People v. McCracken CA5

Opinion

Filed 9/23/26 P. v. McCracken CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, F090097 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CF01659787) v. MICHAEL ALAN MCCRACKEN, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT* APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan B. Conklin, Judge. John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the State Attorney General, Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- * Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and Meehan, J. INTRODUCTION Appellant and defendant Michael Alan McCracken (defendant) was charged with murder with two special circumstances. In 2002, he entered into a negotiated disposition and pleaded guilty to first degree murder with personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon, and also pleaded guilty to separate felony offenses of burglary and unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. In entering the plea, defendant admitted that he stabbed and killed the victim. The court dismissed both special circumstances as part of the plea agreement. He was sentenced to 25 years to life for first degree murder, plus seven years eight months for the other offenses and personal use enhancement. In 2025, the trial court denied defendant’s petition for resentencing filed pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6, and found he failed to state a prima facie case for relief because he admitted to being the actual killer at the time he entered his plea. On appeal from the denial of his section 1172.6 petition, appellate counsel filed a brief which summarized the facts and procedural history with citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked this court to independently review the record pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. In response to this court’s invitation, defendant filed a supplemental letter brief. We address his contentions and affirm the trial court’s denial of his section 1172.6 petition. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On October 10, 2000, a complaint was filed in the Fresno County Superior Court charging defendant with count 1, murder of John Renna on or about August 15, 2000, and alleged two special circumstances: he committed the murder while engaged in the commission of a robbery, and also while engaged in the commission of a burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).

1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2. On May 18, 2001, an amended complaint was filed that again charged appellant with murder with the same two special circumstances, and further alleged he personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon, a knife, in the commission of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). On May 31, 2001, the information was filed that again charged appellant with murder with same two special circumstances and the same personal use enhancement. Defendant’s Plea and Sentence On September 9, 2002, appellant entered into a negotiated disposition. On that date, he signed a “FELONY ADVISEMENT, WAIVER OF RIGHTS, AND PLEA FORM” (plea form) and initialed each paragraph that stated the following terms for his guilty pleas. Defendant pleaded guilty to count 1, murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and admitted the personal use enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The parties “stipulated [the murder] to be a [f]elony [m]urder due to underlying [sections] 211/212.5[, subdivision ](a)” robbery. Defendant also pleaded guilty to a “new” count 2, burglary (§§ 459, 460), and a “new” count 3, unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851). Defendant did not admit the special circumstances. The trial court dismissed the remaining allegations, consisting of both special circumstances. Defendant’s maximum possible sentence was life in prison plus seven years eight months, he would be on lifetime parole, and he waived all accumulated time credits and his right to an appeal. Defendant also initialed the following paragraph that stated the factual basis for his plea: “[Defendant and] accomplices burglarized [Renna]’s home to get keys to steal [Renna]’s car. During later contact between [Renna and defendant], a struggle ensued in which [Renna] was stabbed & killed by [defendant].”

