People v. Thomas CA3

Opinion

Filed 9/23/26 P. v. Thomas CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Yolo)

THE PEOPLE, C103137 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CR2019-13) v. BUCK MALDONADO THOMAS, Defendant and Appellant.

A jury found defendant Buck Maldonado Thomas guilty of multiple crimes arising out of his sexual abuse of two high school students whose families had hired him for his coaching services. At defendant’s original sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life, plus 12 years four months. This sentence included a term of 25 years to life for forcible sexual penetration and a term of six years for felony burglary that the trial court stayed pursuant to Penal Code 1 section 654. This court affirmed defendant’s convictions on appeal but remanded the case for resentencing so the trial court could exercise discretion provided by new amendments to section 654. On remand, the trial court resentenced defendant to 25 years to life for forcible sexual penetration and stayed a shorter, two-year term for burglary.

1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

1 On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion under section 654 by staying punishment on the shorter term. We disagree and affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I Statement Of Facts The relevant facts are taken from this court’s opinion in the prior appeal, People v. Thomas (Jun. 6, 2023, C093565) [nonpub. opn.] (Thomas). Defendant “was a private softball coach who offered training and liaison services to high school students to help them secure college softball scholarships.” (Ibid.) The victims were two teenage girls, 15-year-old H.L. and 16-year-old M.R., who hoped to secure college softball scholarships. (Ibid.) In 2018, H.L.’s family hired defendant as a batting trainer and liaison on the recommendation of her softball coach. (Thomas, supra, C093565.) The family allowed defendant to stay in a spare room in their home from July 30 to August 4, 2018. (Ibid.) When defendant arrived, he discussed logistics for training and payment with the family, then told H.L. they should begin training in her room, without her parents. (Thomas, supra, C093565.) “Defendant told H.L. not to wear her bra or underwear. H.L. and defendant went into her room and defendant closed the door. Once inside, they began stretching on a mat with H.L. lying on her back. Defendant sat by her legs and began rubbing the inner lips of her vagina with his finger under her clothes. As he rubbed her vagina, defendant said something like, ‘[Y]ou like that, huh.’ H.L. froze and tried not to cry. When she tried to push him with her legs, defendant, who was much larger than H.L., pulled her shorts aside and began licking her vagina. As he did so, he held H.L.’s legs down, and she was unable to get up. Defendant eventually stopped.” (Ibid.) Two days later, M.R. met with defendant at H.L.’s house for training. (Thomas, supra, C093565.) While alone with M.R. outside H.L.’s house, defendant grabbed 2 M.R.’s hips, moved her against him, and began groping her breasts under the guise of loosening her muscles. (Ibid.) He stopped when M.R.’s father returned. (Ibid.) M.R. did not say anything about the touching to her father at the time. (Ibid.) M.R.’s parents subsequently hired defendant to coach her. (Thomas, supra, C093565.) In September 2018, and again in November 2018, M.R. went to defendant’s Arizona house for training. (Ibid.) Those trips resulted in repeated, escalating sexual offenses against her. (Ibid.) Defendant was later prosecuted in Arizona for some of those offenses, as well as sexual offenses against other victims. II Procedural History The jury found defendant guilty of five counts against H.L.: two counts of first degree burglary by means of unlawfully entering an inhabited child’s bedroom with the intent to commit forcible sex acts against a minor; one count of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child 14 or 15 years of age; one count of forcible sexual penetration of a minor; and one count of forcible oral copulation of a minor. (Thomas, supra, C093565.) For the forcible sexual penetration count, the jury found true that defendant committed the crime during the commission of first degree burglary. (Ibid.) The jury further found defendant guilty of sexual battery against M.R. (Ibid.) The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life plus 12 years four months, which included, among other things, a term of 25 years to life for forcible sexual penetration and a term of six years for burglary, which it stayed pursuant to section 654. (Thomas, supra, C093565.) Defendant appealed the judgment. (See ibid.) While his appeal was pending, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1), which amended section 654 to give trial courts discretion to choose between sentences when the provision applies. (See Thomas, supra, C093565.)

3 Also while this appeal was pending, evidence of offenses uncharged in this case formed the basis for a prosecution in Arizona, where defendant pled guilty to several charges of sexual abuse. The Arizona court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of 24 years, to be served concurrently with defendant’s sentence in this case. Ultimately, on the first appeal in this matter, this court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for the trial court to exercise its new discretion under section 654. III Resentencing Hearing On remand, the parties filed resentencing briefs. To his brief, defendant attached several exhibits that were unavailable during his original sentencing. These exhibits included an October 2022 sentencing order from the Arizona case in which defendant pled guilty and a document showing defendant had a California static risk assessment score of 1, which defendant said “translate[d] to an estimated risk that there was a 3.9[ percent] chance to reoffend within five years.” Defendant also included a social history that showed he was a victim of repeated childhood sexual abuse, had successfully completed a substance abuse program, and wanted to ensure he did not relapse or reoffend. The trial court also heard victim impact statements from H.L.’s mother and M.R.’s parents. Both stressed the harm defendant caused to their children and others and urged against leniency. Defendant argued the trial court should stay punishment for forcible sexual penetration in favor of punishing him for burglary because (1) before trial, the prosecution had sought a prison term of only 15 years eight months, (2) staying the greater punishment “would achieve a level of uniformity in sentencing” with defendant’s Arizona case, and (3) defendant’s risk assessment results and social history showed he was at a low risk of reoffending.

