In re Lily R. CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 9/23/26 In re Lily R. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re LILY R. et al., Persons B350573 Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP02216)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. W.A., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed. W.A., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Courtney Fisher, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ____________________ The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the agency) filed a petition concerning N.S.’s (mother’s) and W.A.’s (father’s) five children, alleging dependency jurisdiction based on, inter alia, father’s repeated acts of domestic violence against mother in the children’s presence. 1 At a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition, removed the children from father, released them to mother, ordered father to complete a case plan, and issued a three-year restraining order protecting mother from father. On appeal, father, in pro. per., argues the court erred in denying his request to continue the hearing, and contests the jurisdictional findings, dispositional rulings, and restraining order. We reject father’s challenge to the denial of his motion for a continuance because he acknowledges his trial counsel did not show good cause warranting what would have been a fifth continuance of the jurisdictional hearing. We also reject his challenges to the juvenile court’s assertion of dependency jurisdiction and issuance of the restraining order because there is substantial evidence father repeatedly physically attacked mother in the presence of the children. The court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to submit to a psychological assessment and drug and alcohol testing because there was 1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.

2 evidence from which the court reasonably could have inferred father’s aggression toward mother could have been caused by an undiagnosed mental illness or substance abuse. Father forfeits his contest to the evidentiary sufficiency of the removal order by failing to address that issue in his opening brief, and his failure to object below to the remainder of the court’s dispositional orders precludes him from challenging them on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional rulings, as well as the restraining order.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition of this appeal. We describe additional facts relevant to our analysis in our Discussion, post. On July 28, 2025, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 3 section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) concerning mother’s and father’s five children: Lily R. (born in September 2010), Lana R. (born in May 2013), Adam R. (born in July 2015), Z.R. (born in February 2018), and Tara R.

2 In describing the procedural history and evidence relevant to this appeal, we rely in part on admissions made by the parties in their appellate briefing and assertions made by DCFS that father does not dispute in his reply. (See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 772, fn. 2, 773–774 [employing this approach].) 3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

3 (born in August 2022). 4 The agency alleged dependency jurisdiction based on father’s history of domestic violence against mother in the presence of the children (counts a-1 & b-1) and his “history of mental and emotional problems” that placed the children at substantial risk of serious physical harm (count b-2). At the initial hearing on August 11, 2025, the juvenile court detained the children from father, released them to mother, and authorized monitored visitation for father. At the October 30, 2025 combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the juvenile court denied father’s trial counsel’s request to continue that hearing to permit counsel to obtain body camera and surveillance footage and unspecified police reports. The court sustained counts a-1, b-1, and b-2 as pleaded in the petition, ordered the children removed from father’s custody and released them to mother, granted father monitored visitation, and ordered him to comply with a case plan. The case plan required father to participate in individual counseling, complete a batterer’s intervention program, undergo a psychological evaluation, take all prescribed psychotropic medication, and submit to drug and alcohol testing. The court also issued a permanent restraining order protecting mother from father for three years. Father timely appealed from the orders issued on October 30, 2025. On May 22, 2026, the juvenile court awarded mother sole legal and physical custody of the children and granted father monitored visitation. On June 18, 2026, the court terminated 4 Father contends the dependency case started after he reported to law enforcement in July 2025 that mother left with the children without telling him their whereabouts.

4 jurisdiction. On June 29, 2026, father appealed from these orders. 5 DISCUSSION “The juvenile court’s orders are ‘presumed to be correct, and it is appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error[ ]’ [citations]” by supporting his or her appellate claims with “ ‘ “reasoned argument and citations to authority . . . .” ’ [Citation].” (See In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79–80.) The rules of appellate procedure, including the obligation to rebut the presumption of correctness, apply to father even though he is self-represented. (See Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 590, 595.) Accordingly, father “ ‘ “is entitled to the same, but no greater[,] consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) As explained below, father does not show the juvenile court erred in denying his request to continue the October 30, 2025 hearing (Discussion, part C, post), asserting dependency jurisdiction over the five children (Discussion, part D, post), ordering him to submit to a psychological assessment and drug and alcohol testing (Discussion, part F, post), and issuing the permanent restraining order (Discussion, part H, post). Father forfeits his challenge to removal of the children from his custody (Discussion, part E, post), and father failed to object to, and thereby forfeited his appellate claims contesting, the court’s orders providing him only monitored visitation and requiring him 5 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s May 22 and June 18, 2026 orders, along with father’s notices of appeal filed on June 29, 2026. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)

5 to participate in a batterer’s intervention program, take prescribed psychotropic medication, and attend individual counseling (Discussion, part G, post). We thus affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional rulings and the permanent restraining order. 6 Before reaching these issues, we address father’s requests to augment, correct, or clarify the record (Discussion, part A, post), and decide whether father may challenge the admissibility of the addendum to the jurisdictional and dispositional report (Discussion, part B, post).