3. Defendant initialed the paragraphs that stated he had enough time to discuss the case and possible defenses with his lawyer; and stated his constitutional rights, and his understanding and waiver of those rights. Defendant signed the plea form and declared under penalty of perjury that he read, understood, and initialed each provision, and everything on the plea form was true and correct. Defendant’s attorney signed the paragraph that stated he went over the plea form with defendant, explained each of his rights, answered all of his questions about the plea, discussed the facts of the case with defendant, and explained the consequences of his plea, the elements of the offenses, and the possible defenses, and he concurred in defendant’s decision to plead guilty. The trial court signed the paragraph at the end of the plea form that stated it reviewed the form, questioned defendant about his constitutional rights, and found defendant had “expressly, knowingly, understandingly and intelligently waived his … constitutional rights,” and found “defendant’s plea(s) and admission(s) [were] freely and voluntarily made with an understanding of the nature and consequences thereof, and that there is a factual basis for the plea(s).” Thereafter, defendant entered his pleas and admissions, and the trial court dismissed both special circumstances. On October 8, 2002, defendant was sentenced to seven years eight months plus 25 years to life consistent with the plea agreement, based on 25 years to life for count 1, first degree murder, plus one year for the personal use enhancement, the consecutive upper term of six years for count 2, first degree residential burglary, and a consecutive eight months (one-third the midterm) for count 3, unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle.2 2 It is clear from the entirety of the record that defendant pleaded to and was convicted of first degree murder. As stated in the plea form, the trial court dismissed both special circumstances, and defendant’s maximum possible sentence was 25 years to 4. SECTION 1172.6 PETITION On February 13, 2025, defendant, in propria persona, filed a petition in the trial court for resentencing of his first degree murder conviction pursuant to section 1172.6. He used a preprinted form where he checked boxes to declare that a complaint, information, or indictment was filed that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, he was convicted of murder after a plea, and that he could not be presently convicted of murder after the amendments to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 1989. He requested appointment of counsel. In addition to the petition, defendant, again acting in propria persona, filed points and authorities that stated he was 16 years old when he “was assaulted by an older man” who “became [defendant’s] victim,” and he “stabbed a man who had stabbed him.” Defendant further alleged he entered into the plea agreement because of alleged ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct, there was a “gross miscarriage of justice,” the prosecution failed to turn over evidence favorable to the defense, and his appeals were “time barred.” Defendant asserted an evidentiary hearing must be held because he was not the only participant, and there were police reports about more suspects being involved.3 life plus a determinate term. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life, consistent with both the plea agreement, and the term for first degree murder without a special circumstance. (§§ 189, subd. (a), 190, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a); see, e.g., People v. Lopez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1002, 1006 [first degree murder is “punishable by ‘imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 25 years to life’ ”].) 3 Also in his points and authorities, defendant discussed several legal principles that were inapplicable to a plea to first degree murder with personal use of a knife, such as the elements of attempted murder, purported instructional errors, the “kill zone” theory, 5. Defendant claimed he was eligible for resentencing because he was not a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to life, based on the factors in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522. Also in support of his petition, defendant attached three pages that were marked as excerpts from “Attorney’s Briefs.” These excerpts addressed an alleged interview by an officer with two juvenile females and described them as “the girls found with the minor/defendant after the alleged homicide and car chase/crash.” Defendant alleged the prosecution had unreported interviews with both female juveniles, one juvenile may have given a statement inconsistent with her previous interview, and the prosecution purportedly failed to disclose these statements to the defense. The trial court appointed counsel for defendant. The Prosecution’s Opposition On April 7, 2025, the prosecution filed opposition to defendant’s petition, and argued defendant was ineligible for resentencing. Defendant failed to state a prima facie case under section 1172.6 because he admitted to being the actual killer in the plea form. As a result of that admission, he was not convicted based on imputed malice and his conviction was still valid after the amendments to sections 188 and 189. The Trial Court’s Denial of the Petition On July 1, 2025, the trial court held the prima facie hearing. Defense counsel asked the court to review the record of conviction, which included the complaint, information, and plea form. The prosecutor replied that based on the “change of plea discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle and into another motor vehicle, and a purported jury finding on personal use of a firearm. Defendant raised issues that were irrelevant to a section 1172.6 petition and not cognizable in this appeal, including that he was entitled to a youthful offender hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, and he should be resentenced pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d), regarding juvenile offenders who are sentenced to life without parole.

6. form in this case, as well as the record of conviction as a whole, the defendant fails to make a prima facie case” because he stipulated to the factual basis that “[Renna] was stabbed and killed by defendant, showing that he’s the actual killer.” The trial court agreed with the prosecutor and denied defendant’s petition. The court found the plea form “clearly establishes the defendant was, and admitted to be, the actual killer in this case.” The court found “beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the actual killer, that there was no theory of natural and probable consequences relied on in this case that would allow for relief.”4 On July 2, 2025, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. DISCUSSION As explained above, appellate counsel filed a brief with this court pursuant to Delgadillo. The brief also included counsel’s declaration that appellant was advised he could file his own brief with this court. In response to this court’s invitation, appellant filed a supplemental letter brief and raised several issues. I. Section 1172.6 We begin with the relevant statutory provisions. In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) which “altered the 4 On February 13, 2025, when defendant filed, in propria persona, points and authorities in support of his petition, he asserted the preliminary hearing transcript could not be relied on to make the prima facie determination. Less than one month later, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, that the trial court may “rely on unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory, checkbox allegations” in a petition to make the prima facie determination. (Id. at p. 564.) The trial court conducted defendant’s prima facie hearing after Patton was decided and could have reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript. The court did not do so, however, likely because of defendant’s admission to being the actual killer as stated in the factual basis.

