Slater v. Ford Motor Co. CA4/3

Opinion

Filed 9/24/26 Slater v. Ford Motor Co. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JEREMY S. SLATER, Plaintiff and Respondent, G064350 v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020- 01147768) FORD MOTOR COMPANY, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Erick L. Larsh, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. Shook Hardy & Bacon, Andrew L. Chang and Amy P. Maclear for Defendant and Appellant. Law Offices of Jim O. Whitworth and Jim O. Whitworth for Plaintiff and Respondent. Plaintiff Jeremy S. Slater filed this lawsuit against defendant Ford Motor Company (Ford) asserting claims regarding a Ford truck under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.; Song- Beverly Act). Prior to trial, Ford sent an offer under Code of Civil Procedure 1 section 998, which, among other things, offered to pay $42,151.58, required Slater to surrender the vehicle to Ford or its designee, and noted Slater could move for an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs and would be treated as having prevailed in the action. Slater did not accept the offer. Following a bench trial at which Slater succeeded on one of his causes of action, the trial court entered a judgment that, among other things, awarded Slater $38,231.58 and required Slater to surrender the vehicle to Ford or its designee. The parties thereafter filed memoranda of costs and competing motions to tax costs. The parties disputed, among other things, whether Slater obtained a more favorable judgment than Ford’s section 998 offer. The trial court struck Ford’s memorandum of costs, concluding Slater obtained a better result than Ford’s section 998 offer. The court also denied in part Ford’s motion to tax Slater’s costs on that same ground. The court reasoned that Slater obtained a better result because his recoverable preoffer fees and costs should be added to the judgment before comparing the offer to the judgment for purposes of section 998. On appeal, Ford contends the trial court erred because it added preoffer fees and costs in determining whether Slater obtained a more favorable judgment but failed to also factor in that Slater could have recovered those same fees and costs under Ford’s section 998 offer. We agree 1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2 the court erred. Based on a proper comparison of the value of the judgment and the value of Ford’s offer, we conclude Slater failed to obtain a more favorable judgment than Ford’s section 998 offer within the meaning of section 998, subdivision (c)(1). Because Slater is therefore not entitled to recover his postoffer costs under section 998, subdivision (c)(1), we reverse the court’s order denying Ford’s motion to tax costs as to Slater’s postoffer costs and remand the matter to the court to determine the specific costs that should be taxed on this ground. In all other respects, the order as to Ford’s motion to tax costs is affirmed. We also reverse the court’s order granting Slater’s motion to tax Ford’s costs because it erred in determining that section 998, subdivision (c)(1), was inapplicable. Because the court did not reach what specific costs Ford was entitled to under section 998, subdivision (c)(1), and whether any of Ford’s claimed costs should be taxed on a different ground, we remand the matter to the court to make those determinations. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In June 2017, Slater purchased a new Ford truck from Huntington Beach Ford. In June 2020, Slater filed this action. His first amended complaint alleged causes of action for breach of express warranty and breach of implied warranty against Ford.2 In August 2022, Ford served Slater with a settlement offer under section 998, which Slater did not accept. Among other things, the section 998 offer stated Ford “offers to allow judgment to be taken against it” and “Ford will pay to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s current counsel of record the sum of forty- 2 Huntington Beach Ford was also named as a defendant on the cause of action for breach of implied warranty, but it was dismissed from the action at the commencement of trial. The trial proceeded with Ford as the sole defendant.

