People v. Copeland CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 9/23/26 P. v. Copeland CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085239

Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Diego Super. Ct. v. No. SCS329485)

ANTHONY DWAYNE COPELAND,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Anthony J. Campagna, Judge. Affirmed. Belinda Escobosa, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. A jury convicted Anthony Dwayne Copeland of multiple offenses arising from two separate incidents of domestic violence against his then-girlfriend. The trial court sentenced him to seven years in prison. His appellate counsel filed a brief stating no arguable issues can be found. (See generally People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende); Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders).) We have independently reviewed the record and agree there are no reasonably arguable issues. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

One evening in November 2023, Copeland visited his then-girlfriend, Shawndra W., at her residence. After hours of drinking with her roommates and friends, Copeland and Shawndra got into a heated argument that turned physical. Copeland strangled Shawndra and punched her in her face and body. He threw a “haymaker” punch that struck her in the face. She fell into a wall with such force that she left a large hole. Two male friends intervened, and one of them called 911. A responding police officer observed redness on both sides of Shawndra’s neck and bruising on her wrist. She reported neck pain, a headache, and dizziness. Copeland left before the police arrived, but he was eventually found and arrested two months later Criminal proceedings were initiated against him and the trial court issued a criminal protective order requiring him to stay away from Shawndra and to not contact her. He was personally served with a copy of the order in court. A month later, in February 2024, Copeland and Shawndra were found riding in her car together. The police had pulled them over because the light bulb above her license plate was out. Copeland told the officer he had not received any tickets lately, had not been arrested, and was not on probation, parole, or under any other supervision. 2 A few months after that, in May 2024, Shawndra was sleeping and woke up to Copeland yelling at her in her bedroom. She did not know how he had gotten into the house; he might have entered through an already broken window. He picked her up by her throat and shoved her into the wall— creating another hole—and held her there for a few minutes. He then punched her twice in the face. She fell to the floor and curled up to protect herself. When he left minutes later, she called the police. The responding officers saw that Shawndra had significant bleeding coming from her mouth and nose. She had a laceration inside her lip that required four stitches, a large hematoma on her hand, and bruising across her body. Copeland was arrested nearby that same night. The prosecution filed a consolidated information charging Copeland with two counts of corporal injury to a dating partner (Pen. Code,1 § 273.5, subd. (a); counts 1 & 6), two counts of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2 & 7), two counts of misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)(A); counts 3 & 8), two counts of misdemeanor violation of a protective order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); counts 4 & 9), and one count of first degree residential burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a); count 5) with an allegation that a nonaccomplice was present during the offense (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). As to counts 5, 6, and 7 (arising from the May 2024 incident), it was alleged that Copeland personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) and that he was out on bail at the time of the offenses (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)). Four aggravating sentencing factors were asserted as well. (Cal. Rules of 1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 3 Court, rule 4.421(a)(1) & (3), (b)(1) & (2); further undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.) Shawndra initially did not want to press charges and was reluctant to testify at trial. She still had feelings for Copeland. She maintained he was a wonderful man and blamed herself to an extent for the fighting. The prosecution offered the testimony of Chula Vista Police Detective Frederico Dominguez as an expert on domestic violence. Dominguez explained three concepts relevant to domestic violence generally: (1) the cycle of abuse, (2) power and control tactics, and (3) victim recantation. The cycle of abuse involves an incident of harm (threatened, attempted, or actual), a honeymoon phase, a calm period, and then tension building until another incident occurs. Power and control tactics include economic abuse, emotional abuse, isolation, and coercion, among others. And, according to Dominguez, up to 80 percent of victims recant at some point during their relationship in order to avoid problems in the relationship and/or because they maintain “a true, legitimate, emotional attachment to the perpetrator.” A jury convicted Copeland on all counts except for the residential burglary (count 5) and found true the great bodily injury allegation. Copeland waived his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors and the on-bail enhancement. In a bifurcated proceeding, he admitted the on-bail enhancement, that “the offense involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness” (rule 4.421(a)(1)), and that he had prior convictions of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)). The trial court 4 found true that Shawndra was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)) but not true that Copeland had engaged in violent conduct (rule 4.421(b)(1)).2 At sentencing, defense counsel advocated for Copeland to be placed on probation with a referral to Drug Court and execution of sentence suspended, emphasizing that the root of his violent conduct was alcohol abuse. The court believed that Copeland was sincerely ready to address his substance abuse. But he was presumptively ineligible for probation (§ 1203, subd. (e)(3)) and the court did not consider this to be an unusual case overcoming that presumption given the facts of this case, his prior misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence offenses, his polysubstance abuse, and his housing instability. At the same time, the court did not consider the maximum punishment (requested by the prosecution) to be appropriate here. It ultimately imposed a total determinate term of seven years in prison—three years (the midterm) for the May 2024 corporal injury offense (count 6), three years (the low term) for the great bodily injury enhancement on that count, and one year (one-third the midterm) for the November 2023 corporal injury offense (count 1). It stayed punishment for the assault offenses, struck punishment for the on-bail enhancement, and ordered credit for time served on the misdemeanor offenses.

