Williams v. City of Torrance CA2/4

Opinion

Filed 9/24/26 Williams v. City of Torrance CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

BLAKE WILLIAMS, B345170 (Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 21TRCV00034)

v. CITY OF TORRANCE et al., Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Gary Y. Tanaka, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded. Corey W. Glave for Plaintiff and Appellant. Liebert Cassidy Whitmore, James E. Oldendorph and Nicholas M. Grether, for Defendants and Respondents. Blake Williams, a peace officer employed by the Torrance Police Department (TPD), was subjected to one audit and three investigations for potential violations of departmental policy. He commenced this lawsuit against his employer and the City of Torrance (City) for violations of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.),1 declaratory relief, and whistleblower retaliation (Labor Code, § 1102.5). He appeals from judgment following an order granting summary judgment in favor of his employer and the City (collectively the Department). Williams has forfeited many of his contentions on appeal. To the extent his legal arguments can be readily correlated with the appellate record, we find triable issues on his POBRA and declaratory relief claims under sections 3304, 3304.5, and 3306. We reverse the judgment and direct the lower court to enter an order denying summary adjudication on these claims. The order shall again grant summary adjudication on the remaining claims.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The Audit, Three Investigations, and Interviews In April 2019, a supervising officer audited Williams and his partner for continuing a high-speed vehicle pursuit outside City limits after command terminated the pursuit. In an audit report, the supervising officer found various violations of departmental policy, including the failure to timely notify communications of their actions. Williams wrote a rebuttal to the findings. Williams testified that TPD prevented him from attaching it to the audit report because he was neither 1 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the Government Code.

2 disciplined nor subjected to further investigation. The audit report was placed in Williams’s divisional file,2 but not his personnel file. The Department investigated Williams for another high- speed vehicle pursuit occurring on a freeway in June 2019 (PD2019-006); a use of force incident occurring during a pedestrian stop outside city limits in June 2019 (PD2019-007); and a vehicle intervention incident occurring in February 2020 (PD2020-004). Following administrative reviews of each of these incidents, Williams was issued personnel complaints for potential violations of departmental policy. Williams received copies of the complaints after he was notified of each. Between September 2019 and June 2020, officers conducting each of the three investigations requested interviews with Williams. In each request, or by additional correspondence before his interview, Williams was given the name and rank of each interviewing officer and the policies alleged to have been violated. Williams was interviewed once during each investigation with his chosen counsel present. Prior to questioning at each interview, Williams was again informed of the name and rank of the interviewing officer. He was also advised of his constitutional rights and provided with relevant police and pursuit report(s), the operative personnel complaint, and relevant TPD policies. In addition, he was given the opportunity to review video footage of each incident before questioning. Before Williams’s first interview (PD2019-006), his counsel lodged objections under 2 A divisional file contains “corrective actions or positive comments” for every employee. It is used primarily for evaluations and is maintained in the employee’s division.

3 POBRA regarding notice, timing of the Department’s disclosure of investigative materials, and one false statement appearing in a pursuit review report.

B. Investigation Findings and Corrective Actions Following the investigation of the freeway vehicle pursuit (PD2019-006), Williams was exonerated of all alleged violations but found in violation of one unalleged policy for unsafe and improper driving. Williams received a May 2020 personal counseling memorandum reminding him of this policy. Several days later, his counsel requested an administrative appeal and copies of all investigative materials. Williams was given these materials (except internal affairs interviews) several weeks later. In June 2020, Williams received an educational reminder that “more accurately” reflected the Department’s intended corrective action. The educational reminder withdrew and “permanently” removed the personal counseling memorandum. It also directed Williams to comply with a vehicle pursuit policy alleged in the personnel complaint. The use of force investigation (PD2019-007) resulted in Williams receiving a November 2019 reprimand for being outside his assigned territory and the City without just cause and failing to timely broadcast his contact. The reprimand noted “previous corrective actions” for both improper actions. According to Deputy Chief Jon Megeff’s deposition testimony, “it stands to reason” this notation referred to the April 2019 pursuit audit findings.3 In December 2019, Williams’s counsel requested 3 The investigating officer who interviewed Williams admittedly reviewed Williams’s divisional file to “see if there [were] similar allegations” to those alleged in the use of force incident (PD2019-007).