7. substantive law of murder in two areas. First, with certain exceptions, it narrowed the application of the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e) to the Penal Code. [Citation.] Under that provision, ‘A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel), italics added.) “Second, Senate Bill 1437 imposed a new requirement that, except in cases of felony murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought’ to be convicted of murder. [Citation.] ‘Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ [Citation.] One effect of this requirement was to eliminate liability for murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.) Senate Bill 1437 also added former section 1170.95, now renumbered as section 1172.6, which created a procedural mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.) When a petition for resentencing is filed, the trial court shall appoint counsel if requested by petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) After counsel is appointed and the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefing, “the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)

8. In making the prima facie determination, a petitioner is ineligible for resentencing “as a matter of law if the record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations,” that the petitioner could still be convicted after the amendments to sections 188 and 189. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13–14, italics added.) While a defendant is not required to admit the truth of specific facts at a plea hearing, that does not mean a defendant cannot do so. (People v. Fisher (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1029.) Although “there may be details that a defendant would not contest because they are not relevant to a plea agreement, that the defendant … killed [the victim] … is not a detail that people blithely admit simply because the admissions will have no immediate consequences.” (Ibid.) A defendant would not admit that he is the actual killer “if he did not believe it to be true.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Ramos (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 460, 463, 466.) A petitioner is not entitled to any relief under section 1172.6 where the record makes clear that the petitioner was convicted of first degree murder as the actual killer. (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233; People v. Nino (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 844, 849.) Analysis Defendant was charged with murder with the burglary-murder and robbery-murder special circumstances. He pleaded guilty to first degree murder with the personal use enhancement, and also pleaded guilty to separate felony charges of burglary and unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. He did not admit any of the special circumstances, and the trial court dismissed both special circumstances as part of the plea agreement. When defendant entered his plea, defense counsel did not offer a stipulation to a generic factual basis. Instead, defendant personally initialed the admission that he “stabbed [and] killed” Renna. The trial court correctly denied defendant’s petition for failing to state a prima facie case based on the record of conviction. Defendant’s 9. admission in the plea form that he was the actual killer established as a matter of law that he was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. II. Challenges to Validity of Plea In his supplemental letter brief, defendant argues he had a valid self-defense claim to felony murder and he was prevented from raising that defense. Defendant further argues his plea was coerced and his free will was “overborne” by “government agents” with threats of being sentenced to the death penalty or life without parole to force him to accept the plea. (Id. at pp. 6–7.) Defendant’s challenges to the validity of his plea are not cognizable in this appeal from the trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. (People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865; People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.) III. The Nature of Defendant’s Pleas and Admission Throughout his supplemental letter brief, defendant repeatedly asserts that in entering his pleas, he made “a coercive admission” to both the robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances, and the matter must be remanded for a hearing so he can “attack the special circumstance admissions, as coercive.” Defendant’s claims about the special circumstances are refuted by the record. When defendant entered into the plea agreement, one of the specific provisions was that he would plead guilty to murder and admit the personal use enhancement, and admit the new felony charges of burglary and unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, and the court would dismiss the remaining allegations—the burglary-murder special circumstance and the robbery-murder special circumstance. The plea form stated defendant’s maximum possible sentence was 25 years to life for first degree murder, plus a determinate term of seven years eight months for the personal use enhancement and his convictions for the separate felonies of burglary and unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. If the plea agreement had been for defendant to 10. admit one or both special circumstances, his maximum possible sentence would have been either life in prison without the possibility of parole or death. (§ 190.2, subd. (a).) The record of conviction shows defendant did not admit either of the special circumstances and the trial court dismissed both special circumstances, consistent with the plea agreement. IV. Banks and Clark Factors Defendant argues his “admissions” to the felony murder “special circumstance[s],” “standing alone,” did not mean he was ineligible for resentencing, and his section 1172.6 petition should have been evaluated pursuant to the factors addressed in Banks and Clark as to whether he was a major participant in the underlying felonies who acted with reckless indifference to life. As explained above, after the amendments enacted by Senate Bill 1437, a participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a specified felony in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if the defendant was the actual killer, defendant was not the actual killer but acted with the intent to kill, or defendant was “ ‘a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2.’ (§ 189, subd. (e).)” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 448; People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1, 7.) Banks and Clark set forth factors to determine “major participant” and “reckless indifference” for purposes of section 190.2, subdivision (d). (In re Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 561.) When “Senate Bill 1437 amended … section 189 to incorporate major participation and reckless indifference requirements, it codified the understanding of those requirements elucidated in Banks and Clark.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710.) “Findings issued by a jury before Banks and Clark [were decided] do not preclude a defendant from making out a prima facie case for relief under Senate Bill 1437.” (Ibid.)