DISCUSSION

Appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738 indicating that she identified no reasonably arguable issues for reversal on appeal. She asked this court to review the 2 The prosecution had specifically alleged that Copeland engaged in violent conduct by “inflicting great bodily injury after entering an inhabited portion of a building with the intent to commit a felony inside ... .” 5 record as mandated by Wende, paying particular attention to whether the court erred in: (1) admitting the deputies’ body worn camera video footage; (2) allowing the prosecution’s domestic violence expert to testify; (3) instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 850; or (4) sentencing Copeland. We offered Copeland the opportunity to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf and gave him additional time to do so, but he ultimately did not submit a brief. Our review of the record as mandated by Wende and Anders has disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues. The court admitted just one body worn camera video over Copeland’s objection.3 It is from the traffic stop in February 2024 where Copeland and Shawndra were riding in the car together. Copeland argued the prosecutor could prove the protective order violation through the officer’s testimony and perhaps a photo; the video was more prejudicial than probative insofar as it included his statements to the officer. The court reasonably admitted the video, finding his evasive responses as to his arrest history probative of his knowing violation of the protective order. (See People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1069 [“A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and it will not be disturbed unless there is a showing that the trial court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a miscarriage of justice”].)

3 Copeland initially objected to another body worn camera video that was taken after the May 2024 assault. It captured Shawndra showing the officer a video on her cell phone in which Copeland is yelling at her. Copeland questioned when the cell phone video was taken and objected to its relevance “particularly if it was not taken on that same day.” At trial, however, Shawndra confirmed she took the video after Copeland woke her up in her bedroom and Copeland accordingly withdrew his objection. 6 Copeland also moved in limine to exclude the testimony of the prosecution’s domestic violence expert, Detective Dominguez, asserting that (1) the prosecutor failed to timely disclose his identity and the nature of his proposed testimony pursuant to section 1054.1 and (2) Dominguez was not qualified to testify as a domestic violence expert. As to the first ground, the prosecutor explained he had disclosed Dominguez’s information a month earlier, with the caveat that he was looking for a backup expert in case the detective had a scheduling conflict, which turned out not to be the case. No prejudice from this timely albeit equivocal disclosure appears in the record. (See People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 467 [“To prevail on a claim alleging a violation of discovery statutes, an appellant must show there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceedings would have been different”].) As to the second ground, Dominguez explained at trial that he worked in the Family Protection Unit, which investigates cases involving domestic violence, sexual assault, child abuse, and elder abuse. He had taken more than 400 hours of training on these subjects—including training on the dynamics of domestic violence relationships—and had investigated more than 2,500 domestic violence cases in his career. He leads Chula Vista’s domestic violence response program as well as a multidisciplinary team of nongovernmental agencies, social service providers, and law enforcement agencies that collaborate on certain cases. On about 10 prior occasions, he had testified as an expert on power and control dynamics, the cycle of abuse, and the recanting phenomenon. This testimony amply supported his qualifications to testify as an expert. (See People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 162 [“Error regarding a witness’s qualifications as an expert 7 will be found only if the evidence shows that the witness ‘ “ ‘clearly lacks qualification as an expert’ ” ’ ”].) In light of Detective Dominguez’s testimony, the trial court decided to instruct the jurors with CALCRIM No. 850. Copeland objected, arguing that Dominguez had not investigated this particular case and his testimony on domestic violence in general “require[d] the jury to extrapolate and make a leap that” was not “necessarily appropriate in this case.” The court properly overruled the objection as the instruction correctly informed the jurors that Dominguez’s testimony was not evidence that Copeland committed the offenses charged. The jury could consider the testimony “only in deciding whether or not Shawndra [W.]’s conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who’s been abused, and in evaluating the believability of her testimony.” (See People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1088, fn. 5 [“If the prosecution offers [intimate partner battering] evidence, an additional limiting instruction might also be appropriate on request, given the statutory prohibition against use of this evidence ‘to prove the occurrence of the act or acts of abuse which form the basis of the criminal charge’ ”].) As the court noted, defense counsel was free to argue in closing that Dominguez’s general description of a relationship involving domestic violence did not apply here. Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Copeland probation given his multiple violent attacks on Shawndra and his history of domestic violence. (See People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 831 [we review “a trial court’s finding that a case may or may not be unusual [for] abuse of discretion”].) We otherwise see no legal error in the sentence, fines, and fees imposed nor in the custody credits awarded. Competent counsel represented Copeland in this appeal.

8 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.