A. We Reject as Procedurally Improper Father’s Requests To Augment, Clarify, or Correct the Record In his appellate briefing, father asks us to “augment[ ], correct[ ], or clarif[y]” three “concrete inaccuracies and ambiguities” in the record pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.155 and 8.410. 7 First, according to father, although volume five of the reporter’s transcript covers the hearing held on October 9, 2025, “[i]ts cover and reporter’s certificate identify an October 30 proceeding . . . .” Second, father claims a minute 6 In his reply brief, father argues for the first time the record contains certain ambiguities as to his case plan for each child (e.g., he claims “[c]ounseling is unchecked in the plan for children A through D but checked in Tara R.’s plan”). Father forfeited this contention by omitting it from his opening brief. (See County of Los Angeles v. Niblett (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 454, 474–475 (Niblett).) 7 Although father initially sought “augmentation, correction, or clarification” of five alleged “inaccuracies and ambiguities,” father states in his reply brief that he “abandons” two of them.

6 order for the October 30, 2025 hearing erroneously stated Tara R. was born in August 2023, whereas her birth certificate reveals she was born in August 2022. Lastly, father argues “the record is unclear about what exhibits were actually admitted on October 30.” (Boldface omitted.) Specifically, father contends the minute orders for the hearing and the reporter’s transcript “reflect admission of [three exhibits] by reference,” but an exhibit list included in the clerk’s transcript “added an Exhibit 4,” which is the addendum to the jurisdiction and disposition report. In its appellate brief, DCFS admits that volume five of the reporter’s transcript covers only the October 9, 2025 hearing and not the proceeding held on October 30, 2025. DCFS also concedes that Tara R. was born in August 2022. Additionally, we conclude father is estopped from challenging the admissibility of the addendum to the jurisdiction and disposition report. (See Discussion, part B, post.) We deny father’s requests for augmentation, clarification, or correction because he seeks this relief in his appellate briefing rather than in a properly noticed motion. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.410(b)(1) [providing that in appeals in juvenile cases, the record may be “augmented or corrected as provided in rule 8.155(a) and (c)” “[o]n motion of a party or on [the reviewing court’s] own motion”]; id., rule 8.155(a) & (c) [setting forth procedures for augmentation and correction].)

B. Father Is Estopped From Contesting the Admissibility of the Addendum to the Jurisdiction and Disposition Report “ ‘Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of that 7 error.’ [Citations.]” (In re G.P. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1193.) Put differently, “ ‘ “Where a party by his conduct induces the commission of error, he is estopped from asserting it as a ground for reversal” on appeal.’ ” (Ibid.) At the October 30, 2025 hearing, the juvenile court admitted into evidence all three exhibits listed on DCFS’s initial exhibit list: (1) the “Detention and Addendum Reports e-filed [on] 7-28-25” (DCFS ex. no. 1), (2) “Jurisdictional Disposition Report e-filed [on] 8-28-25” (DCFS ex. no. 2), and (3) “Last Minute Information for the Court e-filed [on] 9-22-25” (DCFS ex. no. 3). Approximately 40 minutes after DCFS filed the initial exhibit list (i.e., at 10:07 a.m. on October 30, 2025), the agency filed an amended exhibit list that included DCFS exhibit numbers 1, 2, and 3 and added DCFS exhibit number 4, which is the addendum to the jurisdiction and disposition report.8 According to the agency, although the juvenile court did not formally admit DCFS exhibit number 4, father’s trial counsel “invited any alleged error” as to the court’s consideration of that exhibit by “rel[ying] on evidence from the addendum report attachments during his argument.” Indeed, all counsel, including father’s attorney, referenced DCFS exhibit number 4 at the October 30, 2025 hearing. 9 In particular, father’s counsel claimed that medical reports attached to the addendum report 8 It is unclear whether DCFS filed this amended exhibit list after the October 30, 2025 hearing concluded. 9 That all parties relied upon this exhibit is unsurprising, given that on September 11, 2025, the juvenile court continued the jurisdictional hearing that had previously been scheduled for that date to give all counsel sufficient time to review the addendum report.

