In re C.K. CA2/8

Opinion

Filed 9/24/26 In re C.K. CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re C.K., a Person Coming B351686 Under the Juvenile Court Law. ______________________________ Los Angeles County Superior LOS ANGELES COUNTY Court No. 23CCJP02119 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.M., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Sumako McCallum, Judge. Affirmed. Mitchell Keiter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ____________________ A mother of a six-year-old returns to this court after the juvenile court ordered adoption as the child’s permanent plan. The mother agrees the child should remain with the paternal aunt. She argues the court erred and abused its discretion in selecting adoption over legal guardianship, however, because 1) the record did not establish the aunt preferred adoption over guardianship, and 2) when selecting adoption, the court impermissibly considered the future involvement of the mother and other family members in the child’s life. Although she raised neither point at the selection and implementation hearing, we overlook this forfeiture and conclude both points lack merit. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in ordering adoption. On the first point, the record shows a social worker provided the aunt detailed information about adoption and legal guardianship several times, covering the benefits of each and the differences between them. The aunt, in turn, developed a “strong parent-child bond with the child” and consistently expressed her desire and commitment to adopt. She expressed no interest in guardianship. She confirmed she was “looking forward to making the child a permanent part of her family.” And she told the Department she was not interested in a post-adoption contact agreement with kin. The aunt’s words and actions show her preference was adoption. Contrary to the mother’s arguments, she had a “proper choice” to pursue guardianship. The mother faults the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services for not asking the aunt explicitly what her preference was and for not including her response in its 2 reports. This was unnecessary under the relevant statute and considering the steps the Department and the aunt did take. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26 (b), (c)(1)(A); see also In re Samantha H. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 410, 414, 416 [refusing to read additional requirements into section 366.26 before ordering adoption as the proposed plan]; In re D.R. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 885, 890–892 [juvenile court should have ordered adoption instead of legal guardianship, as adoption is “the preferred permanent plan” and the child’s grandmother was “willing to adopt” and “committed to adopting” the child].) The mother relies on distinguishable cases that do not help her. For example, the grandmother in In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529 testified she preferred legal guardianship over adoption, there was evidence a social worker coerced her to accept adoption, and the juvenile court made no finding she was willing and able to adopt the child. (Id. at pp. 533, 536, 538.) In re K.H. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 406 also involved pressure to adopt, this time by the children’s attorney. The grandparents there said they were unwilling to adopt because they wished to remain the children’s grandparents; instead, they wanted to raise the children as legal guardians and maintain the mother’s visitation with them. (Id. at pp. 411–413, 419.) In this context, K.H. aptly recognized courts may consider a “relative caregiver’s preference for legal guardianship due to family dynamics” when assessing the relative caregiver exception to termination of parental rights. (Id. at p. 416.) Turning to the second point, the mother’s argument is unsupported by the record. Specifically, the record does not show the court relied on the future involvement of family members in selecting adoption as the child’s permanent plan.

3 The mother’s argument relies entirely on a single Department report showing that the paternal aunt was open to supervising parental visits, if appropriate, and that another aunt was willing to be a part of the child’s support system. This does not show the juvenile court erred. We presume the court knew and followed the law and considered appropriate factors in reaching its decision, absent a record showing otherwise. (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361; Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 908, 921.) This record does not show otherwise. In making the adoption orders, the court relied on the paternal aunt’s expressed commitment to adopt. It noted this aunt had taken at least one step to facilitate adoption. It recognized the child had lived with the aunt for more than seven months. The court also found the parental bond exception was inapplicable, the child was adoptable, and adoption was in the child’s best interest. The mother has not demonstrated the juvenile court considered impermissible factors, applied the wrong standard, or otherwise erred in ordering adoption. DISPOSITION We affirm the challenged order.

WILEY, J. We concur:

STRATTON, P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.