4 another administrative appeal and copies of investigative materials. Several days later, Captain Mark Athan issued Williams a “correction,” changing the reprimand effective date. Captain Athan also confirmed Williams’s receipt of the investigation summary, personnel complaint, captain review report, and interview recording. Due to “an oversight, mistake, and/or inadvertence,” Police Chief Jeremiah Hart informed Williams in October 2021 that his administrative appeal had not been scheduled. Despite coordinating tentative dates with Williams’s counsel, the Department did not hold an administrative appeal hearing. Williams was fully exonerated in the vehicle intervention investigation (PD2020-004). In light of his exoneration, Williams did not receive additional investigative materials.

C. Trial Court Proceedings Williams commenced this action in 2021 and filed the operative third amended complaint in 2024. He alleged three causes of action for (1) violations of POBRA (§§ 3303, subds. (c), (g), (h), 3304, subds. (a)–(b), 3305, 3306, 3306.5, subds. (a)–(b)); (2) declaratory relief for each POBRA violation; and (3) whistleblower retaliation (Lab. Code, § 1102.5) for reporting POBRA and other state law violations. The Department moved for summary judgment or adjudication. It argued Williams was afforded every applicable POBRA right and received no adverse employment action supporting a whistleblower claim. Following briefing and several hearings, the court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of the Department. Williams appealed.

5 DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review Summary judgment or adjudication may properly be granted if there is no question of fact and the issues raised by the pleadings may be decided as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To obtain summary judgment or adjudication, the defendant must establish a complete defense or show that one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849–850.) If the defendant satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish a triable issue or defense to the cause(s) of action. (Id. at p. 849.) We review de novo whether triable issues of fact exist and whether the Department is entitled to judgment. (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.) Depending on our review, we may affirm the judgment or reverse with directions to enter an order granting or denying summary adjudication on individual causes of action. (Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1239.)

B. Forfeiture The Department contends, and we agree, that Williams has failed to adequately brief his appellate contentions with citations to the record. Williams’s appellate brief furnishes almost no citations to the record to support factual assertions made in the course of his legal discussion or arguments.4 It is Williams’s “responsibility to support claims of error with citation and 4 Williams’s opening brief contains background statements of fact. At times, the brief cites exhibit numbers that do not comprise part of the appellate record. Williams did not file a reply brief.

6 authority; this court is not obligated to perform that function on [his] behalf.” (Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 656; see Claudio v. Regents of University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 230 [de novo review “‘does not obligate us to cull the record’” for triable issues].) “If a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, that portion of the brief may be stricken” and the argument will be deemed forfeited. (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1220, italics added.) We decline to consider Williams’s contentions regarding sections 3303, subdivision (g), 3305, and 3306.5, subdivision (a). To the extent we can readily correlate his remaining contentions with the appellate record, we exercise our discretion to consider them.

C. POBRA Violations Williams contends he raised triable issues of fact under his first cause of action for violations of POBRA. This cause of action combines “‘separate and distinct wrongful acts’” (Edward Fineman Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1118) under various POBRA statutes, which prescribe “basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers” during proceedings that may lead to punitive action. (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135; see also § 3309.5, subds. (a)–(e) [vesting jurisdiction and prescribing judicial relief].) We address each alleged act despite their combination “with other wrongful acts alleged in the same cause of action.” (Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1855.)