8 showed mother “has . . . an unhealthy reliance on pain management medication.” By asking the court to consider DCFS exhibit number 4, father’s counsel led the court to believe the exhibit was properly before it. Given these circumstances, father is estopped from arguing to the contrary on appeal. In his reply brief, father seems to argue his attorney’s reliance on medical reports attached to the addendum report “may foreclose” him from challenging the admissibility of only those attachments and not the contents of the addendum report to which they were attached. Yet, at the October 30, 2025 hearing, father’s counsel did not take the position that only the medical reports attached to the addendum report were properly before the juvenile court. Furthermore, father does not cogently argue the invited error doctrine should apply only to part of DCFS exhibit number 4. Thus, we disregard that contention. (See Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 (Hernandez) [“We may and do ‘disregard conclusory arguments that . . . fail to disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt.’ ”].) In sum, father is estopped from arguing the juvenile court did not properly admit the addendum report and its attachments.

C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Father’s Request To Continue the Jurisdictional Hearing A juvenile court may continue a hearing, “provided that a continuance shall not be granted that is contrary to the interest of the minor. In considering the minor’s interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status[ and] the need to provide children with stable environments . . . .” (See § 352, subd. (a)(1).)

9 “Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of time shown to be necessary by the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for the continuance. Neither a stipulation between counsel nor the convenience of the parties is in and of itself a good cause.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).) “[U]nless the court for good cause entertains an oral motion for continuance,” the party seeking a continuance must file a written motion supported “with affidavits or declarations detailing specific facts showing that a continuance is necessary . . . .” (See id., subd. (a)(3).) “ ‘We review the juvenile court’s decision to deny a continuance for abuse of discretion. [Citation.]’ . . . [Citation.]” (In re D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 756.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Juan A. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1204, 1208 (Juan A.).) Before father moved for a continuance of the October 30, 2025 hearing, the juvenile court had continued the jurisdictional hearing four times. At the initial hearing held on August 11, 2025, the juvenile court scheduled the jurisdictional hearing for September 10, 2025. On September 10, 2025, the court continued the hearing for one day to secure an Arabic interpreter for father, and, on September 11, 2025, the court continued the hearing to September 24, 2025 because the agency had filed its lengthy addendum to the jurisdiction and disposition report three days earlier. On September 24, 2025, the court continued the hearing for one day to allow father’s new counsel to 10 attend. 10 On September 25, 2025, the court continued the matter to October 30, 2025. On October 21, 2025, father’s counsel filed a motion seeking “a short continuance” of unspecified duration of the hearing scheduled for October 30, 2025. According to father’s counsel’s supporting declaration, “the police department need[ed] additional time to produce” certain “subpoenaed reports” that counsel did not further describe. Counsel did not specify when he had subpoenaed these reports or when the police anticipated producing them. At the October 30, 2025 hearing, father’s counsel asserted his office had (1) “attempted to subpoena body cam[era] footage” and (2) “issued a subpoena for video footage from a park where there was an alleged incident of domestic violence.” Father’s counsel argued, “Without this footage, . . . [counsel] would not be able to . . . present to the court discovery that would potentially absolve [his] client of any wrongdoing.” The juvenile court denied the motion, reasoning the court was unable to determine whether the subpoenas were timely because father’s counsel did not specify when he issued them, the attorney had more than thirty days since the matter was last continued on September 25, 2025 to subpoena any relevant materials, the motion was “just a delay,” and “what is on the body cam[era] is referenced” in one of DCFS’s reports. On appeal, father acknowledges in his reply brief his counsel did not make “a sufficient statutory showing” of good cause to continue the hearing. Indeed, he notes the juvenile court 10 Two days earlier, father filed a notice of substitution of attorney indicating he had retained private counsel.

