Marriage of Angelica G. and Joshua G. CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 9/23/26 Marriage of Angelica G. and Joshua G. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of ANGELICA G. and JOSHUA G. ANGELICA G., D085644 Respondent, (San Diego Super. Ct. v. No. D563325)

JOSHUA G., Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Danna W. Nicholas, Judge. Affirmed. Joshua G., in pro. per., for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.

Joshua G. appeals from a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) prohibiting him from abusing, contacting, or coming near his ex-wife, Angelica G. Joshua challenges the DVRO on three grounds: there is insufficient evidence that he abused Angelica, he was denied his right to present evidence at the DVRO hearing, and the court abused its discretion in setting the DVRO for a three year term. On the limited record before us— which does not include a reporter’s transcript—we affirm the trial court’s order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Joshua and Angelica divorced in 2017. They have since shared joint legal and physical custody of their son Josiah. In January 2025, Angelica requested a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) as well as sole legal and physical custody of Josiah, who was then 11 years old. In her sworn request, Angelica stated that during a custody exchange two days prior, Josiah expressed feeling unsafe and afraid of his father. Joshua attempted to grab Josiah and force him into his car and screamed at him. Angelica and Josiah ran back to her car and locked the doors. Joshua and his wife proceeded to pound on the car windows and continued screaming and shouting. Angelica also described two instances of past abuse by Joshua that had been reported to the police—sexual abuse around 2011 and a choking incident in 2015. In support of Angelica’s request, her brother and sister-in-law, who witnessed the custody exchange, submitted declarations. Her sister-in-law stated that she walked Josiah over to Joshua to express “how he was feeling” which caused Joshua to scream and attempt to grab Josiah. When Joshua refused to calm down, Angelica and Josiah ran to her car and locked the doors. The sister-in-law called the police because Joshua “was close to the car and acting agressive [sic] with Angelica.” Angelica’s brother similarly stated that Joshua became aggressive, tried grabbing Josiah, and screamed at Angelica. Angelica and Josiah were “terrified” and Joshua continued shouting at them once they were locked inside her car. 2 Joshua filed sworn responses opposing all requested orders. In a declaration supporting his opposition, he stated that at the custody exchange Josiah appeared “very sad and hesitant” and told Joshua he did not want to go with him. As Joshua attempted to reassure him, Angelica and her family began yelling that Josiah was afraid of him, saying he was abusive, and calling him derogatory names. When Josiah began approaching Joshua, Angelica grabbed him and pulled him into her car. Joshua walked toward the car, stopped about 20 feet away, and called out to Josiah. Angelica’s brother then put his hand on Joshua’s chest and warned him not to get any closer. Angelica’s brother then removed his sweater and reached toward his belt as though he were preparing to fight. Joshua’s brother-in-law intervened and then Joshua returned to his car to wait for the police. Joshua’s wife, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law filed declarations supporting his opposition. They concurred that Angelica and her family were the instigators during the exchange, claiming that Josiah was afraid, saying “horrible things” about Joshua in front of the children, and refusing to let Josiah go. They attested that Angelica’s brother took off his sweater, removed everything from his pockets, and squared up to fight Joshua, but then the family intervened. They maintained that Joshua remained calm during the incident and never touched Angelica’s car. The court held a hearing in February 2025. Since neither party requested a court reporter, there is no verbatim record of the hearing.1 1 Upon request, the trial court must give indigent civil litigants access to an official verbatim record by providing an official court reporter or through alternative means, such as electronic recording. (See Family Violence Appellate Project v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (Aug. 10, 2026, S288176) 20 Cal.5th 564, 576 [346 Cal.Rptr.3d 841, 854].)

3 According to the minute order of the hearing and a settled statement, both parties were sworn under oath and addressed the court. Angelica’s sister-in- law, Joshua’s mother-in-law, and Josiah’s school counselor testified. The court did not recall the specifics of any testimony given or objections made. The parties did not offer any exhibits into evidence. The court ultimately granted a three year DVRO prohibiting Joshua from abusing, contacting, or coming within 100 yards of Angelica. The finding that Joshua perpetrated domestic violence triggered a presumption that granting him joint custody would be detrimental to Josiah’s best interest (see Fam. Code,2 § 3044), and the court found that Joshua had “not yet” rebutted that presumption. It ordered Joshua to attend conjoint therapy with Josiah for 10 to 12 sessions and, if the therapists agreed, allowed him to have professionally supervised visits on alternating Saturdays. The court otherwise awarded Angelica sole physical and legal custody of Josiah.

