People v. Bolton CA2/4

Opinion

Filed 9/24/26 P. v. Bolton CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B346796 (Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BA503907)

v. FRAMEL LAWAYNE BOLTON, SR., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed. Christina Vanarelli, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant Framel Lawayne Bolton, Senior, appeals from judgment following his conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Defendant testified that he killed the victim to defend himself and others. To support this argument, he offered evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)). In rebuttal, the prosecutor recalled defendant and inquired into his own prior acts of violence. Defendant challenges the admission of his testimony. He contends (1) his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the compelled examination; and (2) the court erred by overruling a motion for mistrial raised during his testimony. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Prosecution Evidence Around noon on February 17, 2022, several witnesses noticed people fighting at a local park. An unhoused man, later identified as Jerry Johnson, was being attacked by three people. Two of the attackers were later identified as defendant and defendant’s common law wife, Shayla Tatum. The fight spilled over onto an adjoining sidewalk, where Tatum struck Johnson over the head with a 16-inch combination taser/flashlight. Defendant then shot Johnson. The group struck Johnson several more times and ran away. Johnson died from a single gunshot wound to the torso. He had marijuana and methamphetamine in his blood. The jury viewed video footage of the fight obtained from nearby security cameras. No weapons were found in the park or on the sidewalk.

2 B. Defense Evidence Defendant testified that he shot Johnson to defend himself and others. The facts set forth below are drawn from defendant’s testimony on direct and cross-examination. As defendant, Tatum, defendant’s cousin, and a female friend were barbecuing in the park, they were aggressively approached by Johnson, who appeared to be under the influence of drugs.1 Johnson told the group he was gang-affiliated and threatened to kill them. “Frightened” and in “fear,” defendant asked Johnson to leave, but Johnson refused. To lure Johnson away, defendant ran from the park and across the street to his apartment. After exiting an elevator onto an upper floor, defendant heard Tatum and their friend screaming across the street. From an outdoor landing, defendant watched Johnson chase, lunge, and swing at both women. Defendant went inside his apartment, where he took “a couple of minutes” to change into a hooded sweatshirt, put on sneakers, and find a weapon. After grabbing a gun, defendant returned to the park. To scare Johnson away from Tatum and their friend, defendant raised his gun and told Johnson to leave. Unfazed, Johnson turned around and attacked defendant. Defendant pocketed his gun and fought back. During the skirmish, Johnson appeared to hold a sharp object. As the fight moved to the sidewalk, Johnson bent over and grabbed a knife or weapon.

1 Bolton (5’ 8”) is shorter and slighter in build than Johnson (6’ 2”).

3 Fearing for his life, defendant pulled his gun and fired one shot at Johnson’s legs. Following his testimony, and after being placed on recall for potential rebuttal,2 defendant called security guards to testify about prior, violent encounters with Johnson. In one incident occurring in April 2019, Johnson threw trash at guards and swung a sharpened fence post at them. In another incident a year later, Johnson threatened to kill a guard while holding a machete.

C. Rebuttal Evidence The prosecutor recalled defendant to the stand in her rebuttal case. Defendant admitted pleading guilty in 2010 and 2012 to making criminal threats against the mother of his child.3 When asked about the incidents giving rise to each guilty plea, defendant denied committing any act of violence. He further denied that other criminal charges were dismissed pursuant to his plea agreements. The prosecutor also examined a police officer who had knowledge concerning the incident underlying defendant’s 2010 guilty plea. The officer testified he responded to a domestic 2 “In a criminal action, evidence of the defendant’s character for violence . . . is not made inadmissible . . . if the evidence is offered by the prosecution to prove conduct of the defendant in conformity with the character . . . and is offered after evidence that the victim had a character for violence . . . tending to show violence has been adduced by the defendant under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a).” (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (b).) 3 Defendant admitted suffering these prior convictions during his testimony in defense.

4 violence call and witnessed several injuries to the victim’s face and leg.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND An amended information charged defendant with Johnson’s murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))4 and alleged a firearm enhancement allegation (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), two prior serious or violent felony convictions for making criminal threats under the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12), and several aggravating sentencing factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)–(b)(5)). Following trial, the jury acquitted defendant of murder, convicted him of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter, and found the firearm enhancement allegation true. At a bifurcated trial, the court found the prior conviction allegations and several aggravating sentencing factors true. After striking one prior strike conviction (see People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497), the court sentenced defendant to 11 years for manslaughter, doubled under the Three Strikes law, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement.

