Siry Investments v. Farkhondehpour CA2/2

Opinion

Filed 9/23/26 Siry Investments v. Farkhondehpour CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

SIRY INVESTMENTS, L.P., B340681 (Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BC372362) v. SAEED FARKHONDEHPOUR et al., Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Law Offices of Mohammad A. Fakhreddine, Mohammad A. Fakhreddine; Anand Law Group and Harvinder S. Anand for Defendants and Appellants. G. Hagen Law Office, Gregory D. Hagen; Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker and Robert Cooper for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendants and appellants Saeed Farkhondehpour and 415 South Wall Street, Inc. (collectively, appellants) appeal from the order granting plaintiff and respondent Siry Investments, L.P.’s (respondent) motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Penal Code1 section 496, subdivision (c). Appellants contend, among other matters, the trial court erred in finding respondent is the prevailing party and awarding attorney’s fees, with a 1.6 multiplier, for its counsel’s services in the appellate proceedings of this case. We conclude the fees for the services of respondent’s counsel, Gregory Hagen, performed on a contingency basis should have been determined by use of the lodestar method. The trial court, however, acted reasonably within its discretion as to its remaining findings on the motion. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.2 BACKGROUND Facts and procedural history The parties in this case formed a limited partnership, formed in 1998, to renovate and lease space in a mixed-use building in downtown Los Angeles. In June 2007, respondent 1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2 We hereby deny appellants’ motion for summary reversal or leave to file supplemental brief, motion to augment record on appeal, motion for judicial notice, and second motion for judicial notice. We grant respondent’s motion to strike portions of appellants’ reply brief.

2 sued appellants and Morad Neman3 for underpayment and improperly diverting the partnership’s rental income to themselves. The case was tried to a jury verdict in 2009, in respondent’s favor. Respondent was awarded $242,975 in actual damages and $1.1 million in punitive damages against Farkhondehpour and $2 million against Neman. In late 2012, the judgment was reversed due to a defect in the special verdict form, which did not require the jury to specify if appellants were liable to respondent individually or as trustees of the various trusts. After the case was remanded, terminating sanctions were imposed against appellants due to violations of discovery orders. The trial court consequently struck appellants’ answers and entered default judgment in the amount of $12,023,066.10, including treble damages of $2,869,461 pursuant to section 496, subdivision (c), and attorney’s fees of $4,010,008.97, as well as compensatory damages, punitive damages, and interest. Appellants then challenged the default judgment by filing a motion to vacate judgment and a motion for new trial. The motion to vacate judgment was denied. In the motion for new trial, appellants maintained the trial court: (1) erroneously awarded treble damages pursuant to section 496, subdivision (c), and allowed respondent to also recover punitive damages; (2) miscalculated the treble damages award; (3) awarded a constitutionally excessive amount in punitive damages; and (4) erroneously awarded attorney’s fees under section 496, 3 Neman was sued in his individual capacity and as trustee of The Neman Family Irrevocable Trust and the Yedidia Investments Defined Benefit Plan Trust (Neman parties). The Neman parties are not parties to this appeal.

3 subdivision (c), and Code of Civil Procedure 1029.8. The motion for new trial was partially granted—total damages were reduced to $7,066,579.10. An amended judgment was entered in the reduced amount. Appellants appealed the original default judgment and the amended judgment. Respondent filed a cross-appeal from the amended judgment, challenging appellants’ standing to file the motion for new trial. This court upheld the trial court’s imposition of terminating sanctions. (Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1118–1128.) Appellants were held to have standing to move for new trial to challenge the amount in damages awarded. (Id. at pp. 1129– 1132.) This court held section 496, subdivision (c), does not apply to this case, reducing the damages award to $3,143,596. (Siry Investment, at pp. 1132–1138.) In April 2020, respondent entered into a confidential settlement agreement with the Neman parties. In May 2020, respondent appealed this court’s decision to our Supreme Court, which granted review. In July 2020, appellants made a settlement offer to respondent to fully resolve the case that was declined. In July 2022, our Supreme Court affirmed appellants had standing to move for new trial to challenge the amount of damages awarded. (Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333, 339, 367.) The Supreme Court, however, reversed the determination that section 496, subdivision (c), does not apply to this case, concluding treble damages and attorney’s fees may be recovered thereunder. (Siry Investment, supra, at pp. 339, 367.) On remand, this court reinstated the treble damages and attorney’s fees award (Siry Investment, L.P.