7 1. Investigation and Interrogation Rights (§ 3303) Williams contends the Department violated various investigation and interrogation rights under section 3303. These rights apply whenever a “public safety officer is under investigation and subjected to interrogation by his or her commanding officer, or any other member of the employing public safety department, that could lead to punitive action, . . . For the purpose of this chapter, punitive action means any action that may lead to dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary, written reprimand, or transfer for purposes of punishment.”

a. Notice of Name and Rank of Interrogating Officer Williams first contends he raised triable issues under section 3303, subdivision (b). This provision requires notice to the officer under investigation of the “rank, name, and command” of any interrogating officer “prior to the interrogation.” Williams argues the Department violated this right during the initial “administrative” reviews of each incident. We are not persuaded. Williams did not allege this theory in the operative complaint and may not rely on it to avoid summary judgment here. (Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v. Avery (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 218, 224.) Even on the merits, we discern no triable issue under section 3303, subdivision (b). The right prescribed under this statute applies to interrogations or formal interviews; it does not apply to “‘normal exchange[s] between supervisor and subordinate’” even if those exchanges result in “‘counseling, instruction, or informal verbal admonishment.’” (Lozano v. Los Angeles (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 711, 731–732; see § 3303, subd. (i);

8 Steinert v. City of Covina (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 458, 462 [“interaction in the normal course of duty”].) Each time Williams was subjected to an interrogation or formal interview, he was provided advance notice of the names, ranks, and commands of each interviewing officer. No triable issue exists under this provision.

b. Notice of Nature of Investigation Williams contends the Department violated his right to be notified of the “nature of the investigation[s] prior to any interrogation.” (§ 3303, subd. (c).) He challenges the notices’ timing (“prior to any interrogation”) and substance (“nature”). We reject both challenges. Under section 3303, subdivision (c), notice must be made “‘reasonably prior to’ the interrogation—that is, with enough time for the officer to meaningfully consult with any representative he elects to have present.” (Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 445, 453 (Ellins).) Whether notice is “reasonably prior” to an interrogation “may depend upon whether the officer has already retained a representative (or instead needs time to secure one) and upon the nature of the allegations; their complexity; and, if they are unrelated, their number.” (Ibid.) Williams received notice reasonably prior to his interviews. The Department notified Williams of each investigation and provided him with copies of the personnel complaints well in advance of each interview. At each interview, Williams and his chosen counsel either confirmed advance receipt of investigative materials or were allowed to review them before questioning. Williams could, and did, “meaningfully consult with his [chosen]

9 representative” prior to questioning. (Ellins, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 455.) The advance notice was reasonable. Williams was also notified of the “nature” of each investigation. (§ 3303, subd. (c).) He was informed of the incidents under investigation and nearly every vehicle pursuit or pedestrian stop policy implicated in each investigation. As Williams admits, this information apprised him of the subject of the investigations well before his interviews, giving him time to review “any reports relating to that [incident] number,” “any police report” he may have drafted, and “any [relevant] video footage.” In other words, Williams admits the notice he received allowed him to make “‘a full and cogent presentation of [his] view of the matter, bringing to light justifications, explanations, extenuating circumstances, and other mitigating factors’ . . . [Citation.]” (Ellins, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 454.) To the extent Williams contends his notice of the freeway vehicle pursuit investigation (PD2019-006) violated Hinrichs v. County of Orange (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 921 by omitting the specific policy cited in the educational reminder, he is mistaken. In that case, the pre-interrogation notice cited a “particular regulation” and gave “no other description of the alleged wrongful conduct” from which discipline under a “different regulation” could be based. (Id. at p. 933.) No similar deficiency appears in the vehicle pursuit notice. Beyond notifying Williams of several policies under investigation, the Department’s notice further provided a description of the alleged wrongful conduct: pursuing a vehicle at speeds reaching 119 miles per hour; weaving around slower traffic; and exposing those engaged in the chase and the public to danger. Given this description, the Department could 10 “thereafter impose discipline based upon a different regulation.” (Ibid.) No triable issues exist under section 3303, subdivision (c).

c. Admonition of Constitutional Rights Williams contends he was not timely admonished of his constitutional rights under section 3303, subdivision (h), which provides: “If prior to or during the interrogation of a public safety officer it is deemed that he or she may be charged with a criminal offense, he or she shall be immediately informed of his or her constitutional rights.” Like Miranda5 advisements, section 3303, subdivision (h) admonishments are designed to protect an officer’s right against self-incrimination. (Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 577–578; see People v. Gwillim (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1254, 1267.) Like Miranda, section 3303, subdivision (h) requires admonishments be given before the officer is “being required to answer an employer’s investigatory questions.” (Spielbauer v. County of Santa Clara (2009) 45 Cal.4th 704, 724, fn. 5; see Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 387 [advisements given with “opportunity to invoke [one’s] rights before giving any answers or admissions”].) Williams admits he received these admonishments “before questioning” at each interview. We discern no triable issue under section 3303, subdivision (h).

