Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 MADINAKHON KHAKIMOVA, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00795-RBM-MSB 10 Petitioner, ORDER DENIED PETITIONER’S 11 v. MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 12 WARDEN OF OTAY MESA DETENTION CENTER, et al., 13 [Doc. 17] Respondents. 14 15 16 On June 10, 2026, this Court granted Petitioner Madinakhon Khakimova’s 17 (“Petitioner”) Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Amended Petition”) (Doc. 18 9) and ordered Petitioner released on conditions deemed appropriate by immigration 19 authorities pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h)(1). (Doc. 12.) 20 Now pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Renewed Motion for Temporary 21 Restraining Order (“Renewed TRO Motion”). (Doc. 17.) Petitioner states that U.S. 22 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) has taken her back into custody, despite 23 this Court’s June 10, 2026 Order, “and informed counsel that Petitioner is scheduled to be 24 deported [on September 23, 2026] absent immediate judicial intervention.” (Id. at 2.) 25 Petitioner therefore seeks “a [TRO] to prevent Respondents from deporting, removing, 26 transferring for removal, or otherwise effectuating her removal to Africa or any third 27 country pending further order of this Court.” (Id.) For the reasons set forth below, 28 Petitioner’s Renewed TRO Motion (Doc. 17) is DENIED for lack of jurisdiction. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Kyrgyzstan, entered the United States on or around 3 September 26, 2024. (Doc. 17 at 2.) “On August 25, 2025, an Immigration Judge ordered 4 Petitioner removed and granted withholding of removal as to Russia and Kyrgyzstan, and 5 the decision became final on September 24, 2025.” (Id.) “Petitioner was detained for an 6 extended period beginning September 26, 2024, and Respondents previously conceded 7 they could not establish a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable 8 future.” (Id.) 9 On February 9, 2026, Petitioner filed the Petition claiming her immigration detention 10 had become unconstitutionally prolonged. (See Doc. 1.) The Court denied the Petition 11 with leave to amend. (Doc. 8.) Petitioner filed the Amended Petition on April 17, 2026. 12 (Doc. 9.) On June 10, 2026, this Court granted the Amended Petition after Respondents 13 acknowledged they could not establish a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in 14 the reasonably foreseeable future under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and 15 ordered Respondents to release Petitioner. (Doc. 12.) 16 On September 18, 2026, Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary 17 Restraining Order (“First TRO Motion”) stating that “ICE has now taken Petitioner back 18 into custody without providing proper notice to Petitioner, Petitioner’s counsel, or this 19 Court.” (Doc. 14 at 2.) Shortly thereafter, the Court issued an order setting a briefing 20 schedule and ordered that Petitioner file an amended petition. (Doc. 15 at 2.) 21 Pursuant to this Court’s Order, Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ 22 of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Second Amended Petition”) (Doc. 16) as well 23 as the Renewed TRO Motion (Doc. 17) on September 22, 2026. In the Renewed TRO 24 Motion, Petitioner asserts that she was re-detained “without proper notice to Petitioner, 25 counsel, or this Court and transferred her out of this District.” (Doc. 17 at 2.) Petitioner 26 further states she “is currently detained at an ICE processing center in Louisiana and, 27 according to information provided to counsel, is scheduled to be deported to Africa or any 28 third country” on September 23, 2026. (Id.) “Respondents have not produced a valid travel 1 document, third-country acceptance evidence, removal itinerary, or any lawful 2 individualized justification permitting re-detention after this Court ordered release.” (Id. 3 at 3.)1 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 The legal standard for issuing a TRO is essentially identical to the standard for 6 issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 7 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). In the Ninth Circuit, “[a] party seeking a preliminary 8 injunction must meet one of two variants of the same standard.” All. for the Wild Rockies 9 v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017). Under the Winter standard, a party is entitled 10 to a preliminary injunction if he demonstrates that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; 11 (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the 12 balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter 13 v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A party must make a showing on all 14 four prongs. See A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Becerra, 901 F.3d 1166, 15 1167 (9th Cir. 2018). “[I]f a [petitioner] can only show that there are serious questions 16 going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a 17 preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips sharply in the 18 [petitioner’s] favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” All. for the Wild 19 Rockies, 865 F.3d at 1217 (cleaned up). 20 21 22 23 24 1 Respondents have not filed a response to the instant TRO Motion. Petitioner explains 25 that she seeks this emergency relief based on the Government’s representations that they plan to remove her today. (See Doc. 7 at 2.) The Court will therefore consider whether 26 the TRO Motion should be granted on the merits. See Rodas v. Samiea, No. 5:26-CV-65- 27 AB (SK), 2026 WL 184226, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2026) (“Emergency ex parte relief preventing Petitioner’s transfer from this district or removal from the country is appropriate 28 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. Jurisdiction 3 The Court need not reach the Winter factors or the merits of the underlying Second 4 Amended Petition because Petitioner has not shown why this Court, as opposed to the one 5 of the three district courts in Louisiana—where Petitioner is presently detained—is the 6 proper Court to consider her TRO Motion. 7 “The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own 8 jurisdiction[.]” FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990), holding modified 9 by City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004). The federal habeas 10 statute authorizes district courts to grant habeas relief “within their respective 11 jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). “The plain language of the habeas statute thus 12 confirms the general rule that for core habeas petitions challenging present physical 13 confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district: the district of confinement.” Rumsfeld 14 v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004). Habeas jurisdiction is established at the time of filing. 15 Johnson v. Gill, 883 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding a petitioner’s transfer to another 16 facility did not destroy jurisdiction established at the time of filing). “[T]he only federal 17 court that can properly entertain a habeas petition is one located in the ‘district in which 18 the applicant is held,’ in other words, the district of confinement.” Doe v. Garland, 109 19 F.4th 1188, 1198 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2242); see Lopez-Marroquin v. Barr, 20 955 F.3d 759, 759–60 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying the “district of confinement” rule to a 21 § 2241 petition challenging a noncitizen’s immigration detention). “[W]hen the 22 Government moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her 23 immediate custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any 24 respondent within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s 25 release.” Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 441 (citing Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944)). Where 26 a case is filed in the wrong division or district, the Court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the 27 interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been 28 brought.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). In this case, at the time of filing the Second Amended Petition, Petitioner was 2 || detained, and is presently detained, at an ICE processing center in Louisiana. (Doc. 17 at 3 As this District is not within Petitioner’s district of confinement, this Court lacks 4 || jurisdiction over the Second Amended Petition and cannot rule on the TRO Motion. See 5 || Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[JJurisdiction attaches on the initial 6 || filing for habeas corpus relief.”) (quoting Santillanes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 754 F.2d 7 888 (10th Cir. 1985)). 8 Petitioner may seek such emergency relief in the appropriate Louisiana district court 9 || within Petitioner’s district of confinement. Accordingly, the TRO Motion is DENIED for 10 || lack of jurisdiction. 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12 Based on the foregoing reasons, the TRO Motion (Doc. 17) is DENIED. 13 || Additionally, Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE on or before September 30, 14 as to why the Second Amended Petition should not be dismissed for lack of 15 jurisdiction or otherwise transferred to the appropriate Louisiana district court for further 16 || proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 || DATE: September 23, 2026 19 pr Bormeds, Margy 20 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28