4 Farkhondehpour (Oct. 27, 2022, B277750) (nonpub. opn.). The amended judgment, however, was ordered to be modified to strike $376,437 in attorney’s fees that respondent incurred from a prior lawsuit. The motion for attorney’s fees In August 2023, respondent moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 496, subdivision (c). Respondent requested $4,274,982 in attorney’s fees, which included a 1.6 multiplier, for the services of its counsel, Robert Cooper and Gregory Hagen.4 The fees requested were for postjudgment services rendered after the original default judgment was entered on July 20, 2016. Respondent contended the total amount requested is reasonable because appellants’ aggressive litigation tactics substantially increased the legal fees. Included in the requested fees was $993,033 for part of Hagen’s services performed on a contingency basis. Respondent argued this amount is reasonable because Hagen risked recovering no fees. Respondent also claimed it may recover the attorney’s fees for its cross-appeal because respondent is entitled to the fees for its interim appellate services, even unsuccessful ones, if they were reasonably incurred in obtaining a favorable result. Respondent maintained, among other reasons, that a multiplier is justified due to the complexity and novelty of the matter and the extraordinary skills required to succeed on appeal in our Supreme Court.

4 Part of Hagen’s services were performed on an hourly basis when Hagen was at his former law firm. Hagen later opened his own practice but continued to represent respondent in this case on a contingency basis.

5 In opposition, appellants contended they should be considered the prevailing party because the amended judgment was reduced by $376,437 on appeal. Appellants asserted respondent did not prevail in its cross-appeal because the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court both affirmed the trial court’s ruling that appellants had standing to move for new trial. Appellants argued the time spent appealing the matters concerning section 496, subdivision (c), was unnecessary because appellants offered a formal settlement. Appellants maintained respondent’s attorney’s fees should also be reduced by respondent’s settlement with the Neman parties. As to Hagen’s contingency-based services, appellants argued respondent did not provide Hagen’s timesheets and is not entitled to fees based on his contingency rate. Appellants also asserted respondent’s fees request for the interim appeal is untimely and challenged the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees and multiplier requested. The trial court heard the motion in June 2024. The court awarded respondent a reduced amount of $4,268,597.97 in attorney’s fees, finding there is no prevailing party requirement under section 496, subdivision (c). The court concluded, even if there is such a requirement, respondent would be the prevailing party because it achieved its main litigation objective by obtaining a net monetary judgment and prevailing on most of the appeals. As to Hagen’s contingency-based services, the court found the $993,033 requested for these services to be reasonable. The court indicated detailed time records are not required in assessing the reasonableness of the contingency fees. In addition, the court found timely the request for attorney’s fees for the 6 interim appeal. The court explained it was proper to extend the motion deadline because the court lacked jurisdiction to decide a fees motion under the discovery statutes in 2017, and the Supreme Court did not decide the applicability of section 496 until 2022. The court further found the 1.6 multiplier respondent requested to be reasonable due to the complex nature of the appellate proceedings, the numerous novel legal issues involved, and the fact Hagen was precluded from taking other cases. The fees award, however, was reduced because the requested amount included clerical tasks and duplicative billing. Appellants subsequently moved to vacate the order granting the attorney’s fees, which respondent opposed. Before the trial court could rule on the motion to vacate, appellants timely appealed the underlying fees motion.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL Appellants assert seven main arguments. First, appellants argue respondent should not be deemed the prevailing party on all of the appeals. Second, appellants assert the attorney’s fees for respondent’s cross-appeal were erroneously awarded because the cross-appeal is based on different facts and legal theories than appellants’ appeal. Third, appellants maintain Hagen’s contingency fees were erroneously awarded because the fees are unsupported and the lodestar method must be applied. Fourth, appellants posit the trial court erred in awarding a 1.6 multiplier because the determinant factors for the multiplier are unsupported and it is improper to grant Hagen’s contingency fees. Fifth, appellants contend the court erroneously found the attorney hours respondent spent after it rejected appellants’

7 settlement offer were reasonably necessary to litigate its claim. Sixth, appellants argue the court erred by awarding attorney’s fees for issues raised solely by the Neman parties, whose settlement with respondent was required to be submitted for a good faith determination. Finally, appellants assert the court erroneously awarded attorney’s fees for the interim appeal because respondent untimely filed its fees motion.

