People v. Meza CA5

Opinion

Filed 9/23/26 P. v. Meza CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, F089629 & F089859 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SC063320A) v. ALICIA ROSINA MEZA, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Tiffany E. Organ- Bowles, Judge. Kyle Gee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Viktoriya Chebotarev, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- Appellant Alicia Rosina Meza appeals from the denial of her petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6,1 following an evidentiary hearing. In 1996, Meza was convicted by jury of first degree felony murder with special circumstances and two counts of second degree robbery. In addition, the jury found true an enhancement for the personal use of a firearm. Meza was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole plus a determinate term of eight years. On appeal, Meza contends the trial court’s cumulative errors, including the consideration of inadmissible evidence and misapplication of the law, necessitates reversal of the court’s order denying her petition for resentencing. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In 1996, Meza was convicted of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (c), counts 2 & 3). The jury found true a special circumstance alleging that Meza committed the murder while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(I)) and that she personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) in the commission of the offense. The court sentenced Meza to life without the possibility of parole plus a determinate term of eight years. We affirmed the judgment on appeal in People v. Meza (Oct. 30, 1997, F025822) [nonpub. opn.] (Meza I). On June 24, 2019, Meza filed a petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95, now renumbered as section 1172.6. On August 10, 2020, the trial court summarily denied Meza’s petition. Meza timely appealed and this Court affirmed the trial court’s order, finding that jury’s true finding on the special circumstance established that she was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (People v. Meza (May 6, 2022, F081612) [nonpub. opn.] (Meza II).)

