the Property. Banuelos testified that when she entered into the stipulation for the dissolution Judgment with James, her intent was “to leave” her 50 percent interest in the Property to Victoria. Her attorney advised her to sign the quitclaim deed, granting her interest in the Property to James. It was her understanding that the Judgment would “protect” Victoria’s “50 percent title interest in the Property.” Banuelos indicated during her testimony that James gave up his claim for spousal support in exchange for her giving up her interest in the Property. She maintained, however, 10 that under the terms of the stipulation and Judgment, her interest in the Property went to Victoria. 3. The court’s ruling and interlocutory judgment After hearing oral argument, receiving further briefing, and taking the matter under submission, the court issued its ruling on January 29, 2025. At the outset of the 12-page minute order, the court summarized its findings and conclusions as follows: “The court finds in favor of plaintiff Victoria D. Rose and against defendants James D. Rose and Regina L. Rose on the quiet title and partition claims. The court finds that Victoria D. Rose is a 50% owner of the property, with the other 50% owned . . . jointly by James and Regina. The court further finds that Victoria D. Rose is entitled to partition by sale. The court will enter an interlocutory judgment for partition by sale. . . . [¶] The court finds against plaintiff and in favor of defendants on the slander of title claim. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient argument or authority to establish entitlement to judgment on 5 that claim.” Because our standard of review in this appeal is de novo, as explained post, a detailed account herein of the court’s reasoning is unnecessary. Nonetheless, we provide the following summary of the court’s interpretation of the Judgment to provide context for James and Regina’s arguments on appeal. The court concluded: “[T]he language of the stipulated judgment is clear on its face that James D. Rose was awarded only a 50% interest in the property. The judgment explicitly states in at least two places that James D. Rose was awarded 5 Victoria did not file a cross-appeal from the interlocutory judgment challenging the portions of the ruling not in her favor.

11 only 50% of the property, specifically stating (1) James D. Rose is awarded ‘[a] fifty percent (50%) interest in the former family residence located at 2909 Via San Carlos, Montebello, CA’; and (2) ‘Respondent’s [James D. Rose’s] ownership interest in the former family residence is fifty percent (50%), and he shall not encumber more than fifty percent (50%) of the equity therein.’ Any claim that James D. Rose was awarded more than fifty percent of the property or that there were somehow no restrictions on James D. Rose’s right to encumber the property is contrary to the express language of the stipulated judgment.” The court further concluded: “[T]he only tenable interpretation is that Victoria Rose was being awarded the other 50%. This is consistent with the fact that the stipulation states that the parties’ intent was to ‘maintain a fifty percent (50%) interest’ in the home for Victoria and that the estate planning attorney would draft documents necessary to ‘preserve Victoria’s one-half (1/2) interest in the former family residence.’ ” The court stated it was “unnecessary for the court to determine whether Victoria must prove her interest in the [P]roperty by [a] preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, because even if the clear and convincing evidence standard applies, clear and convincing evidence established that James D. Rose (along with Regina Rose) owns only 50% of the [P]roperty and that Victoria D. Rose owns the other 50%.” The court rejected James and Regina’s arguments that provisions in the Judgment regarding a potential sale of the Property and referencing the prior agreement with Ybarra (James’s grandfather) demonstrate that Victoria’s only interest in the property was a contingent right to receive 50 percent of proceeds in the event James ever decided to sell the Property.

12 The court concluded that these provisions do not negate the express, clear, unequivocal language in the Judgment stating James was awarded only a 50 percent interest in the Property. The court also rejected James and Regina’s argument that “the fact that Banuelos quitclaimed the property to James shows that Victoria was not awarded any interest in the [P]roperty by the [J]udgment.” The court noted: “Victoria was a minor at the time the stipulated [J]udgment was entered into. The parties had agreed to jointly hire an estate planning attorney to determine how Victoria’s interest in the [P]roperty would be held. The parties also agreed that James would refinance the [P]roperty in order to pay Banuelos the $13,000 equalization payment. Under those conditions, it makes sense that the parties would choose not to have a minor on title in the first instance, at least until after the parties had received advice from the estate 6 planning attorney.” The court found James’s “arguments regarding his own trust instrument,” which did not include any reference to the Property, “to be frivolous.” The court concluded that because the dissolution Judgment granted Victoria a 50 percent ownership interest in the Property, she had standing to bring a quiet title action, and she had a right to partition. On June 6, 2025, the court entered an interlocutory judgment, quieting title “to an undivided 50% interest in the [Property] to [Victoria] as of June 21, 2016 [the date the 6 As discussed ante, James and Banuelos did not “retain an estate planning attorney to draft documents necessary to preserve Victoria’s one-half (1/2) interest in the former family residence,” as required by the terms of the Judgment.

13 dissolution Judgment was entered],” and ordering partition of the Property by sale, with Victoria “entitled to 50% of the sale proceeds after the costs of sale.” The court retained jurisdiction pending the sale and distribution of net proceeds. James and Regina filed a timely notice of appeal from the interlocutory judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(9) [“an interlocutory judgment in an action for partition determining the rights and interests of the respective parties and directing partition to be made” is appealable].)