DISCUSSION I. Standard of review and applicable law “[A]n appeal of an award of attorney fees is generally reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.” (Powerhouse Motorsports Group, Inc. v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 867, 887.) “Under this standard of review, the trial court’s order will be upheld on appeal unless, considering all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of the order and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order.” (In re Marriage of Rangell (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1218 (Rangell).) “‘Discretion is abused when its exercise is arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious.’” (Ibid.) “However, de novo review of such a trial court order is warranted where the determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs in this context have been satisfied amounts to statutory construction and a question of law.” (Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142.) “An appellate court reviews a determination of the legal basis for an award of attorney fees independently as a question of law.” (Leamon v. Krajkiewcz (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) “[W]here the material facts are largely not in dispute, our review 8 is de novo.” (Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 751.) II. The trial court’s attorney’s fees award is reasonable, but lodestar applies for Hagen’s contingency-based services A. The trial court reasonably found respondent the prevailing party under section 496, subdivision (c) Appellants contend the trial court erred in finding respondent achieved its litigation objectives and is the prevailing party in this matter, arguing respondent did not prevail because respondent failed to achieve its litigation objective of restoring the original judgment of $12,023,066 on appeal. We disagree.5 Section 496, subdivision (c), states: “Any person who has been injured by a violation of subdivision (a) or (b) may bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney’s fees.” “‘In the absence of legislative direction in the attorney fees statute, the courts have concluded that a rigid definition of prevailing party should not be used. [Citation.] Rather, prevailing party status should be determined by the trial court based on an evaluation of whether a party prevailed “‘on a practical level,’”

5 Appellants also assert the trial court erroneously found no prevailing party requirement under section 496, subdivision (c). The court nevertheless found respondent is the prevailing party in this matter and explained its decision. Thus, we need not specifically address if the statute has a prevailing party requirement, especially since we conclude here the court reasonably found respondent to be the prevailing party.

9 and the trial court’s decision should be affirmed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.’” (Sharif v. Mehusa, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 185, 192.) “Among the factors the trial court must consider in determining whether a party prevailed is the extent to which each party has realized its litigation objectives.” (Zuehlsdorf v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 249, 257.) “‘[I]n determining litigation success, courts should respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be guided by “equitable considerations.” For example, a party who is denied direct relief on a claim may nonetheless be found to be a prevailing party if it is clear that the party has otherwise achieved its main litigation objective.’” (Silver Creek, LLC v. BlackRock Realty Advisors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1539.) Factors favoring a finding the plaintiff prevailed may include the plaintiff obtaining a net monetary recovery or otherwise “‘get[ting] most or all of what he wanted by filing the action.’” (See Kim v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 170, 179–180, 181 [“[W]hile [the defendant] obtained a dismissal in the settlement agreement, [the plaintiff] obtained many of his litigation objectives including return of the car, cancellation of the lease and a monetary recovery.”].) “[A] court’s ruling on who is the prevailing party ‘should be affirmed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.’” (Artus v. Gramercy Towers Condominium Assn. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1050.) “The trial court ‘“‘is given wide discretion in determining which party has prevailed on its cause(s) of action….’”’” (Sears v. Baccaglio (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1158.) “Generally, parties ‘who qualify for a fee should recover compensation for “all the hours reasonably spent ….”’” (State 10 Farm General Ins. Co. v. Lara (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 197, 218 (State Farm).) “This includes work on unsuccessful arguments.” (Ibid.) “‘Litigation often involves a succession of attacks upon an opponent’s case; indeed the final ground of resolution may only become clear after a series of unsuccessful attacks. Compensation is ordinarily warranted even for unsuccessful forays.’” (City of Los Angeles v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 290, 307 (Metropolitan Water Dist.).) We conclude the trial court’s finding respondent to be the prevailing party in this matter was reasonable. Respondent successfully obtained a judgment in its favor regarding its section 496 claim, which was affirmed on appeal. While this court determined section 496, subdivision (c), does not authorize treble damages and attorney’s fees under the circumstances of the case, respondent successfully appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Indeed, appellants fail to show respondent can be the prevailing party only if none of its damages were reduced in the appellant proceedings. Appellants’ narrow view of attorney’s fees under section 496, subdivision (c), is unsupported. The recovery of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 496, subdivision (c), is tied generally to litigating the civil claim under the statute, not to any particular aspect of the litigation such as success in a related appeal. “[F]ee awards should be fully compensatory.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133 (Ketchum).) “‘[A]bsent circumstances rendering the award unjust, an attorney fee award should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent’ in litigating the action to a successful conclusion.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 394 (Horsford).)

