Opinion

1 2 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 GREGORY P., Case No. 3:26-cv-1522-SBC 12 13 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION 14 vs. FOR ALLOWANCE OF FEES AND 15 COSTS UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS FRANK BISIGNANO, TO JUSTICE ACT, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 16 Commissioner of Social Security, 17 [Dkt. No. 18] Defendant. 18 19 20 On March 11, 2026, Plaintiff Gregory P. filed a complaint against the 21 Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”), seeking judicial review of 22 Defendant’s decision to deny Plaintiff disability insurance benefits. (Dkt. No. 1.) On 23 August 5, 2026, the Court granted the parties’ joint motion for voluntary remand of 24 this matter to the Social Security Administration for further administrative 25 proceedings. (Dkt. No. 16.) 26 Presently before the court is the parties’ Joint Motion for Allowance of Fees 27 and Costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (hereafter 1 “Joint Motion”). (Dkt. No. 18.) Because the Joint Motion did not provide sufficient 2 information regarding the hours expended, hourly rates or counsel’s qualifications, 3 the Court ordered supplemental briefing. (Dkt. No. 19.) On September 17, 2026, the 4 parties filed their Joint Supplemental Brief, together with an itemized billing 5 statement and information regarding counsel’s qualifications and billing rates. (Dkt 6 No. 20.) 7 The supplemental materials reflect that Plaintiff’s counsel expended 16.5 8 attorney hours, resulting in $3,795.00 in fees at a rate of $230/hour. (Dkt. No. 20-2.) 9 For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Joint Motion and awards 10 Plaintiff attorney fees of $3,795.00. 11 12 I. DISCUSSION 13 A. Timeliness 14 According to the EAJA, an application for fees must be filed “within thirty 15 days of final judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). A final judgment is “a 16 judgement that is final and not appealable ….” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G). The Ninth 17 Circuit has held that the EAJA’s 30-day filing period does not begin to run until after 18 the 60-day appeal period in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a).1 Hoa Hong 19 Van v. Barnhart, 483 F.3d 600, 612 (9th Cir. 2007). 20 Here, judgment was entered on August 5, 2026, and the Joint Motion was filed 21 on September 11, 2026. (Dkt. Nos. 16, 18.) The motion was filed within thirty days 22 after expiration of the 60-day appeal period and therefore falls within the EAJA 23 filing period. Accordingly, Plaintiff met the deadline to file a timely motion for 24 25 1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides that a “notice of appeal 26 may be filed by any party within 60 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from” if one of the parties is the United States or a United States officer 27 sued in official capacity. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). 1 EAJA fees. 2 B. Applicable Law 3 A litigant is entitled to attorney fees and costs under the EAJA if: “(1) he is 4 the prevailing party; (2) the government fails to show that its position was 5 substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) 6 the requested fees and costs are reasonable.” Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 F.3d 894, 898 7 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a), (d). The Court addresses each of these 8 elements below. 9 C. Prevailing Party 10 A plaintiff is a prevailing party if he or she “has succeeded on any significant 11 issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit … sought in bringing suit.” 12 Ulugalu v. Berryhill, Case No. 3:17-cv-01087-GPC-JLB, 2018 WL 2012330, at *2 13 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018) (quoting Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). 14 Here, there is no doubt that Plaintiff is the prevailing party as the Court granted the 15 joint motion for voluntary remand, entered judgment in his favor, reversed the 16 decision of the Commissioner, and remanded the matter for further administrative 17 proceedings. (Dkt. No. 16.) 18 D. Substantial Justification and Special Circumstances 19 The government bears the burden of proving that its position, both in the 20 underlying administrative proceedings and in the subsequent litigation, was 21 substantially justified under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). See Meier v. Colvin, 727 22 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court has held that a position may be 23 substantially justified “if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Pierce v. 24 Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 n.2 (1988). When determining whether the 25 government’s position was substantially justified, the court considered “both the 26 government’s litigation position and the underlying agency action giving rise to the 27 civil action.” Meier, 727 F.3d at 870. The government’s position must be “as a whole, 1 substantially justified.” Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 2 2001) (emphasis omitted). “[D]istrict courts should focus on whether the 3 government’s position on the particular issue on which the claimant earned remand 4 was substantially justified, not on whether the government’s ultimate disability 5 determination was substantially justified.” Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th 6 Cir. 1990). 7 Defendant has not carried the burden of demonstrating that the Government’s 8 position was substantially justified or that an award of attorney fees under the 9 circumstances would be unjust. See id. at 569-70. By not arguing a position and 10 agreeing to the Joint Motion, Defendant effectively concedes that the Government’s 11 litigation position had no reasonable basis in law or fact, and that there are no special 12 circumstances that would make the award of attorney fees here unjust. Accordingly, 13 the Court finds no basis to deny the EAJA fee request pursuant to § 2412(d)(1)(A). 