Tran v. Coast Community College Dist. CA4/3

Opinion

Filed 9/23/26 Tran v. Coast Community College Dist. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

LOUIS TRAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G065696 v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023- 01336537) COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT et al., OPINION Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Robert Shawn Nelson, Judge. Affirmed. Lakhman & Kasamatsu and Ann L. Lakhman for Plaintiff and Appellant. Callahan & Blaine, David J. Darnell, James M. Sabovich and John D. Stanley for Defendants and Respondents. Plaintiff Louis Tran challenges summary judgment for defendants Coast Community College District (Coast), Christine Nguyen, and Randy Flint on his conversion claim. He contends triable issues exist as to whether (1) he had a right to possess commercial kitchen equipment he had installed in a café on defendants’ campus, and (2) defendants wrongfully interfered with his attempts to retrieve the equipment. We conclude plaintiff failed to raise any triable issue. The undisputed evidence showed the lease required him to remove the equipment before the lease expired; because he did not do so, he lost the right to possess the equipment. And the undisputed evidence shows defendants nonetheless gave plaintiff multiple opportunities to retrieve the property, showing they had no intention to interfere with any possessory rights he may have had. The trial court thus correctly granted summary judgment. We affirm. FACTS The parties’ separate statements establish the following undisputed facts. Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with defendant Coast allowing him to convert classroom space into a café. Plaintiff built the café, installing various fixtures necessary for running the restaurant. The lease stated the fixtures “shall remain the property of [plaintiff] and shall be removed by [plaintiff]. Any personal property of [plaintiff] not removed on or before the [e]xpiration [d]ate or any earlier termination date shall be deemed to have been abandoned by [plaintiff] and may be disposed of or retained by [defendants].” Defendants could also ask plaintiff to remove “alterations or utilities installations.” When the lease expired in October 2022, plaintiff did not remove the fixtures. Defendants sent a letter in December 2022 instructing plaintiff to contact them “to facilitate access to the premises and removal of said 2 fixtures on or before January 5, 2023, after which date all remaining property will be surrendered by the lessee.” Plaintiff went to campus to get his fixtures the day before defendant’s deadline, however defendants did not know he was coming. Because they did not have someone available to monitor removal of the equipment, defendants did not allow plaintiff to enter the property. There was an altercation during which a security guard tried to take plaintiff’s keys and threatened to have him arrested. Defendants sent an email in February 2023 offering plaintiff “one final opportunity to remove [his] fixtures,” asking him to coordinate with defendants to remove them. Plaintiff did not contact defendants or attempt to remove his fixtures before the requested deadline. A third letter in March 2023 then offered a “final notice to remove [plaintiff’s] fixtures” and again asked plaintiff to coordinate with defendants. This letter also advised plaintiff that any unremoved fixtures would be deemed abandoned and would be “disposed of or retained by” defendants. Plaintiff did not contact defendants or attempt to remove his fixtures before the deadline. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint asserted causes of action for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to all causes of action other than conversion. The trial court then granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.1 1 Judgment was entered after the plaintiff filed his notice of appeal. (See Mukthar v. Latin American Security Service (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 284, 288 [when an order on a summary judgment motion is followed by entry of judgment, “the appellate court may deem the premature notice of appeal to have been filed after the entry of judgment”].)