11 Here, the trial court can reasonably find the hours spent in the appellate proceedings were necessary to litigating the section 496 claim. The claim was the subject of the appellate proceedings and respondent had significant successes on appeal. Respondent succeeded in affirming the terminating sanctions entered against appellants. Respondent also succeeded on the issue of whether section 496, subdivision (c), applied to this case and allowed respondent to recover treble damages and attorney’s fees. While respondent did not succeed on all issues in the appellate proceedings, appellants fail to establish this was required. Respondent ultimately retained the judgment entered in its favor and was able to recover treble damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to section 496, subdivision (c). As discussed above, compensation of attorney’s fees is ordinarily warranted even for unsuccessful arguments. (See Metropolitan Water Dist., supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 307.) The fact that respondent did not prevail on its cross-appeal and damages were reduced does not mean the trial court abused its discretion by finding the hours were reasonably necessary for litigating the claim. Appellants contend net monetary recovery should not be a factor considered in deciding the prevailing party in this matter because the claim at issue is not a contract claim. Appellants assert courts only assess whether a party achieved its litigation objective and prevailed on a practical level when the claim is statutory. Appellants’ assertion is unsupported, however, since factors showing the claimant prevailed on a statutory claim may include the claimant obtaining a net monetary recovery or otherwise “‘get[ting] most or all of what he wanted by filing the action.’” (See Kim v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 170, 179–180, 181 [“[In claim under the 12 Consumer Legal Remedies Act], while [the defendant] obtained a dismissal in the settlement agreement, [the plaintiff may be considered the prevailing party because he] obtained many of his litigation objectives including return of the car, cancellation of the lease and a monetary recovery.”].) Nothing shows net monetary recovery cannot be considered a factor favoring a finding that the claimant prevailed on a statutory claim. Appellants also argue this court should apply the Supreme Court’s analysis in Smith v. Rae-Venter Law Group (2002) 29 Cal.4th 345 (Smith) for determining the prevailing party on appeal. Appellants posit Smith shows the final judgment must be compared with the judgment from which the appeal was taken. Smith involves the specific fee-shifting provision in Labor Code section 98.2, subdivision (c), which provides “the court shall assess costs and reasonable attorney fees against an appellant who ‘is unsuccessful in the appeal.’” (Smith, at p. 350.) “The purpose of this fee-shifting provision is to discourage frivolous and meritless appeals from the [labor] commissioner’s decisions.” (Ibid.) As discussed above, the attorney’s fees provision in section 496, subdivision (c), is tied generally to litigating the civil claim under the statute, not to success in any specific aspect of litigation. There is nothing in section 496 regarding success in an appeal. Accordingly, Smith is inapposite to determining the issues here. Further, appellants assert the trial court erroneously found the parties’ settlement discussions and respondent’s settlement with the Neman parties after the first appellate opinion are irrelevant to determining the prevailing party. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by finding the settlement negotiations should not decide who is the prevailing party.