DISCUSSION

Joshua primarily argues there is insufficient evidence that he abused Angelica. He accordingly asks that we reverse the DVRO and custody order or at least remand the case for a new evidentiary hearing. The purpose of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) “is to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence.” (§ 6220.) Under the DVPA, the trial court can issue a restraining order if an affidavit or testimony “shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) The court 2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. 4 may issue a restraining order “based solely on the affidavit or testimony of the person requesting the restraining order.” (Ibid.; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5 [declarations may be offered in lieu of affidavits].) The DVPA defines “abuse” to include “any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4).) In turn, the behavior described in section 6320 includes molesting, attacking, threatening, harassing, destroying personal property, or disturbing the peace of the other party. (Id., subd. (a).) “ ‘[D]isturbing the peace of the other party’ ” means “conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (Id., subd. (c).) Generally, a trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a request for a restraining order under the DVPA. (In re Marriage of Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 702.) “On review of an order granting or denying a protective order under the DVPA, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion. ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ We accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings, resolving every conflict in the evidence in favor of the judgment. Under the substantial evidence test, the pertinent inquiry is whether substantial evidence supports the court’s finding—not whether a contrary finding might have been made.” (Ibid., citations omitted.) Here, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Joshua committed at least one act of abuse against Angelica. In her sworn request for a DVRO, Angelica stated that Joshua became “aggressive” during a 5 custody exchange. When he refused to calm down, Angelica and Josiah retreated to her car and locked the doors. Joshua and his wife pursued them, “banging and pounding on [her] car windows screaming and shouting for [Josiah] to get out.” Angelica’s brother and sister-in-law agreed that Joshua was aggressive with Angelica and screamed at her, leaving her and Josiah terrified. The sister-in-law was concerned enough to call the police. The court could have reasonably found that Joshua destroyed Angelica’s “mental or emotional calm” with this behavior. In his brief, Joshua emphasizes the fact that no exhibits were offered or admitted into evidence at the DVRO hearing, there is no reporter’s transcript of the testimony given, and the court was unable to recall the testimony in its settled statement. Given this “evidentiary vacuum,” Joshua contends we must conclude the DVRO is not supported by the evidence. But the opposite is true. “ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) This means that when there is no reporter’s transcript and no error is apparent on the face of the existing record, “it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992.) We therefore presume that the sworn statements3 and testimony 3 Joshua seems to believe that because no exhibits were offered or admitted at the hearing, the court did not consider the declarations the parties and witnesses submitted. But these declarations —signed under penalty of perjury under California law—were filed directly with the court and were not objected to, as far as the record shows. The declarations were not exhibits accompanying live testimony that needed to be admitted at the hearing for the court to consider them.

6 given by Angelica and her sister-in-law at the hearing supported the court’s finding that Joshua abused Angelica. We likewise defer to the trial court, who was able to observe the witnesses firsthand, in finding Angelica’s version of events more credible. (See Schneer v. Llaurado (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1285–1286.)4 Joshua further argues he was “denied due process and the statutory right to present relevant evidence when the trial court limited the proceeding and did not permit testimony from listed witnesses … .” To be sure, the record indicates he intended to present four witnesses—his wife, his mother- in-law, his brother-in-law, and Josiah’s school counselor—but only his mother-in-law and the school counselor testified at the hearing. But section 217, the statute Joshua relies on, does not grant him an unfettered right to present however many witnesses he wishes. It generally requires the court to “receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing” but at the same time allows the court to refuse to receive live testimony for good cause. (§ 217, subds. (a) & (b).) Without a record explaining the reason only two of Joshua’s witnesses testified, we must presume the court properly excluded the remaining two. On the record we do have, which reflects that Joshua addressed the court, presented two of his witnesses, and cross-examined Angelica’s witness, we cannot say he was denied his right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard. (See In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 935 [“Due process requires ‘the right to be heard in a meaningful manner’ ”].)

4 Although the court could not recall the specifics of the testimony by the time it issued the settled statement, we must presume that testimony supported the DVRO at the time the court made its decision. 7 Finally, Joshua asserts the court abused its discretion in setting the DVRO for three years because there was no evidence of an ongoing danger, escalation, stalking, repeated harassment, or an inability to comply with custody-exchange protocols. He suggests an order less onerous—such as one requiring supervised custody exchanges—would have sufficed. But the court may issue a restraining order based on evidence of a past act of abuse; the petitioner is not required to establish a probability of future abuse. (R.R. v. C.R. (2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1262, 1275.) The court otherwise has discretion to choose the duration of the DVRO, with three years being the default. (§ 6345, subds. (a) & (c).) On the limited record before us, which generally depicts a nonpeaceful relationship between Joshua and Angelica that involved physical violence in the past, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in setting the DVRO for the typical three year term.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.