Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TAHN VAN TRAN, Case No.: 26-CV-4773 JLS (DEB)

12 Petitioner, ORDER (1) GRANTING 13 v. AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND (2) 14 WARDEN OF THE OTAY MESA DENYING AS MOOT MOTION DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 15 FOR TEMPORARY Respondents. RESTRAINING ORDER 16 17 (ECF Nos. 6, 2) 18 Presently before the Court is Tanh Van Tran’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 19 Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 6). Also before the Court is Respondents’ 20 Return (“Ret.,” ECF No. 16) and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 17). For the 21 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 22 BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner, a native of Vietnam, alleges that he came to the United States in 1979 and 24 was granted lawful permanent residence. Pet. at 1. Between his arrival in the U.S. and 25 2010, Petitioner has been convicted of several crimes, ranging from burglary to driving 26 under the influence of alcohol. Id.; Ret. at 2. In 2002, Petitioner was placed into removal 27 proceedings whereafter an immigration judge ordered him removed. Pet. at 1. After 28 1 several months in detention, the government still could not effectuate his removal and 2 released him under supervision. Id. This process repeated several more times in the 3 intervening 24 years, all ending with the government failing to deport Petitioner and 4 releasing him under an order of supervision. Id. This time around, Petitioner was arrested 5 at his San Diego home on June 17, 2025. Id. at 2. Upon his arrest, Immigration and 6 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents “never explained why they were arresting him, nor 7 did they give him an informal interview at which he could contest his detention.” Id. 8 Petitioner has remained in detention ever since. Respondent’s claim that ICE has attempted 9 to obtain travel documents but have not yet received them. Ret. at 2. 10 LEGAL STANDARD 11 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 12 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 13 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 14 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 15 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez-Barajas v. Gonzales, 16 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 17 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 18 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 19 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 20 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 21 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 22 (citations omitted). 23 DISCUSSION 24 Petitioner brings two claims. First, that his re-detention violates 8 C.F.R. §§ 25 241.4(1) and 241.13(i). Pet. at 2. Second, that his continued detention violates Zadvydas 26 v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Id. at 5. Because Petitioner’s first 27 claim is sufficient to merit his release, the Court addresses only that claim. 28 1 When an alien has been found to be unlawfully present in the United States and a 2 final order of removal has been entered, they must be detained for ninety days (90) pending 3 the government’s efforts to secure their removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). This ninety- 4 day period is referred to as the “removal period.” 8 C.F.R. § 1231(a)(1)(A). After the 5 removal period, this statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period 6 reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States” and “does 7 not permit indefinite detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. A six-month period of post- 8 removal detention constitutes a “presumptively reasonable period of detention.” Id. at 701. 9 After this six-month period passes, the petitioner has the burden to “provide[] good reason 10 to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable 11 future.” Id. If the petitioner satisfies their initial burden, it then shifts to the Government 12 to rebut that showing. Id. “[F]or detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior 13 post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ 14 conversely would have to shrink.” Id. “[O]nce removal is no longer reasonably 15 foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. In that 16 case, the alien’s release may be conditioned on any of the various forms of conditioned 17 release, including an order of supervised release. Id. at 700. 18 Once ICE releases a non-citizen on supervised release, “ICE’s ability to re-detain 19 that noncitizen is constrained by its own regulations.” Nouri v. Herrera, SA CV 25-1905- 20 JFW(DBT), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (internal 21 citation omitted). ICE may re-detain a non-citizen released on an order of supervised 22 release “if, on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a 23 significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 24 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). ICE may also re-detain if the non-citizen “violates any of the 25 conditions of release.” Id. If ICE chooses to re-detain, the non-citizen must “be notified 26 of the reasons for revocation” and be afforded “an initial informal interview promptly after 27 his return to . . . custody to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for 28 revocation stated in the notification.” Id. The non-citizen may “submit any evidence or 1 information that [he] believes shows there is no significant likelihood [he may] be removed 2 in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that [he] has not violated the order of supervision.” 