Holtz v. Moreles

Opinion

Filed 9/23/26

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

BRIAN HOLTZ et al., H053842 (Santa Clara County Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No. 25CV472881)

v. MATT MORELES, as Registrar of Voters, etc., Defendant and Respondent;

SANTA CLARA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.

In this appeal, we consider the application of the California Constitution,1 article XIII C’s “cases of emergency” clause to the decision of a county board of supervisors to seek voter approval of a general tax increase by special—rather than general—election. Section 2 of article XIII C, added by Proposition 218 in 1996, generally requires local governments to submit any general tax increase to the 1 All further unspecified references to “article” are to the California Constitution. electorate for approval at a regularly scheduled general election. Section 2 contains an exception under which voter approval can be secured by special election for “cases of emergency declared by a unanimous vote of the governing body.” (See art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (b).) In August 2025, real party in interest Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors (Board of Supervisors or Board) invoked this emergency provision. The Board’s resolution declared an emergency related to the provision of county healthcare and safety net services resulting from federal funding cuts due to Congress’s passage of H.R. 1 (signed into law in July 2025). The Board resolved to place Measure A—proposing a five-year, five- eighths cent (0.625 percent) general sales tax—on the county’s November 4, 2025 special election ballot. Appellants2 filed in the trial court a preelection complaint and petition for writ of mandate challenging under article XIII C, section 2 and Proposition 218 the validity of the emergency declaration and special election authorization. Appellants also argued the language of the ballot question and the impartial analysis prepared by the county counsel violated Elections Code requirements for impartial, nonargumentative, and accurate ballot materials. After expedited briefing and a three-day hearing on the merits, the trial court issued an order on the writ petition and entered judgment. The court found the emergency declaration valid and denied the petition for writ of mandate on that ground. As to the other claims, the order directed modifications to the ballot measure and impartial analysis language. In a 2 Appellants Brian Holtz, Dawn R. Davis, John Inks, and Christopher Robell (appellants) are individuals and electors in Santa Clara County. 2 November 2025 special election, Santa Clara County voters approved Measure A. On appeal from the order on the writ petition and judgment, appellants contend the trial court erred in interpreting the “cases of emergency” clause in article XIII C, section 2. Appellants maintain the court abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of materials promulgated by the Board of Supervisors in support of the emergency declaration and contend the declaration was legally insufficient and invalid. In addition, appellants argue that, although technically moot, this court should independently review the language of the Measure A ballot question and impartial analysis for consistency with Elections Code requirements. We conclude that the trial court did not err in construing the phrase “cases of emergency” under article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b), any abuse of discretion in relation to the court’s judicial notice rulings was not prejudicial, and the county’s declaration of emergency was not invalid. We decline to exercise our discretion to review the fact- and context-specific issues raised by appellants’ Elections Code claims. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order and judgment.

3 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3 A. Special Meeting of the Board of Supervisors On August 7, 2025,4 the Board of Supervisors held a special meeting (August 7 board meeting) to discuss the anticipated impact on Santa Clara 3 We draw the facts recited herein from the materials filed in the trial court’s expedited proceedings on the writ petition, of which the court took judicial notice upon stipulation of the parties. To the extent appellants challenge on appeal the court’s consideration of the contents of the noticed materials for the truth of the matter therein, we address appellants’ arguments in our discussion, post (pt. II.D.). We separately grant respondents’ unopposed request for judicial notice of exhibits A through E, filed in this court on April 24, 2026, comprising the certificate of election for Measure A and official final summary of results of the November 4, 2025 special election; verified complaint in Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association, Inc., et al. v. County of Santa Clara (Sup. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 26CV483689), a related action discussed post; petition for writ of mandate in this matter filed in this court on September 10, 2026, and this court’s September 12, 2025 order denying the writ petition; and the County Voter Information Guide for the November 4, 2025 special election. We also grant appellants’ unopposed request for judicial notice of exhibits 25 and 26, filed in this court on May 14, 2026, comprising the endorsed-filed first amended complaint in the Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association, Inc., et al. v. County of Santa Clara (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, No. 26CV483689), and the Charter of Santa Clara County, revised August 30, 2017. Each of these documents satisfies criteria for judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code, sections 452, subdivisions (b), (d), or (h), and 459, subdivision (a). We deny appellants’ second request for judicial notice of exhibit 27, filed in this court shortly before oral argument on September 8, 2026. Appellants’ second request for judicial notice contains the text of a ballot question, Measure ER, published by the Los Angeles County Registrar- Recorder as appearing on the statewide direct primary election on June 2, 2026. The text of Measure ER is relevant only to appellants’ effort to show that language similar to that of Measure A has appeared in proposed measures in other jurisdictions, such that whether that language complies with governing law is an issue of significant public interest and likely to recur. However, as explained post (pt. II.A.), we decline to exercise our discretion to decide the Elections Code issues presented in this case, and the 4 County of H.R. 1 and to consider recommendations related to proposed Measure A. The agenda packet described Measure A as “a sales tax measure for voter consideration to protect local services.” The action items stated in the agenda packet for the August 7 board meeting were: (1) receive a report from the Office of the County Executive “relating to the impacts of H.R. 1 and a potential sales tax ballot measure”; (2) adopt a resolution for an emergency declaration authorizing a special election on the proposed sales tax and consolidating the election with the office of the assessor special election, already set for November 4; and (3) adopt “an urgency ordinance implementing a five-year general retail transactions (sales) and use tax in Santa Clara County at the rate of five- eighths of one cent, and setting an approval measure on the ballot for the November 4[] special election.” (Some capitalization omitted.) Included in the agenda packet for the August 7 board meeting were recommendations of the county executive and a memorandum submitted by the County Budget Director on the fiscal impacts of H.R. 1. The county budget director reported that, following the county’s adoption of its fiscal year 2025–2026 budget, the effects of H.R. 1 (compounded by additional state level impacts) created “extraordinary and severe financial challenges in the next five years” beginning “immediately with the current fiscal year (FY 2025– 2026)” and expanding annually “to nearly $1.4 billion by FY 2029–2030,” absent ameliorative action. The county executive’s report described the impact of H.R. 1 on county funding for services, including cuts to Medicaid (known in California as Medi- material presented in appellants’ second request for judicial notice is otherwise not relevant to any aspect of our decision. 4 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2025.