13 “‘Settlement communications are not sources “similar” to “pleadings, trial briefs, [and] opening statements.” [Citation.] They were not presented at trial,’” and “‘[t]he objectives in settlement negotiations are utterly unlike litigation objectives stated in court proceedings to obtain a legal decision.’” (Waterwood Enterprises, LLC v. City of Long Beach (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 955, 967–968.) Hence, it was not unreasonable for the court to decide the settlement discussions should not determine the prevailing party in this case. B. The trial court did not err in awarding the attorney’s fees for the cross-appeal Appellants posit the trial court erroneously awarded attorney’s fees for respondent’s cross-appeal, because it is based on separate and distinct facts and legal theories from appellants’ appeal and was not reasonably necessary for litigating the claim. Appellants contend the issue as to their standing to move for new trial was a “distinctly different claim” and not “intertwined inextricably” with their appeal regarding the applicability of section 496, subdivision (c). Appellants argue they never raised the standing issue in their appeal and the issue does not share a common core of facts therewith. We disagree with appellants’ contention that the attorney’s fees associated with the cross-appeal are unrecoverable because the cross-appeal is a “distinctly different claim” separate from the appeal concerning section 496, subdivision (c). Appellants’ narrow framing of the issues here is unsupported. As discussed above, the trial court needs only to find the hours spent on a matter were reasonable for litigating the claim. (See Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 394.) Appellants’ motion for new trial challenged, among other matters, the treble damages and 14 attorney’s fees awarded under section 496, subdivision (c). Respondent filed its cross-appeal to challenge appellants’ standing, as parties in default, to bring the motion for new trial. Accordingly, the cross-appeal was not unrelated to the litigation of the section 496 claim and can reasonably be found to be a part of respondent’s efforts to oppose appellants’ challenges to the claim. As mentioned earlier, a party need not prevail on a matter toward litigating its claim to recover the attorney’s fees associated with that matter. (See State Farm, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 218; Metropolitan Water Dist., supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 307.) The Court of Appeal and our Supreme Court both reviewed whether appellants had standing to bring their motion for new trial. The standing issue was never found to be baseless or devoid of merit. Hence, the trial court can reasonably find the hours spent on the cross-appeal, despite it being ultimately unsuccessful, were reasonably necessary for litigating the section 496 claim. C. The lodestar method was necessary to determine reasonable attorney’s fees for Hagen’s contingency-based services Appellants argue respondent is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees based on the contingency rate it agreed to with its counsel, Hagen. Appellants posit the lodestar method is required to determine statutory attorney’s fees, unless the underlying statute expressly provides for another method of calculation. We agree. “In statutory fee-shifting cases, in which the prevailing party is statutorily authorized to recover his or her attorney’s fees from the losing party, the lodestar method is the primary 15 method for establishing the amount of recoverable fees.” (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 750–751 (Glaviano).) “[A]lthough the lodestar method is not the only approach for calculating fees and is not required for every fee-shifting statute, the Legislature appears to have endorsed the lodestar method except in limited situations where the Legislature has expressly indicated that method is not appropriate.” (Id. at p. 753.) “When the Legislature has determined that the lodestar adjustment approach is not appropriate, it has expressly so stated.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1135.) “[T]he California Supreme Court intended its lodestar method to apply to a statutory attorney’s fee award unless the statutory authorization for the award provided for another method of calculation.” (Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 448–449 (Meister).) “Under the lodestar method, the trial court must first determine the lodestar figure—the reasonable hours spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate—based on a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case.” (Glaviano, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 751.) We conclude the lodestar method was required for determining the hours reasonably spent by Hagen. Section 496, subdivision (c), does not expressly authorize another method of calculating reasonable attorney’s fees for the claim. Indeed, the statute is completely silent as to the appropriate method for establishing the amount of recoverable fees. The statute’s language on attorney’s fees is sparse, providing no detail regarding the proper approach for determining reasonable fees. As discussed above, the appropriate method for deciding 16 reasonable attorney’s fees is the lodestar method unless the statute expressly provides for another method of calculation. (See Glaviano, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 750–751; Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1135; Meister, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 448– 449.) Since section 496, subdivision (c), provides for no other method of calculation, the proper approach for establishing reasonable attorney’s fees must be the lodestar method.6 Thus, a contingency rate could not be accepted for deciding Hagen’s reasonable attorney’s fees. Here, the order indicates Hagen’s contingency rate was accepted in determining reasonable attorney’s fees. The trial court found Hagen’s declaration was credible regarding the work performed to support the contingency fees. But nothing in the record shows the number of hours and hourly rate for the work Hagen performed were considered for these fees. Accordingly, this matter must be remanded for the trial court to determine these fees based on the lodestar method.

6 Respondent cites and quotes from Fed-Mart Corp. v. Pell Enterprises, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 215, 229, suggesting this case allows the use of contingency rates for determining reasonable attorney’s fees for section 496 claims. While respondent represents section 496 is at issue in Fed-Mart, the case actually involves Corporations Code section 317. (See Fed- Mart, at pp. 218–219, 221–222, 229.) Fed-Mart does not even mention section 496, and respondent fails to show how it otherwise directly applies to the attorney’s fees provision of the statute.