1 All further undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2. On September 21, 2022, Meza filed a second petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition, and Meza appealed. On January 18, 2024, following our Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 and People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, we reversed the trial court’s denial of Meza’s petition and remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). (People v. Meza (Jan. 18, 2024, F085771) [nonpub. opn.] (Meza III).) On April 3, 2025, the court held an evidentiary hearing on Meza’s petition. On May 20, 2025, the court issued a written ruling denying Meza’s petition. Meza filed a timely notice of appeal. Evidence Adduced at the Section 1172.6 Evidentiary Hearing 1. The Preliminary Hearing Transcript On the evening of June 9, 1995, A.S. and his cousin, Isidro Cardenas, visited a motel on Union Avenue in Bakersfield. At some point during the evening, A.S. left the motel to get some beer. When he returned, there were two female prostitutes in his room, one of whom was subsequently identified as Meza. Meza wanted to engage in sex in exchange for money, but Cardenas was not interested. Meza stated that she was going to bring her “pretty girlfriends,” and A.S. accompanied her to meet the girls. However, they returned to the motel room approximately five or 10 minutes later. As A.S. was standing outside the motel, an African-American woman approached and stated, “this one will take care of this one,” as she brandished a barbecue fork at him. Meza held A.S. with her arm; as he slipped away, she grabbed his shirt. A.S. took the money in his wallet out and threw it on the ground. Three African- American men jumped on top of him and began to physically assault him. A.S. managed to flee just as Cardenas came outside to intervene. Cardenas stood in the middle of 3. everyone and asked, “what’s the problem?” The woman with the fork brandished it at Cardenas, who took it away from her. According to A.S., Meza took out a gun from her waistband. As Cardenas ran, Meza shot him in the back, killing him. When A.S. got up, everyone had fled. F.G. was at the motel when he heard popping sounds. He observed a Hispanic male run past him and then collapse onto the ground. A white or Hispanic woman, whom F.G. later identified as Meza, approached him. Meza brandished a firearm at F.G.’s stomach and demanded that he drop the cellular phone he was holding. F.G. complied. An African-American male accompanying Meza picked up F.G.’s phone. Meza pulled F.G.’s necklace from his neck and demanded his wallet. F.G. again complied. The African-American man took the money out of F.G.’s wallet and threw the wallet on the ground. Meza and the man then fled on foot. 2. Trial Evidence Although the jury instructions permitted the jury to convict Meza of murder based upon her participation in the underlying robbery, the prosecutor argued that she was the actual killer. Both A.S. and F.G. testified that they observed Meza brandish a firearm. Meza also told a detective with the Bakersfield Police Department that she had shot Cardenas. The relevant portion of the witnesses’ trial testimony is summarized as follows: On June 9, 1995, A.S. and his cousin, Cardenas, rented a room at the Plaza Motel in Bakersfield. A.S. stated that he went to the motel to take a car to an acquaintance, A.G. While drinking beers inside of A.G.’s room, A.S. met a blonde Hispanic woman whom he later identified as Meza. A.S. subsequently went with Meza to pick up Meza’s friend, whom Meza described as “real pretty.” When A.S. was outside of the motel, he 4. was confronted by an African-American woman with a fork. The woman stated, “we could take this guy.” Meza grabbed A.S.’s neck. As soon as A.S. broke loose from Meza, four or five men jumped on top of him and began to physically assault him. A.S. threw the money in his pocket on the ground. He tried to escape by fleeing to the right side of the motel. Cardenas came to assist him, standing between A.S. and the woman with the fork. Cardenas knocked the fork out of the woman’s hands. Meza pointed a gun at Cardenas and A.S. and Cardenas began to run. A.S. heard a gunshot but did not see Cardenas fall. He could not remember in which direction any of the perpetrators fled after the gunshot, but he remembered first responders subsequently working on Cardenas and law enforcement arriving sometime thereafter. F.G. was sitting inside of his vehicle talking on his phone when he observed Cardenas crawling by him and Meza holding a gun. F.G. explained that Meza had a visible tattoo on her shoulder which was inscribed with her last name. Meza told F.G. to drop the phone and demanded his money while holding a gun against his stomach. Meza grabbed a necklace that F.G. was wearing and took it from him. F.G. gave Meza his wallet and she passed it to an African-American male that accompanied her. The man took the cash from F.G.’s wallet, dropped it, and picked up F.G.’s phone. Cardenas was transported to the hospital where he succumbed to his injuries. The forensic pathologist that performed Cardenas’s autopsy opined that he died from a gunshot wound to his back. Detective Roger Kert Buckles with the Bakersfield Police Department interviewed F.G. and A.S. and conducted a photographic lineup which included Meza’s picture. Both men identified Meza as the woman who had brandished a firearm. Detective Lesley Vincent with the Bakersfield Police Department interrogated Meza following her arrest. During the interrogation, Meza gave several versions of 5. events before admitting she had shot Cardenas. She told Vincent that she gave the gun to her friend and told him to get rid of it. Meza also stated she was afraid to turn herself in because she “had shot a man and that he was dead.” At trial, Meza testified that on June 9, 1995, A.S. approached her and asked if she was a prostitute. Meza stated that she was not, however, they struck up a conversation and began drinking beers and doing cocaine together. During their encounter, A.S. asked Meza to find some pretty girls for him. Meza agreed and got into A.S.’s vehicle. They drove around the block. According to Meza, A.S. started rubbing on her, stating that he wanted to be with her. She walked back to the motel. A.S. subsequently returned to the motel with a girl. Meza and Cardenas began talking and drinking outside in the parking lot. When A.S. emerged from the room, “Regulate,” Meza’s boyfriend’s brother, yelled at Meza to get back to her room. A.S. told Regulate to leave Meza alone and began walking towards Regulate. Meza put her arms around A.S. and told him to leave them (Regulate and his companions) alone. Then, an African-American woman with the fork, “Dede,” emerged. Multiple men also approached and began to physically assault A.S. Regulate approached Meza and asked for the gun in her waistband. Meza claimed that she then heard a “fire cracker” go off. As she was removing the gun from her waistband, it suddenly “went off.” Meza claimed that she had shot herself in her hand. She denied pointing the firearm at anyone, or taking money from F.G. Meza asserted that the gun was pointed downward. Meza fled the motel, leaving her young sons with a friend. When Meza later called friends at the motel to check on her sons, they advised her that she was wanted for police questioning and that Cardenas was dead.

6. 3. The Evidentiary Hearing on Meza’s Petition and Trial Court’s Ruling On April 3, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Meza’s petition. The prosecutor explained that he had submitted seven PDF files of evidence, including: (1) a clerk’s transcript containing “processed” documents and the abstract of judgment; (2) a file containing the preliminary hearing transcripts and police reports documenting the offense; (3) appellate court documents from Meza II, supra, F081612, Meza’s appeal from the denial of her first section 1172.6 petition; (4) our appellate opinion in Meza III, supra, F085771, Meza’s appeal from the denial of her second section 1172.6 petition;2 (5) the first volume of the reporter’s transcripts from her jury trial; (6) the second volume of reporter’s transcripts from her trial; and (7) the jury verdict forms. The prosecutor asked the court to exclude the police reports from its review, explaining they were not part of the People’s evidence and are inadmissible. The prosecutor further clarified that the appellate court documents and opinion were being offered “just for the procedural posture of the case,” rather than for their factual content. He emphasized that the jury trial transcripts represented the thrust of their evidence. The prosecutor further explained that the jury’s verdict was not particularly significant, except insofar as it could offer the court guidance on how those who had observed the witnesses testify had assessed their credibility. Trial counsel objected to the admission of the clerk’s transcripts of motions filed during the course of Meza’s prosecution, the preliminary hearing transcripts, and this 2 The Attorney General’s request for this Court to take judicial notice of the record on appeal in Meza I, supra, F025822; Meza II, supra, F081612; and Meza III, supra, F085771 is granted over Meza’s objection. (Evid. Code, §§ 459, subd. (a) [“The reviewing court may take judicial notice of any matter specified in Section 452”], 452, subd. (d) [permitting a court to take judicial notice of records of “any court of this state”].) We have considered these records for the limited purpose of the procedural history of this case.