5 Cal) and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (known in California as CalFresh), elimination and reduction of funding for the county’s public health and hospital system (comprising four county hospitals and 15 health centers), and fiscal impacts due to, inter alia, changes in eligibility for Medicaid and other programs. The County Executive recommended a three- pronged strategy to address the “more than $1 billion” in lost annual funding, including seeking additional support from the state, reducing the county budget while trying to minimize service cuts, and requesting community help via a ballot measure proposing a local sales tax. B. Resolution, Proposed Ballot Question, and Impartial Analysis Following public comment, at the August 7 board meeting the Board of Supervisors approved Resolution No. BOS-2025-79 (resolution) and Urgency Ordinance No. NS-7.23 (ordinance) to place Measure A on the November 4 special election ballot. Titled “Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Santa Clara Declaring an Emergency Under Proposition 218 and Authorizing a Special Election,” the resolution set forth findings concerning, inter alia, the county’s taxation authority, its provision of safety net and health care services, the anticipated impacts of H.R. 1 on funding for those services, and the determination of the Board of Supervisors that it was in the public interest not to await the next regularly scheduled election but to implement the proposed sales tax “effective beginning April 1, 2026 and lasting for a period of five years.” As part of the resolution, the Board declared an emergency under article XIII C and called for a special election, stating: “BE IT RESOLVED that the Board of Supervisors . . . finds facts constituting an emergency under section 2 of article XIII C of the California Constitution, including but not 6 limited to the facts reflected in the recitals above and those findings recited in section 1 of the urgency ordinance . . ., considered concurrently with this resolution, as well as the legislative file and materials presented by county administration at the August 7 [board meeting] to consider adoption of this resolution; . . . [¶] BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that due to the present emergency the Board calls and orders a special election” (hereafter, the emergency declaration). (Some capitalization & boldface omitted.) As part of the resolution, the Board also approved the text of the Measure A ballot question and directed the Registrar of Voters to print it on the sample ballot for the November 4 special election, as follows: “To help protect our community from severe federal cuts enacted by President Trump and Congress; support critical local services such as trauma, emergency room, mental health, burn, and cancer care; and reduce the risk of hospital closures at Santa Clara Valley Healthcare and other service cuts—shall the County of Santa Clara adopt a five-eighth cent general sales tax for 5 years, providing $330 million annually that cannot be taken by the federal government and is subject to independent audits/oversight?” (proposed ballot question). The Board concurrently approved the ordinance, titled “An Urgency Ordinance Implementing a Five-Year General Retail Transactions (Sales) and Use Tax in Santa Clara County at the Rate of Five-Eighths of One Cent” (boldface & some capitalization omitted). Among the findings set forth therein, the Board found that the county “serves as the social safety net for the [county’s] approximately 1.9 million residents” and that the county’s “current property taxes and other revenue sources cannot offset the expected reductions in federal and State revenues and these deficits will result in cuts to vital public services.” The Board also found that placing the proposed 7 sales tax on the November 4 ballot “is needed as an action to immediately preserve public health and safety because failure to enable voters to consider this tax in 2025 will result in a delay of up to two years in implementing any tax to be approved by voters and during that time, the [c]ounty’s budget deficit will require severe cuts to the services needed to protect public health, safety, and other services.” Subsequently, on or about August 19, the county made available on the Registrar of Voters’ website the county counsel’s impartial analysis of Measure A (impartial analysis),5 authored by real parties in interest Tony LoPresti and Nick DeFiesta. The impartial analysis explained that the Board of Supervisors “placed Measure A on the ballot after declaring a fiscal emergency by unanimous vote.” It stated that funds generated by Measure A “would partially offset” the loss of federal funding due to H.R. 1. The impartial analysis further stated that Measure A was “a general tax, meaning the [c]ounty could use the funds to support Santa Clara Valley Healthcare hospitals and clinics, provide social services, or for any other legitimate governmental purposes.” C. Petition for Writ of Mandate On August 21, four days after filing their initial complaint and petition for writ of mandate in the trial court to challenge the proposed Measure A, appellants filed the operative, verified first amended complaint and petition 5 Under Elections Code section 9160, if a county measure qualifies for the ballot, “[t]he county counsel or district attorney shall prepare an impartial analysis of the measure showing the effect of the measure on the existing law and the operation of the measure.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) A copy of the impartial analysis shall be made “available for public examination . . . for a period of 10 calendar days immediately following the deadline for submission of those materials.” (Id., § 9190, subd. (a).) 8 for writ of mandate seeking declaratory, mandatory, and injunctive relief (petition).6 The petition asserted in the first cause of action that the Board’s emergency declaration was not legally sufficient under Proposition 218 and article XIII C to authorize a special election, the declared “emergency” did not meet any related constitutional or statutory definitions of emergency, and the trial court should issue a peremptory writ ordering respondents to remove Measure A from the November 4 ballot. In the second through sixth causes of action, the petition challenged the wording of the ballot question as “untrue, partial, argumentative, and/or prejudicial” in violation of Elections Code7 sections 9051, subdivision (e) and 13119, subdivision (c), and “false and/or misleading” under section 9190 and McDonough v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1169. In the seventh cause of action, the petition challenged the wording of the impartial analysis under sections 9160 and 9190 as “false, misleading, and not impartial.” The trial court found the petition had priority over all other civil matters (§ 13314, subd. (a)(3)), ordered expedited briefing, and set a hearing schedule. The parties filed written briefing, respective requests for judicial notice, and supplemental briefs on the disputed issue of the Board of Supervisors’ emergency declaration.

6 The petition named county elections official, Santa Clara County Registrar Matt Moreles (Moreles) as respondent and further identified the county (as sponsor of Measure A) and Board of Supervisors (as authors of Measure A) (together, county parties) as real parties in interest. The petition further identified County Counsel Tony LoPresti and Deputy County Counsel Nick DeFiesta (as authors of the impartial analysis) as real parties in interest. For convenience, we refer to the named respondent and real parties in interest, together, as respondents. 7 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Elections Code.

9 Appellants’ request for judicial notice identified 19 items. Among the requested items, appellants sought judicial notice of the agenda packet for the August 7 board meeting (RJN 1, or August 7 agenda packet), the official “ ‘[s]ummary of [p]roceedings’ ” for the August 7 board meeting (RJN 2, or August 7 summary of proceedings), a copy of the August 19 impartial analysis for the November 4 special election on Measure A (RJN 15, or impartial analysis), a copy of the “ ‘Detailed Description of the Sales & Use Tax Rate’ ” information from the website of the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (RJN 18, or California Department of Tax summary of sales tax rate), and a copy of the California Legislative Analyst Office (LAO)’s report titled “ ‘Understanding California’s Sales Tax’ (2015)” from the LAO’s website (RJN 19, or LAO report). Respondents’ request for judicial notice consisted of five items. Among these was a copy of the resolution, adopted by the Board of Supervisors at the August 7 board meeting, and a copy of the Voter Information Guide for the 1996 General Election. The county parties also submitted a video recording of the August 7 board meeting, published on the county website, and an automatically generated transcript included “for the court’s convenience.” D. Expedited Hearing On August 27, shortly after setting the expedited schedule, the trial court held the first of three, consecutive, full-day merits hearings. The court asked the parties to discuss possible areas of agreement related to the matters submitted for judicial notice and offered informal feedback on issues in dispute related to the ballot question and impartial analysis. The parties ultimately agreed to several changes in the wording of the ballot question, which the court memorialized in its order.