3 two thousand one hundred fifty-one dollars and fifty-eight cents ($42,151.58). This amount is in compromise of Plaintiff’s claim, and it may be more or less than Plaintiff would recover if plaintiff’s claims are tried in court. Ford will pay this amount within two business days after Plaintiff surrenders the vehicle as described in Paragraph 3 and notifies Defendant’s counsel of the completion of surrender of vehicle.” (Capitalization omitted.) It further noted, however, “[i]f there is a remaining loan balance on Plaintiff’s vehicle, Plaintiff will advise Ford of that amount and of the name of the lienholder upon accepting this offer, and Ford will withhold that amount from the settlement payment that is made directly to Plaintiff. Ford will then pay the loan balance directly to the lienholder on Plaintiff’s behalf within seven (7) days after Plaintiff surrenders the vehicle as described in Paragraph 3.” Paragraph three stated, “Plaintiff will surrender the vehicle to Ford or its designee on a date, time, and place mutually agreeable, no later than 60 calendar days after the parties’ counsel have accepted this Statutory Offer. Plaintiff will surrender the vehicle with clear title, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances, other than of the lender of record (if any) to be paid by Ford as described in Paragraph 1. At the time of surrender, Plaintiff will execute whatever documents are necessary to effectuate the transfer of the vehicle to Ford.” Regarding attorney fees and costs, the section 998 offer stated, “[t]he judgment will include a provision allowing Plaintiff to petition the Court for an award of reasonably and actually incurred attorney fees and costs recoverable pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1794(d). Any motion for fees must be made pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702. In ruling on Plaintiff’s fee/cost motion(s), the attorney fees, expenses and costs amount shall be calculated as if Plaintiff was found 4 to have prevailed in this action under section 1794(d) of the California Code of Civil Procedure as of the date of this offer of judgment. Ford expressly reserves all defenses to Plaintiff’s fee/costs motion(s) and any award thereon. Ford will pay the amounts determined by the Court within 30 days after 3 entry of the award unless either party has filed a notice of appeal.” The case proceeded to a bench trial in 2023. Ford admitted liability on the cause of action for breach of express warranty, and the trial court found in favor of Slater on that cause of action. The court, however, found Slater was not entitled to civil penalties, and it found in favor of Ford on the cause of action for breach of implied warranty. In October 2023, the trial court entered judgment. The judgment stated “Slater shall recover from Defendant Ford Motor Company, a statutory repurchase pursuant to California Civil Code section 1793.2, subd. (d)(2), in the amount of $38,231.58, inclusive of damages for breach of the express warranty. Prior to Plaintiff’s recovery, Plaintiff shall surrender the vehicle to Ford or its designee on a date, time, and place mutually agreeable. Plaintiff shall surrender the vehicle with clear title, free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. At the time of surrender, Plaintiff shall execute whatever documents are necessary to effectuate the transfer of the vehicle to Ford.” The judgment also stated Slater shall not recover civil penalties or any damages on his cause of action for breach of implied warranty, and costs and attorney fees were to be determined.

3 The Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer erroneously referred to section 1794 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which does not exist. Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), addresses attorney fees and costs. Slater does not contend on appeal that this error invalidated the statutory offer.