DISCUSSION A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Defendant contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object when he was recalled to testify in 4 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the Penal Code. The information additionally charged Tatum with assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). She was tried alongside defendant and convicted of this offense. Tatum is not a party to this appeal.

5 the prosecutor’s rebuttal case. To establish such claim, defendant must demonstrate (1) defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) prejudice. (People v. Jasso (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, 695 (Jasso); Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 693–694.) Defendant has established neither ground. As defendant admits, “the prosecutor was entitled to present evidence of [defendant’s] character for violence once [defendant] presented evidence of Mr. Johnson’s character for violence.” (Citing Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (b).) Indeed, “if ‘a defendant offers evidence to establish that the victim was a violent person, thereby inviting the jury to infer that the victim acted violently during the events in question, then the prosecution is permitted to introduce evidence demonstrating that . . . the defendant was a violent person, from which the jury might infer it was the defendant who acted violently.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 953 (Barrett); see also Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)(1)–(2).) Defendant further admits his examination in rebuttal was, “in substance,” cross-examination. Defendant sought to characterize Johnson’s shooting as necessary to defend himself and others. To do so, defendant testified that (1) Johnson was the violent aggressor, and (2) defendant feared Johnson. Both subjects of testimony were rebuttable by “evidence of defendant’s own violent character.” (Barrett, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 954 [victim aggression and self-defense]; see People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 696 [“victim was a violent person”]; People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 771–777 [“motives, intent and state of mind”].) When asked about his prior convictions, defendant explained them away, denying every factual basis on 6 which they were based. Such minimization, or casting “a favorable light on the circumstances of his prior conviction[s],” allowed the prosecutor to “cross-examine him regarding all of the circumstances” giving rise to the convictions for the additional purpose of impeachment. (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 52.) Notwithstanding his agreement on the substantive admissibility of his rebuttal testimony, defendant argues the testimony “was still, procedurally,” compelled direct examination. We disagree. By testifying in his own defense, “defendant relinquished his privilege against compelled self-incrimination with respect to cross-examination on matters within the scope of the narrative testimony he provided on direct examination, as well as on matters that impeached his credibility as a witness.” (People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1227, fn. 3 (Barnum).) In light of defendant’s voluntary testimony in defense, his testimony in rebuttal did not constitute compelled direct examination. “It is true that the People called defendant as a witness in their rebuttal. But in the People’s rebuttal, the prosecutor, in effect, merely subjected defendant to reopened cross-examination [citations] . . . , doing little more than what [s]he properly did on the initial cross-examination of defendant in the course of the defense, which was to impeach defendant’s credibility by probing into prior incidents . . . .” (Barnum, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1227, fn. 3.) Numerous cases recognize this type of reopened cross-examination in rebuttal. (E.g., People v. Rosoto (1962) 58 Cal.2d 304, 351–352 [approving recall for further examination “even though [defendant] had already rested his case”], limited on another ground in People v. Haston (1968) 69 7 Cal.2d 233, 250, fn. 22; People v. La Vers (1933) 130 Cal.App. 708, 710–713 [same]; Ching v. United States (9th. Cir. 1920) 264 F. 639, 642–643 [same].)5 Defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to defendant’s rebuttal examination. (See People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122 [counsel is “not ineffective for failing to make frivolous or futile motions”].) Defendant has also failed to establish prejudice. He argues the rebuttal questions “elicit[ed] testimony from him about the specific facts giving rise to his prior convictions.” The only testimony defendant offered in response to these questions were denials. Those denials did not transform the prosecutor’s questions into evidence or suggest that whatever was asked was true.6 Further, evidence of defendant’s actions in connection with Mr. Johnson’s death was clear. Defendant admittedly shot an outnumbered victim after spending several minutes obtaining a weapon. Despite his testimony that Johnson wielded a weapon and was reaching for one at the moment he fired a shot, no such 5 The authority on which defendant relies found any procedural error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because, “[i]n practical effect, the erroneous procedure accomplished nothing more than could have been done had the trial court granted a request to recall the defendant for further cross-examination.” (People v. Mack (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 839, 861.) 6 The jury was twice instructed on this principle: “Nothing that the attorneys say is evidence. . . . Their questions are not evidence. Only the witnesses’ answers are evidence. The attorneys’ questions are significant only if they helped you to understand the witnesses’ answers. Do not assume that something is true just because one of the attorneys asked a question that suggested it was true.” (CALCRIM Nos. 104, 222.) We presume the jury followed these instructions. (Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 683–684.)