11 “relied on elapsed time, inadequate diligence [on the part of father’s counsel], and [the lack of] proof of when records were requested” in denying the motion, and that these “grounds . . . could independently sustain [the] denial.” Father further concedes in his reply the “defects” in his written and oral continuance requests were “substantial,” including (1) failing to attach or quote the subpoena, identify the custodian, or document the response, and (2) failing to demonstrate “established retention or present availability” of the subpoenaed materials or to provide a “production estimate.” He also acknowledges the written motion did not refer to the body camera footage or the surveillance video from the park where there was an alleged incident of domestic violence; instead, father’s counsel mentioned this potential discovery in his oral request for a continuance at the October 30, 2025 hearing. He further acknowledges that in defending the court’s denial of his request for a continuance, DCFS could “properly rel[y] on those omissions and the matter’s age.” These concessions notwithstanding, father argues we may reverse the order denying his continuance request on the ground the court erred in finding “ ‘what is on the body cam[era] is referenced in the report.’ ” According to father, the record contains only a “ ‘synopsis’ ” of the police’s interviews with mother and the children, whereas the body worn camera footage contains the “witnesses’ ‘complete statements.’ ” The juvenile court did not find that a transcript of the body camera footage is in the record. Rather, as we noted above, the court merely remarked that “what is on the body cam[era] is referenced in” one of the agency’s reports. Importantly, father’s concession that his counsel did not show good cause is fatal to his 12 claim the court exceeded the bounds of reason in denying a continuance of the hearing. (See § 352, subd. (a)(2) [“Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause . . . .”]; Juan A., supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1208 [describing the abuse of discretion standard].)

D. We Reject Father’s Challenge to the Juvenile Court’s Assumption of Dependency Jurisdiction Over the Children 1. Applicable law and standard of review Section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A) authorizes dependency jurisdiction if: “The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . : [¶] . . . The failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.” (See § 300, subd. (b)(1)(A).) “Exposure to domestic violence may serve as the basis of a jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b)” because “ ‘ “[d]omestic violence in the same household where children are living . . . is a failure to protect [the children] from the substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it.” [Citation.]’ . . . [Citation.]” (See In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941 (R.C.).) “We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and orders for substantial evidence.” (R.C., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at pp. 940–941.) This appellate standard imposes an “ ‘ “enormous burden” ’ ” on father. (See Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581–582 (Schmidt).) “When reviewing for substantial evidence, ‘ “ ‘we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency 13 court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ [Citation.] ‘We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.]” . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re A.P. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1142 (A.P.).) “[W]e [also] completely disregard” evidence that is “contrary” to the order sustaining the petition. (See Schmidt, supra, at pp. 581–582.) Additionally, “[t]o warrant rejection of the statements of a witness who has been believed by the trier of fact, it must be physically impossible for the statements to be true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.” (In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 136 (Jordan R.).)

2. Father fails to show count b-1 is not supported by substantial evidence As set forth below, father’s arguments misconceive our standard of review, which does not permit us to reweigh evidence or determine credibility, and requires us to affirm if substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s rulings. In sustaining count b-1, the juvenile court found that “mother . . . and father . . . have a history of engaging in violent physical altercations in the presence of the children,” and that “[t]he violent conduct by . . . father against . . . mother endangers the children’s physical health and safety, creates a detrimental home environment, and places the children at risk of serious physical harm, damage, and danger.” Several examples of father’s acts of violence against mother appear in count b-1, 14 including occasions in which father: choked mother; “placed [his] hand over . . . mother’s mouth and pinched . . . mother’s nose closed, causing . . . mother to be unable to breathe”; “repeatedly closed [a] door on . . . mother’s head” “while . . . mother was on the ground”; and “struck . . . mother with a guitar.” The record contains evidence father committed multiple acts of violence against mother, several in the presence of the children. For instance, in the addendum to the jurisdiction and disposition report, DCFS informed the juvenile court that during an August 2025 interview, Lana R. told the agency she and her siblings observed father push mother up against a wall and choke her. According to that report, mother stated in an August 2025 interview that father began to hit her when the couple married in 2009, and she indicated father’s violent behavior toward her intensified when the family moved from New Jersey to California in 2016. Also included in the report is a statement from a police detective to the effect mother told the detective that father had subjected her to domestic violence for 20 years. Per the addendum to the jurisdiction and disposition report, mother indicated that on at least one occasion while the children were present, father got on top of mother and closed her mouth and nose so she could not breathe. Additionally, in a police report attached to DCFS’s jurisdiction and disposition report, a detective noted Lily R. stated during a July 2025 interview that father “ha[d] always been a violent person” and Lily saw father give mother “a black eye in the past.” (Boldface omitted.) The above examples establish a pattern of violent behavior from which the juvenile court reasonably could have inferred father would again assault mother in the children’s presence.