3 Id. 4 Here, Petitioner was ordered removed in 2002. Pet. at 1. About six months later, 5 Petitioner was released on an order of supervision because the government was unable to 6 remove him. Id. at 2. Petitioner has been re-apprehended and released from custody at 7 least three more times since then, presumably because his removal was not reasonably 8 foreseeable. Id.; see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–700 (“[I]f removal is not reasonably 9 foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer 10 authorized by statute.”). Regarding this most recent detention, Respondents claim that they 11 provided Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release and informal interview on 12 March 3, 2026. Ret. at 8. But in support of this contention, they cite to two nonexistent 13 exhibits. Id. The Court is thus unable to determine whether the alleged notice actually 14 provided Petitioner with the reasons for the revocation of his release. 15 Even if the notice was sufficient, Respondents arguments would fail for another 16 reason: the informal interview came entirely too late. Section 241.13(i)(3) mandates that 17 informal interviews be given “promptly” after re-detention, providing the non-citizen with 18 an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation outlined in the notice. 8 C.F.R. 19 § 241.13(i)(3). But here, the unsubstantiated interview came over eight months after 20 Petitioner was re-detained—hardly satisfying this promptness requirement. See Van Pham 21 v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2997-JES-KSC, 2025 WL 3280995, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) 22 (holding that the government failed to satisfy § 241.13(i)(3)’s promptness mandate when 23 the informal interview came sixty-seven days after the petitioner’s re-detention). 24 “Government agencies are required to follow their own regulations.” Hoac v. 25 Becerra, No. 25-cv-1740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) 26 (citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 US. 260, 268 (1954)). “[W]hen 27 ICE fails to follow its own regulations in revoking release, the detention is unlawful, and 28 the petitioner’s release must be ordered.” Truong v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2597-JES-MMP, 1 2025 WL 2988357, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025) (collecting cases). The Court finds that, 2 in violation of ICE’s regulations, the revocation of his parole without a prompt interview 3 justifies Petitioner’s release. See, e.g., Hoac, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (granting a TRO 4 where ICE failed to follow § 241.13(i)(3) procedures); Phakeokoth v. Noem, No. 25-cv- 5 2817 RBM (SBC), 2025 WL 3124341, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025) (same); Nouri, 2025 6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171809, at *11 (same); Tran v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02391-BTM-BLM, 7 2025 WL 3005347, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct 27, 2025) (granting a habeas petition on the same 8 grounds); Truong, 2025 WL 2988357, at *6 (same); Nguyen v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2792 LL 9 (VET), 2025 WL 3101979, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025) (same). 10 Additionally, notwithstanding the government’s procedural deficiencies, the Court 11 is not persuaded that Respondents have showed a change in circumstances such that there 12 is now a significant likelihood that Petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable 13 future. First, Petitioner has been subject to a final order of removal for twenty-four years, 14 and in those twenty-four years, there has been no progress on securing his removal. 15 Second, Respondents have failed to secure travel documents for Petitioner. Ret. at 8. The 16 many times Petitioner was detained, he was released because his removal was not 17 reasonably foreseeable. Respondents present no evidence that this has changed. See 18 generally Ret. 19 Therefore, because Respondents have failed to follow their own regulations in re- 20 detaining Petitioner and have failed to demonstrate that his removal is reasonably 21 foreseeable, the Court GRANTS the Petition. 22 CONCLUSION 23 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Amended Petition for Writ of 24 Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 6), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner 25 from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting Order of Supervision. The Court 26 ORDERS that Respondents cannot re-detain Petitioner without following the procedures 27 set out in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) and other implementing regulations. The Parties are 28 ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by September 29, 2026, confirming that Petitioner | been released. The Court DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for a Temporary 2 || Restraining Order (ECF No. 2). The Clerk of Court SHALL CLOSE the case. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: September 22, 2026 on. Janis L. Sammartino 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28