People v. Gonzalez CA2/2

Opinion

Filed 9/23/26 P. v. Gonzalez CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B343827

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA100818) v.

RICARDO GONZALEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Judith L. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed. Christina Vanarelli, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant and appellant Ricardo Gonzalez (defendant) appeals from a 2025 resentencing order. In his opening brief, for the first time, defendant contends the trial court violated the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) at his original sentencing in 2019. We conclude defendant’s claim regarding events that took place during his original sentencing hearing has been forfeited. As defendant has not alleged any issues arising from his 2025 resentencing hearing, we affirm the order. In 2018, defendant and his codefendant were convicted of the murder of Enrique Lopez, Jr. (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1), attempted murder of David Osuna (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2), and attempted murder of Jerry Frazier (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 4). As to count 1, the jury found true two special circumstance allegations—that the murder was perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle at persons outside the vehicle with the intent to cause death (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21)) and that defendant and his codefendant killed Lopez, Jr., while they were active participants in a criminal street gang and to further the activities of the gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). As to counts 1, 2, and 4, the jury found true allegations that defendant and his codefendant committed the offense for the benefit of a gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) and that a principal discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). The jury also convicted defendant of transportation for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 8) and possession of a controlled 1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 9). Defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) plus 55 years to life. In 2022, we vacated the gang-murder special-circumstance allegation and the gang enhancement and the gang-related firearm enhancement as to counts 1, 2 and 4. We remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. (People v. Gonzalez (Nov. 30, 2022, B302834) [nonpub. opn.].) In January 2025, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. Ahead of the hearing, defense counsel2 filed a resentencing motion asking the court to strike the “shooting from a vehicle” special circumstance and sentence defendant to an indeterminate life sentence. In support of the motion, counsel attached defendant’s mitigation report originally submitted as part of his “Franklin Proceeding.” The People indicated they would not retry defendant on the gang allegations or the gang- murder special circumstance. The court explained it was unable to consider the defense request to strike the remaining special circumstance based on section 1385.1. The court also indicated, even if the court had discretion to strike the allegation, it would not. The court struck the firearm enhancement, finding it to be “duplicative” of the allegation that the murder occurred by use of a gun. As to count 1, the court sentenced defendant to LWOP. As to counts 2 and 4, the court sentenced defendant to life with 2 Defendant was represented by Murray Meyer at trial and again for purposes of his 2025 resentencing.

3 the possibility of parole after seven years, and as to counts 8 and 9, the court sentenced defendant to the middle term of three years.3 The court ordered counts 8 and 9 to run concurrent to the sentence imposed in count 1. Defendant timely appealed. Defendant’s only contention on appeal is that the trial court violated the RJA at the time of his 2019 sentencing. Specifically, defendant argues, the trial court’s statement, “these guys went hunting. They are savages who were hunting for pr[e]y” was a per se violation because it “directly label[ed] him an animal.” Respondent contends defendant’s claim is moot because he has been resentenced, his claim was forfeited because he failed to bring the claim “as soon as practicable,” and the RJA was not violated or, if it was, any violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. To support the contention that defendant’s claim has been forfeited, respondent relies on People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804 (Lashon), People v. Quintero (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1060 (Quintero), People v. Corbi (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 25 (Corbi), and People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76. Presenting no authority, defendant contends his claim has not been forfeited because his “trial counsel, Murray Meyer, did not represent [him] in Gonzalez I[, his direct appeal, and a]t the time of the 2025 resentencing, there would have been no obvious reason for Mr. Meyer to have obtained the transcript of the 2019 sentencing.” As such, defendant asserts he “has 3 Defendant was originally sentenced to the upper term of four years on each count 8 and 9.

4 raised his RJA claim as soon as practicable after discovering the violation.”4 We disagree and find defendant forfeited his claim. Effective January 1, 2021, the RJA permits a criminal defendant to challenge a conviction or sentence on the ground it was obtained “on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a).) “When it was first passed, the RJA applied only prospectively, to cases in which judgment had not yet been entered as of the [RJA]’s effective date ….” (People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 946.) “But in 2022, the Legislature extended the [RJA] to additional categories of cases, effective at various points over the next several years.” (Ibid.) Relevant here, the 2022 amendments, which became effective January 1, 2023, made the RJA retroactively applicable to all cases in which the judgments were not final. (Wilson, at p. 946; Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 810.) Thus the RJA applied to defendant’s case as of January 2023, two years before his January 2025 resentencing hearing. (Lashon, at p. 810.) An RJA claim may be raised on direct appeal from conviction or sentence if the claim is based on the trial record. (§ 745, subd. (b).) However, such claims are still subject to appellate rules of forfeiture. (Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 810–811.) In Lashon, the court observed the Legislature “did not include any language indicating a section 745 claim could be presented on direct appeal for the first time.” (Id. at p. 812.) Lashon also noted the Legislature included a waiver provision, providing that an RJA motion may be deemed waived if not 4 We note, defendant requested a stay of this appeal to “remand to the superior court to file a[n] [RJA] motion” (see § 745, subd. (b)), but this court denied the request.

5 “made as soon as practicable upon the defendant learning of the alleged violation.” (§ 745, subd. (c); see Lashon, at p. 813.) Here, as noted, Meyer was defendant’s attorney during his 2019 trial and sentencing and again during his 2025 resentencing. Therefore Meyer would have been aware of the grounds for an RJA claim in the trial court and could have brought an RJA motion prior to or during the 2025 resentencing. He did not. We find defendant’s claim there would have been no reason to review the 2019 sentencing transcript in preparation for the 2025 resentencing is unavailing. First, as noted, Meyer was present for the 2019 sentencing hearing, and second, the idea that counsel would fail to review the 16-page sentencing transcript in preparation for the upcoming resentencing hearing is unpersuasive. Thus, because the proper time to bring the RJA claim in the trial court would have been any time after January 2023, defendant “forfeited [his] RJA claim by failing to raise it in the trial court.” (Quintero, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1077, citing Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 813.) Moreover, “had defense counsel presented the RJA claim to the trial court as soon as practicable, the defense could have pursued ‘a remedy specific to the [potential] violation’ much sooner”—specifically, at the time of his resentencing. (Corbi, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 42, citing § 745, subd. (e).) The claim is forfeited.5 5 We note, defendant is not without remedy, as he may raise claims concerning the RJA in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Lashon, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 817; see § 745, subd. (b).) We express no opinion on the merits of defendant’s claim.

6 DISPOSITION The trial court’s orders upon resentencing are affirmed.

CHAVEZ, J. We concur:

LUI, P. J.

GOORVITCH, J.