gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:24-cv-00039 · 2026-09-25 · Unknown

Dejanne Johnson, Eve Epstein-Ortiz, and Sandra Gamlin, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated v. Luminary Genetics f/k/a Nextgen Genetics, LLC; and Luminary Life Sciences, and Does 1 through 50, inclusive

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
James E. Simmons (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:16Z · confidence high

The court considered Defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings, its alternative motion to dismiss, and Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file supplemental authority. The court granted the motion to compel arbitration and stay, denied the motion to dismiss as moot, and denied the motion for supplemental authority.

What the court decidedThe model
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is GRANTED.
“Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is GRANTED.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and Ninth Circuit precedent. It determined that the entity named in the caption was the same entity that signed the consent form, rejecting the non-signatory argument. It found a valid delegation clause via the incorporation of AAA rules, which committed scope and unconscionability challenges to the arbitrator under Rent-A-Center. It correctly noted that the FAA requires a stay rather than dismissal when a party requests a stay, citing Smith v. Spizzirri.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT.
“Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT.”
agree with court
Because the court compelled arbitration and stayed the action, it did not reach the merits of the motion to dismiss. Denying as moot is the standard procedural outcome when a threshold motion to compel arbitration renders the underlying claims pending in court unaddressable at that time.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority is DENIED.
“Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority is DENIED.”
agree with court
The court found the authority unnecessary because its decision relied on corporate identity and the delegation clause, not the scope analysis in the cited case. It also noted the cited case was distinguishable on the facts (waiver of delegation argument and choice of law). Denial is appropriate when the authority does not affect the outcome.
Defendant's request for fees is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
“Defendant’s request for fees in connection with Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
agree with court
The court denied the fee request because it was not presented as a separately noticed motion with proper briefing and evidence, as required by local rules. Denial without prejudice allows the defendant to refile properly.

The order itself: sound — The order is sound. It correctly identifies the legal standards for compelling arbitration under the FAA, including the role of delegation clauses and the distinction between challenges to the delegation clause versus the underlying agreement. It properly applies the 'clear and unmistakable' standard for delegation via incorporation of AAA rules. It correctly addresses the non-signatory argument by relying on evidence of corporate identity. It correctly applies Smith v. Spizzirri to order a stay rather than dismissal. It correctly distinguishes McGill as inapplicable to private retrospective relief. The reasoning is complete and supported by the cited authorities.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DEJANNE JOHNSON, EVE EPSTEIN- Case No.: 3:25-cv-01629-JES-JAC ORTIZ, and SANDRA GAMLIN, 12 individually and on behalf of others ORDER: 13 similarly situated, (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 14 Plaintiffs, MOTION TO COMPEL 15 v. ARBITRATION AND STAY PROCEEDINGS; 16 LUMINARY GENETICS f/k/a NEXTGEN GENETICS, LLC; and 17 (2) DENYING WITHOUT LUMINARY LIFE SCIENCES, and PREJUDICE DEFENDANT’S 18 DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT; 19 Defendants. and 20 (3) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ 21 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 22 23 [ECF Nos. 23, 24, 35]