5 In December 2023, Ford and Slater each filed a memorandum of costs, with Ford seeking costs of $40,534.08 and Slater seeking costs of $54,805.13. Slater and Ford then each filed a motion to tax costs. Among other things, the parties disagreed about whether the judgment was more favorable than Ford’s section 998 offer. Slater contended it was. Ford contended the judgment was not more favorable than its statutory offer and accordingly (1) Slater was not entitled to an award of any of his postoffer costs and (2) instead, Ford was entitled to its postoffer costs. On June 24, 2024, the trial court issued its order on the various motions regarding attorney fees and costs. The court granted Slater’s motion to tax costs and struck the entirety of Ford’s memorandum of costs. In determining whether section 998, subdivision (c) applied, the court rejected Ford’s argument that its section 998 offer of $42,151.58 was more favorable than Slater’s recovery at trial of $38,831.58. The court cited Kelly v. Yee (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 336, 342 (Kelly), for the proposition that “‘[i]n determining whether [plaintiff] obtained a judgment more favorable than the settlement offer, we first add to the judgment of damages those recoverable costs and attorney’s fees authorized by statute and incurred before the settlement offer.’” The court concluded Ford was not entitled to recover costs under section 998 because adding Slater’s recoverable preoffer fees and costs to the judgment “yields a better result than defendant’s 998 Offer.” The trial court also granted in part and denied in part Ford’s motion to tax costs. The court rejected Ford’s argument that Slater could not recover his postoffer costs because, as the court explained, “plaintiff did in fact obtain a better recovery than defendant’s 998 Offer once recoverable fees and costs are included.” The court, however, granted Ford’s motion to tax 6 certain costs Slater had claimed on his memorandum of costs related to 4 expert witness fees, copies for experts, and court reporter fees. Ford appealed. DISCUSSION I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES A. The Song-Beverly Act The Song-Beverly Act “permits new vehicle buyers who have been damaged by a manufacturer’s failure to comply with the [Song-Beverly] Act to sue under [Civil Code] section 1794 for the recovery of damages and other relief. [Citation.] The measure of a buyer’s damages in such an action includes ‘replacement or reimbursement as set forth in subdivision (d) of [Civil Code] [s]ection 1793.2 . . . .’ [Citation.] If a manufacturer is unable to repair a new vehicle after a reasonable number of attempts, section 1793.2, subdivision (d) requires the manufacturer to promptly replace the vehicle or promptly pay restitution ‘in an amount equal to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer,’ as specified. [Citation.] The manufacturer is entitled to reduce the amount of restitution by the ‘amount directly attributable’ to the buyer’s use of the vehicle prior to the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle for repair.” (Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC (2024) 15 Cal.5th 792, 800– 801 (Niedermeier).) In Niedermeier, our Supreme Court held “that in an action pursuant to [Civil Code] section 1794, neither a trade-in credit nor sale 4 The court’s June 24, 2024 order also ruled on Slater’s motion for an award of attorney fees and costs, awarding Slater $74,745 for attorney fees and $2,425.50 for paralegal fees. As neither party challenges that portion of the court’s order on appeal, the award of attorney fees to Slater is not at issue on this appeal.

7 proceeds reduce the statutory restitution remedy set forth in [Civil Code] section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) at least where, as here, a consumer has been forced to trade in or sell a defective vehicle due to the manufacturer’s failure to comply with the [Song-Beverly] Act.” (Id. at p. 801.) Under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), “[i]f the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Ibid.) B. Section 998 and Costs “The right to recover costs in litigation ‘“exists solely by virtue of statute.”’ [Citations.] The general rule . . . is that the prevailing party is entitled to recover its litigation costs. [Citations.] Section 998 ‘modifies the general rule of section 1032 that only the prevailing party recovers its costs.’” (Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2025) 17 Cal.5th 592, 602 (Madrigal); see also § 998, subd. (a).) Under section 998, subdivision (c)(1), “[i]f an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover their postoffer costs and shall pay the defendant’s costs from the time of the offer. In addition, in any action or proceeding other than an eminent domain action, the court or arbitrator, in its discretion, may require the plaintiff to pay a reasonable sum to cover postoffer costs of the services of expert witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually incurred and reasonably necessary 8 in either, or both, preparation for trial or arbitration, or during trial or 5 arbitration, of the case by the defendant.” (Ibid.) “To trigger the operation of section 998, an offer must be valid 6 and made in good faith.” (Ayers v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1280, 1293 (Ayers).) “An offer is valid if it: (i) complies with the statutory requirements that it be in writing, contains the terms of the offer, include [sic] a mechanism for acceptance, and provides for entry of judgment or a legal equivalent if accepted [citations]; and (ii) is ‘sufficiently specific to allow the recipient to evaluate the worth of the offer and make a reasoned decision whether to accept the offer’ [citation].”7 (Ayers, at p. 1293.) “An offer is insufficiently specific if it contains terms making it ‘“exceedingly difficult or impossible to determine the value of the offer to the plaintiff.”’” (Chen v. BMW of North America, LLC (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 957, 961.) “‘A judgment is more favorable to the plaintiff than a prior settlement offer only if the value of the plaintiff’s recovery in the judgment, exclusive of the plaintiff’s postoffer costs, exceeds the value of the offer.’” (Ayers, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1307–1308.) “[N]onmonetary terms may have material value that must be accounted for in the comparison. Section 998 ‘does not describe the “offer” in monetary terms nor authorize cost- shifting every time the monetary value of the damage award is less than the 5 “In determining whether the plaintiff obtains a more favorable judgment, the court or arbitrator shall exclude the postoffer costs.” (§ 998, subd. (c)(2)(A).)

