Searles v. Kemmerling CA2/2

Opinion

Filed 9/24/26 Searles v. Kemmerling CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO QUEEN SEARLES, B345812

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. 24STRO08875)

LISA KEMMERLING,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Christmas Brookens, Judge. Affirmed. Queen Searles in propria persona. No appearance for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________________________ Queen Searles appeals the denial of her request for a civil harassment restraining order against her neighbor. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Appellant is a “spiritual work[er]” who lives in the same housing complex as Lisa Kimmerling (respondent). According to appellant, respondent has threatened to call the police and the landlord about her without good cause and has “defam[ed]” her character by telling others that appellant has “a lot of evil” in her house and that she “throw[s] trash and makeup down the toilet.” Respondent also calls appellant “crazy” and a “bitch,” says appellant is “going to drop dead,” and turns “other tenants” against her. Respondent also “disrespects” and “talks bad about all the neighbors.” In December 2024, appellant filed a request for a restraining order against respondent on the basis that “[s]he threatened [her], stalked [her], and disturbed [her] peace.” Appellant requested that respondent be ordered to stay 100 yards away from her, and at least 10 yards away from her “while entering, exiting, or residing in [their] respective apartments.” On February 14, 2025, the trial court convened the hearing, and appellant and her neighbor, Forrest Mitchell, both testified. The hearing had been continued twice to allow appellant to serve respondent, but respondent did not appear to testify. After considering the evidence, the court denied appellant’s request for a restraining order. DISCUSSION Section 527.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure1 provides injunctive relief to a person who has suffered harassment.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2 (§ 527.6, subd. (a)(1); Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399, 401.) “Harassment” is defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) At a hearing on a restraining order request, “the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent inquiry. If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i)(1).) We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a restraining order for an abuse of discretion. (Jan F. v. Natalie F. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 583, 593; Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420.) The party seeking a restraining order bears the burden of showing the circumstances that justify the order. (Jan F., at p. 593.) Where the trier of fact has concluded that the party has failed to meet her burden of proof, the question for the reviewing court is whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. (Ibid.) The trial court’s ruling is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to provide an adequate record demonstrating error. (Defend Bayview Hunters Point Com. v. City and County of San Francisco (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 846, 859–860.) Appellant argues that the trial court erred by discounting the video that she played for the court and the fact that respondent did not attend the hearing. We have granted 3 appellant’s motion to augment the record on appeal to include various videos that were apparently shown or made available to the trial court. We agree with the trial court’s characterization of the footage: “It’s hard to hear what’s going on. But more concerning . . . was that there was a narrative over the video. In other words, things were being written and placed over the video. So regardless [of] if I could hear or see, I’m already given a story about what’s happening and I don’t know if the story is true or not.” The trial court properly “discounted” the video on these bases. Other videos submitted with appellant’s motion to augment show her speaking with the witness on the telephone, giving a tour of her apartment complex and describing what respondent does to harass her, and arguing with a neighbor who is not a party to this action. Nothing in these videos, or any other part of the record, entitles appellant to a restraining order as a matter of law. (See Jan F., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 593.) As to the lack of testimony from respondent, the trial court’s statement that appellant still bore the burden of proof was correct, and respondent’s absence from the hearing did not require the trial court to grant appellant the restraining order. (See People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485, 498 [“ ‘No finding can be predicated on the absence of evidence’ ”].) Appellant also argues that the trial court “Applied an Incorrect Legal Framework by Invoking Inapplicable Burdens of Proof.” The trial court was explicit in its understanding that “for civil harassment the burden is clear and convincing.” This was correct. (§ 527.6, subd. (i)(1).) Appellant cites the trial court’s statement, “[T]he way it works is the highest burden in the land is beyond a reasonable doubt. Then it’s clear and convincing.

4 And then it’s preponderance. [¶] And based on the evidence that was provided to me today, the court is going to rule that you did not meet that burden . . . .” This statement does not negate that the court applied the correct legal standard. It merely shows that, in the trial court’s view, appellant did not meet her burden even under a less stringent standard. Next, appellant charges the trial court with making an improper accusation of witness tampering and discriminating against the witness for being “ ‘on the spectrum.’ ” This mischaracterizes the record, which shows that the witness brought up on his own that he was on the spectrum to explain to the trial court that he has “some trouble communicating.” Nothing the trial court said shows that it discounted the witness’s testimony based on this information. While appellant is correct that the trial court interrupted to ask questions of its own and to stop the witness from testifying about irrelevant topics, this was well within its discretion. When the trial court asked the witness whether there was “anything else” he had to say, the witness asked appellant whether he was “missing anything.” This prompted the trial court to inquire of the witness why he asked that question. The court’s inquiry was reasonable, and it does not suggest any improper bias against the witness or appellant. Finally, appellant argues that the trial court improperly “truncate[d] the hearing” to exclude appellant’s material witnesses. We disagree that it was outside the bounds of reason for the trial court to decline to continue the hearing in the afternoon for other witnesses to testify remotely. The trial court reasonably concluded on the record before it that although “[respondent] may be an unpleasant person” who 5 “may be out there . . . saying things,” the conduct complained of did not justify a civil harassment restraining order. Because our review of the record has revealed no error or misconduct, we also reject appellant’s claims of cumulative error and of violations of due process and judicial ethics rules. DISPOSITION The order is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

RICHARDSON, J.