2. Retaliation (§ 3304, subd. (a)) Section 3304, subdivision (a) prohibits an employer from retaliating against a public safety officer for lawfully exercising 5 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

11 their POBRA rights. To establish such claim, the employer must “arbitrarily increase a punishment” or engage in a “vindictive measure.” (Holcomb v. City of Los Angeles (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1568.) Williams contends he established triable issues under section 3304, subdivision (a) for the following departmental actions: (1) “creating forms” to circumvent an administrative appeal; (2) investigating him “for allegations that did not violate any policy”; and (3) opening the vehicle intervention investigation (PD2020-004) the same day he requested an appeal in the freeway vehicle pursuit investigation (PD2019-006). Williams forfeited the last assertion by not pursuing it below. (Miller v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1161, 1170.) Absent any discussion on the effect of his exoneration in the vehicle intervention investigation (PD2020-004), or the effect(s) of the Department creating forms or investigating him for penalty-free actions, Williams has also failed to establish how any of these actions “fall within the scope” of vindictive or punitive actions under section 3304, subdivision (a). (Otto v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 985, 998 (Otto).) No triable issue exists under this provision.

3. Right of Response to Adverse Comments (§ 3306) Next, Williams contends he raised triable issues under section 3306 based on his inability to submit written responses to the pursuit audit report and educational reminder. We agree. Section 3306 grants a public safety officer “30 days within which to file a written response to any adverse comment entered 12 in his personnel file.” Such response “shall be attached to, and shall accompany, the adverse comment.” Contrary to the Department’s suggestion, section 3306 applies “regardless of whether the information at issue actually was placed” in an officer’s personnel file. (Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 292.) A law enforcement agency may not avoid statutory requirements like those imposed by POBRA by maintaining a “personnel file” independent of another file, maintained under a different label, containing “reports of complaints or similar matters that could affect the status of their employment . . . .” (Ibid. [“internal affairs files” and “memorandum summarizing [adverse] comments”]; see Sacramento Police Officers Assn. v. Venegas (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 916, 919–920, 926 (Venegas) [“internal affairs index card”].) Section 3306 further provides officers with the opportunity to file a written response to an adverse comment even if the comment culminates in no punitive action. “It is enough that [these documents] ‘will be considered in future personnel decisions . . .’ [Citation.]” (Otto, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 998; see Venegas, at pp. 926, 929 [documents create an “adverse impression” influencing future decisions].)6 Williams has established triable issues concerning the violation of his section 3306 right to respond to adverse comments. He provided evidence indicating TPD did not permit him to attach rebuttal comments to the pursuit audit report 6 A May 2023 TPD Policy Manual defines “corrective action” as any supervisory action directed toward an employee for censurable conduct. If in writing, the corrective action must be recorded as an “Educational Reminder” or “Incident” and be “incorporated into the employee’s next evaluation, and retained for a period of two years[.]”

13 placed in his divisional file. He also presented evidence that TPD issued him an educational reminder, which could be considered in future personnel decisions, without giving him the opportunity to respond. His section 3306 cause of action may proceed.