10 As to judicial notice, the parties stipulated that there was no objection to the trial court taking judicial notice of several of the matters submitted. These included the resolution, the August 7 agenda packet and summary of proceedings, and the video recording of the August 7 board meeting. With respect to the August 7 agenda packet and summary of proceedings, respondents specified that they had no objection to the court taking judicial notice as to both the “existence and contents” of the documents. Counsel for appellants later questioned the propriety of the trial court taking judicial notice of the “contents” of the August 7 agenda packet and raised a hearsay objection. Appellants asserted that they had not intended their agreement regarding judicial notice to extend to the truth of statements contained therein. Appellants argued that treating the contents of the judicially noticed documents as true would improperly allow the court to consider a “trojan horse, . . . laden with hearsay.” Respondents countered that the parties had “collectively stipulated to the admission of these documents for all purposes, including for the truth of the matter.” Respondents additionally maintained that the documents were properly considered for their truth because they reflected a legislative determination of the Board of Supervisors, and courts generally defer to the determination of a legislative body based on legislative facts. The trial court declined to “retread territory that’s already been determined” and pointed out that the contents appellants contested were submitted as part of their own request for judicial notice. After further review, the trial court confirmed that appellants’ RJN 1 and 2 “came in, without objection, . . . offered by [appellants], coming in for content, as well as . . . the existence.” Ultimately, the court recognized that it was not entirely clear during the expedited proceedings whether the matters 11 submitted by appellants for judicial notice constituted legislative or adjudicative facts and that appellants had raised objections “very late.” On the merits of the petition, appellants asserted that there was no precedent for a fiscal emergency to constitute an emergency under Proposition 218 and the Board of Supervisors’ declaration was invalid. They maintained that an “emergency” for purposes of the “cases of emergency” clause must be founded on something apart from the conclusory declaration of five members of the governing body, especially given the express direction in section 5 of Proposition 218 to liberally construe its provisions to, “when in doubt, limit local government revenue.” The hearings concluded on the August 29 deadline requested by the Registrar of Voters. E. Order and Judgment On August 29, the trial court filed its order and judgment (August 29 order). The August 29 order largely resolved the remaining contested issues in favor of respondents by denying the writ petition, though the order directed respondents to amend certain language in the ballot question and impartial analysis. The August 29 order addressed each request for judicial notice. The trial court explained that “[i]t was not entirely clear throughout the course of the writ proceedings what specific information derived from the RJN documents that [appellants] wished to have the [c]ourt consider for the truth of the matter asserted, and/or whether certain documents were merely intended to provide “legislative facts” (e.g., for background, context, policy, etc.) versus “adjudicative facts” directly relating to the disputed matters herein.” As to appellants’ RJN 1 and 2, the court found that the parties had stipulated to judicial notice “without objection” and had stipulated that the 12 court “may consider the substance of this document for evidentiary purposes.” (Italics omitted.) Regarding appellants’ RJN 18 and 19, the trial court took judicial notice of the publication of the California Department of Tax summary of sales tax rate document on the department website but not of the truth of the matters stated therein. The court similarly took judicial notice of the publication of the “ ‘Understanding California’s Sales Tax’ (2015)” report on the LAO website but not of the truth of the matters stated therein. The court rejected appellants’ RJN 20 and 21 to take judicial notice of two statutes (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 6051.15, 6051.2), stating the items were “late- identified” and not included among appellants’ initial requests for judicial notice or cited in the petition or supporting briefs. On the merits, the August 29 order rejected appellants’ contention that the Board of Supervisors did not declare a valid emergency within the meaning of article XIII C, section 2 and Proposition 218. As neither Proposition 218 nor its implementing legislation (Proposition 218 Omnibus Implementation Act; Gov. Code, § 53750 et seq.) defined the term “emergency,” the trial court looked to its ordinary definition as recognized in case authority. It adopted the definition set forth in Sonoma County Organization etc. Employees v. County of Sonoma (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 267 (Sonoma County), “long . . . accepted in California as an unforeseen situation calling for immediate action” (id. at p. 276). The trial court found that the Board of Supervisors’ emergency declaration met this legal standard, judged by the facts set forth in the resolution’s recitals, ordinance, and materials presented by county administration at the August 7 board meeting. The court reasoned that appellants had “stipulate[ed] to every single fact cited” by agreeing to judicial 13 notice of the existence and “truth of the matters contained” in their RJN 1. It concluded that the findings of the Board “reasonably reflected an ‘unforeseen situation calling for immediate action.’ ([Sonoma County], supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 276.)” The trial court further observed that appellants had provided no reason to depart from the presumption of validity afforded to a local government enactment. Finding no basis to invalidate the Board of Supervisors’ unanimous decision to declare an emergency on the facts presented, the court denied the writ and declaratory and injunctive relief on appellants’ first cause of action. As to the remaining causes of action, the August 29 order summarized the modifications to the ballot question sought by appellants in the second and third causes of action. The trial court described several agreed-upon changes, which the parties reached without waiving or conceding any legal arguments. The court found that appellants had not met their burden to demonstrate that the other phrases and terms challenged in the ballot question were untrue, partial, argumentative, and/or prejudicial in favor of Measure A. Nevertheless, the court suggested that the phrase “ ‘cannot be taken by the federal government’ ” did display partiality. The court’s tentative ruling on this point led the parties to agree (without waiving any legal arguments) to modify the phrase to state, “ ‘is not available to the federal government.’ ” Lastly, as to the seventh cause of action, the court summarized the parties’ agreed-upon changes to certain words and phrases in the impartial analysis and rejected appellants’ claim that the other words and phrases were partial, false, and/or misleading.

14 Applying these rulings, the August 29 order denied appellants’ writ as to the second through seventh causes of action but mandated the “voluntary modifications to the language of” Measure A. F. Measure A Approval and Third-party Reverse Validation Action The ballot question put to the voters at the November 4 special election incorporated the changes set forth in the August 29 order. By majority vote, Santa Clara County voters approved Measure A. Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association, Inc. and other nonparties8 filed a reverse validation action in the trial court challenging the validity of Measure A (reverse validation action). The reverse validation action, Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association, Inc., et al. v. County of Santa Clara (Super. Ct. Santa Clara, No. 26CV483689), was designated a related action and remains pending in the trial court. II. DISCUSSION Appellants seek this court’s independent review of whether the Board’s actions fall under the “ ‘cases of emergency’ ” exception in article XIII C, section 2. They challenge the validity of the emergency declared by the Board of Supervisors and contend the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the truth of matters asserted in the documents submitted at the August 7 board meeting in support of the Board’s determination. Appellants maintain that, while the election has occurred and therefore the legal issue is moot, this court’s “articulation of the elements of a valid emergency declaration” under article XIII C, section 2 will help local governments implement the law and provide needed guidance in the pending reverse 8 Although Christopher Robell (a plaintiff and appellant in this action)

was originally a named plaintiff in the reverse-validation action, the plaintiffs in that matter have since filed a first amended complaint that does not include Robell as a plaintiff. 15 validation action as to Measure A. Appellants also assert that the ballot question and impartial analysis issues under the Elections Code present important questions of continuing public interest that are likely to recur while evading timely review. Respondents disagree with appellants’ interpretation of the challenged constitutional provision and argue that because the November 4 special election has already occurred, this court can no longer grant relief and the appeal is moot. Nevertheless, respondents assert that the constitutional issue raised by appellants is of broad public interest and likely to recur. They agree with appellants that this court should address the meaning of “cases of ‘emergency’ ” under article XIII C, section 2 and the validity of the Board’s action. Respondents contend that the remainder of the appeal does not raise any exceptional issue warranting postelection review. We first address the parties’ arguments concerning mootness and this court’s exercise of discretion over the issues on appeal. A. Mootness The timing of this appeal raises questions of mootness and this court’s ability to grant effective relief to appellants. A court’s duty is “ ‘to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’ ” (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.) Generally, an appeal “should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief.” (Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of 16 Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479 (Cucamongans United), citing Eye Dog Foundation, at p. 541.) Nevertheless, courts recognize “three discretionary exceptions to the rules regarding mootness.” (Cucamongans United, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 479.) Applying these exceptions, “courts will generally exercise their discretion to review a moot case when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for the court’s determination.’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 282 (D.P.).) Both appellants and respondents suggest that this court should exercise its discretion to review the principal issue on appeal concerning what constitutes a legally sufficient “emergency” within the meaning of article XIII C, section 2. They argue that this portion of the appeal raises a question of broad public interest that has already recurred in subsequent litigation between the parties. We agree. Because a ruling on the merits interpreting the “cases of emergency” clause of article XIII C, section 2 involves an issue of broad public interest likely to recur and is likely to “ ‘affect future proceedings between the parties[,] or will have some precedential consequence in future litigation generally’ ” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283), we will exercise our discretion to address it. Turning to the nonconstitutional questions raised by appellants, they contend that the ballot question does not conform with the statutory language of section 13119, subdivision (a), providing that “[t]he ballots used when voting upon a measure proposed by a local governing body . . . shall have printed on them the words ‘Shall the measure (stating the nature thereof) be adopted?’ ”