3 DISCUSSION Plaintiff contends the court wrongly granted summary judgment on his sole remaining cause of action for conversion because there are triable issues of material fact as to whether he owned the equipment in question, and whether defendants wrongfully interfered with those ownership rights. “Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no triable issues of material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all causes of action.” (Choi v. Sagemark Consulting (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 308, 318.) We review the trial court’s ruling de novo, viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Ibid.) “‘Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion are the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion; the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and damages. It is not necessary that there be a manual taking of the property; it is only necessary to show an assumption of control or ownership over the property, or that the alleged converter has applied the property to his own use.’” (Spates v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 208, 221 (Spates).) Here, plaintiff has not raised a triable issue as to the first element, his right to possession. Plaintiff does not dispute the lease’s validity or that he was bound by its terms. The lease requires removal of all fixtures before the stated expiration date and states unremoved fixtures are “abandoned” by plaintiff. Plaintiff conceded he did not remove the restaurant 4 equipment before the lease expired. By the terms to which he agreed, the equipment was “deemed to have been abandoned.” 2 The expiration of the lease ended plaintiff’s possessory rights and, consequently, his conversion claim. We are not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that the December 2022 letter inherently admits plaintiff’s continued possessory rights by offering to allow plaintiff to come to campus to get the items. The letter asserted the lease had expired and cited section 7.4, confirming that personal property not removed before the lease’s expiration shall be deemed abandoned. Nothing reasonably suggests defendants restored plaintiff’s property rights by extending him grace.3 Even if plaintiff had retained some right to possession, he has not raised a triable issue as to the second element: defendants’ conversion by a wrongful act. (See Spates, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 222 [conversion claim failed because “[a]s a matter of law, there was no wrongful act or disposition” of the property].) “To establish a conversion, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show an intention or purpose to convert the goods and to exercise ownership 2 At oral argument, defendants’ counsel cited Civil Code section 1019 as well as Wolfen v. Clinical Data, Inc. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 171, 179, footnote 2 and Rinaldi v. Goller (1957) 48 Cal.2d 276, 282 in support of an argument the fixtures were abandoned when the lease expired. We decline to consider these authorities. (Quinteros v. Harbor Distributing, LLC (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 60, 79 fn. 11 [“And we will not decide issues raised for the first time at oral argument”].)

3 Plaintiff contends there are questions of fact which show he did not intend to abandon the fixtures. However, plaintiff’s supporting facts occurred after the lease expired. They are therefore immaterial.

5 over them, or to prevent the owner from taking possession of his property.” (Zaslow v. Kroenert (1946) 29 Cal.2d 541, 550 (Zaslow).) Of particular relevance to this case, “the act of taking possession of a building and locking it does not, of itself, constitute a conversion of the personal property therein.” (Zaslow, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 550.) “[E]very failure to deliver [property] is not such a serious interference with the owner’s dominion that the defendant should be required to pay the full value of the goods” as a conversion.4 (Ibid. [citing cases holding a person taking lawful possession of a building was not liable for conversion of furniture or machinery left inside].) The undisputed facts show defendants did not “show an intention or purpose to convert the goods and to exercise ownership over them, or to prevent the owner from taking possession of his property.” (Zaslow, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 550.) Even after the lease expired in October 2022, defendants repeatedly offered to let plaintiff collect his abandoned equipment. While his first effort in January 2023 was unsuccessful due to the security guard, and the parties dispute the exact circumstances leading up to that incident, it is undisputed defendants again invited plaintiff to retrieve the equipment in February 2023 and yet again in March 2023. Plaintiff cannot, in perpetuity, ignore defendants and still hold them liable for conversion of property he declined to retrieve. On that point, plaintiff asserts for the first time on appeal that there was a “subsequent refusal to allow removal of affixed items” in March 4 While Zaslow held the defendants were not liable for conversion, it remanded the matter for determination of trespass damages due to the defendants’ “intermeddling” with the property. (Zaslow, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 551.) Plaintiff has not asserted a trespass claim here.

6 2024. Plaintiff testified at deposition he was eventually able to take some of his property from the premises but not all of it—he was forced to leave the items attached to the walls. We do not reach this assertion. These facts are not in plaintiff’s separate statement or in his response to defendants’ statements of fact (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1214 [a fact missing from a party’s separate statement precludes reliance on that fact or any theory in reliance on it].) Moreover, this was not an argument made to the trial court. Contentions raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered because neither the parties nor the court had the opportunity to address them. (R & J Sheet Metal, Inc. v. W.E. O’Neil Construction Co. of California (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 878, 912.) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Responding party is entitled to costs on appeal.

SCOTT, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SERVINO, J.

SCHWARM, J.* *Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution