In re M.R. CA2/4

Opinion

Filed 9/23/26 In re M.R. CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re M.R., B353077 a Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP03542B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J.G., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Commissioner. Affirmed. Christine E. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION1 J.G. (mother) appeals the termination of parental rights over her son, M. Mother argues that M. had a bond with his older brother, Na., and the benefits of ongoing contact with Na. outweighed the benefits of permanency and stability of adoption for M. The record demonstrates that the juvenile court acted well within its discretion in rejecting mother’s argument. We therefore affirm. Section 366.26 provides procedural requirements for the termination of parental rights. When, as here, the trial court finds at a section 366.26 hearing that “it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights” unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) One of the statutory exceptions is the sibling relationship exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). That subdivision states that a court may find that termination would be detrimental to the child if “[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, … whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” Mother argues that this exception applies here. “The parent has the burden of establishing an exception to termination of parental rights.” (In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 291; see also 1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural background because our opinion is unpublished and the parties are familiar with the facts of the case and its procedural history. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness of trial court’s decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].) Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630–631; Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 5.725(d)(2) [“The party claiming that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child has the burden of proving the detriment”].) To find that an exception applies, the court must find “a compelling reason for determining the termination would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) “[W]e apply … the abuse of discretion standard to the court’s weighing of competing interests.” (In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 174; see also In re V.S. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1167.) Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that for M., the benefit of legal permanence through adoption outweighed the benefit of ongoing contact with Na.2 We find no abuse of discretion. Na. was born in 2009 and M. was born in 2013. They share a father, who was not involved with the children or this case.3 2 Mother asserts three contentions: first, that there was a “significant sibling bond” between M. and Na.; second, that adoption would likely interfere with that bond; and third, that the juvenile court abused its discretion by finding that the benefits of adoption outweighed any interference with the sibling relationship. We need not address each of these arguments. Even if we were to assume without deciding that there was a bond between M. and Na. and that adoption would interfere with that bond, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the benefit of legal permanence through adoption for M. outweighed any benefit of M. maintaining an ongoing relationship with Na.

3 The children’s half-brother, Ni., was born in 2020, and while this case was pending, mother gave birth to a fourth child, A., in April 2024. Ni. was placed in a separate home upon removal from mother. Ni. and A.’s father died in January 2025. 3 The children were removed from mother in August 2022 due to mother’s physical abuse of the children. M., age nine, was placed with his current caregiver, Ms. U., in September 2022. Na., age 12, was also initially placed with Ms. U., but he was removed due to his “aggressive behavior.” Subsequent efforts to return Na. to Ms. U.’s care were unsuccessful because of Na.’s ongoing aggression toward M. As reported by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services, Na. had been “getting verbally aggressive with M[.], which later escalated ... to physically aggressive to the point where [Ms. U.] intervened and ended up being hit on two separate occasion[s] protecting M[.] from Na[.]” In one incident, Na. was “choking M[.] against the wall.” Na. did not live with M. after August 2023. Thereafter, M. and Na. mostly saw each other during monitored visitation with mother and their half-siblings.4 Monitors of the visits noted that Na. was frequently angry and rude toward M., observing that Na. yelled at M., called M. fat and an idiot, told M. to shut up, told M. “you suck,” and cussed at M. In addition, Na. often sat by himself during visits and did not interact with the family. M. told a children’s social worker in July 2025 that “although Na[.] seems calmer during visits, he doesn’t interact much and ‘barely talks.’” Monitors noted that sometimes M. and Na. played together, or discussed video games, therapy, or computers. Mother often showed favoritism to Na., such as giving expensive gifts to Na., but not to M. Ms. U. observed that M. often came home from visits 4 M. and Na. had some sibling visits, but these ended in May 2024 because Na. was “having difficulty transitioning between” the two homes.

4 “upset or angry” “due to perceived favoritism” by mother, which was consistent across the years M. had lived with her.5 Meanwhile, M. was thriving in Ms. U.’s care. He played soccer, took karate classes, was student council president, and won awards at school. Ms. U. loved M. and was committed to providing him with permanency. Ms. U. said that if she adopted M., she was willing to maintain contact with his siblings. In an interview on January 14, 2026, M. “expressed concerns as to having to be at Court as he wants to be adopted by his current caregiver but does not want to have to say it to his mom due to fear about retaliation from the mother and Na[.]” As the potential for adoption approached in January and February 2026, M. began refusing to visit with mother and Na. At the section 366.26 hearing on February 27, 2026, M., now age 12, testified that he wanted to be adopted. He testified that his relationship with Na. was “good and bad.” When asked if he was aware that Na. “will no longer be your brother” if he were adopted, M. said yes, but he still wanted to be adopted. M. testified that if he did not see Na. anymore, M. would miss Na. “at some point.” But when Na.’s counsel asked M. if he might prefer legal guardianship over adoption so he could guarantee a continuing relationship with Na., M. said, “No.” M. struggled to testify about the time that Na. choked him before Na. was removed from Ms. U.’s home, saying that it still gave him “an intense feeling … like pressure in my neck.” M. testified again that he wanted to be adopted, and that his bond with Na. did not outweigh that.

5 Mother also frequently ignored M. when he tried to get mother’s attention. In addition, mother often asked only M. to help care for the younger children. One monitor noted, “The tone of mother’s voice would change whenever she had interactions with M[.], as it was monotone.” 5 Na. testified that he knew M. wanted to be adopted, because M. told him so. Na. also testified that he thought M. would miss the family if he was adopted. When asked why he believed this, Na. testified, “Well, I don’t remember him saying that he misses the family but he will.” “The sibling bond exception is evaluated from the perspective of the child who is being considered for adoption, not the perspective of that child’s siblings.” (In re D.O., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 174.) Throughout the case, M. remained safe, happy, and comfortable in Ms. U.’s home. M. clearly expressed that he wanted the stability and permanency of being adopted by Ms. U. This evidence supports a finding that adoption would be highly beneficial to M. (See In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1076 [Children have “‘“compelling rights … to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child”’”].) By contrast, the record contains very little evidence that M.’s relationship with Na. was beneficial to M. Their relationship was characterized by Na.’s aggressive behavior and angry outbursts directed toward M., as well as mother’s favoritism toward Na. Instances of bonding between M. and Na. were sporadic. The juvenile court therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding that mother failed to demonstrate that this was one of the “‘exceptional circumstances’” (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631) in which maintaining the sibling relationship outweighed the benefits of adoption. DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s March 2, 2026 order terminating parental rights is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 6 DAUM, J. We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J. TAMZARIAN, J.