7. court’s appellate opinions. Counsel asserted that only the reporter’s transcripts and jury instructions were relevant and admissible evidence. Over counsel’s objections, the court admitted all seven files into evidence, while acknowledging that counsel’s position was correct and confirming it would limit its review to the materials the People had identified as evidence. The prosecutor stated that his central theory of the case was that Meza was the actual killer, and that the transcripts established a motive for the murder: Meza killed the victim to prevent him from escaping during an ongoing robbery. The prosecutor pointed out that Meza was observed running up behind the victim with a gun immediately before a gunshot was heard. The prosecutor also represented that a detective had testified that Meza had given multiple versions of the incident, including a version in which she admitted to shooting the victim. Trial counsel offered no evidence at the evidentiary hearing and submitted on the briefs. The trial court then took the matter under submission. On May 20, 2025, the trial court issued a lengthy written ruling denying Meza’s petition. In denying Meza’s petition, the court summarized the trial evidence, including the testimony of the witnesses. It also discussed the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument, the instructions given to the jury, and the jury’s verdict. We quote portions of the trial court’s order at length because they are relevant to the issues raised on appeal:

“V. Burden of Proof:

“Pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6(d)(3), the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Petitioner is guilty of murder, under current California law, including the amendments to Penal Code Sections 188 and 189 ….”

“X. Conclusions:

“Since the amendments to the Penal Code in 2019, Petitioner can now only be held accountable for the murder of the Victim if she 8. was the actual killer, or as an aider and abettor, either acted with her own intent to kill, or was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Petitioner is only entitled to relief under Section 1172.6 if she could not be convicted of murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019. (People v. Lewis, (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, fn. 6). Those changes only affect the potential culpability of an aider and abettor who lacked malice aforethought, or a non-killer convicted on a felony murder theory. Those changes did not affect the culpability of the actual killer, even if convicted on a felony murder theory.

“In this case, it was conceded that Petitioner fired a gun at the scene on June 9, 1995 and that the Victim died of a gunshot wound to his back. The jury found true that Petitioner personally used a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code Section 12022.5(a). Considering the evidence presented to it, the jury could not have made this finding[] about Petitioner’s firearm use without also concluding that she was the actual killer.

“However, like the petitioner in the case of People v. Jasso, (2025) 17 Cal.5th 646, in the case at hand, there was no evidence that more than one firearm had been used in the incident or that more than one shooter had fired a gun. There was no evidence that the robbery involved more than one armed participant or that the Victim suffered any firearm-related injuries other than those inflicted by the one fatal shot.

“The Court makes the factual findings that there was only one gunshot during the incident at the motel on June 9, 1995, that the gun was in the hands of Petitioner when the gun fired, and that the bullet fired from the gun in Petitioner’s hand entered the back of the Victim and caused his death. Based on the admissible evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and at trial, this Court finds that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Petitioner was the actual killer.

“With the conducting of an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner was provided the opportunity to refute the conclusion that she was the actual shooter. She did not do so. As the actual killer of the Victim, Petitioner is not eligible for relief under Penal Code Section 1172.6. (See, People v. Patton, (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 [actual shooter of a victim who died of a gunshot wound is not eligible for relief but should be provided the opportunity to present evidence that he was not the sole and direct perpetrator of the shooting such that this 9. conviction was not based on the natural and probable consequences theory].

“Senate Bill 1437 made significant changes to murder liability but only to theories applicable to accomplices. The amendments to Penal Code Section 188 and 189 were meant to ameliorate the injustice of finding someone guilty of murder when they are involved in the commission of a felony, with no intent to kill anyone, but someone dies at the hands of a confederate during the commission of the felony. However, the changes in the law did not affect culpability of the actual killer in a felony murder scenario.