17 We decline to address this moot issue because it presents a specific question of compliance with a longstanding statute 9 that does not rise to the level of “ ‘an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur.’ ” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) As to the remaining challenges to the ballot question and impartial analysis on grounds that the language of each violated the requirements of, inter alia, impartiality, truthfulness, and accuracy, we similarly decline to exercise our discretion to reach those issues. Determining whether the ballot question violated the legal standards demands a fact-specific inquiry tethered to its language and the Board’s findings in support of the emergency declaration. The same is true with respect to the impartial analysis. In contrast with cases like Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Bowen (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 110 and California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924 (California Cannabis), cited by appellants, the issues of alleged partiality and inaccuracies in the challenged statements do not raise questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation likely to recur, and resolving them would not address a question of continuing public interest. (See Building a Better Redondo, Inc. v. City of Redondo Beach 9 Apart from a one-word change that took place in 2017, the sentence formulating the language to be printed on the ballots has been the same since 1911 (though the statute has experienced numerous revisions, including in 1994 when the Legislature repealed the former Elections Code and reenacted it in a reorganized format). (See Stats. 1911, ex. Session, ch. 33, § 1 [providing that “The ballots used when voting upon said proposed ordinances shall have printed thereon the words ‘Shall the ordinance (stating the nature thereof) be adopted?”]; Stats. 1994, ch. 920, §§ 1, 2 [repealing, adding the Elections Code].) In 2017, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 195, amending certain provisions of section 13119, including, for subdivision (a), replacing the word “ordinance” with the word “measure.” (Stats. 2017, ch. 105, § 1.) 18 (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 852, 867–868 [declining to exercise discretion over moot issues related to voter approval of city’s amendments to the local coastal program].) Appellants furthermore have not shown the alleged, statutory violations based on the ballot question and impartial analysis language to be an issue likely to recur between the parties or of remaining relevance as a material question in the reverse-validation proceeding. (Cf. D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.) The availability of a statutory remedy (pursuant to section 9190) for interested parties seeking expeditious, preelection review of deficient election materials also undercuts appellants’ argument that an exercise of discretion over the mooted ballot language claims is needed. We acknowledge appellants’ concern regarding the timing challenges for litigation seeking preelection review of ballot materials. Nevertheless, they have not shown that the deadlines applied in this case (i.e., the deadlines set by the Registrar of Voters) were improper or outside the scope of authority conferred by the Elections Code. (See § 9163.) We therefore decline to exercise our discretion to review the merits of appellants’ appeal concerning the format and text of the ballot question and text of the impartial analysis. We turn to the constitutionality of the county’s invocation of the “cases of emergency” clause of article XIII C, section 2 with respect to Measure A. B. Standard of Review The interpretation of a constitutional provision or statute is a question of law subject to this court’s independent review. (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 934; California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698.) We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including rulings on requests for judicial notice, for abuse of discretion. (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 19 281; Vo v. Technology Credit Union (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 632, 639.) A trial court abuses its discretion by action that is arbitrary or “ ‘that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law.’ ” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 393.) The parties dispute the standard of review applicable to the Board’s emergency declaration based on the findings in its resolution recitals and accompanying ordinance. We examine this issue further post. C. “Cases of Emergency” Under Proposition 218 and Article XIII C Appellants challenge the Board of Supervisors’ emergency declaration as outside the purview of the “cases of emergency” clause and setting the Measure A vote for the November 4 special election as unconstitutional. They urge that the term “ ‘emergency’ ” in article XIII C, section 2 must be construed to effectuate Proposition 218’s local government revenue limiting purpose, which the Board’s emergency declaration contravened. 1. Legal Principles and Background on Proposition 218 “When, as here, the voters enacted the provision, their intent governs.” (Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil (2006) 39 Cal.4th 205, 212 (Bighorn-Desert).) To ascertain intent, we analyze the text in its relevant context, “ascribing to words their ordinary meaning” and “taking account of related provisions and the structure of the relevant statutory and constitutional scheme.” (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 933.) “If the provisions’ intended purpose nonetheless remains opaque, we may consider extrinsic sources, such as an initiative’s ballot materials.” (Id. at p. 934.) California voters passed Proposition 218 in 1996, as part of “a series of initiatives designed to limit the authority of state and local governments to impose taxes without voter approval.” (Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of 20 Redding (2018) 6 Cal.5th 1, 10 (REU Rates); see Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 552, 578.) Known as the “ ‘ “Right to Vote on Taxes Act,” ’ ” Proposition 218 “added articles XIII C and XIII D to the state Constitution.” (REU Rates, at p. 10.) Article XIII D sets out “the authority of local governments to assess taxes and other charges on real property” (REU Rates, at p. 10), while article XIII C limits “the other methods by which local governments can exact revenue using fees and taxes not based on real property value or ownership.” (REU Rates, at p. 10.) Article XIII C provides that “[a]ll taxes imposed by any local government shall be deemed to be either general taxes or special taxes.” (Id., § 2, subd. (a).) It specifies that “[l]ocal governments may not impose, increase, or extend: (1) any general tax, unless approved by a majority vote at a general election; or (2) any special tax, unless approved by a two-thirds vote.” (REU Rates, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 10–11, citing art. XIII C, § 2, subds. (b), (d).) Thus, it “requires the approval of either a majority or two- thirds of voters before new or increased local taxes take effect, depending on the type of tax.” (Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1105, 1112 (Wilde).) “ ‘General tax’ ” is defined as “any tax imposed for general governmental purposes.” (Art. XIIIC, § 1, subd. (a).) “ ‘Special tax’ ” is defined as “any tax imposed for specific purposes, including a tax imposed for specific purposes, which is placed into a general fund.” (Id., subd. (d).) There is no dispute that the sales tax increase proposed by Measure A constituted a general tax under subdivision (b) of article XIII C, section 2 (section 2).10 10 Appellants argue that the Board could have designated Measure A as a “ ‘special tax’ ” addressed to health care and social purposes, allowing it to call a special election without need for a declaration of emergency, but requiring a two-thirds voter approval threshold. (Art. XIIIC, § 2, subd. (d).) 21 Section 2, governing voter approval for a general tax, states: “No local government may impose, extend, or increase any general tax unless and until that tax is submitted to the electorate and approved by a majority vote. . . . The election required by this subdivision shall be consolidated with a regularly scheduled general election for members of the governing body of the local government, except in cases of emergency declared by a unanimous vote of the governing body.” (Art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (b), italics added.) 2. Analysis We begin with the text of section 2. The phrase “cases of emergency” operates as an exception to the requirement that the submission of a general tax to the electorate for approval by majority vote occur “with a regularly scheduled general election.” (Art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (b).) The exception requires “a unanimous vote of the governing body” (ibid.), here, the Board of Supervisors. As “emergency” is not defined in article XIII C or in the implementing legislation for Proposition 218 (see generally, Gov. Code, § 53750 et seq.), we look to its “ordinary meaning, while taking account of related provisions and the structure of the relevant statutory and constitutional scheme.” (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 933.) The parties point to competing sources for this determination. Respondents propose that, like the trial court, this court look to the definition of “ ‘emergency’ ” articulated by the Court of Appeal in Sonoma County. There, the court examined whether work stoppages by public employees constituted an emergency that exempted the public agency employer from its meet and confer obligation under the Meyers–Milias– Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.). (Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th As this is not the circumstance at issue before this court, we do not further address it. 22 at p. 270.) The court reasoned that where the term “emergency” is left undefined by statute (id. at p. 276), California courts have agreed on a commonly understood meaning: “[E]mergency has long been accepted in California as an unforeseen situation calling for immediate action.” (Ibid.) Sonoma County further observed that it is difficult to specifically identify characteristics of an emergency, since “ ‘[t]he term depends greatly upon the special circumstances of each case.’ [Citation.] Not only must urgency be present, the magnitude of the exigency must factor.” (Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 277.) Among other criteria, the court noted that “an emergency must have ‘a substantial likelihood that serious harm will be experienced’ [citation] unless immediate action is taken” (ibid.) and must be based on more “than simple speculation. [Citations.] Emergency is not synonymous with expediency, convenience, or best interests [citations], and it imports ‘more . . . than merely a general public need.’ ” (Ibid.) Respondents assert that public health emergencies and fiscal emergencies have both been held to qualify as emergencies requiring immediate action to avert serious harm. In Sonoma County, the appellate court upheld the county’s determination of an emergency when actions taken by employees during labor negotiations imposed on the county’s public health facilities a “quilt-like pattern of disruption” (Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 278) and imperiled public health services due to unannounced absences of workers. (Id. at p. 279.) Respondents also cite Northgate Partnership v. City of Sacramento (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 65 (Northgate), in which the appellate court affirmed the validity of an emergency measure adopted by the City of Sacramento, imposing a real estate transfer tax as mitigation for the impending “ ‘extreme revenue loss’ ”