17 D. The trial court reasonably awarded a multiplier for Hagen’s services Appellants contend the trial court unreasonably awarded a multiplier for Hagen’s services.7 Appellants argue a multiplier is not justified because Hagen and his former firm were not precluded from other employment, he only assisted in reviewing the draft appellate briefs and preparing for oral arguments, and the results on appeal were mixed at best. We disagree. “The amount of attorney fees awarded pursuant to the lodestar adjustment method may be increased or decreased. Such an adjustment is commonly referred to as a ‘fee enhancement’ or ‘multiplier.’” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247.) “The trial court is neither foreclosed from, nor required to, award a multiplier.” (Ibid.) “Rather, applying a multiplier is discretionary.” (Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1242.) “The Supreme Court has ‘set forth a number of factors the trial court may consider in adjusting the lodestar figure. These include: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; [and] (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, both from the point of view of eventual victory on the merits and the point of view of establishing eligibility for an award.”’” (Mikhaeilpoor, 7 Appellants separately argue Hagen is not entitled to a multiplier for the services he performed on a contingency basis because the factors for determining a multiplier are the same as those to justify the contingency fee award. This argument is moot because we have concluded the lodestar method must be used to determine Hagen’s services.

18 supra, at p. 248.) “‘A court may rely on these factors to increase or decrease the lodestar. [Citation.] Any one factor may be sufficient to apply a positive or negative multiplier.’” (The Kennedy Com. v. City of Huntington Beach (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 436, 467 (The Kennedy Com.).) We conclude the trial court reasonably granted a 1.6 multiplier for Hagen’s services. The court based its ruling on multiple appropriate factors that justified the enhancement. The court reasonably found the complex and difficult nature of the appellate proceedings justified the multiplier. This court issued a lengthy, complicated published opinion concerning, in part, the availability of treble damages and attorney’s fees in this case under section 496, subdivision (c), which respondent appealed to our Supreme Court and was granted review. The Supreme Court ruled in respondent’s favor on this significant issue, finding the statute’s unambiguous words provide for treble damages and attorney’s fees in this case. The Supreme Court concluded the Legislature can be expected to amend the statute accordingly to the extent such remedies are problematic as a matter of policy. Respondent provided evidence the Supreme Court’s decision was widely covered in legal journals and major publications. These facts show the issues litigated involve novel and difficult questions having significant impact, which support an enhancement of fees. Further, the trial court reasonably found the quality of the representation justified the multiplier. Hagen had extensive knowledge of this case as he represented respondent for more than a dozen years in this litigation. Further, he tried the matter to a jury in October 2009, which found in respondent’s favor. Hagen detailed his substantial trial and litigation experience in 19 multiparty, complicated cases involving large exposures. Hagen established he was involved in reviewing draft appellate briefs, suggesting revisions, and exchanging multiple drafts of each brief before their finalization. Further, Hagen invested substantial time and effort preparing Cooper for his oral arguments by developing themes, framing anticipated questions, and conducting postmoot strategy sessions. Appellants assert the multiplier for Hagen’s work at his former law firm is not justified because Cooper primarily handled the appellate proceedings. This assertion, however, is merely appellants’ interpretation of the significance of Hagen’s contributions to respondent’s representation. Deciding such facts requires this court to improperly reweigh the evidence. (See Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 1006 [“The abuse of discretion standard includes a substantial evidence component: ‘We defer to the trial court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence ….’”]; see also Daugherty v. City and County of San Francisco (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 928, 944 [Under “‘“the substantial evidence test on appeal, we may not reweigh the evidence …. [Citations.] The question on appeal is whether the evidence reveals substantial support—contradicted or uncontradicted—for the trial court’s conclusion that the weight of the evidence supports the commission’s findings of fact.”’”].) Appellants fail to show a lack of substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s findings. As discussed above, Hagen detailed his background and contributions to respondent’s representation. The court found Hagen’s involvement in the case was significant enough to warrant a multiplier for his services. Appellants do not 20 establish a multiplier cannot be awarded merely because Hagen was not respondent’s lead attorney for the appellate proceedings. Appellants also maintain a multiplier is unjustified because the results on appeal were mixed. But, as mentioned earlier, respondent prevailed on a significant issue that substantially impacts the amount respondent may recover in the litigation. “‘“[P]laintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.”’” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 153.) Thus, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to award a multiplier based on the success respondent achieved despite not prevailing on every single issue on appeal. Appellants argue Hagen and his former law firm were not precluded from other employment. These arguments are, again, merely appellants’ own interpretation of the evidence and factors that should be weighted for the multiplier. Hagen attested he was precluded from taking other representation when he continued representing respondent after he opened his office. Hagen also attested to the contingency nature of his agreement with respondent, indicating he was entitled to 28 percent of “net recovery” on the appeal. Hagen indicated he would have only been entitled to $10,000 had the Supreme Court not decided in respondent’s favor. While appellants attempt to identify some evidence and factors in their favor, we note that a single factor is sufficient to apply a positive multiplier. (See The Kennedy Com., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 467.) Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings as to the difficulty and significance of the issues involved in the appellate proceedings and the quality of respondent’s counsel’s representation. Accordingly, the court 21 was not unreasonable in awarding the multiplier for Hagen’s services. E. The trial court reasonably awarded a multiplier for Cooper’s services Appellants posit a multiplier is not justified for Cooper’s services because this case was within his special expertise as a certified appellate specialist. Appellants assert a multiplier should only be applied when the quality of representation far exceeds the representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill. As similarly discussed above, appellants’ arguments here fail because they are merely appellants’ interpretation of the evidence. Respondent provided evidence that other similar-sized firms handling appeals in intermediate courts had hourly rates exceeding Cooper’s. Respondent also submitted evidence that Cooper worked with a lean staff on the case, thus, providing substantial evidence Cooper’s services far exceeded those that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill. F. Appellants fail to show error concerning the matters involving the Neman parties Appellants maintain respondent was erroneously awarded attorney’s fees for time spent solely litigating issues raised by the Neman parties. Appellants assert they should not be penalized by having to pay the fees for litigating the Neman parties’ distinct claims. Appellants, however, fail to identify the billing entries and the total hours they claim involved work performed on the Neman parties’ separate issues. “‘The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that an appealed judgment or order is presumed to be correct.’ [Citation.] It is the appellant who bears 22 the burden of overcoming that presumption.” (State Water Resources Control Bd. Cases (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674, 836.) “To ‘rebut[] the presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court’s decision,’ the appellant must ‘“‘“supply[] the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.”’”’” (Cruz v. Tapestry, Inc. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 943, 954; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [“Each brief must … [¶] Support any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.”].) “It is not the task of the reviewing court to search the record for evidence that supports the party’s statement; it is for the party to cite the court to those references. Upon the party’s failure to do so, the appellate court need not consider or may disregard the matter.” (Regents of University of California v. Sheily (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 824, 826, fn. 1.) Here, appellants assert the work performed solely on the Neman parties’ separate issues are clearly identified in the billing statements of respondent’s counsel, Cooper. But appellants fail to cite the portions of the record that support this assertion. Without the evidence properly identified, it is unclear what hours, if any, were even spent on the matters appellants claim are problematic and unrecoverable. Accordingly, appellants fail to satisfy their burden of showing error on this issue. In addition, appellants posit respondent was required to submit its settlement with the Neman parties to the trial court for a good faith determination because the defendants were jointly and severally liable. Appellants argue the settlement likely resolved the Neman parties’ obligations to respondent’s attorney’s fees and costs, which are relevant here because 23 respondent would not be entitled to any hours spent on appellants and the Neman parties’ joint arguments. But good faith determination applies “[w]here a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877, italics added.) “[S]ection 877 applies only to settlements reached before liability is established by jury verdict or by judgment. (Southern Cal. White Trucks v. Teresinski (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1393, 1405.) Respondent settled with the Neman parties after the amended judgment was entered and the Court of Appeal issued its opinion in 2020. Appellants contend the amended judgment was not final because it was on appeal in the Supreme Court. Appellants fail to establish, however, how that fact is material given their liability as to the section 496 claim was never vacated. Even if a good faith determination was required, appellants fail to show they properly raised this matter in the trial court. Appellants request this court to compel respondent to disclose the terms of its settlement with the Neman parties. But appellants do not establish they ever sought to compel discovery of such matter in the trial court. “Generally, a reviewing court will not consider claims raised for the first time on appeal that could have been but were not presented to the trial court.” (Pratt v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 165, 174.) “Failure to raise a claim may be forfeited or waived. ‘“‘[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”’”’” (Ibid.) We conclude appellants forfeited this matter because they never timely asserted their rights thereon in the 24 trial court. Nothing in the record shows the court ever denied a request for discovery of respondent’s settlement with the Neman parties. Without providing any terms of respondent’s settlement with the Neman parties, appellants’ argument is entirely speculative. Appellants cannot identify anything in the record indicating the settlement was intended to resolve attorney’s fees and costs. At best, appellants can only speculate the settlement was likely to resolve such issues. Thus, appellants fail to meet their burden of demonstrating error on this issue. G. The award of attorney’s fees for services performed after respondent declined appellants’ settlement offer was reasonable Appellants assert the trial court should not have awarded attorney’s fees for the hours spent on appeal after respondent rejected appellants’ settlement offer. Appellants argue those fees should have been denied because their settlement offer was higher than the amount of the judgment respondent ultimately received after the appeals. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion when it did not weigh the declined settlement offer in appellants’ favor. Respondent provided evidence detailing appellants’ history of broken promises in settlement discussions and commitments in this case. Respondent indicated appellants’ inability to keep promises is what ultimately led to the court issuing terminating sanctions. Respondent also demonstrated it would have been worse off accepting appellants’ settlement offer because the offer disregarded the attorney’s fees respondent had already incurred to that point. Given the foregoing evidence, the court could properly find it was not unreasonable for respondent to reject the 25 settlement offer. Respondent’s evidence shows the settlement offer was not in its best interest, and respondent was reasonably skeptical of appellants’ commitment to a settlement. Further, appellants posit the trial court should have considered the policy concerns of Code of Civil Procedure section 998 under Meister, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 437. Appellants contend Meister controls even when Code of Civil Procedure section 998 does not apply. Meister holds only a trial court may in its discretion consider the policy concerns of Code of Civil Procedure section 998 when the statute does not apply to a case. (See Meister, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 450 [“However, the inapplicability of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 998 did not prevent the trial court from allowing the underlying policy concerns addressed by that section to guide its exercise of its discretion in this case.”].) Meister does not hold a court must consider the policy concerns of Code of Civil Procedure section 998 when a party makes a nonstatutory settlement offer. (See Meister, at p. 452 [“Consideration of a nonstatutory settlement offer by a trial court where appropriate does not involve the creation of a ‘rule’ similar to [Code of Civil Procedure] section 998 but without its precise requirements. Instead, a trial court operating within its discretion is simply empowered to take into consideration the fact that a party continued to litigate a matter after a reasonable, albeit informal, settlement offer.”].) Meister is thus not instructive here. The court here acted reasonably within its discretion when it did not weigh in appellants’ favor the rejection of the settlement offer.