8 weapon was located at the scene or in the park where the fight began. Defendant received the lowest possible conviction for Johnson’s killing because, to echo the trial court, defense counsel “did a great” and “very good job” highlighting defendant’s honest but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense. Because defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the alleged deficiencies in defense counsel’s representation, his ineffective assistance claim fails.

B. Motion for Mistrial Defendant also argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial during the prosecutor’s rebuttal case. That motion, he contends, was based on the prosecutor’s improper examination into the length of his prior prison terms and the “specific instances” of his conduct. We disagree that the trial court erred.

1. Relevant Background Near the end of her rebuttal case, the prosecutor requested a sidebar conference, where she asked to inquire into one of defendant’s prior prison sentences. The prosecutor argued defendant’s seven-year sentence was relevant because “he’s denying the underlying facts that led to the conviction. [¶] It’s unreasonable to believe that a person is going to voluntarily enter into a plea resulting in that much time if he, in fact, did not commit . . . the underlying offense . . . .” Defense counsel objected, “[I]t’s 352.”7 7 Evidence Code section 352 provides: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 9 After initially sustaining counsel’s objection, the court quickly changed its mind. The court found the proposed questioning relevant to defendant’s veracity because he was “denying everything.” Defense counsel objected and “move[d] for a mistrial on the basis of that decision.” Defense counsel argued, “[I]t’s 352 for the jury to hear that he’s sentenced to a 92-month prison sentence. The People can prove up the priors through alternative witnesses, but to allow them to hear about a long prison sentence will wildly prejudice us in [defendant’s] case.” Rather than having the prosecutor inquire into defendant’s prior sentence, defense counsel requested to cross-examine his client to address defendant’s insistent denial of any wrongdoing in his prior case. Defense counsel suggested he could ask if defendant “committed an act of criminal threats that led him to plead, [and] he could say, ‘yes’; the jury would hear that, without having to hear about a 92-month sentence.” The court granted defense counsel’s request but held off ruling on the prosecutor’s request to question defendant about the lengthy prior prison term. The court indicated its ruling on the prosecutor’s request would depend upon “what [defendant] says.” On cross-examination, counsel asked defendant if he committed acts of criminal threats in 2009 and 2012 “that led [him] to plead” in both cases. Defendant replied, “Yes.” During the prosecutor’s follow-up examination, however, defendant testified that he “didn’t commit [any] criminal acts” in the prior cases. In light of these responses, the prosecutor asked if defendant pleaded guilty in 2012 in exchange for seven years eight months imprisonment. Defendant admitted a court consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”

10 document reflected this sentence but stated he “pled to six years” for “something [he] didn’t do.” No objections were interposed to this line of questioning.8 2. Analysis The Attorney General contends defendant forfeited this claim. We partially agree. “‘“[A] defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion— and on the same ground—the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety. . . .”’” (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 198 (Collins), citations omitted.) When moving for mistrial below, defendant challenged the prosecutor’s requested question about his prior seven-year sentence. He did not challenge the “specific instances of prior conduct.” Defendant has forfeited this portion of his claim on appeal. (Ibid.) Defendant has not established impropriety in the question underlying his mistrial motion or an abuse in the court’s discretion declining to consider the motion under the circumstances before it. (See Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 198; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 574.) Throughout his testimony, defendant acknowledged his prior guilty pleas but denied actually committing the underlying offenses. As recognized by the parties and court below, defendant’s agreement to serve a lengthy sentence in exchange for one of those pleas tended to refute his testimony that he “didn’t commit [any] criminal acts.” (See People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 382 [prosecutor may introduce evidence in cross-examination 8 The court noted that defense counsel “actually has no objection to the line of questioning [the prosecutor] wanted to get into.”

11 refuting defendant’s “‘statements or the inference which may necessarily be drawn from them’”].) We discern no misconduct in this examination and no error denying the motion for mistrial.

DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MORI, Acting P. J. We concur:

TAMZARIAN, J.

DAUM, J.