4 The prosecution argued that punishment for forcible sexual penetration was appropriate because defendant committed the burglary as a means to commit rape. The prosecution further argued the crimes did not constitute the same act within the meaning of section 654 and defendant’s arguments relative to his Arizona case were irrelevant and lacked support. Finally, the prosecution argued that defendant’s assertion regarding his childhood trauma was unpersuasive and the nature of defendant’s crimes, his pattern of predatory behavior, and imprisonment “in a male dominant, paramilitary environment” without access to young females for the last three years all belied his argument he had rehabilitated. After considering the arguments and evidence and acknowledging its new discretion under section 654, the trial court chose to again impose punishment for forcible sexual penetration and stay punishment for burglary. The court explained that defendant had not provided any basis to consider the pretrial offer or legal authority to consider uniformity in sentencing with his Arizona case. The court further explained it found defendant’s social history unpersuasive both because it was told solely from defendant’s perspective and therefore of uncertain veracity, and because defendant had failed to articulate how his sobriety would assist him in not reoffending when there was no evidence showing his crimes had been committed while intoxicated. And the court noted the risk assessment only predicted the likelihood of reoffending within a three-year period and defendant’s score on that assessment was, in the court’s recollection, average. The trial court then explained that imposing the greater penalty, i.e., 25 years to life for sexual penetration, was appropriate in light of multiple considerations. These included the fact that defendant committed the burglary with the intent of committing the sexual assault; the seriousness of the sexual assault—forcible sexual penetration of a minor; and that his victim was a 15-year-old girl seeking his help to earn a softball scholarship. The court also considered the particular factual circumstances of the crimes, such as defendant’s instructions to H.L. not to wear a bra or underwear for her first 5 session with him and that he committed the crime within hours after meeting her, while her parents were in another bedroom. After these explanations, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 25 years to life, plus eight years four months, which included 25 years to life for forcible sexual penetration and a term of two years for burglary, stayed pursuant to section 654. Defendant appeals. DISCUSSION Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion under section 654 by staying the two-year sentence for burglary instead of the 25-year-to-life sentence for forcible sexual penetration. Specifically, defendant argues the court’s sentencing decision was arbitrary because (1) he had been repeatedly sexually abused as a child and (2) he was already serving a concurrent 24-year sentence in an Arizona case for other offenses, which “[a] reasonable jurist should have taken … into account … especially in light of the newly-discovered abuse in his background” and his lack of danger to the public. The People disagree and so do we. Section 654, subdivision (a) provides, “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” That section previously required “punish[ment] under the law that provided for the longest potential term of imprisonment.” (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 351; see § 654, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 410, § 1, p. 2752.) As amended by Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), the section now “afford[s] [trial] courts the discretion to punish the act or omission under either provision.” (Mani, at p. 351; see id. at p. 379; Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.) We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) On appeal, we will affirm unless the trial court was not aware of its discretion, considered impermissible factors, or exercised its 6 discretion in an arbitrary and capricious manner. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378; Sandoval, at p. 847.) “ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (Carmony, at pp. 376-377.) In evaluating whether defendant has met this burden, we do not reweigh evidence; nor do we substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. (Id. at pp. 374, 378-379.) Applying this standard, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by staying defendant’s burglary sentence. The trial court was aware of its discretion under section 654. In exercising that discretion, the trial court considered the particular facts and circumstances of the offenses, including that defendant committed the burglary to facilitate his commission of forcible sexual penetration, that the sexual offense was very serious, and that defendant took advantage of his particular position of power over H.L. to assault her. The trial court also explicitly addressed all of the considerations defendant has raised again on appeal. It considered defendant’s childhood history of abuse and evidence of rehabilitation in the social history but found that unpersuasive since it was told solely from defendant’s perspective and lacked corroboration. It considered defendant’s risk assessment but found it of limited utility because it only predicted defendant’s rate of recidivism within a limited timeframe. And it reviewed but did not consider defendant’s sentence in Arizona because defendant did not, and still does not, provide any legal authority for doing so or persuasive argument as to its relevance. In this context, defendant’s argument amounts to a claim that the court did not give enough weight to the evidence and arguments in his favor. This essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 374, 378-379.)

7 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

/s/ ROBIE, J.

We concur:

/s/ HULL, Acting P. J.

/s/ MAURO, J.