“This Court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Petitioner, as the actual killer, could still be convicted of murder even after the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, and she is, therefore, not eligible for relief under Penal Code Section 1172.6. The 1172.6 Petition is denied.” DISCUSSION I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING MEZA’S PETITION Meza contends the trial court erred in denying her petition for resentencing. She specifically asserts the trial court relied upon inadmissible evidence and made errors of law in concluding that she was ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6. We are not persuaded. A. Reliance on Inadmissible Evidence Meza argues the trial court relied upon incompetent evidence in denying her petition, including: the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument, the jury instructions, and the jury’s verdict and findings. We conclude that Meza has forfeited her claim for failing to challenge the admission of this evidence in the trial court below. Forfeiture aside, we further conclude she has failed to demonstrate prejudice from any presumed error. 1. Standard of Review In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a resentencing petition under section 1172.6, we review factual findings for substantial evidence, and we review the court’s application 10. of the law to those facts de novo. (People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066.) Applying this standard of review, we ask only whether the appellate record contains “evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Hubbard (2016) 63 Cal.4th 378, 392.) We “ ‘ “presume[ ] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” ’ [Citations.] Substantial evidence also ‘ “includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.) “ ‘Evidence erroneously admitted is properly considered in weighing the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, notwithstanding its erroneous admission.’ ” (People v. Jasso, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 684, quoting People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 311; McDaniel v. Brown (2010) 558 U.S. 120, 131 [in analyzing sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court’ regardless of whether that evidence was admitted erroneously”].) If the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rests in part on erroneously admitted evidence, we must determine whether the error was prejudicial. In other words, we must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that a more favorable outcome would have been reached absent the error; that is, the trial court’s reliance on improper evidence. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d. 818, 836.) Given the nature of the asserted error, our inquiry is whether the properly admitted evidence alone is sufficient to sustain the trial court’s order. If so, the error was harmless. If however the properly admitted evidence was not sufficient and the error was prejudicial, the appropriate remedy is to remand for a new evidentiary hearing where the prosecutor may again attempt to prove the Meza’s guilt with admissible evidence. (See 11. People v. Dixon (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 116, 137 & fn. 3 [prejudicial evidentiary errors warrant remand for a new evidentiary hearing rather than remand for resentencing]; § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) 2. Forfeiture Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) governs the admissibility of evidence at an evidentiary hearing on a petition for resentencing filed under this statute. This section provides the following:

“(3) At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019. The admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed. The court may also consider the procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion. However, hearsay evidence that was admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule. The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) At Meza’s evidentiary hearing, the court admitted into evidence seven files submitted by the prosecutor, which included the reporter’s transcripts from Meza’s trial, the instructions given to the jury, and the jury verdict forms. Trial counsel neither objected to nor otherwise challenged the admissibility of this evidence. It is well-settled that “[a] defendant may not challenge the admissibility of evidence on appeal if he or she failed to raise a proper objection on those grounds in the trial court.” (People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 696; Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) (People v. Myles, at p. 696, quoting People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434 12. [“ ‘The objection requirement is necessary in criminal cases because a “contrary rule would deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would ‘permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his [or her] trial secure in the knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal’ ” ’ ”].) We conclude that counsel’s failure to timely challenge the admission of the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument, the jury instructions, and the verdict forms, resulted in forfeiture of Meza’s claim on appeal. 3. No Prejudice Forfeiture aside, Meza has not demonstrated prejudice. The jury instructions and verdict forms merely memorialized matters reflected in the reporter’s transcripts from Meza’s trial. Thus, even assuming trial counsel had not conceded that the jury instructions were relevant and admissible—which she did—the trial court could glean the substance of the instructions and verdict forms from the reporter’s transcripts. Likewise, the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument were merely a summation of the trial evidence, which was independently reflected in the reporter’s transcripts. As the Attorney General observes, the trial evidence establishes that “[Meza] was the undisputed sole perpetrator of the murder and the actual killer.”3 Thus, although the trial court relied on the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument, which is not evidence (CALCRIM No. 104; People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 47), Meza has not demonstrated that the error affected the outcome of the section 1172.6 hearing. In particular, Meza does not identify any respect in which the prosecutor misstated the evidence or materially mischaracterized the witness’s testimony during closing argument. Nor does she explain how the trial court’s reliance on the prosecutor’s 3 Meza does not dispute that there was sufficient evidence to find that she was the actual killer.