23 due to the enactment of Proposition 13. (Id. at p. 68.) The court in Northgate invoked separation of powers principles applicable to local legislative bodies in determining facts constituting an emergency (id. at p. 69) and rejected the argument that revenue needed for municipal expenses does not as a matter of law constitute an emergency (id. at pp. 69–72). Appellants dispute that this court should rely on what they characterize as the “exceedingly broad definition” of “ ‘emergency’ ” advanced in these cases because it would undermine Proposition 218’s purpose of limiting local government revenue. Proposition 218 states that “[t]he provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes of limiting local government revenue and enhancing taxpayer consent.” (Prop. 218, § 5, Stats. 1996; see Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), text of Prop. 218, p. 109; Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431, 448; Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn. v. Garner (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 402, 408 (Garner).) Appellants contend that the term “ ‘emergency’ ” in section 2, subdivision (b) must be given a restrictive definition consistent with the initiative’s intent to limit local government revenue and enhance taxpayer consent. They argue that Northgate is not persuasive because the case predated the enactment of Proposition 218 and, moreover, is distinguishable based on the inclusion of a statement of facts in the city’s emergency tax resolution. Appellants suggest that this court take guidance from specific definitions of “ ‘emergency’ ” that appear in other constitutional and statutory provisions. For example, article XIII B contains an exception to appropriation limits based on an emergency declaration, where “ ‘emergency’ means the existence, as declared by the Governor, of conditions of disaster or 24 of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property within the state, or parts thereof, caused by such conditions as attack or probable or imminent attack by an enemy of the United States, fire, flood, drought, storm, civil disorder, earthquake, or volcanic eruption.” (Art. XIII B, § 3, subd. (c)(2).) Appellants also cite the Emergency Services Act (Gov. Code, § 8550 et seq.), which defines three states of emergency, including “ ‘[l]ocal emergency,’ ”11 and delimits, inter alia, who may proclaim a local emergency, the duration, and the orders and regulations that may be promulgated as a result. (Gov. Code, §§ 8630, 8634.) They also raise (for the first time in their reply brief) Public Contract Code section 1102, which they maintain is a contemporaneous statute to Proposition 218 and should be considered for its definition of “ ‘emergency.’ ”12 We are not persuaded that appellants’ proposed definitions of “ ‘cases of emergency’ ” best accord with the phrase’s “ordinary meaning . . . and the 11 “ ‘Local emergency’ means the duly proclaimed existence of conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property within the territorial limits of a county, city and county, or city, caused by conditions such as air pollution, fire, flood, storm, epidemic, riot, drought, cyberterrorism, sudden and severe energy shortage, deenergization event, electromagnetic pulse attack, plant or animal infestation or disease, the Governor’s warning of an earthquake or volcanic prediction, or an earthquake, or other conditions, other than conditions resulting from a labor controversy, which are or are likely to be beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of that political subdivision and require the combined forces of other political subdivisions to combat, or with respect to regulated energy utilities, a sudden and severe energy shortage or deenergization event that requires extraordinary measures beyond the authority vested in the Public Utilities Commission.” (Gov. Code, § 8558, subd. (c)(1).) 12 “ ‘Emergency,’ as used in this code, means a sudden, unexpected occurrence that poses a clear and imminent danger, requiring immediate action to prevent or mitigate the loss or impairment of life, health, property, or essential public services.” (Pub. Contract Code, § 1102.) 25 structure of the relevant statutory and constitutional scheme.” (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 933.) Beginning with the text of the initiative “in [its] relevant context” (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 933), there is no indication that Proposition 218 intended to limit invocation of the “emergency” provision to specific circumstances. On the contrary, the phrase at issue (“except in cases of emergency declared by a unanimous vote of the governing body”) is undeniably broad. Section 2’s text contains no preference, distinction, or limitation as to the nature of the emergency, requiring only that it be declared by a unanimous vote of the local governing body. (Art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (b).) In the absence of a special definition, we look to the term’s ordinary meaning (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 933; Bighorn-Desert, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 212). Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines “emergency” as “an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emergency> [as of Sept. 22, 2026], archived at: <https://perma.cc/UNM7-JU6C>.) This ordinary meaning comports with the definition used in Sonoma County and “long . . . accepted in California as an unforeseen situation calling for immediate action.” (Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 276.) It permits a range of possible scenarios that could be characterized as an “emergency,” depending on the circumstances threatening harm and the factors of urgency and magnitude. (Id. at p. 277.) Were it the voters’ intent to limit the grounds for an emergency, the text of Proposition 218 or its implementing legislation could easily have stated as much or cross-referenced a preexisting definition. “[W]hen 26 construing initiatives, we generally presume electors are aware of existing law.” (California Cannabis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 934.) The definitions of “emergency” in Article XIII B, section 3, and of a “ ‘[l]ocal emergency’ ” in the Emergency Services Act, both predated the enactment of Proposition 218. (See Stats. 1970, ch. 1454, p. 2846, § 2 [adding Gov. Code § 8558]; Prop. 111, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (June 5, 1990) [adding art. XIII B, § 3, subd. (c)(1)].) So, too, the provision defining “emergency” for purposes of the Public Contract Code was added in 1994 (Stats. 1994, ch. 803, § 1) and predated Proposition 218. Absent evidence in the text of Proposition 218 or relevant extrinsic sources (such as the ballot pamphlet) of voters’ intent to categorically restrict the meaning of “cases of emergencies,” we decline to read such a limitation into the constitutional provision or borrow it from a preexisting provision. (See Wilde, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1117 [declining to apply the defined term “ ‘tax’ ” as used in articles XIII C and XIII D to a separate constitutional provision, because “while we have a duty to harmonize constitutional provisions where possible, this duty does not compel us to graft the tax terminology of articles XIII C and XIII D onto the referendum provision when the voters have not chosen to do so”].) We further decide that construing “emergency” according to its ordinary meaning is consistent with the intent of Proposition 218 to allow rather than limit the electorate’s right to vote on taxes. (Garner, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) As stated in the findings and declarations, “This measure protects taxpayers by limiting the methods by which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers without their consent.” (Prop. 218, § 2, Stats. 1996; see Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), text of Prop. 218, p. 108.) Proposition 218’s “ ‘main emphasis was on plugging the loophole 27 that allowed assessments to be imposed without a vote.’ ” (Garner, at p. 409.) Recognizing a broad interpretation of “cases of emergency” does not alter or diminish the requirement that any general tax increase, extension, or imposition must be “submitted to the electorate and approved by a majority vote.” (Art. XIII C, § 2, subd. (b).) Nor have appellants alleged that allowing the up-down vote on a general tax to occur at a time other than a regularly scheduled general election for that locality contravenes the purpose of Proposition 218. Appellants cite the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (2026) 607 U.S. 229 (Learning Resources) as support for curbing the unchecked use of broad emergency powers. (See Learning Resources, at p. 244 [“All it takes to unlock that extraordinary power is a Presidential declaration of emergency, which the Government asserts is unreviewable.”].) Appellants assert that an overbroad definition of emergency is similarly untenable in the local government context, arguing a narrower definition for “emergency” is required than “whatever a local government legislative body says it is.” We are not persuaded of the relevance of Learning Resources to the facts here. The Board of Supervisors’ exercise of the “cases of emergency” clause to submit a general tax to the voters outside a regularly scheduled election does not eliminate the voters’ check on the action, nor does it remove the legislative action from the province of judicial review. (Cf. Learning Resources, supra, 607 U.S. at pp. 244–245.) As Santa Clara County voters indisputably were given the opportunity to vote on Measure A, the dangers of unchecked power identified in Learning Resources are absent. We conclude that “cases of emergency” under article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b), should be construed according to its ordinary meaning, 28 without special limitation as to the nature of “emergency.” We therefore understand the phrase “cases of emergency” as used in article XIII C, section 2 to refer to cases of unforeseen circumstances or a combination of unforeseen circumstances that call for immediate action. (See Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emergency> [as of Sept. 22, 2026], archived at: <https://perma.cc/UNM7-JU6C>); see also Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 276 [defining “emergency” “as an unforeseen situation calling for immediate action”].) D. Validity of the Emergency Declaration and Taking of Judicial Notice Appellants also challenge the validity of the Board of Supervisors’ emergency declaration on procedural and substantive grounds. Appellants maintain the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion by taking judicial notice of matters (and accepting as true the Board’s findings) in the August 7 board meeting agenda packet and summary of proceedings and by denying several of appellants’ requests for judicial notice. Appellants further contend that the judicially noticed material (including the Board’s resolution), is legally insufficient for failing to “describe, specify, name, or otherwise characterize the purported ‘emergency’ ” or estimate the emergency’s duration or state any criteria for its termination. Appellants assert that the emergency was merely a “legal fiction intended to circumvent the regular rule of law, including article XIII C.” They challenge respondents’ subsequent efforts to recast the emergency as a “ ‘fiscal emergency’ ” and/or “ ‘public health emergency’ ” and the accuracy of the county’s characterization of its legal obligation to ensure access to health care. Respondents counter that the Board’s action was a lawful exercise of its authority, amply supported by the findings in the record, and is afforded 29 deference as a policy- and fact-based legislative determination. Respondents further assert that appellants have not shown the trial court erred in its treatment of the materials submitted for judicial notice. 1. Additional Background During the trial court proceedings described ante (pt. I.D.), the parties entered into a stipulation regarding judicial notice. The stipulation included the August 7 agenda packet (appellants’ RJN 1), to which the respondents specified that they had no objection to the court taking judicial notice of both the “existence and contents” of the documents. When appellants later clarified that their request for judicial notice did not extend to the truth of the contents, the court observed that appellants raised their objections to the stipulation “very late.” The court ruled, with respect to the key documents at issue, that, based on the stipulation, it could “consider the substance of th[e] document[s] for evidentiary purposes.” The trial court also rejected appellants’ challenge to the validity of the emergency declaration. The court found the Board’s resolution and finding of “ ‘facts constituting an emergency under section 2 of Article XIII C’ ” were supported by the record. It based this determination on “the facts found in the resolution recitals, in the attached [] ordinance implementing the general sales tax, as well as in the legislative file and materials presented by [c]ounty [a]dministration” at the August 7 board meeting. The court additionally cited statements provided to the Board in the documents provided with the agenda packet (i.e., the budget director’s memorandum to the Board regarding fiscal impacts of H.R. 1 on the county) and included in RJN 1, as well as comments by the Board president during deliberations at the August 7 board meeting. The factual findings contained in the resolution recitals included, inter alia, that: “the County’s core mission is to act as a safety net for its most 30 vulnerable residents, including low-income families, seniors, and individuals experiencing homelessness”; “federal funding supports the delivery of the [c]ounty’s safety net services including medical and behavioral health care, food assistance, social services, public health programs, child welfare services, housing, public safety, and many other critical services”; “H.R. 1 [passed the previous month] imposes significant and unprecedented cuts to Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program”; “more than 130,000 Santa Clara County residents rely on federal food assistance and approximately one in four Santa Clara County residents relies on Medicaid for access to health care”; and “Medicaid is the single largest source of revenue for Santa Clara Valley Healthcare, which is the second largest public hospital system in California, and the largest provider of Medi-Cal and Medicare hospital-related healthcare services to Santa Clara County residents.” Additional findings in the resolution addressed financial and other impacts of H.R. 1, including: “H.R. 1 immediately freezes supplemental Medicaid funding and prevents Santa Clara Valley Healthcare from being able to draw down expected and needed supplemental Medicaid payments causing a significant negative impact on the County budget immediately and escalating over time”; “changes in federal funding made by H.R. 1 and related impacts are projected to cause a loss of revenue to the [c]ounty in [f]iscal [y]ear 2026-2027 of approximately $500 million, with increasing losses in future years, growing to $1 billion in [f]iscal [y]ear 2027-2028 . . ., creating an extraordinary fiscal crisis for the [c]ounty, and potentially dire consequences for the neediest families in our community”; “the [c]ounty adopted its fiscal year 2025-[20]26 budget prior to the passage and enactment of H.R. 1”; “sales and use tax revenues are used by the [c]ounty to address vital local needs, 31 including but not limited to public safety services; trauma and emergency medical care; mental health care and services; . . . [and] affordable housing . . .”; and “the next regularly scheduled election of the members of the Board is June 2, 2026, which is nearly a year after the first provisions of H.R. 1 will be in effect, dramatically reducing funding for critical safety net services such as those currently funded by Medicaid.” Based on these findings, the Board declared that it “finds facts constituting an emergency under section 2 of Article XIII C.” The Board specified that the facts constituting the emergency “include[d] but [were] not limited to the facts reflected in the recitals above and those findings recited in [s]ection 1 of the [u]rgency [o]rdinance[13] . . ., considered concurrently with this [r]esolution, as well as the legislative file and materials presented by [c]ounty [a]dministration at the August 7 [board meeting] to consider adoption of this resolution.” The Board additionally found that “due to the present emergency the Board calls and orders a special election.” The trial court’s August 29 order referred to these and other findings articulated by the Board in the judicially noticed documents. It found that the Board’s emergency declaration satisfied the legal standard applied in published case authority, including Northgate and Sonoma County, and observed that appellants had provided “no reason or evidence to depart” from the principle that a local government enactment is presumed valid. The 13 The urgency ordinance set forth additional findings concerning the county’s “social safety net for the approximately 1.9 million” residents and the need to place the proposed sales tax on the November 4 ballot “as an action to immediately preserve public health and safety because failure to enable voters to consider this tax in 2025 will result in a delay of up to two years in implementing any tax to be approved by voters and during that time, the [c]ounty’s budget deficit will require severe cuts to the services needed to protect public health, safety, and other services.” 32 court found appellants’ argument that the Board failed to deliberate about the emergency declaration was “belied by the record” and concluded that appellants had not shown why the court “should take the extraordinary step of invalidating the Board’s unanimous decision to declare an emergency following extensive fact finding.” As previously noted (ante, pt. I.D.), the trial court partially rejected several of appellants’ other requests for judicial notice. The court took notice only “of the fact” of two sales tax-related reports (one published on the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration website, and the second on the LAO website) but did not take notice of “the truth of the matters stated” in either document. It rejected appellants’ request to take judicial notice of two statutes (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 6051.15, 6051.2), stating that the request came too late to be considered. 2. Legal Principles “ ‘ “Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter.” ’ ” (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1374 (Herrera).) “ ‘Judicial notice may not be taken of any matter unless authorized or required by law.’ (Evid. Code, § 450.) Matters that are subject to judicial notice are listed in Evidence Code sections 451 and 452. A matter ordinarily is subject to judicial notice only if the matter is reasonably beyond dispute.” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113 (Fremont Indemnity).) “ ‘Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its 33 meaning.’ [Citation.] While courts take judicial notice of public records, they do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein.” (Herrera, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375; see Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 (Mangini), overruled on other grounds in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.) In other words, “[a]lthough the existence of a document may be judicially noticeable, the truth of statements contained in the document and its proper interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those matters are reasonably disputable.” (Fremont Indemnity, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 113; see StorMedia Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9 [“When judicial notice is taken of a document, . . . the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable.”]; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117 [“[T]he fact a court may take judicial notice of a recorded deed, or similar document, does not mean it may take judicial notice of factual matters stated therein.”].) As for determining the legal sufficiency of the Board’s emergency declaration, the California Supreme Court in San Francisco Fire Fighters noted that the Courts of Appeal have applied varying levels of deference in reviewing municipal emergency or urgency legislation. (San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 38 Cal.4th 653, 669 (San Francisco Fire Fighters).) One line of cases suggests that the court “must determine for itself, based upon the evidence presented, whether an actual emergency existed at the time of the declaration.” (Verreos v. City and County of San Francisco (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 86, 104 (Verreos).) Other, more recent cases, including Northgate, Sonoma County, and Crown Motors v. City of Redding (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 173 (Crown Motors), reviewed municipal declarations of emergency or urgency using an abuse of discretion 34 standard. (San Francisco Fire Fighters, at p. 669.) The high court in San Francisco Fire Fighters did not endorse either approach, concluding doing so was unnecessary under the facts of the case. (Ibid.) We also need not determine which standard to adopt, because as we explain post, we would not find prejudicial error under either formulation. 3. Analysis Applying the principles governing judicial review, we agree with appellants’ main premise in disputing the trial court’s judicial notice rulings: even when judicial notice of a document is proper, courts do not take judicial notice of the truth of disputable matters stated therein. (See Herrera, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1375; Fremont Indemnity, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 113; accord, Julian Volunteer Fire Co. Assn. v. Julian-Cuyamaca Fire Protection Dist. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 583, 600 (Julian Volunteer).) California cases enforce this distinction, including in the context of official acts and public records. Julian Volunteer is illustrative. In proceedings arising from the dissolution of a local fire district, the trial court took judicial notice of categories of documents submitted by the county and a state agency, including “official reports and acts” (i.e., district and county resolutions related to the dissolution). (Julian Volunteer, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 599.) The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. (Ibid.) It stated that “[a] court may take judicial notice of documents . . . reflecting the official acts of local and state agencies, including resolutions, minutes, and agendas.” (Ibid.) It further explained that taking notice “not only of the fact of the document but also facts that can be deduced, and/or clearly derived from, its legal effect, such as the names and dates contained in the document, and the legal consequences of the document . . . is different from taking judicial notice of the truth of specific factual representations 35 within a document.” (Id. at p. 600.) The court held that while a court may not take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted within such documents, that rule was inapplicable where “the judicially noticed documents were not admitted or relied upon for the truth of particular facts contained” therein. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court espoused a similar view in denying the plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of two government reports (a 1994 United States Surgeon General’s report and a 1994 report to the California Department of Health Services) in Mangini. (Mangini, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1063.) While the high court declined the request based on relevance, it also clarified that “the truth of matters asserted in those documents, and not merely their existence” was outside the scope of proper notice. (Ibid.) The court explained, “ ‘[T]he taking of judicial notice of the official acts of a governmental entity does not in and of itself require acceptance of the truth of factual matters which might be deduced therefrom, since in many instances what is being noticed, and thereby established, is no more than the existence of such acts and not, without supporting evidence, what might factually be associated with or flow therefrom.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1063–1064.) Judicial notice of the documents included in the August 7 agenda packet and summary of proceedings was proper pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (b) and (c), but only as to the existence and legal effect of the documents—not as to the contested “factual representations” (Julian Volunteer, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 600) therein. To the extent that the trial court deviated from these principles in extending the taking of judicial notice to “the substance of” the documents for what it referred to as “evidentiary purposes,” including treating as true the facts asserted therein, we conclude those judicial notice rulings constituted an abuse of discretion.