24 Before the Court are Defendant NextGen Genetics, LLC d/b/a Luminary Genetics, 25 incorrectly named as Luminary Genetics f/k/a NextGen Genetics, LLC’s (“Defendant” or 26 “NextGen”) Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings (“Motion”) and Motion 27 28 1 to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, both filed on November 4, 2025. ECF Nos. 23, 2 24. 3 Plaintiffs DeJanne Johnson (“Johnson”) and Sandra Gamlin (“Gamlin”) filed this 4 putative class action on behalf of purchasers of Defendant’s preimplantation genetic testing 5 for aneuploidy (“PGT-A”) services. Plaintiffs filed the First Amended Class Action 6 Complaint, on October 1, 2025. ECF No. 22, (“FAC”). NextGen moved to compel 7 arbitration of Plaintiffs’ claims and, in the alternative, to dismiss the FAC under Federal 8 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)”) 12(b)(6) and 9(b). ECF No. 24. Both motions were 9 noticed for hearing on December 12, 2025, fully briefed, and argued at that hearing. ECF 10 No. 31. The Court took both motions under submission. 11 While those motions were under submission, on March 25, 2026, Plaintiffs moved 12 for leave to file the decision in M.M., et al. v. Igenomix USA, Inc., et al., as supplemental 13 authority bearing on the Motion to Compel Arbitration. ECF No. 35; No. 25-21008-CIV- 14 DIMITROULEAS, 2026 WL 2516749 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2026). Defendant opposed. ECF 15 No. 36. 16 For the reasons stated below, the Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority 17 is DENIED; the Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED, and the Motion to Dismiss 18 is DENIED AS MOOT. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 NextGen operates the PGT-A testing service at issue, which is used in connection 21 with in vitro fertilization treatment. FAC ¶¶ 9, 16. Plaintiffs Johnson, a California resident, 22 and Gamlin, a Virginia resident, each underwent PGT-A testing through Defendant. Id. ¶¶ 23 33-34, 291–294, 296–299. Before doing so, each viewed a video on Defendant’s website 24 and executed Defendant’s “Uniform Patient Consent Form” (the “Consent Form”). FAC 25 ¶¶ 78, 259-60, 292, 298. 26 The Consent Form contains an arbitration provision, which each Plaintiff initialed: 27 I/we acknowledge that any legal controversy, dispute or disagreement arising out of the services provided by NextGen Genetics or any subsidiary thereof shall be settled 28 1 by binding arbitration by the American Arbitration Association, under the applicable Arbitration Rules then in effect. … All disputes shall be decided under the laws of 2 the State of California. 3 ECF No. 23-3 at 21. 4 By signing, each Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate covered claims and waived the right to 5 a jury trial or to proceed in court. The provision incorporates the American Arbitration 6 Association’s (“AAA”) applicable arbitration rules. ECF No. 23-3 at 2-4, (“Cinnioglu 7 Decl.”) ¶¶ 5, 7. 8 The FAC asserts ten causes of action arising from Plaintiffs’ purchase of PGT-A: 9 violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law (unfair/fraudulent and unlawful prongs) 10 and Consumers Legal Remedies Act; violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act; 11 breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and usability; fraud; fraud by 12 concealment; breach of express warranty; and unjust enrichment. FAC ¶¶ 315–430. 13 Defendant moved to compel arbitration of all ten claims and, in the alternative, to 14 dismiss the FAC in its entirety. ECF Nos. 23, 24. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Agreements “evidencing a transaction involving commerce” are subject to the 17 Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). See Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 18 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2). The FAA provides that an arbitration 19 agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 20 law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. “A party aggrieved by 21 the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for 22 arbitration may petition any United States district court ... for an order directing that ... 23 arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the arbitration] agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 24 4. If the district court finds a party has failed to comply with a valid arbitration agreement, 25 it must issue an order compelling arbitration. Id. 26 Under the FAA, the court’s role is “limited to determining (1) whether a valid 27 agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the 28 1 dispute at issue.” Chiron Corp., 207 F.3d at 1130. “If the response is affirmative on both 2 counts, then the Act requires the court to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance 3 with its terms.” Id. However, where the parties have agreed to delegate issues pertaining to 4 scope and enforceability to the arbitrator, the existence of an executed arbitration 5 agreement is the only issue for this Court to resolve. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer and White 6 Sales Inc., 586 U.S. 63, 67-68 (2019). Courts must apply ordinary state law principles in 7 determining the validity of an agreement to arbitrate. Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit 8 Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, arbitration agreements may 9 be invalidated by generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 10 unconscionability. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339-41 (2011). 11 “[P]arties cannot delegate issues of formation to the arbitrator.” Ahlstrom v. DHI 12 Mortg. Co., Ltd., L.P., 21 F.4th 631, 635 (9th Cir. 2021). However, “[i]t is well-established 13 that some ‘gateway’ issues pertaining to an arbitration agreement, such as issues of validity 14 and arbitrability, can be delegated to an arbitrator by agreement.” Id. at 634. “The presence 15 of a delegation clause … limits the issues that a court may decide.” 16 Caremark LLC v. Chickasaw Nation, 43 F.4th 1021, 1029 (9th Cir. 2022). “[A] valid— 17 i.e., enforceable—delegation clause commits to the arbitrator nearly all challenges to an 18 arbitration provision.” Id. at 1029. 19 III. DISCUSSION 20 A. Motion to Compel Arbitration 21 1. Defendant Is Not a Non-Signatory 22 Plaintiffs’ central argument is that “Luminary” cannot invoke the Consent Form 23 because it is a non-signatory. ECF No. 28, (“Opp’n”), at 2–6. That argument rests on the 24 case caption, which describes Defendant as “Luminary Genetics f/k/a NextGen Genetics, 25 LLC.” But Defendant has submitted the Cinnioglu Declaration, together with its Corporate 26 Disclosure Statement and an accompanying Fictitious Business Name filing on record with 27 the Santa Clara County Clerk-Recorder, showing that “Luminary Genetics” is simply a 28 1 registered trade name of NextGen Genetics, LLC—the entity that signed the Consent Form. 2 ECF Nos. 16, 23-3. Plaintiffs have not disputed that evidence. 