15 (See R.C., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 942 [“ ‘ “[P]ast violent behavior in a relationship is ‘the best predictor of future violence.’ ” ’ ”].) In addition, the detention report and the jurisdiction and disposition report indicate father denied the allegations of domestic violence against him. Father’s failure to acknowledge his past violent behavior, let alone express remorse or show any insight regarding it, is substantial evidence that in the absence of juvenile court supervision, he would again attack mother in the children’s presence. (See In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“ ‘[D]enial is a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without court supervision.’ ”].) Father’s arguments do not dissuade us from these conclusions. Father contests the sufficiency of the evidence of the incidents in which he allegedly struck mother with a guitar and closed the door on mother’s head while she was on the ground. Specifically, he argues the former occasion (which he dubs “the guitar incident”) (boldface omitted) — “if it occurred at all — was remote, out of state, and not remembered firsthand by the younger children” or by mother. He further maintains that Lily and Adam “admitt[ed] they did not recall” the incident in which he closed the door on mother’s head and “knew of it because mother told them.” (Boldface omitted.) Assuming arguendo no rational factfinder could conclude these two alleged instances of domestic violence occurred, there remains the other evidence described above that father had assaulted mother on a number of other occasions (e.g., Lana and her siblings witnessed father choke mother). Although father insists the so-called guitar incident “was . . . treated as a major [count] . . . B-1 credibility anchor in the petition,” the text of count b-1 does not indicate 16 that the incident was essential to DCFS’s invocation of dependency jurisdiction, and father does not support this assertion with reasoned argument. (See Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.) Father maintains he “presented DCFS with concrete media evidence bearing on mother’s aggression, medication use, household conditions, and child distress.” Yet, father supports this assertion with a citation to the entirety of the 29-page jurisdiction and disposition report (along with its attachments) and the 58-page addendum to that report (along with its attachments). We disregard this argument because father does not support it with adequate citations to the record. (See Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 611 [noting that “block [record] citations do not comply with” the rules governing appellate briefing].) Father asserts that DCFS reported he “appeared to display appropriate concern” for the children, and, during his monitored visits with them, the agency observed that (1) “the children and father had a good relationship and enjoyed their visits” and (2) one such monitored visit “ ‘went great.’ ” (Boldface omitted.) Father also asserts DCFS had an interpreter translate from Arabic to English video footage mother had given to the agency but did not do the same for clips father had provided to the agency. He deduces from this disparity that DCFS “was not neutrally evaluating competing evidence” but was instead “selecting which evidence to treat as serious and which to downplay.” He further intimates, without any supporting analysis, that mother must have “coach[ed]” the children to report to DCFS that he committed acts of violence against her. (Boldface & capitalization omitted.)

17 In essence, father challenges the weight or credibility of mother’s and children’s accounts of his violent behavior based on his suspicion that mother coached the children and his assertions he had a positive relationship with the children and the agency was biased against him. These challenges fall short of establishing error under the deferential standard that governs our review of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding. (See Jordan R., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 136 [holding that an appellate court may reject the statements of a witness credited by the factfinder only if it is physically impossible for the statements to be true or their falsity is apparent without resort to inferences or deductions].) Finally, in his reply brief, father raises new arguments disputing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting count b-1. For instance, he complains, “No identified medical-treatment record, obstetric report, or dated injury photograph corroborated” reports that father assaulted mother. Another example is father’s assertion that a police officer’s description of a video showing father “ ‘smack[ing]’ [mother’s] head while Tara R. was next to [m]other” is of limited weight because “the raw file was not independently admitted” and the officer’s description “did not establish the date, full prelude, [or] Tara R.’s precise location . . . .” We disregard father’s belatedly raised evidentiary challenges to count b-1. (Niblett, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 475.) In sum, father fails to overcome the presumption that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that father committed violent acts against mother in the children’s presence, thereby warranting assertion of dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(A).