14 E. Whether the Amount Sought is Reasonable 15 The EAJA provides that courts may award reasonable attorney fees “based on 16 prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of services furnished.” 28 U.S.C. § 17 2412(d)(2)(A). Additionally, courts generally defer to the winning lawyer’s 18 professional judgment as to how much time was required to complete the litigation. 19 See e.g., Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2012) 20 (“’lawyers are not likely to spend unnecessary time on contingency fee cases in the 21 hope of inflating their fees’ because ‘the payoff is too uncertain.’ []As a result, courts 22 should generally defer to the ‘winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how 23 much time he was required to spend on the case.’”) (quoting Moreno v. City of 24 Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also id. at 1136 (“[m]any 25 district courts have noted that twenty to forty hours is the range most often requested 26 and granted in social security cases.”); Krebs v. Berryhill, Case No. 16-cv-3096- 27 JLS-BGS, 2018 WL 3064346, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 21, 2018) (finding that 21.7 1 hours billed by plaintiff’s counsel and 3.5 hours billed by a paralegal a reasonable 2 number of hours). 3 Here, Plaintiff’s counsel spent 16.5 hours on the case, which the Court finds 4 to be reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The total number of hours billed is within 5 the typical range seen in social security appeals. See, e.g., Stearns v. Colvin, Case 6 No. 3:14-cv-05611 JRC, 2016 WL 730301, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 24, 2016) 7 (collecting cases that establish that the typical number of hours reported for counsel 8 in a social security case ranged from 18-40 hours). 9 Attorney’s fees “shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the 10 court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor … justifies 11 a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. §2412(d)(2)(A). The Ninth Circuit has established that “the 12 EAJA provides for an upward adjustment of the $125 rate contained in the statute, 13 based on cost-of-living increases[.]” Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876 (9th 14 Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has set its own statutory maximum EAJA 15 rates, factoring in annual increases in the cost of living. The most recently published 16 statutory maximum EAJA rate for attorney work in the Ninth Circuit is $258.46. See 17 United State Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal 18 Access to Justice Act, https://www.ca9.usoucrts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum- 19 rates/ (last visited September 17, 2026); see also Black v. Berryhill, Case No. 20 18cv1673-JM-LL, 2019 WL 2436393, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 11, 2019) (considering 21 the Ninth Circuit’s hourly EAJA rate a reasonable rate). 22 Consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s hourly EAJA rates, Plaintiff’s counsel 23 billed at a rate of $230 per hour. (Dkt. No. 20-2.) As such, the Court finds the hourly 24 rates billed by counsel are reasonable. 25 F. Assignment of Rights to Counsel 26 The parties jointly request that fees be made payable to Plaintiff, but that if 27 the Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, 1 payment may be made directly to Plaintiff’s attorney pursuant to Plaintiff’s 2 assignment. (Dkt. Nos. 18, 20-1.) 3 The Supreme Court has held that “a § 2412(d) fees award is payable to the 4 litigant and is therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy pre-existing debt 5 that the litigant owes the United States.” Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 588-89 6 (2010). Nonetheless, “district courts have recognized that Ratliff does not prevent 7 payment of a fee award directly to the attorney where there has been a valid 8 assignment and the plaintiff does not owe a debt to the government.” Ulugalu, 2018 9 WL 2012330, at *4-*5 (reviewing Plaintiff’s assignment agreement and ordering 10 that the EAJA fees be paid to plaintiff’s counsel, subject to any administrative offset 11 due to outstanding federal debt); Bell v. Berryhill, Case No. 16-cv-00809-MMC, 12 2018 WL 452110, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2018) (same); Blackwell v. Astrue, No. 13 CIV-08-1454-EFB, 2011 WL 1077765, at *4-*5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2011) (same); 14 cf. Hernandez v. Berryhill, No. 2:15–cv–1322-DB, 2017 WL 2930802, at *3 (E.D. 15 Cal. July 10, 2017) (declining to order that the EAJA fees be paid to plaintiff’s 16 counsel, subject to any administrative offset due to outstanding federal debt, because 17 the parties failed to produce evidence of an assignment agreement). 18 The parties’ supplemental brief included Plaintiff’s assignment of EAJA fees 19 to counsel. (Dkt. No. 20-1.) Accordingly, if Plaintiff has no federal debt that is 20 subject to offset, the award of fees may be paid directly to Plaintiff’s counsel 21 pursuant to the asserted assignment. 22 23 II. CONCLUSION 24 Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS that: 25 1. The parties’ Joint Motion for Allowance of Fees and Costs Under the Equal 26 Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Dkt. No. 18), as supplemented by 27 the Supplemental Joint Brief in Support of Motion for EAJA Fees (Dkt. No. ° 20), is GRANTED; ; 2. Plaintiff is awarded attorney fees under the EAJA in the amount of $3,795.00; and ° 3. Pursuant to Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 588-89 (2010), any payment shall 6 be made to Plaintiff and delivered to Plaintiff's counsel, unless Plaintiff does ’ not owe a federal debt. If the United States Department of the Treasury determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt, the government may make payment directly to Plaintiff's counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 || Dated: September 25, 2026 13 AF &.

16 United States Magistrate Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 3:26-cv-01522-SBC