DISCUSSION James and Regina (hereinafter, referred to as appellants) contend that “undisputed evidence” demonstrates that the stipulated dissolution Judgment “is reasonably susceptible” to their interpretation—that Victoria has no ownership interest in the Property but is entitled to 50 percent of the proceeds upon sale of the Property—and therefore, “the [J]udgment evinces a latent ambiguity as a matter of law.” They urge us to “constru[e] the undisputed evidence” to resolve the purported ambiguity in 7 their favor.

7 In the respondent’s brief, Victoria argues that James forfeited his contention regarding an ambiguity in the Judgment by not raising the issue in the dissolution proceedings. She cites no authority supporting her argument, and we reject it. She filed this action seeking to enforce the Judgment, and James may offer his interpretation of the Judgment in his defense. Victoria also argues that appellants’ opening brief does not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 8.204, and suggests that the appellate record is inadequate for meaningful review. Victoria does not point to a specific part(s) of appellants’ brief (Fn. is continued on the next page.)

14 A. Principles of Contractual Interpretation and Standards of Review “ ‘ “ ‘Marital settlement agreements incorporated into a dissolution judgment are construed under the statutory rules governing the interpretations of contracts generally.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. [Citation.] If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs.’ ” ’ [Citations.] ‘ “ ‘The mutual intention to which the courts give effect is determined by objective manifestations of the parties’ intent, including the words used in the agreement, as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding circumstances under which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘The parties’ expressed objective intent, not their unexpressed subjective intent, governs.’ ” (In re Marriage of Minkin (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 939, 948.) “Where the meaning of the words used in a contract is disputed, the trial court must provisionally receive any proffered extrinsic evidence which is relevant to show whether the contract is reasonably susceptible of a particular meaning.” (Wolf v. Superior Court (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1350 (Wolf).) “The interpretation of a contract involves ‘a two-step process: “First the court provisionally receives (without actually admitting) all credible evidence concerning the parties’ intentions to determine ‘ambiguity,’ i.e., whether the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’

that she believes violates the rule. Nor does she explain the purported inadequacy of the record. For these reasons, we reject the arguments.

15 to the interpretation urged by a party. If in light of the extrinsic evidence the court decides the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation urged, the extrinsic evidence is then admitted to aid in the second step—interpreting the contract. [Citation.]” [Citation.] The trial court’s determination of whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law, subject to independent review on appeal. [Citation] The trial court’s resolution of an ambiguity is also a question of law if no parol evidence is admitted or if the parol evidence is not in conflict.’ ” (Id. at p. 1351.) Here, the trial court resolved the matter at the first step, concluding the language of the stipulated dissolution Judgment is not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation appellants advanced. Appellants urge us to reach the opposite conclusion on the first step, move to the second step, and resolve the purported ambiguity in the Judgment in their favor by independently construing the undisputed evidence.

B. Analysis The division of the Property in the Judgment is clear: “Respondent’s [James’s] ownership interest in the former family residence is fifty percent (50%), and he shall not encumber more than fifty present (50%) of the equity therein.” James and Banuelos expressly included in the Judgment their agreement to “maintain a fifty (50%) interest in the home for [their] daughter, Victoria[].” They further agreed that in the event the Property were sold, James and Victoria would each receive 50 percent of the proceeds. Appellants contend that notwithstanding the unequivocal language in the Judgment that James owns 50 percent of the Property and may not encumber more than 50 percent of the Property’s equity, he and Banuelos actually agreed 16 that he would own 100 percent of the Property and could encumber 100 percent of the Property’s equity. We agree with the trial court that none of the extrinsic evidence appellants introduced regarding James’s and Banuelos’s intentions demonstrates that the Judgment is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation appellants advance. Thus, appellants have not demonstrated a latent ambiguity in the Judgment that we should resolve in their favor. Appellants argue that the reference in the Judgment to the 8 prior agreement with James’s grandfather Ybarra creates an ambiguity as to whether the Judgment grants Victoria a 50 percent ownership interest in the Property or merely a contingent future right to receive 50 percent of the proceeds if James ever sells the Property. We find no such ambiguity. The pertinent paragraph of the Judgment states: “It is the parties’ intent to enforce the agreement made at time of purchase of the former family residence and maintain a fifty percent (50%) interest in the home for the parties’ daughter, Victoria[]. The parties shall retain an estate planning attorney to draft documents necessary to preserve Victoria’s one-half (1/2) interest in the former family residence. The parties shall share 8 As discussed ante, James and Banuelos’s 2003 agreement with Ybarra stated: “I, Raul Ybarra, hereby agree to sell my house, located at 2909 Via San Carlo, Montebello, California, to [James] and [Banuelos] for the amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000). In the event that James and [Banuelos] sell the property listed above, it is agreed that Victoria[], their daughter, is entitled to receive a sum of money equal to fifty percent (50%) of the sale price of the property listed above.”

