gno.law

District Court, S.D. California · 3:26-cv-04829 · 2026-09-23 · Unknown

Wilfredo Jesus Bastidas Mejias v. Gregory J. Archambeault, et al.

Proceeding
district
Area
civil
Panel
Andrew G. Schopler (author)

Analysis

A model's reading — qwen3.8-27b, prompt own-v1, 2026-10-13T20:16Z · confidence high

The court considered a third habeas petition challenging the petitioner's immigration detention following the revocation of his parole. The court granted the petition and ordered the petitioner's immediate release on the same terms as his prior parole.

What the court decidedThe model
Granting the habeas petition and ordering the petitioner's release
“Thus, Bastidas Mejias’s latest habeas petition is GRANTED. Respondents are ordered to release him subject to the same terms and conditions of his prior parole.”
agree with court
The court correctly applied the abuse of the writ doctrine by finding that the petitioner demonstrated 'cause' for not raising the claim earlier (lack of access to government records) and 'prejudice' (the government's concession that the revocation was unlawful). The remedy of release is consistent with the court's cited precedent in similar circumstances.

The order itself: sound — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly identifies the legal standard for successive petitions, applies the facts to the 'cause' and 'prejudice' prongs, and relies on a direct concession by the government to establish prejudice. The remedy is supported by cited district court precedent.

How this analysis was made · dispute it

unusual disposition

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Wilfredo Jesus BASTIDAS MEJIAS, Case No.: 26-cv-4829-AGS-DEB 4 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING HABEAS PETITION (ECF 1) AND ORDERING 5 v. RELEASE 6 Gregory J. ARCHAMBEAULT, et al. 7 Respondents. 8 9 Petitioner Wilfredo Bastidas Mejias returns for a third attempt at a writ of habeas 10 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his immigration detention. In his first case, this 11 Court ordered “that petitioner receive a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) . . . .” 12 See Bartidas v. LaRose, 26-cv-3068-AGS-DEB, ECF 5, at 1 (S.D. Cal. May 15, 2026). At 13 that bond hearing, an Immigration Judge found that Bastidas Mejias was “a flight risk” and 14 denied him bond. See Bastidas Mejias, 26-cv-3715-AGS-DEB, ECF 8, at 1 (S.D. Cal. July 15 21, 2026). His second petition, which “omit[ted] any mention of that hearing,” was denied 16 as an “abuse of the writ” for raising the same argument “he made in his first petition just a 17 few months” earlier. See id. at 1–2. 18 In this petition, his third, Bastidas Mejias “acknowledges the complete procedural 19 history,” but now contests “whether [the Department of Homeland Security] lawfully 20 revoked the conditional liberty it granted” to him before it arrested him. (See ECF 1, at 2.) 21 Respondents do not dispute that he was previously granted release nor respond to his 22 arguments that it was inappropriately revoked. Instead, they argue that this petition, like 23 his second one, must be dismissed as an “abuse of the writ” because “this argument was 24 available to him at the time of filing” his original petition. (ECF 7, at 3.) This time, though, 25 respondents’ abuse-of-the-writ arguments fail. 26 The “abuse of the writ doctrine forbids the reconsideration of claims that were or 27 could have been raised in a prior habeas petition.” Eldridge v. Howard, 70 F.4th 543, 551 28 (9th Cir. 2023). Such a “successive petition” “must be dismissed unless the petitioner can 1 show (1) cause for bringing a successive petition and that prejudice would result or (2) that 2 a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to entertain the claim.” 3 Eldridge, 70 F.4th at 551. There’s no question that this claim—that his previously granted 4 parole was improvidently revoked—existed at the time he filed his last two petitions. But 5 Bastidas Mejias contends that his failure to do so is excused by cause and prejudice. 6 “[T]he cause standard requires the petition to show that some objective factor 7 external” to petitioner “impeded” his “efforts to raise the claim” previously. McCleskey v. 8 Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (cleaned up). Bastidas Mejias, who has brought all three 9 petitions without an attorney, offers such an objective factor: “Petitioner lacked access to 10 the Government’s revocation record and did not know whether a revocation decision 11 existed, who made it, or the basis for it.” (ECF 8, at 2.) “Those are facts primarily within 12 [the Department of Homeland Security’s] possession.” (Id.) As Bastidas Mejias has shown 13 that the factual “basis for [his] claim was not reasonably available” before, he had “cause” 14 for failing to raise this argument earlier. See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494. 15 That leaves the question of prejudice, which is even more straightforward. 16 Respondents don’t deny his claim of error, seemingly conceding that they inappropriately 17 revoked his parole. (See ECF 7 (addressing only the abuse of the writ doctrine).) Thus, 18 Bastidas Mejias has shown “actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which he 19 complains.” McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494. 20 When the government conceded that it lacked any lawful basis for revoking parole 21 in the past, this Court has ordered the petitioner’s immediate release on the same terms as 22 the original parole. See, e.g., Reyes Hernandez v. Mullen, No. 26-cv-5208-AGS-DEB, 23 ECF 5, at 1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2026). On this record, there is no reason to break from that 24 precedent. Thus, Bastidas Mejias’s latest habeas petition is GRANTED. Respondents are 25 ordered to release him subject to the same terms and conditions of his prior parole. The 26 Clerk must issue a judgment and close this case. 27 28 1 || Dated: September 23, 2026 3 Hon. rew G. Schopler 4 United States District Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28