36 Notwithstanding our determination that the trial court abused its discretion in taking judicial notice of the truth of those disputed factual assertions stated within the county’s documents, we decide any error in this regard was not prejudicial. As the court recognized, there was substantial uncertainty during the expedited proceedings regarding the scope and nature of the judicial notice sought and agreed to by the parties. Respondents’ assertion that they did not object to the court taking judicial notice as to both the “existence and contents” of appellants’ RJN 1 and 2 (August 7 agenda packet and summary of proceedings) did little to clarify this uncertainty. When challenged, respondents’ counsel emphasized that the documents could properly be considered for their contents (i.e., facts stated therein) because they reflected a legislative determination of the Board of Supervisors, and courts generally defer to the determination of a legislative body based on legislative facts. The challenge the trial court faced in ascertaining how to treat the contents of the August 7 agenda packet (including resolution findings) arises from the parties’ attempt to address these materials exclusively through the lens of judicial notice. We agree with respondents that the statements and facts set forth in these documents are legislative in nature, presented not for purposes of factfinding but as prima facie evidence of the Board’s legislative determination. We therefore apply the principles of review articulated in Northgate in deciding whether they served as a sufficient basis for the Board’s action. Northgate addressed whether a real estate transfer tax imposed by the City of Sacramento “was a validly enacted emergency measure in force prior to the effective date of Proposition 13, which expressly prohibits the imposition of a tax of this nature.” (Northgate, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at 37 p. 67.) The trial court reviewed the city’s ordinance, which contained a declaration of emergency and statement of facts constituting the emergency. (Ibid.) The “ ‘facts constituting the emergency’ ” stated in the ordinance were “ ‘the need immediately to provide for revenue for the usual and current expenses of the [c]ity to mitigate the extreme revenue loss’ ” anticipated as a result of Proposition 13. (Id. at p. 68.) Applying a deferential standard, the appellate court in Northgate upheld the action as a validly enacted emergency measure. (Northgate, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 73.) It stated, “ ‘In the absence of evidence to the contrary it will be assumed that a municipal legislative body in enacting an emergency ordinance acted on sufficient inquiry as to whether an emergency existed. Its declaration is prima facie evidence of the fact. Where the facts constituting the emergency or urgency are recited in the ordinance and are such that they may reasonably be held to constitute an emergency, the courts will not interfere, and they will not undertake to determine the truth of the recited facts.’ [Citation.] Under the doctrine of separation of powers, which applies to local legislative bodies, we may not invalidate legislation in the absence of ‘some overriding constitutional, statutory or charter proscription.’ ” (Id. at p. 69.) These same principles guided the decisions in Crown Motors and Sonoma County. In Crown Motors, the plaintiff challenged a city ordinance prohibiting electronic reader boards, which the city adopted as an urgency measure shortly after the plaintiff applied for a reader board use permit, thus preventing issuance of the use permit to the plaintiff. (Crown Motors, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 175.) The city justified the urgency measure for reasons including aesthetics, which the plaintiff maintained did not constitute a valid ground for urgency under the relevant governing statute. (Id. at p. 178.) The 38 plaintiff also asserted there were “no facts constituting an actual urgency and justifying an immediate ban of electronic reader boards.” (Id. at p. 179.) The appellate court rejected both arguments. Citing Northgate, the court looked to the factual support in the record, including a report from the planning commission to the city council, and on that record “defer[red] to legislative wisdom” about whether the circumstances justified the urgency provision. (Id. at p. 180.) It concluded the city council “reasonably found an urgency” under the statute. (Ibid.) Like in Crown Motors, the Court of Appeal in Sonoma County accepted the evidence cited by the county in the urgency ordinance declaring an emergency and deferred to the county board of supervisors’ factual determination. (Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at pp. 275–276.) The court concluded that the county “was not responding to fanciful speculation” (id. p. 277) and, in the absence of contrary evidence from the plaintiff challenging the ordinance, “was amply justified in concluding that it confronted an ‘emergency of grave character and serious moment’ demanding immediate action.” (Id. at p. 279.) Appellants offer no persuasive reason for this court to depart from these authorities. They contend that the phrase “ ‘cases of emergency’ ” in article XIII C is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny under section 5 of Proposition 218, which provides that “ ‘[t]he provisions of this act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes of limiting local government revenue.’ ” We have already concluded this directive does not narrow the meaning of the term “emergency” or limit the authority of the local governing body to invoke the provision. We are aware of no legal authority (and appellants have provided none) requiring heightened judicial scrutiny in reviewing an authorized legislative act by the county.