4. Right to Administrative Appeal (§§ 3304, subd. (b), 3304.5) We further agree with Williams that triable issues exist on his right to administratively appeal the educational reminder and written reprimand. Section 3304, subdivision (b) provides: “No punitive action, nor denial of promotion on grounds other than merit, shall be undertaken by any public agency . . . without providing the public safety officer with an opportunity for administrative appeal.” Like the right of response to an adverse comment, the right to an administrative appeal “does not require a showing that an adverse employment consequence has occurred or is likely to occur. It is sufficient if the report’s issuance . . . ‘may lead’ to such consequences in the future.” (Otto, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 997.) To determine whether written action triggers section 3304, subdivision (b), we look to its “contents” rather than its “title” or the employer’s intent. (Id. at pp. 995, 998.) Williams has established triable issues under section 3304, subdivision (b) as to the educational reminder and his written reprimand. The latter document is per se punitive. (§ 3303.) The former document, while not punitive per se, did identify a specific “‘criticism’” that may be “considered in the future with regard to personnel decisions affecting [Williams that] might lead to punitive action.” (Otto, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 997, 999; see also James v. City of Coronado (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 905, 14 909 [“criticisms” may hinder advancement or result in adverse future consequences].)7 Williams also established triable issues under section 3304.5, which requires conducting an administrative appeal “in conformance with rules and procedures adopted by the local public agency.” These rules and procedures appear in a TPD-Torrance Police Officers Association memorandum of understanding (MOU). Under that MOU, the Deputy Chief (or their designee) must schedule an appeal hearing no later than 30 days from the date an officer receives notice of punitive action. The Department did not schedule an appeal hearing for the educational reminder and attempted to schedule one for the reprimand well beyond the MOU timeframe. Even if Williams admittedly engaged in the conduct for which he was reprimanded, he may still seek reversal “through proof of mitigating circumstances.” (Browning v. Block (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 423, 430.) On these facts, Williams has raised triable issues concerning his right to relief under sections 3304 and 3304.5.

D. Declaratory Relief The parties agree that Williams has raised cognizable claims for declaratory relief to the extent he raised triable POBRA issues above. (See Mounger v. Gates (1987) 193 7 We reject the Department’s argument that Williams’s “‘Above Standards’” performance evaluation in June 2020 conclusively eliminated any negative consequence from his educational reminder. That evaluation was for a rating period between June 9, 2019, and June 8, 2020—the very day Williams received the educational reminder.

15 Cal.App.3d 1248, 1253, fn. 7.) We agree and conclude Williams has raised triable issues on his right to declaratory relief relating to the pursuit audit report (§ 3306), educational reminder (§§ 3306, 3304, 3304.5), and written reprimand (§§ 3304, 3304.5).

E. Whistleblower Retaliation Finally, Williams fails to establish triable issues for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5. (McVeigh v. Recology San Francisco (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 443, 468.)8 To establish this claim, Williams must establish protected activity (i.e., reporting violation(s) of law), an adverse employment action, and causation. (Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 718.) Unlike the indeterminacy with which punitive action may arise under section 3303, an adverse employment action under Labor Code section 1102.5 must have a “‘detrimental and substantial effect’” on the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. (St. Myers v. Dignity Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 318.) Actions that are “‘“merely contrary to the employee’s interests”’” or “‘reasonably would deter an employee from engaging in the protected activity’” do not constitute adverse employment actions. (Ibid.) Williams contends the Department retaliated against him for reporting POBRA and other state law violations during the vehicle pursuit investigation (PD2019-006) by (1) denying him 8 Subdivision (b) of Labor Code section 1102.5 provides: “An employer . . . shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information . . . to a government or law enforcement agency . . . if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation” of federal, state, or local law or regulation.

16 the ability to challenge allegations of misconduct that “could” impair prospects for advancement; (2) investigating him for penalty-free actions; and (3) barring him from seeking promotion or advancement during each investigation. Williams has failed to demonstrate how these actions, singularly or in the collective, detrimentally or substantially affected the terms or conditions of his employment. It is not enough for him to show his prospects could be impacted, though he suffered no penalty. Further, Williams offers no evidence he sought a promotion or was dissuaded from pursuing one during the investigations. His “‘speculation, conjecture, imagination, or guesswork’” these actions could impair his employment does not establish triable issues. (Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Century Indemnity Co. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1035.)9 9 In light of our conclusion, we decline to consider whether the trial court erred by relying on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, when summarily adjudicating Williams’s whistleblower retaliation claim. (See Clarke v. Yu (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 199, 205–206.)

17 DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the order granting the motion for summary judgment and enter an order denying summary adjudication of William’s first and second causes of action under sections 3304, 3304.5, and 3306. The order shall again grant summary adjudication on all remaining causes of action. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MORI, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

DAUM, J.