People v. Rogers CA1/2

Opinion

Filed 9/23/26 P. v. Rogers CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, A174710 v. DAMON WADE ROGERS, (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. CR2500396) Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 On February 13, 2025, the Humboldt County District Attorney filed a felony complaint charging Damon Wade Rogers with willful infliction of corporal injury on a domestic partner. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count one.) On August 12, 2025, rather than set a preliminary hearing, Rogers executed a written plea form and waiver of rights, representing that Rogers would plead guilty to count one in exchange for a three-year grant of felony probation, and as a condition of that probation, would serve up to 120 days in the county jail; Rogers, his attorney, the prosecutor, and the court signed the 1 Because this appeal raises no substantial issues of law or fact, we resolve it by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; Ct. App., First Dist., Local Rules of Ct., rule 19, Abbreviated Opinions.)

1 written plea form. At the change of plea hearing held that same day, the parties stipulated to a factual basis: on February 10, 2025, Rogers was in a dating relationship with the victim when he unlawfully and willfully inflicted corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition when he kicked her and left injuries on her head and face. They also agreed that, despite Rogers’s prior record, “unusual circumstances” rendered him eligible for felony probation.2 During its verbal voir dire prior to taking the guilty plea, the court advised Rogers that “If eligible for probation and probation is granted in the matter, you could be placed on supervised probation for a period of up to three years.” The probation report prepared in advance of sentencing acknowledged that, “as the conditional plea agreement stipulates [Rogers] is to be granted probation, it would appear that an unusual circumstance has been found” and did not address “the Criteria Affecting Probation” because the conditional plea form stipulated to a grant of probation “with a 120-day jail cap.” However, the probation department ultimately wrote in its report, “It is further recommended [Rogers] be granted FOUR (4) YEARS SUPERVISED PROBATION.” At the September 2, 2025 sentencing hearing before the same judge who accepted the guilty plea, the court adopted the recommendation of the probation department and sentenced Rogers to the middle term of three years in state prison with the execution of sentence suspended, conditioned on his successful completion of four years formal supervised probation and 120 days in the county jail. Neither the court nor any party present noted, explained, or challenged on the record the imposition of the four-year probationary term.

2 Penal Code section 1203, subdivision (e) provides that defendants who have sustained two or more prior felony convictions are ineligible for probation except in “unusual cases in which the interests of justice would best be served if the person is granted probation.”

2 Rogers filed a timely notice of appeal on October 29, 2025. The trial court granted Rogers’s request for a certificate of probable cause. DISCUSSION Here, Rogers argues the trial court erred by imposing a four-year grant of probation inconsistent with the negotiated plea agreement and, in the event we find the claim noncognizable for lack of objection, Rogers argues his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.3 The Attorney General “agrees that the court erroneously violated the terms of the plea agreement by placing [Rogers] on probation for a period longer than the agreed-upon three years” and “further agree[s] that [Rogers’s] challenge to the court’s violation of the plea agreement is not waived” and thus does not address Rogers’s alterative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We accept the Attorney General’s concessions. The Attorney General suggests the “matter should be remanded with directions for the trial court to place [Rogers] on probation for a period of three years or allow him the opportunity to withdraw his plea.” However, on reply, Rogers clarified he does not seek to withdraw his plea and requests that we “order specific performance of the plea agreement by directing the trial court to place [Rogers] on probation for three years.” “The usual remedies for violation of a plea bargain are to allow defendant to withdraw the plea and go to trial on the original charges, or to specifically enforce the plea bargain.” (People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 860–861.) “Specific enforcement is appropriate when it will implement the reasonable expectations of the parties without binding the trial judge to a 3 Rogers also challenged a term of his probation requiring him to seek “treatment” for “substance use disorder.” However, Rogers subsequently withdrew the argument “due to intervening trial court proceedings rendering the issue moot.” Therefore, we do not address his initial claim.

3 disposition that he or she considers unsuitable under all the circumstances.” (Id. at p. 861.) Here, the record reflects the imposition of a four-year probationary term was an oversight as opposed to an exercise of discretion by the court, which stated that after “read[ing] and consider[ing]” the probation report, it was inclined “to go along with . . . the offer of the People in [this] matter” but then imposed the four-year probationary term recommended by the probation department. The probation report does not provide a basis for its recommended increase, and the court gave no indication that it intended deviate from its representation at the change of plea hearing that any term of probation would be “for a period of up to three years,” nor did it explain the reason for the increased probationary term imposed. Accordingly, under these circumstances, specific enforcement is the appropriate remedy. (People v. Mancheno, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 861.) DISPOSITION The four-year term of probation is stricken and modified to reflect the agreed-upon three-year term. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The court is directed to prepare an amended order of probation reflecting the three-year term and serve a copy of the amended order on the chief probation officer of the Humboldt County Probation Department along with this opinion.

4 DESAUTELS, J.

We concur:

RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.

MILLER, J.

People v. Rogers (A174710)