39 Appellants suggest that our review of the emergency declaration should meet the standard articulated in Verreos, requiring “a factual and objective determination whether an actual emergency existed” (Verreos, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. 105). They also argue that the Measure A resolution and ordinance falls short even under the more deferential standard articulated in Northgate and Sonoma County. We disagree that the Verreos standard governs here. As the Supreme Court explained in San Francisco Fire Fighters, Verreos emerged from a line of cases beginning with San Christina etc. Co. v. San Francisco (1914) 167 Cal. 762, which involved a provision of the San Francisco city charter, invoked in the wake of the 1906 earthquake, to allow a tax levy in excess of the maximum rate set in the charter based on “a declaration of ‘great necessity or emergency.’ ” (San Francisco Fire Fighters, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 668, quoting San Christina, at p. 768.) San Christina held that the determination under the charter of the board of supervisors as to the existence of a great necessity or emergency was subject to judicial review. (San Francisco Fire Fighters, at p. 668.) Decisions following San Christina, including Verreos, arose under the same charter provision. (Id. at p. 669; see Verreos, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. 102.) The specific context of these cases (pertaining to a particular, emergency provision of the San Francisco charter) and pattern of more recent judicial decisions extending deference to the legislative findings of municipal governing bodies exercising emergency authority (see, e.g., Northgate, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 71) counsel against adopting a per se rule that courts must engage in independent fact finding to ascertain “whether an actual emergency existed at the time of the declaration” (Verreos, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. 104).