11. Defendant erroneously asserts the Banks and Clark factors must be applied to this case because he allegedly “admitted” special circumstances at the time of his plea in 2002, prior to the decisions in those cases. As explained above, however, defendant never admitted any of the special circumstances, and both allegations were dismissed as part of the plea agreement. While the parties stipulated in the plea form that defendant was pleading guilty to a felony murder, he specifically entered his guilty plea to first degree murder based on the factual basis that he was the actual killer. Defendant did not admit any special circumstances prior to the decisions in Banks and Clark, and the factors addressed in those opinions are irrelevant to this case. V. Validity Of A Plea By An Alleged “Infant” Defendant asserts he was incapable of entering into the plea agreement because he was 16 years old, “infants cannot contract and their contracts are voidable,” and plea agreements with minors are “are coercive in nature.” As previously explained, the validity of defendant’s plea is not cognizable in an appeal from the denial of his section 1172.6 petition. (People v. Burns, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865; People v. Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.) Moreover, the record refutes defendant’s arguments. The complaint, amended complaint, and information state defendant was born in 1983. The charging documents also state the actual date and month of defendant’s birthday. Suffice it to say that, simply based on the year of his birth, defendant was at least 16 years old when he committed the offenses on August 15, 2000. Defendant was at least 18 years old and an adult on September 9, 2002, when he signed the plea form and pleaded guilty to murder with the personal use enhancement, burglary, and unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. (See, e.g., People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1032 [summarizing cases holding age is a bright-line rule and an 18-year-old is an adult].) In addition, defendant cannot rely on contract law and Civil Code provisions to argue that plea bargains with minors are void. (Brown v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 229 12. Cal.App.4th 320, 323.) Such an argument “incorrectly assumes that since civil statutes govern contracts in general, they must govern plea bargains as well.” (Ibid.) Instead, plea bargains are governed by the Penal Code and not civil law, so that “principals of contract law should not be imported wholesale into the plea bargaining process.” (Ibid.; see, e.g., Breazeale v. Victim Services, Inc. (9th Cir. 2017) 878 F.3d 759, 770.) When a minor enters into a plea agreement, “[t]he relevant considerations are whether the plea bargain was ‘freely and voluntarily made’ and whether it has a factual basis. [Citations.] Since plea bargains are enforced by courts on ‘due process grounds,’ principles of contract law should not be imported wholesale into the plea bargaining process.” (Brown v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 323.) “A defendant’s age is one factor among many that may be relevant to the issue of voluntariness; it is not the sole factor.” (Id. at pp. 323–324, citing In re Uriah R. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1158 [juvenile waivers generally valid]; In re Charles P. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 768, 772 [a minor’s age alone does not prevent waiver of rights].) Defendant was not a minor when he pleaded guilty and he did not make a timely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. VI. Alleged “Package-Deal” Plea Finally, defendant characterizes his plea as an alleged “ ‘[p]ackage-deal’ plea bargain[].” He argues all such deals are unreasonable and inherently coercive, and he should be allowed to collaterally attack his alleged coercive plea, and the coerciveness of the plea bargaining process in general. Again, the validity of defendant’s plea is not cognizable in this appeal. In any event, this argument is again refuted by the record. A so-called “package-deal” plea bargain is one in which “the prosecutor offers a defendant the opportunity to plead guilty to a lesser charge, and receive a lesser sentence, contingent upon a guilty plea by all codefendants.” (In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 286, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175–1178.)

13. Ibarra rejected the argument that a package-deal plea is inherently coercive. (In re Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 283–284, 286–287.) Ibarra explained that normally a trial court may properly rely on a validly executed waiver form in determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea. (Id. at p. 281.) Ibarra further held that “when a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a ‘package-deal’ arrangement, the trial court has a duty to conduct further inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea: although such a bargain is not per se coercive, it may be so under a totality of the circumstances.” (Id. at pp. 281–282.) In defendant’s points and authorities filed in propria persona, and in support of his petition, defendant attached documents that stated two “girls” were found with him after “the alleged homicide and car chase/crash.” The factual basis in defendant’s plea form also referred to accomplices, and partially stated that “[defendant and] accomplices burglarized [Renna]’s home to get keys to steal [Renna]’s car.” The entirety of the record, however, shows that defendant was not subject to a “package deal” plea bargain. The complaint, amended complaint, and information charged only defendant with murder, and did not charge or even refer to any codefendants, coconspirators, or accomplices. As already explained, defendant admitted he stabbed Renna in the plea form. Further, there were no statements in the plea form that the plea offer to defendant was contingent on any unidentified accomplices or codefendants accepting their own plea offers. DISPOSITION The trial court’s order of July 1, 2025, denying appellant’s section 1172.6 petition for resentencing, is affirmed.

14.