13. remarks led it to reach a conclusion that was unsupported by the properly admitted evidence. Moreover, even apart from the challenged material, the properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly established that Meza was the actual killer. Not only did A.S. and F.G. identify Meza as the woman who brandished the firearm, Meza told Detective Buckles that she was afraid to turn herself in because she “had shot a man and that he was dead.” The reporter’s transcripts also included Meza’s own account of the shooting, in which she claimed either that another person fired the fatal shot or that the shooting was accidental. The trial court was therefore able to evaluate and reject those theories based solely on properly admitted evidence. To the extent Meza contends that the court’s reliance upon the challenged materials was prejudicial, it is her burden to affirmatively demonstrate prejudice. (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573 [“Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error”]; Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1206, fn. 11 [an appellate court is not required to develop an appellant’s arguments]; Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [“The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error”].) We conclude that she has failed to carry her burden. Based on the foregoing, we conclude Meza has not shown that the trial court’s consideration of the jury instructions, verdict forms, and prosecutor’s closing argument affected the outcome of the section 1172.6 hearing. Any error was therefore harmless. B. Misapplication of the Law Meza asserts the trial court also committed two reversible errors of law. First, by weighing against her the fact that she did not offer any exculpatory evidence at the 14. evidentiary hearing, thereby shifting the burden of proof to her. And second, by relying upon an improper legal standard in denying her petition. Neither contention has merit. 1. The Court Did Not Improperly Shift the Burden of Proof Meza contends the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof by commenting that she failed to present new or additional exculpatory evidence at the evidentiary hearing. The record does not support her claim. The trial court expressly found that the prosecutor had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Meza was the actual killer. It then observed that although Meza had the opportunity to present new or additional evidence to the contrary, she did not do so. Read in the context of the court’s written order as a whole, this latter remark was simply an observation about the state of the evidence: the prosecutor’s evidence established Meza’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and Meza had introduced no additional evidence that undermined that conclusion. It did not suggest that Meza bore the burden of disproving her guilt. Meza argues that this conclusion is belied by the fact that the trial court’s statement that there was “ ‘no evidence that more than one firearm had been used.’ ” She contends, “[e]ither the lower court did not consider her trial testimony, or found it of no moment because [it was] not repeated at the evidentiary hearing.” The record again fails to support her assertions. The trial court summarized Meza’s trial testimony in its written ruling, including her claim that she heard a “fire cracker” go off just before her gun discharged. There is no indication that the court refused to consider Meza’s version of events because she did not testify at the evidentiary hearing. Rather, the record reflects that the court considered her trial testimony but found it unpersuasive in light of the evidence establishing that she was the actual killer.

15. 2. The Trial Court Applied the Correct Legal Standard Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) requires the prosecution to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” The statute expressly rejects substantial evidence as the applicable burden: “A finding that there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder … is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Meza contends the trial court erroneously denied her petition by concluding that she “could still be convicted of murder even after the changes to Section 188 or 189,” rather than finding that she is guilty of murder. Meza explains the trial court’s use of the phrase “ ‘could still be convicted’ is logically equivalent to a ‘substantial evidence’ finding,” which falls short of the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Although we agree that use of the phrase “could still be convicted” of murder “might suggest the application of an incorrect standard of proof” (see People v. Tyler (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 724, 731), the record refutes the possibility that the court applied an improper legal standard in denying Meza’s petition. In denying Meza’s petition, the court expressly observed that the applicable standard of proof required it to determine whether the prosecutor proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Meza “is guilty of murder, under current California law.” In its conclusion, the trial court made independent factual findings and determined, from those findings, that the evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Meza was the actual killer, stating:

“The Court makes the factual findings that there was only one gunshot during the incident at the motel on June 9, 1995, that the gun was in the hands of Petitioner when the gun fired, and that the bullet fired from the gun in Petitioner’s hand entered the back of the 16. Victim and caused his death. Based on the admissible evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and at trial, this Court finds that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Petitioner was the actual killer.” (Italics added.) Nothing in the trial court’s ruling suggests that it treated Meza’s guilt as merely supported by substantial evidence. Instead, the court resolved the ultimate question itself, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Meza was the actual killer. That finding renders Meza ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, and it forecloses any claim that the court’s isolated comment that Meza “could still be convicted of murder” was prejudicial. DISPOSITION The trial court’s order denying Meza’s section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is affirmed.

FRANSON, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR:

SNAUFFER, J.

DE SANTOS, J.

17.