Chiem v. Vu CA4/3

Opinion

Filed 9/24/26 Chiem v. Vu CA4/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THAI QUOC CHIEM,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G064453 v. (Super. Ct. Case No. 30-2016- 00892487) NGUYET ANH VU, et al., OPINION Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Sheila Recio, Judge. Affirmed. NT Law, and Julie Nong, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Thaler Law, and Jesse J. Thaler, for Defendants and Respondents. Thai Quoc Chiem appeals from a judgment following a bench trial in favor of respondents Nguyet Anh Vu (Nguyet) and her son Quan A. Vu (Quan) (collective “the Vus”). The trial court determined Chiem failed to prove the elements of his claims against the Vus. It also determined he failed to trace the monies in the Vus’ bank accounts to the funds he had been defrauded of by his former wife Hong Ngoc Thuy Vu (Hong). Hong is the daughter of Nguyet and the sister of Quan. On appeal, Chiem contends a default judgment he obtained against Hong also applied to the Vus. We disagree. The Vus were not parties in the prior matter and Chiem fails to establish privity between Hong and the Vus as to that matter. Chiem also argues substantial evidence supports a finding he traced the monies in the Vus’ bank accounts to the funds Hong had fraudulently obtained from him. We conclude Chiem fails to show the evidence would compel a finding of tracing. Accordingly, we affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE I. DEFAULT JUDGMENT In July 2018, Chiem obtained a default judgment against Hong in a family law action in Orange County Superior Court. In the default judgment, the court granted a judgment of nullity on the ground of “fraud.” Based on the judgment of nullity, the court determined the various properties were Chiem’s sole and separate property, including, as relevant in this case, “$[1.58 million] that was transferred from [Chiem] to [Hong] and [her] family member [sic] from 2007 to 2014. [Hong] and [her] family members used the said money to purchase vari[ous] items [including], three Lexus vehicles . . . .”

2 II. TRIAL ON CIVIL COMPLAINT Aside from the family law action, Chiem also filed the instant civil action against Hong, Nguyet, and Quan. On June 12, 2019, Chiem filed a Third Amended Complaint (TAC), alleging a conspiracy among the defendants to defraud him by misrepresenting that Hong would sponsor him for United States residency. Before trial, Hong was dismissed with prejudice from the case. Additionally, various causes of action were dismissed with prejudice. Trial proceeded against the Vus on the remaining causes of action for fraud, negligent representation, and claim and delivery. Following a five-day bench trial, the trial court ruled on the parties’ Joint Statement of Controverted Issues. The court found Chiem failed to establish tracing of his funds to the Vus. It further found Chiem failed to establish the elements of all his causes of action against the Vus. Judgment against Chiem and in favor of the Vus was entered on May 28, 2024. Chiem noticed an appeal from the Judgment on July 24, 2024. DISCUSSION Chiem challenges the trial court’s determination he failed to trace the monies he provided to Hong to her brother and mother on two grounds. We find no error. I. RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY Chiem first argues the fraudulent transfer of his funds by Hong to the Vus was adjudicated on the merits. Specifically, the default judgment determined Hong had committed fraud against Chiem and awarded him $1.58 million. He asserts “res judicata conclusively resolved any claims by Chiem against Hong and the issue of fraud has been conclusively 3 adjudicated.” However, the default judgment does not assist Chiem. As Chiem acknowledges, res judicata or collateral estoppel requires the party against whom collateral estoppel is invoked was a party to or in privity with a party in the previous proceeding. (See Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1194, 1201, fn. 1.) The Vus, however, were not named in the default judgment as defendants. In his reply brief, Chiem argues the Vus were in privity with Hong, the judgment debtor, because they received funds over which the donor (Hong) had no legal or equitable title. Thus, they hold the funds in “constructive trust” for Chiem. Chiem does not cite any legal authority that holding funds in a “constructive trust” establishes privity between the donor and alleged donees for the purposes of res judicata. The single case he cites does not involve res judicata. (See Berniker v. Berniker (1947) 30 Cal.2d 439, 445–446 [discussing whether fraudulent transfer of property by dead husband to his father binds wife]). Rather, this “constructive trust” theory is more properly addressed in the context of tracing, discussed below. In sum, Chiem failed to establish the default judgment conclusively determined the Vus received Chiem’s funds from Hong. II. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT COMPEL A FINDING THE VUS RECEIVED FUNDS HONG HAD DEFRAUDED FROM CHIEM Without the benefit of the res judicata doctrine, Chiem was required to trace the funds Hong defrauded from him to the Vus. The trial court concluded he failed to do so. He contends the court erred because there was substantial evidence to find he traced the monies. We conclude Chiem failed to establish error.

4 As an initial matter, the applicable standard of review of the trial court’s determination that Chiem failed to establish tracing is not substantial evidence. “When the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof failed to carry that burden and that party appeals, it is somewhat misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. This is because such a characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on (1) the evidence supporting the party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the trier of fact's unassailable conclusion that the party with the burden did not prove one or more elements of the case. [Citations.] Thus, where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant's evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.’” (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 279.) Here, Chiem had the burden of proof to establish the Vus received the funds Hong had defrauded from him. In his opening brief, he argues the Vus had no or very low income in 2007 to 2015, but received over $600,000 of his money from Hong. However, he provides no record citation for these alleged facts. His opening brief references “Exhibit 10” without any page citation, even though the appellate record totals over 4,000 pages. In the factual summary section of the brief, he repeatedly references “Appendix Vol. 1 00081,” but that page does not exist in appellate record. A review of the index for the appendix indicates “00081” is the second page of “Chiem’s Opening [Trial] Brief.” That brief is not in the record. Thus, Chiem has 5 forfeited or waived this argument. (See Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333, 368 (Baxter) [“[A]ppellant must support all of its factual assertions with citations to evidence in the appellate record”]; Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal. App. 4th 1108, 1115 [“It is the duty of counsel to refer the reviewing court to the portion of the record which supports appellant’s contentions on appeal. [Citation.] If no citation ‘is 1 furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived’”].) Additionally, as Chiem acknowledges, an appellant forfeits or waives any substantial evidence challenge if its opening brief fails to recite all evidence supporting the judgment. (Baxter, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 368 [“The appellant’s brief must set forth all of the material evidence bearing on the issue, not merely the evidence favorable to the appellant, and it also must show how the evidence does not sustain the challenged finding”].) Chiem does not cite any evidence submitted by the Vus. For example, in conjunction with their trial brief, Quan submitted a declaration attesting the bank deposits were from rental income or work, and Nguyet submitted a declaration that the deposits were from monies in other accounts. Nor does he reference any evidence that could support the court’s findings. For example, Hong testified at trial that she received substantial funds from her now- deceased father. Even if the argument is not forfeited, Chiem’s evidence does not compel a finding that the monies in the Vus’ bank accounts are his funds. His evidence and argument are as follows: the Vus had little to no reported income; he transferred $1.58 million to Hong; significant sums were 1 To date, Chiem has not corrected or augmented the appellate record.

6 deposited into the Vus’ bank accounts; and thus, the deposited amounts were his funds. However, there is no evidence Hong made all those deposits into the Vus’ accounts. Hong also testified she had access to funds from her father. The Vus testified they had other sources for the deposits. For example, Nguyet’s neighbor owed her money. Quan also testified he returned all of the monies he withdrew from the joint bank accounts he had with Hong. In sum, the evidence does not compel a finding that the monies in the Vus’ bank accounts were Chiem’s funds. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The Vus are awarded their costs on appeal.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, P. J.

MOORE, J.