40 Further, our Supreme Court has emphasized that the scope of judicial review of municipal actions is dictated in part by the language of the relevant authority. (See San Francisco Fire Fighters, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 670 [stating “the Charter provision may define the scope of the City’s discretion, and this in turn shapes not only what is to be reviewed but how it should be reviewed”].) As described above, the broad language of article XIII C’s “cases of emergency” clause suggests a standard of review deferential to the emergency determination. In any event, based on our review of the record, the county’s actions were valid under either standard. As appellants point out, the more deferential standard does not absolve the county’s emergency declaration from review. (Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.) Rather, applying the principles stated in Northgate, we must evaluate whether “ ‘[(1)] the facts constituting the emergency . . . are recited in the ordinance and [(2)] are such that they may reasonably be held to constitute an emergency.’ ” (Northgate, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 69.) The record in this case satisfies that standard. The Board’s legislative findings stating the facts constituting the emergency are set forth in detail in the resolution recitals and in the attached ordinance implementing the general sales tax. The video recording of the August 7 board meeting (the fact of which the parties agreed could be considered by the trial court) showed that after receiving public comment, the members of the Board of Supervisors spoke their views on the circumstances faced by the county and their reasons for voting for the resolution. On this record, we reject as inaccurate appellants’ complaint that the resolution failed to “describe, specify, or name” the emergency, that the declaration was 41 too vague and ambiguous to be valid, and that the Board “did not even discuss or deliberate” the elements of the purported emergency. Appellants attack the legal sufficiency of the Board’s emergency declaration but do not point to any contrary evidence from the trial court’s expedited hearing to suggest the Board’s determination was unreasonable or without factual basis. The Board based the emergency declaration on findings that the passage of H.R. 1 would have immediate and detrimental impacts on funding for healthcare and social safety net support for county residents, that those impacts could not be addressed through the fiscal year budget (which had already been passed) or offset through state or other federal funding, and that waiting for the next regularly scheduled county election to present a resolution to the voters would result in “dramatically reducing funding for critical safety net services such as those currently funded by Medicaid.” Absent a contrary factual showing, we treat the resolution recitals, ordinance, and emergency declaration “ ‘ “as prima facie evidence of the fact” ’ ” and do “ ‘ “not undertake to determine the truth of the recited facts.” ’ ” (Sonoma County, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 275.) Moreover, these findings accurately reflected the information presented to the Board in the staff reports included in the August 7 agenda packet. Without determining the truth of the facts stated therein, we recognize the reasonableness of the conclusions drawn therefrom and defer to the Board’s legislative assessment of the magnitude and urgency of the circumstances. (Id. at p. 277; Crown Motors, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 175.) Even assuming the trial court had to “determine for itself, based upon the evidence presented, whether an actual emergency existed at the time of the declaration” (Verreos, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d at p. 104), appellants have pointed to nothing in the record to 42 contest the facts underlying the county’s assessment of the scale and severity of the emergency and support a contrary determination. Appellants argue that they demonstrated to the trial court that the county’s “so-called ‘emergency’ ” cannot be related to the passage of H.R. 1 because, despite the statewide impacts of the federal funding cuts, no other county responded by calling an election to increase taxes on November 4. They also take issue with respondents’ representation to the court that the county “ ‘is the provider of last resort’ ” and “ ‘required to ensure access to healthcare’ ” under Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000.14 (Italics omitted.) They maintain that, because the statute’s phrase “lawfully resident therein” has been construed not to extend to “citizens of other countries who are present here on a temporary, undocumented, or illegal basis” (Khasminskaya v. Lum (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 537, 540 (Lum)), respondents misrepresented their legal obligation by failing to specify that any mandate to ensure healthcare is limited to lawful county residents. Appellants contend that if there truly were an emergency related to funding for healthcare services, the county “should have exercised its legal authority . . . to control its health care expenditures” by restricting services to lawful residents. According to appellants, these shortcomings demonstrate that the Board’s emergency declaration was “self-created.” These arguments reflect disagreement with and criticism of the county’s response to H.R. 1 from a policy perspective, but they do not demonstrate the legal insufficiency of the Board’s actions. That other 14 “Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, by their own means, or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 17000.) 43 counties may have addressed H.R. 1’s funding cuts differently says nothing about whether the facts recited in the resolution could “ ‘reasonably be held to constitute an emergency’ ” (Northgate, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 69) in Santa Clara County. So, too, that the county might lawfully restrict its provision of services to those lawfully residing in the county (see Lum, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at pp. 540–541, 544) does not undermine its determination that a general tax measure was needed urgently to prevent more drastic reductions in healthcare and social safety net services. Accepting arguendo appellants’ contention that respondents exaggerated the county’s statutory obligation by asserting in opposition to the petition that it was “the provider of last resort for all county residents” (italics added) does not alter our analysis of the validity of the emergency declaration. We further conclude that appellants have not established a prejudicial abuse of discretion in relation to the trial court’s judicial notice rulings denying RJN 18, 19, 20, and 21. Even if the court might have considered conclusions stated in the LAO report (see, e.g., Tomra Pacific, Inc. v. Chiang (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 463, 475 & fn. 6 [citing information from LAO reports, judicially noticed by the court]; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 647, 657–658 [citing LAO reports documenting abusive tax shelters]), they have not explained how the court’s failure to consider the information on sales tax rates was prejudicial in assessing the validity of the Board’s emergency declaration. While appellants maintain (as to the denial of RJN 20 and 21) that the court “cannot choose to be willfully blind to the text of current California statutes,” they overlook the court’s broad discretion to control the proceedings before it (Code Civ. Proc., § 128). Given the expedited and time-limited proceedings in this case, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s election not to consider 44 statutes introduced late on the second day of the hearing that were not previously cited in the parties’ papers. Moreover, appellants cited the statutes in support of their argument that the ballot question was materially misleading. Because this court has decided to exercise discretion to review only the validity of the emergency declaration and related constitutional questions, any abuse of discretion regarding consideration of the cited Revenue and Taxation Code sections is moot as to the matters under consideration on appeal. D. Conclusion We conclude that “cases of emergency” under article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (b), should be construed according to its ordinary meaning, without special limitation as to the nature of “emergency” that can be declared. Under this definition, appellants have not shown the Board of Supervisors’ emergency declaration to be invalid. Absent evidence to the contrary, we accept the Board’s legislative findings set forth in its resolution and ordinance as sufficient evidence of the facts constituting the emergency. On this record, we conclude that the Board’s determination of emergency was reasonable, and the resolution to place Measure A on the November 4 special election ballot was not invalid. We decline to exercise our discretion to review the contentions of statutory nonconformance pertaining to the specific language and format of the ballot question and impartial analysis. III. DISPOSITION The August 29, 2025 order denying the petition for writ of mandate and judgment thereon are affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their reasonable costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

45 ______________________________________ Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________ Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________________ Grover, J.

H053842 Holtz et al. v. Matt Moreles, as Registrar of Voters, etc., et al. Trial Court: County of Santa Clara Trial Judge: Hon. Carol W. Overton Counsel: Jason A. Bezis for Appellants.

Tony Lopresti, County Counsel, Steve Mitra, Assistant County Counsel, Mary Hanna-Wier, Lead Deputy County Counsel, Susan Greenberg, Deputy County Counsel for Respondents.

H053842 Holtz et al. v. Matt Moreles, as Registrar of Voters, etc., et al.