6 Slater does not contend Ford’s section 998 offer was not made in good faith.

7 “Section 998, subdivision (b) . . . sets out the requirements for making and accepting an offer.” (Madrigal, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 602.)

9 monetary “term” of the defendant’s statutory offer. Instead an “offer” includes all its terms and conditions and must be evaluated in the light of all those terms and conditions.’ [Citation.] If the nonmonetary terms make it ‘exceedingly difficult or impossible to determine the value of the offer to the plaintiff[,] . . . a court should not undertake extraordinary efforts to attempt to determine whether the judgment is more favorable to the plaintiff’ but should instead ‘conclude that the offer is not sufficiently specific or certain to determine its value and deny cost shifting . . . .’” (Id. at p. 1308.) “The clear policy behind section 998 is to encourage the settlement of lawsuits before trial. [Citations.] It does so ‘by providing a strong financial disincentive to a party—whether it be a plaintiff or a defendant—who fails to achieve a better result than that party could have achieved by accepting his or her opponent’s settlement offer. (This is the stick. The carrot is that by awarding costs to the putative settler the statute provides a financial incentive to make reasonable settlement offers.)’ [Citation.] ‘The basic premise of section 998 is that plaintiffs who reject reasonable settlement offers and then obtain less than the offer should be penalized for continuing the litigation.’ [Citation.] Or, as [our Supreme Court has] explained, to encourage both the making and acceptance of reasonable offers, section 998 treats even a losing defendant ‘whose settlement offer exceeds the judgment . . . as if it were the prevailing party’ for purposes of postoffer costs.” (Madrigal, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 603–604.) “We review the validity of a section 998 offer de novo. [Citation.] Under that standard of review, we exercise our independent judgment; we do not defer to the trial court’s decision and we are not bound by its reasoning.” (Chen v. BMW of North America, LLC, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 961.) “While the question of whether a plaintiff obtained a more favorable result is 10 ordinarily left to the trial court’s discretion [citation], where the question turns on our statutory construction and the application of that construction to undisputed facts, our review is independent [citation].” (Ayers, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1293.) II. ANALYSIS Ford argues the trial court erred in determining whether the judgment was more favorable than Ford’s settlement offer because it added preoffer fees and costs to the amount of the judgment but failed to take into account that those preoffer fees and costs were also recoverable under the section 998 offer. According to Ford, because Slater’s preoffer fees and costs were recoverable under both the section 998 offer and the judgment, the relevant comparison is the amount of the monetary compensation included in each. And because the $38,231.58 awarded in the judgment is less than the $42,151.58 offer, Ford contends Slater did not obtain a more favorable judgment. We agree with Ford that the trial court erred by adding Slater’s preoffer fees and costs to the amount of the judgment in order to compare it to Ford’s section 998 offer without taking into account that the offer also provided that preoffer fees and costs would be recoverable. Ford’s section 998 offer stated Slater would be allowed to move for attorney fees and costs and would be treated as having prevailed in the action.8 Because Slater could 8 As noted above, Ford’s Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer erroneously referred to section 1794 of the Code of Civil Procedure, rather than the Civil Code. On appeal, Slater does not argue this made the statutory settlement offer invalid or affected his ability to obtain attorney fees and costs. Even if the offer were deemed to be silent on fees and costs under Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), Slater’s preoffer fees and costs still would 11 recover preoffer attorney fees and costs as determined by the court under both the judgment and the section 998 offer, that component was “‘effectively 9 a wash.’” (See Maneri v. FCA US LLC (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 897, 908; see also Duale v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 718, 725–726, fn. 3.) Thus, comparing the value of the offer to the value of the judgment leads us to the conclusion Slater failed to obtain a more favorable judgment because the $38,231.58 judgment is less than the $42,151.58 section 998 offer. Slater raises a series of arguments in an attempt to avoid this result. None of them are persuasive. Most of Slater’s arguments are based on his assertion that he had already sold the vehicle (purportedly for approximately $31,500) when Ford made its offer. From this, Slater argues that (1) when the $31,500 proceeds from the sale of the vehicle are added to the $38,231.58 judgment in his favor, his “net gain” (of more than $69,000) exceeded the amount of Ford’s section be added to the value of the offer for comparison purposes. (See Martinez v. Eatlite One, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1181, 1185.) Citing Martinez, Slater’s appellate brief asserts, “while pre-offer costs are added to the judgment, they are not added to the section 998 offer unless the offer explicitly includes them.” That is not what Martinez holds. Martinez addressed a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer that did not explicitly state the plaintiff could recover fees and costs, and the appellate court “conclude[d] the court should have compared the jury’s award plus plaintiff’s preoffer costs and fees with the amount of the section 998 offer plus plaintiff’s preoffer costs and fees. Because, for comparison purposes, the preoffer costs and fees are added to both the jury award and the (silent on costs) section 998 offer, we may simply compare the jury award with the section 998 offer.” (Martinez, at p. 1185.)