3 Because the signatory and the moving party are the same entity, this is not a case 4 about a non-signatory’s attempt to enforce someone else’s agreement. Plaintiffs’ third- 5 party-beneficiary and equitable-estoppel authorities, thus, do not apply. Plaintiffs Johnson 6 and Gamlin each executed a valid arbitration agreement with Defendant, and Defendant 7 may enforce it. 8 2. Delegation Clause Reaches Plaintiffs’ Scope and 9 Unconscionability Arguments 10 The Consent Form incorporates the AAA’s rules, including Rule 7(a), which gives 11 the arbitrator authority to decide its own jurisdiction. ECF No. 23-1, (“Mot.”), at 9–11; 12 Cinnioglu Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7. That incorporation is clear and unmistakable evidence that the 13 parties delegated arbitrability, including scope, to the arbitrator rather than to this Court. 14 Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2015). 15 Plaintiffs argue, in opposition, that their consumer-fraud claims fall outside the 16 clause because they arise from pre-purchase advertising rather than from “services 17 provided,” and that the clause is procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Opp’n. at 18 7–16. Neither argument is directed at the delegation clause, specifically. They both 19 challenge the arbitration clause, and thus, the underlying agreement, more broadly. Under 20 Rent-A-Center, that is not enough: a party resisting arbitration must challenge the 21 delegation provision itself for the court to retain authority over the question. Rent-A-Ctr., 22 W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010). Plaintiffs do not do so, and both the scope and 23 unconscionability arguments, accordingly, belong to the arbitrator. Id. 24 That would be true even on the merits. The FAC does not allege that the Consent 25 Form is unconscionable, and Plaintiffs’ Opposition offers no declaration or other evidence 26 about the circumstances of contracting beyond the bare fact that the form was preprinted. 27 See generally Opp’n. A party resisting arbitration on unconscionability grounds bears the 28 1 burden of showing both procedural and substantive unconscionability, and attorney 2 argument is not evidence. Plaintiffs have not carried that burden. 3 3. Plaintiffs Must Arbitrate Individually, and McGill Does Not 4 Apply 5 An arbitration agreement’s silence on class arbitration is not a basis to compel it. 6 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010); Lamps Plus, Inc. 7 v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176, 189 (2019). The Consent Form does not authorize class arbitration, 8 and the incorporated AAA rules delegate that question to the arbitrator in any event. 9 Plaintiffs must, therefore, arbitrate on an individual basis. 10 McGill is no obstacle, here. See McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 2 Cal. 5th 945, 955 (2017). 11 McGill bars only waivers of the right to seek public injunctive relief. Id. The FAC seeks 12 restitution and damages for Plaintiffs’ own past purchases. FAC ¶¶ 320, 323, 329, 350. 13 Private, retrospective relief is outside of McGill’s scope. 2 Cal. 5th 945, 955-56; Hodges 14 v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 21 F.4th 535, 543 (9th Cir. 2021). 15 4. A Stay Is Required 16 Defendant requested a stay, not dismissal. Mot. at 18. Where a party requests a stay 17 pending arbitration, Section 3 of the FAA requires the court to grant it, rather than dismiss 18 the action. Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 475–78 (2024). The Court, accordingly, 19 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings. Plaintiffs 20 shall arbitrate their claims against Defendant individually, before the AAA’s office in San 21 Francisco, California, under the Consent Form’s arbitration provision. See ECF No. 23-3 22 at 11, 21. As a result, this Action is STAYED pending completion of that arbitration. 23 B. Motion to Dismiss 24 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss argues that: (1) Plaintiffs lack standing; (2) their 25 claims are barred by the learned intermediary doctrine; (3) the fraud claims are not pled 26 with the particularity Rule 9(b) requires; (4) the U.C.C. claims fail because PGT-A is a 27 service rather than a good; and (5) several claims are time-barred. ECF No. 24-1 at 18, 22, 28 25, 31. Plaintiffs opposed on each ground. See generally ECF No. 27. Because the Court 1 COMPELS arbitration of all ten claims and STAYS this Action, it does not reach any of 2 these arguments. These issues—including whether particular claims fall within the 3 arbitration clause’s scope—are for the arbitrator to decide in the first instance, or for this 4 Court, if and when the Action returns from arbitration. The Motion to Dismiss DENIED 5 AS MOOT. 6 C. Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority 7 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority is unnecessary. The 8 Court’s ruling on arbitration turns on the parties’ corporate identity and the delegation 9 clause, not on the scope analysis at issue in Igenomix. See supra PartIII.A.1–2 Therefore, 10 the proposed authority would not change the outcome. The Court notes, without relying on 11 it, that Igenomix is distinguishable in any event, which turned on the Igenomix defendants’ 12 waiver of any delegation argument and applied Florida law. 2026 WL 2516749, at *5, 10. 13 Neither of which is true here. Mot. at 15-17 (indicating Defendant did raise delegation); 14 ECF No. 23-3 at 11, 21 (showing Consent Form’s California choice-of-law clause). 15 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority is DENIED. 16 Defendant’s accompanying request for $3,000 in fees is DENIED WITHOUT 17 PREJUDICE. ECF No. 36 at 4 n.2. A fee request must be presented by separately noticed 18 motion, supported by briefing and evidence of the fees incurred, and Defendant has not 19 done so here. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1. 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 22 (1) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings is 23 GRANTED. Plaintiffs SHALL submit their claims against Defendant 24 to binding, individual arbitration before the American Arbitration 25 Association’s office in San Francisco, California, under the Consent 26 Form’s arbitration provision; 27 (2) This Action is STAYED in its entirety, pending completion of 28 arbitration; (3) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT; 2 (4) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Authority is 3 DENIED; 4 (5) Defendant’s request for fees in connection with Plaintiffs’ Motion for 5 Leave to File Supplemental Authority is DENIED WITHOUT 6 PREJUDICE; 7 (6) The parties SHALL FILE a joint status report on the arbitration 8 proceedings every six months until its conclusion. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 Dated: September 25, 2026 Na a 4 12 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Cites, in this corpus