18 3. Our affirmance of the juvenile court’s ruling sustaining count b-1 moots father’s challenges to counts a-1 and b-2 “As a general rule, a single jurisdictional finding supported by substantial evidence is sufficient to support jurisdiction and render moot a challenge to the other [jurisdictional] findings.” (See In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452.) In light of our affirmance of the juvenile court’s ruling sustaining count b-1, we need not determine whether substantial evidence supports count a-1 (which alleged jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a) based on father’s acts of domestic violence) or count b-2 (which alleged jurisdiction under subdivision (b)(1) based on father’s mental and emotional problems). Father argues in his reply that we “should reach [count] B-2 even if another finding could sustain dependency jurisdiction” because count “B-2 supplies a distinct psychiatric predicate for the psychological-assessment and medication- related terms, bears on visitation and future decisionmaking, and carries consequences separate from [counts] A-1 or B-1.” Father overlooks the fact that we may affirm the juvenile court’s dispositional rulings, including the order requiring him to submit to a psychological assessment even if arguendo the court erred in sustaining count b-2.11 Additionally, as explained in our 11 (See In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311 (Briana V.) [“At disposition, the juvenile court is not limited to the content of the sustained petition when it considers what dispositional orders would be in the best interests of the children.”].)

19 Discussion, part G, post, father has forfeited his appellate challenges to the orders requiring him to take prescribed psychotropic medication and authorizing him to have only monitored visits with the children. Lastly, father does not develop his contention that count b-2 “bears on . . . [the juvenile court’s] future decisionmaking, and carries [other] consequences . . . .” Accordingly, we adhere to the general rule that affirmance of one jurisdictional finding renders moot challenges to other jurisdictional findings.

E. Father Forfeits His Challenge to the Orders Removing the Children from His Custody In his opening brief, father argues the orders removing the children from his custody should be vacated if we conclude the jurisdictional findings lacked sufficient evidentiary support. Father does not argue in that brief that even if we were to affirm one or more of the jurisdictional findings, the removal orders should nonetheless be vacated for insufficient evidence. In its respondent’s brief, DCFS argues the orders removing the children from father should be affirmed because father “makes no independent challenge to those orders” in his opening brief. In his reply brief, father raises new arguments to support his position the juvenile court erred in issuing the removal orders. For instance, he maintains removal was improper because DCFS and the court “did not explain why enforceable separation, . . . approved monitors, unannounced checks, [or We address father’s claim of error as to the order requiring him to undergo a psychological assessment in Discussion, part F, post.

20 other] services . . . could not manage the asserted risk” of harm to the children. Father forfeited these arguments by not raising them in his opening brief, thereby depriving DCFS of an opportunity to respond to them. (See Niblett, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 475 [“ ‘ “ ‘ “To withhold a point until the closing brief would deprive the respondent of his opportunity to answer it or require the effort and delay of an additional brief by permission.” ’ ” ’ ”].)

F. Father Does Not Show the Juvenile Court Abused Its Discretion In Ordering Him To Submit to a Psychological Assessment and Drug and Alcohol Testing “ ‘The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interests and to fashion a dispositional order accordingly. On appeal, this determination cannot be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 311–312 [applying this standard in reviewing an order requiring a father to attend counseling].) “ ‘When applying the deferential abuse of discretion standard, “the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence . . . .” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 102.) As for the juvenile court’s order requiring father to undergo a psychological assessment, there was evidence from which the juvenile court reasonably could have inferred father may have an undiagnosed mental health condition that caused him to attack mother. For example, DCFS noted in its detention report that in July 2025, mother told the agency: (1) Mother “observed father’s mental health . . . decline over the last 1.5 years”; (2) “[f]ather 21 ha[d] stated to her and the children that the Egyptian Intelligence [was] ‘out to get him’ and [he] believe[d] mother [was] connected to them”; (3) “[f]ather ha[d] also stated that mother . . . ‘d[id] something’ to him and the children to get them to sleep so she c[ould] bring men home and perform sexual acts with them”; (4) father had “hear[d] things and see[n] things that no one else c[ould] and w[ould] tell these things to mother and [the] children”; and (5) “[f]ather has made inappropriate comments about mother in front of the children, calling her a whore and accus[ing] her of bringing men into the home and performing sexual acts and being a prostitute.” The detention report shows that in July 2025, Lana R. relayed to the agency that “father has physically harmed mother when angry” and, “as father [had] become more paranoid and accusatory [toward] mother,” he became angered by her more easily. Similarly, according to the addendum to the jurisdiction and disposition report, Adam R. indicated during an August 2025 interview that his parents argued every day, father has repeatedly accused mother of “do[ing] bad stuff with . . . men,” and Adam saw father grab mother by the neck and “sometimes he grabbed her from behind like a choke hold.” The juvenile court was entitled to credit this evidence of father’s angry and paranoid behavior. (See Discussion, part D.1, ante [noting that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the juvenile court].) Based on that evidence, the court did not exceed the bounds of reason in ordering a psychological assessment to determine whether a mental health condition caused father to perpetrate violent acts against mother. (Juan A., supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1208 [describing the abuse of discretion standard].)