17 the cost of said estate planning equally. Any retainer required by the estate planning attorney shall be paid by the parties within ten days of execution of the Judgment by the parties. [James]’s ownership interest in the former family residence is fifty percent (50%), and he shall not encumber more than fifty percent (50%) of the equity therein.” The next paragraph of the Judgment states that if James could not refinance the loan on the Property without Banuelos’s name on it and pay her an equalization payment within 90 days, the Property would be sold. The following paragraph sets forth the division of proceeds in the event the Property is sold (50 percent for Victoria and 50 percent for James). Appellants’ assertion that James and Banuelos intended to give Victoria only a contingent future right to sale proceeds and no ownership interest in the Property cannot be reconciled with the language in the Judgment awarding James only a 50 percent ownership interest in the Property and restricting him from 9 encumbering more than 50 percent of the Property’s equity. Nor can appellants’ assertion be reconciled with the language stating that James and Banuelos intend “to maintain a fifty percent (50%) interest in the home” for Victoria, language that appears in 9 There is no evidence indicating James encumbered more than 50 percent of the Property’s equity when he took out the $175,000 loan in 2016 at the time of the divorce. According to Banuelos’s trial testimony, the Property’s value when she and James purchased it in 2004 was between $400,000 and $450,000. She estimated that the Property’s value in 2016 was around $700,000. In 2022, the Property was appraised at $930,000, and James and Regina obtained a loan for $490,000, more than half the Property’s equity.

18 a paragraph discussing ownership of the Property, not the paragraph discussing division of proceeds upon a sale of the Property. The only interpretation of the Judgment that harmonizes all of its language is that James and Banuelos intended to honor the agreement they made with Ybarra regarding division of proceeds in the event of a sale and secure a 50 percent ownership interest in the Property for Victoria. In support of their interpretation of the Judgment, appellants also rely on the quitclaim deed Banuelos executed on the day she signed the stipulation for the Judgment. We are not persuaded that consideration of the quitclaim deed renders the Judgment ambiguous. James signed the stipulation for the Judgment after Banuelos quitclaimed her 50 percent interest in the Property to him and the title company recorded the quitclaim deed and the deed of trust on James’s loan against the Property. The Judgment required the parties to hire an attorney “to draft documents necessary to preserve Victoria’s one-half (1/2) interest in the former family residence,” which they failed to do. That failure does not mean that Victoria may not enforce the Judgment awarding her a 50 percent ownership interest in the Property. (See Fam. Code, § 2010, subd. (e) [in a marital dissolution action, a “court has jurisdiction to inquire into and render any judgment and make orders that are appropriate concerning” the “settlement of the property rights of the parties”].) The court entered the Judgment dividing the Property after Banuelos quitclaimed her interest to James. Appellants have not demonstrated the Judgment is ambiguous and reasonably susceptible to their interpretation. Even if appellants had demonstrated an ambiguity in the Judgment, we would resolve any ambiguity in favor of Victoria 19 based on the undisputed evidence in the record. Appellants agree this step of the analysis is subject to our independent review, acknowledging that “the extrinsic evidence is not in material conflict.” (See Wolf, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 [“ ‘The trial court’s resolution of an ambiguity is also a question of law if no parol evidence is admitted or if the parol evidence is not in conflict’ ”].) In this part of their analysis, appellants rely on other terms of the dissolution settlement in their attempt to show that James and Banuelos intended for James to own 100 percent of the Property. They assert, “The undisputed evidence at trial was that [Banuelos] sold her interest in the Property to James in exchange for James surrendering the spousal support to which he was entitled.” While it is true that Banuelos indicated during her testimony that James gave up his claim for spousal support in exchange for her giving up her interest in the Property, this does not demonstrate that the parties intended the Judgment to award James 100 percent of the Property. According to James’s trial testimony, Banuelos wanted to sell the Property, but he and Victoria wanted to keep it. Reaching the deal memorialized in the stipulation for the Judgment accomplished James’s goal of staying in the Property and avoiding a sale. That James waived spousal support, paid off Banuelos’s share of the mortgage (approximately $20,000), and paid her an equalization payment of $13,000, does not mean that James was awarded a 100 percent ownership interest in the Property. The agreement he signed expressly states otherwise, and the trial court did not err in interpreting it in Victoria’s favor. Appellants invoke Evidence Code section 662, which provides, “The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to 20 be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.” They contend, “Without a contract that unequivocally grants Victoria an ownership interest in the property, Victoria is left without the requisite evidence to defeat [appellants’] recorded legal title.” To the extent Evidence Code section 662 is applicable here, Victoria has rebutted the presumption, as we conclude the Judgment unequivocally awarded her a 50 percent ownership interest in the Property. As an owner of the property, Victoria has a valid claim for quiet title. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 760.020, subd. (a) [“An action may be brought under this chapter to establish title against adverse claims to real or personal property or any interest therein”] & 760.010 [“ ‘Claim’ includes a legal or equitable right, title, estate, lien, or interest in property or cloud upon title”].) Appellants have not demonstrated error.

DISPOSITION The interlocutory judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to recover costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.