9 The trial court relied on Kelly, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 336, and Stallman v. Bell (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 740. Those cases, however, are distinguishable because they involved section 998 offers that stated each party was to bear its own costs. (Kelly, at p. 338; Stallman, at pp. 743, 749.)

12 998 offer; and (2) in any case, the offer was invalid at the outset because it 10 purported to require him to surrender the vehicle to Ford. We disagree with both arguments. We begin with Slater’s mathematical argument that, after pocketing the proceeds from the sale of the truck, he had a “net gain” of 11 $69,731.58, which would be greater than Ford’s $42,152.58 offer. The math checks out, but the reasoning does not. The first problem with this argument is that Slater’s appellate brief fails to include any record citations to support it. He provides no record citations to evidence establishing that he sold the truck, when he sold the truck, and what the sale proceeds were. “Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court requires all appellate briefs to ‘[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.’ It is well-established that ‘“[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived.”’” (Conservatorship of Kevin 10 Slater does not contend the section 988 offer was otherwise invalid because it did not comply with the “statutory requirements that it be in writing, contains the terms of the offer, include a mechanism for acceptance, and provides for entry of judgment or a legal equivalent if accepted.” (Ayers, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1293; see also § 998, subd. (b).) Ford’s offer met those requirements.

11 We note Slater’s appellate brief is inconsistent on the timing of the claimed sale. It sometimes states he sold the truck before Ford made the section 998 offer. But it also says he rejected Ford’s offer and “subsequently sold the vehicle for approximately $31,500.” (Italics added.) We need not dwell on this inconsistency, as we conclude Slater’s arguments based on the sale of the truck do not carry the day.