22 Turning to father’s obligation to submit to drug and alcohol testing, father argues we should reverse that ruling because “[t]here was no sustained father-substance-abuse count.” (Boldface omitted.) The absence of a jurisdictional finding that father abused substances does not undermine the validity of the drug and alcohol testing requirement. (See Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311 [“The problem that the juvenile court seeks to address need not be described in the sustained section 300 petition.”].) Furthermore, according to the addendum to the jurisdiction and disposition report, a police detective, who spoke with father several months before the October 30, 2025 hearing, told the agency, “[Father] may . . . be under the influence of a stimulant given how he presents as manic.” We acknowledge the detective’s observation that father’s behavior is consistent with being under the influence of a stimulant, by itself, does not show substance abuse. Nevertheless, because this evidence suggests father’s paranoia and belligerence could be attributable to an illicit substance, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering testing to ascertain whether that was the case. We further note that in his reply brief, father levels several new arguments as to the drug and alcohol testing order, including his assertions the detective did not find any drugs in father’s vehicle and no positive drug test result for father is in the record. We disregard father’s belated evidentiary challenges to this order. (See Niblett, supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 475.) In sum, we conclude father does not show the juvenile court clearly abused its discretion in ordering him to submit to a psychological evaluation and drug and alcohol testing.

23 G. Father Forfeited His Challenges to the Monitored Visitation Order and the Orders Requiring Him To Participate in a Batterer’s Intervention Program, Take All Prescribed Psychotropic Medication, and Attend Individual Counseling On appeal, father maintains the juvenile court erred in ordering only monitored visitation and requiring him to complete a batterer’s intervention program, take all prescribed psychotropic medication, and participate in individual counseling. He acknowledges in his reply brief, however, he did not object to these orders at the combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. Consequently, father forfeited these challenges. (See In re A.E. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1, 4–5 [holding that a parent forfeits an appellate challenge to a dispositional ruling by failing to object to the order during the juvenile court proceedings].)

H. Father Fails To Demonstrate the Juvenile Court Erred By Issuing a Permanent Restraining Order Protecting Mother From Father “ ‘Under section 213.5, . . . a juvenile court has the authority to issue a restraining order lasting up to three years that protects . . . “any parent . . . of the [dependent] child” from harassment by a parent. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (A.P., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1143.) A restraining order may be issued under the statute if “ ‘ “failure to make [the order] may jeopardize the safety of the [protected person].” ’ [Citation.]” (See In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 673, second bracketed insertion added.) “ ‘[A]ppellate courts apply the substantial evidence standard to determine whether sufficient facts supported the 24 factual findings in support of a [section 213.5] restraining order and the abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the court properly issued the order.’ [Citation.]” (S.G., supra, at p. 670.) Father argues the juvenile court’s issuance of the permanent restraining order “was procedurally irregular.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) In support of this contention, father lists certain events preceding the order (e.g., the court issued a prior temporary restraining order on September 11, 2025 and reissued it 14 days later). He, however, provides no legal analysis or citation to authority demonstrating the court failed to comply with procedures governing issuance of the permanent restraining order. We thus decline to address this argument further. Father also complains the restraining order “rested on the same unreliable and insufficient record as the jurisdictional findings.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) As explained in our Discussion, part D.2, ante, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that father had committed multiple acts of domestic violence against mother. Accordingly, we reject father’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the restraining order.

25 DISPOSITION We affirm the juvenile court’s (1) assumption of dependency jurisdiction over Lily R., Lana R., Adam R., Z.R., and Tara R.; (2) dispositional orders; and (3) permanent restraining order protecting mother from father. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

M. KIM, J.