26 H. The trial court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees for the interim appeal Finally, appellants contend the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees for the interim appeal because respondent’s fees motion was untimely filed. Appellants maintain the parties’ stipulation to extend the deadline to file the motion did not extend to the fees for the interim appeal and the court erroneously found it lacked jurisdiction in 2017 to decide a fees motion under the discovery statutes. “Flexibility is built into [California Rules of Court,] rule 3.1702 through subdivision (d), which allows a judge ‘[f]or good cause’ to ‘extend the time for filing a motion for attorney’s fees in the absence of a stipulation or for a longer period than allowed by stipulation.’” (Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304, 326.) Further, “we can infer [the trial court] found good cause for any additional time needed.” (State Farm, supra,71 Cal.App.5th at p. 213.) “[T]he time limits [for moving for attorney’s fees] are not jurisdictional, just mandatory.” (Ibid.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by extending the deadline for respondent to move for attorney’s fees for the interim appeal. The court indicated respondent could not seek those fees under section 496, subdivision (c), in 2017 because our Supreme Court did not decide the applicability of that statute until 2022. Since respondent may recover the fees under section 496, subdivision (c), it was not arbitrary or capricious for the court to extend the deadline to file the fees motion until after the issue was decided. The court acted reasonably because the applicability of section 496, subdivision (c), was relevant to respondent’s fees motion. Because the court had a reasonable ground to extend the motion deadline, we need not decide the 27 other issues appellants raise. (See Rangell, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1218 [“Under [the abuse of discretion] standard of review, the trial court’s order will be upheld on appeal unless … no judge could reasonably make the order…. We reverse ‘“‘only if prejudicial error is found after examining the record of the proceedings below.’”’” [Citations omitted.]].)

DISPOSITION The June 13, 2024 order granting, in part, respondent’s motion for attorney’s fees is reversed as to the award of Hagen’s contingency fees. On remand, the trial court shall vacate the award of Hagen’s contingency fees and enter a new order determining the reasonable attorney’s fees for Hagen’s contingency-based services based on the lodestar method. The order is affirmed as to the remaining issues. Each party is to bear its own costs of appeal.

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

LUI, P. J.

RICHARDSON, J.