13 A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1253.) Thus, Slater has forfeited this argument by failing to provide the necessary supporting record references. The second—and even more fundamental—problem with this argument is that it ignores the terms of the judgment. In making the comparison required by section 998, we are required to compare the value of the statutory settlement offer to the value of the judgment. (See Ayers, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1307–1308 [“‘A judgment is more favorable to the plaintiff than a prior settlement offer only if the value of the plaintiff’s recovery in the judgment . . . exceeds the value of the offer’”].) The judgment required Slater to surrender the vehicle with clear title prior to Slater’s recovery of $38,231.58. Thus, the entire premise of Slater’s argument—that he was entitled to sell the truck, keep the proceeds, and then add them to the amount of the judgment for purposes of section 998, subdivision (c)(1)—is contrary to the judgment, which ordered him to surrender the truck to Ford. To the extent Slater is suggesting the trial court erred in ordering him to surrender the truck as part of the judgment, the burden was on him to challenge the judgment and seek relief. Yet there is no indication in the record Slater sought in any way to correct the judgment in the trial court, and he does not argue on appeal that he attempted to do so. Although Slater filed a notice of appeal from the judgment, his appeal was dismissed after he failed to file his opening brief. Slater also points to the California Supreme Court’s 2024 opinion in Niedermeier and asserts “Ford is not entitled to any credit or offset for the value of the subject vehicle that Slater sold and does not have to return nor can he return.” But again, the judgment required Slater to surrender the car. To the extent Slater is suggesting Niedermeier 14 would have required reversal of the judgment on a direct appeal on this 12 ground, he did not seek that relief. Slater’s next argument takes a different, but related, approach. Slater correctly points out one of the requirements of a valid section 998 offer is that the offer be “‘sufficiently certain and capable of valuation.’” (See Covert v. FCA USA, LLC (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 821, 841 [“‘[a]ny nonmonetary terms or conditions must be sufficiently certain and capable of valuation to allow the court to determine whether the judgment is more favorable than the offer’”].) Slater argues “[t]he vehicle surrender requirement in Ford’s offer was not ‘sufficiently certain and capable of valuation’ given that Slater had already sold the vehicle,” and that requirement therefore was “impossible.” Setting aside the fact that Slater’s briefing also states that he sold the vehicle after the offer was made, as explained above, Slater has waived any argument based on the purported sale of the truck and his retention of the sale proceeds because of his failure to provide the necessary supporting record citations.

12 In Niedermeier, our Supreme Court “conclude[d] that in an action pursuant to section 1794, neither a trade-in credit nor sale proceeds reduce the statutory restitution remedy set forth in section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) at least where, as here, a consumer has been forced to trade in or sell a defective vehicle due to the manufacturer’s failure to comply with the [Song-Beverly] Act.” (Niedermeier, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 801, italics added.) Our Supreme Court noted it was not deciding in Niedermeier how the damages calculation might be impacted when “a manufacturer has violated the [Song-Beverly] Act but has a good faith and reasonable belief that a statutory obligation to pay restitution does not exist” or when “a buyer sells or trades in a vehicle before a manufacturer has the opportunity to comply with its obligation to promptly pay restitution.” (Id. at p. 819, fn. 8.)

