Errol George Hunter v. Todd Blanche, Attorney General, Department of Justice
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Barry T. Moskowitz (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a habeas petition challenging an immigration judge's denial of bond, specifically alleging judicial bias and improper allocation of the burden of proof. The court denied the petition without prejudice, finding no evidence of bias and determining that the immigration judge correctly applied the burden of proof as mandated by the court's prior order.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Waiver of the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement“Therefore, the Court waives Hunter’s exhaustion requirement.” | agree with court The court correctly identified that the challenge concerned compliance with a prior federal court order, which is a legal issue within the district court's authority to review without requiring exhaustion of BIA remedies. |
Denial of the claim that Immigration Judges are biased“The Court again denies without prejudice the generalized claim that IJs are biased.” | agree with court The petitioner failed to provide specific evidence of bias against the adjudicating judge, and the court had previously addressed and rejected similar generalized allegations in the underlying order. |
Denial of the claim that the Immigration Judge improperly placed the burden of proof“Thus, the Court denies without prejudice Hunter’s second claim.” | agree with court The record cited in the order (the IJ Bond Memorandum) explicitly states that the Government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence, which aligns with the district court's prior directive. The IJ's application of the Guerra factors to the criminal history evidence supports the finding that the burden was met. |
Denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus“In conclusion, Hunter’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED without prejudice on both claims.” | agree with court The denial follows logically from the rejection of the two specific claims raised in the petition. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly applies the legal standard for reviewing compliance with a prior court order. It accurately cites Ninth Circuit precedent to waive exhaustion for legal questions regarding the court's own directives. The factual findings regarding the burden of proof are supported by the quoted text from the Immigration Judge's memorandum, which explicitly assigns the burden to the Government as ordered. The court appropriately declines to reach the discretionary abuse claim, noting it was not properly raised in this specific compliance petition.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERROL GEORGE HUNTER, Case No.: 3:26-cv-03615-BTM-VET 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 [ECF NO. 1] 15 TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, Department of Justice, 16 Respondent. 17 18 19 The Court previously granted Errol George Hunter’s amended petition for the writ 20 of habeas corpus. Hunter v. LaRose, No. 26-cv-00894, 2026 WL 1075239 (Apr. 17, 2026). 21 The Court granted Hunter “a bond hearing at which the Government bears the burden of 22 establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the 23 community or a risk of flight.” Id. at *2. A bond hearing was held on April 28, 2026. 24 (ECF No. 8-1, Ex. 3 (“IJ Bond Mem.”), at 1.) The immigration judge (“IJ”) determined 25 that Hunter posed a danger to the community and denied bond. (Id. at 3.) Hunter appealed 26 the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (Id. at 1.) He then filed this 27 petition for the writ of habeas corpus on June 18, 2026. (ECF No. 1.) He claims first that 28 IJs are biased, “placed for the sole purpose to deny bond[] and asylum[] and relief.” (Id. 1 at 3.) He claims second that the IJ improperly placed the burden on him to prove that he 2 is not a danger or flight risk instead of placing the burden on the Government. (Id.) The 3 Government claims Hunter failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 8.) It 4 also argues that Hunter has not provided evidence that supports either claim. (Id. at 5–6.) 5 As a threshold matter, Hunter is not required to exhaust his administrative remedies 6 because he challenges whether the IJ complied with this Court’s order. By claiming that 7 IJ improperly placed the burden of proof, Hunter contends that the IJ did not follow the 8 directives in the Court’s order and judgment. This is a legal issue for the Court to address 9 rather than the BIA. Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[The 10 Petitioner] is correct that the district court had authority to review compliance with its 11 earlier order conditionally granting habeas relief.”); see Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 12 976, 989 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming waiver of prudential exhaustion where the challenge at 13 issue raised pure questions of law). Therefore, the Court waives Hunter’s exhaustion 14 requirement. 15 After reviewing the petition on its merits, the Court denies both claims. First, Hunter 16 does not present evidence that IJs are generally biased or that the IJ that adjudicated his 17 bond hearing is biased. Moreover, the Court addressed this argument in its previous order, 18 stating that the Government has “shown the upmost respect for this Court’s judgments and 19 have timely followed them thereby enabling the mutual respect of the Court. There is no 20 reason to believe that the mutual respect for coequal branches of the government will not 21 continue here in the Southern District of California.” Hunter, 2026 WL 1075239, at *2. 22 The Court again denies without prejudice the generalized claim that IJs are biased. 23 Second, the Court does not find that the IJ improperly applied the burden of proof in 24 Hunter’s bond hearing. At the outset of the bond memorandum decision, the IJ stated that 25 the “Government [would] bear[] the burden of establishing by clear and convincing 26 evidence that [the respondent] poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” (IJ 27 Bond Mem., 1 (alteration in original) (quoting Hunter, 2026 WL 1075239, at *2).) This 28 was the standard set by the Court in its order granting Hunter’s first habeas petition. The 1 then reviewed the Guerra bond factors and the Government’s evidence of Hunter’s 2 ||criminal history. (/d. at 2-3.) See In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.LA. 2006). 3 Based on Hunter’s “very serious” criminal history, the IJ found that the Government met 4 burden of demonstrating that Hunter would pose a danger to the community if released. 5 || dd. at 3.) It is plain from the face of the bond memorandum decision that the IJ placed the 6 || burden of proof on the Government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Hunter 7 ||posed a danger or flight risk. (J Bond Mem., 1, 3.) Thus, the Court denies without 8 || prejudice Hunter’s second claim. To the extent that Hunter argues that the IJ abused his 9 || discretion by denying him bond, the Court declines to reach the issue. Hunter has appealed 10 || the denial of his bond to the BIA and has not expressly raised the issue here. See Leonardo, 11 F.3d at 1161 (“The district court was under no obligation to address [the Petitioner’s] 12 ||new arguments under the ambit of ensuring compliance with the earlier order.’’). 13 In conclusion, Hunter’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED without 14 || prejudice on both claims. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: September 24, 2026 j tll eek Honorttble Barry Ted Mosko 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 □ □□