15 Slater also points to the provision in the section 998 offer that Slater would inform Ford of the amount of any remaining loan balance on the truck, and Ford would then withhold that amount from the settlement payment to Slater and instead pay that amount directly to the lienholder. According to Slater, “the payoff had to be deducted from the stated amount of $42,151.58,” which made “the actual net amount to plaintiff substantially less than the judgment.” We disagree that this provision makes the value of the section 998 offer less than the value of the judgment. Both the judgment and the section 998 offer required Slater to surrender the truck. The judgment required Slater to surrender the truck with clear title and free of any lien, and the section 998 offer similarly required Slater to surrender the truck with clear title, except if there was an outstanding loan, Ford would withhold that amount from the settlement payment and pay that amount directly to the lienholder. But this difference does not mean that the amount of the loan should be deducted from the $42,151.58 in the section 998 offer in order to compare the offer and judgment for purposes of section 998, subdivision (c)(1). That is because, although Slater would be receiving less cash from Ford under the offer if there was an outstanding loan, he effectively would be receiving equivalent value by having his debt paid. For example, if Slater had accepted the offer and owed $10,000 on the vehicle loan at the time, Ford would have paid $32,151.58 to Slater and $10,000 to the lienholder, which is effectively $42,151.58 in value to Slater in that he received $32,151.58 in cash and had $10,000 of debt eliminated. In that hypothetical scenario, Slater effectively would be no worse off than if Ford had paid to him the entire $42,151.58 in cash and he then paid $10,000 to the lienholder.13 Slater claims this case is analogous to MacQuiddy v. Mercedes- Benz USA, LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1036. It is not. In MacQuiddy, a 16 section 998 offer included a term that the defendant would repurchase the vehicle “‘in an undamaged condition, save normal wear and tear.’” (MacQuiddy, at pp. 1041, 1050.) The court concluded, “[b]ecause of the undefined and subjective nature of the term that Mercedes-Benz would repurchase the ‘undamaged’ car, . . . the section 998 offer was at least ambiguous, and was therefore not valid.” (Id. at p. 1050.) MacQuiddy is inapposite because the section 998 offer here did not contain a similar provision requiring the vehicle to be surrendered in an undamaged condition. Finally, Slater argues Ford failed to provide an adequate record on appeal because it did not provide a transcript of the trial or a transcript of the hearing on the competing cost motions. Slater therefore urges us to reject Ford’s appeal based on “the cardinal rule of appellate review that a judgment or order of the trial court is presumed correct and prejudicial error must be affirmatively shown.” (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.) Slater is correct that Ford, as the appellant, “‘has the burden of providing an adequate record’” for our review. (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc., supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 187.) He also is correct that “dismissal of an appeal may be warranted in the absence of a reporter’s transcript when such a transcript is necessary for meaningful review.” (Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 933.) But Slater’s argument fails because we find the appellate record is adequate for our review of the trial court’s order. (See People ex rel. Harris & Becerra v. Shine (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 524, 533 [“Because the absence of a reporter’s transcript does not impair our review of the Fee Order, there is no ground for declaring a forfeiture by the People”].) The record includes, among other things, the judgment, the parties’ competing briefs and declarations 17 regarding costs, the section 998 offer, and the trial court’s written order. Ford’s arguments on appeal do not require us to consider either the transcript of the hearing on the motions or the transcript of the trial. Nor does Slater assert there was any specific evidence that was presented at the hearing on the motions or at the trial that would require affirming the order that is not already in the record on appeal. Slater asserts Ford “included arguments in their brief that would require review of the transcript.” According to Slater, a transcript of the hearing on the cost motions is necessary “to fully review [Ford’s] argument that the trial court abused its discretion striking Ford’s request for [c]osts as unreasonable.” Ford, however, does not make that argument on appeal, and the trial court’s order did not strike Ford’s request for costs because they were unreasonable. The court did not reach the issue of whether Ford’s costs were unreasonable given its determination that Ford was not entitled to costs 14 under section 998, subdivision (c)(1). In sum, Ford made a valid offer under section 998, and section 998, subdivision (c)(1), applies here because the record shows Slater failed to obtain a more favorable judgment than Ford’s offer. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying Ford’s motion to tax costs as to Slater’s postoffer costs under section 998, subdivision (c)(1), and we remand the matter to the court to determine the specific costs that should be taxed on this ground. In 14 Slater also argues “Ford contends the 998 is the best offer yet fails to provide the transcript as to all of the damages at the time of the 998 including the payoff. Without providing a transcript of those arguments.” It is not clear what Slater is attempting to argue here. To the extent Slater is suggesting Ford needed to provide a transcript showing the amount Slater owed on a loan at the time of the section 998 offer, as discussed above, Ford did not need to do so to prevail on this appeal.

18 all other respects, the order as to Ford’s motion to tax costs is affirmed. The court also erred for the same reason in granting Slater’s motion to tax Ford’s costs, but the court did not reach what specific costs Ford was entitled to under section 998, subdivision (c)(1), and whether any of Ford’s claimed costs 15 should be taxed on a different ground. We therefore reverse the court’s order granting Slater’s motion to tax Ford’s costs and remand the matter to the court to make those determinations. DISPOSITION The postjudgment order is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appellant shall recover its costs on appeal.

GOODING, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SCOTT, J.

SCHWARM, J.* *Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

15 Slater asserts, without citation to the record, the trial court “found Ford’s costs unreasonable.” As discussed above, the court’s order made no such finding.