Andrews v. City of Lomita CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 9/22/26 Andrews v. City of Lomita CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

CHRISTY ANDREWS, B343848

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23TRCV00029) v.

CITY OF LOMITA,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Douglas W. Stern, Judge. Affirmed. Lahmani Law, Nicole Lahmani; Gelb Law and Yisrael Gelb for Plaintiff and Appellant. Collins + Collins, Michael L. Wroniak, Kristopher P. Lancial; Pollak, Vida & Barer, Daniel P. Barer and Hamed Amiri Ghaemmaghami for Defendant and Respondent. ____________________________ Plaintiff Christy Andrews appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent City of Lomita (Lomita). Andrews sued Lomita and the City of Torrance (Torrance) after she was allegedly struck by a falling tree branch near the border between the two cities. The tree was within Lomita’s jurisdictional boundaries, but was in Torrance’s tree inventory, and Torrance had maintained the tree for years prior to the incident. The trial court found no triable issues as to Lomita’s liability because there was no evidence Lomita’s negligence led to the branch falling, nor did Lomita have constructive knowledge of the tree’s decay given Torrance had taken responsibility for maintaining the tree. We agree with the trial court’s conclusions and affirm.

BACKGROUND Andrews filed a complaint against Lomita, Torrance, and West Coast Arborists, Inc., alleging that on January 19, 2021, she was injured by a falling tree branch near Walnut Street and 241st Street in Lomita. Andrews alleged the property on which the tree stood was owned by either Lomita or Torrance. Andrews alleged public entity premises liability (Gov. Code, §§ 830, 835 et seq.) and public entity negligence (id., § 815.2) against the two cities, and negligence and premises liability against West Coast Arborists.1 We take judicial notice that Walnut Street at 241st Street lies along the border between Lomita and Torrance. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (h), 459, subd. (a).)

1 Andrews later dismissed her claims against West Coast Arborists.

2 Lomita moved for summary judgment based on the following undisputed facts: Both Torrance and Lomita rely on their tree maps and tree inventory to determine which trees they have a duty to maintain. At the time the branch allegedly fell on Andrews, the subject tree was included in Torrance’s tree inventory. Torrance serviced and maintained the subject tree for at least five years prior to the branch allegedly falling, and had serviced the tree in 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2016. The tree was actually within Lomita’s jurisdictional boundary, but Lomita did not determine that until after the branch fell. Torrance informed Lomita in May 2023, two years after the branch fell, that it would no longer maintain the subject tree. Both Torrance and Lomita contracted with West Coast Arborists for tree maintenance and service. West Coast Arborists’ vice president submitted a declaration confirming the subject tree was in Torrance’s tree map and service area, not in Lomita’s. The vice president stated that had West Coast Arborists been aware of any problems with the tree, West Coast Arborists would have informed Torrance, not Lomita, and would have invoiced Torrance for the work. At least since 2008, Lomita employees had taken no action with respect to the tree. Lomita’s city records did not contain any complaints, requests for work, or other maintenance records concerning the subject tree. Torrance never provided any information to Lomita about the subject tree. The trial court granted Lomita’s motion for summary judgment. The court found Lomita had failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to whether a Lomita employee caused a dangerous condition by negligently failing to realize the 3 tree was within Lomita’s borders. The court stated, “This is not a situation where the tree was completely ignored or not mapped. The subject tree was on another city’s inventory and Torrance had taken responsibility for maintenance.” The court found the undisputed facts demonstrated Lomita did not have actual notice of the tree’s condition because Lomita was unaware the tree was within its boundaries until after the incident; the tree was not on Lomita’s tree map; the tree was in Torrance’s tree inventory and Torrance maintained the tree; Lomita had not received any complaints or reports about the tree; and Torrance and West Coast Arborists had not provided any information to Lomita about the tree. The court further found Lomita had no constructive notice of the tree’s condition because the tree was within Torrance’s inspection system, not Lomita’s, and Andrews failed to show “the condition of the tree had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that Lomita should have discovered the condition and ‘its dangerous character.’ ” The court found plaintiff could not assert a negligence claim based on vicarious liability under Government Code section 815.2 because her sole available cause of action was for public entity premises liability.2 2 Torrance separately moved for summary judgment or adjudication. The trial court denied summary adjudication on the public entity premises liability cause of action against Torrance, finding Anderson had raised triable issues as to whether the tree was in a dangerous condition and whether Torrance should have discovered any defects with the tree. Torrance’s motion is not at issue in this appeal. Andrews states in her appellate briefing Torrance has settled with her.

4 The court entered judgment in favor of Lomita. Anderson timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW “ ‘A motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is properly granted only when “all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” ’ [Citations.] We review a ruling on summary judgment or summary adjudication de novo and ‘decide independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving party or a determination a cause of action has no merit as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] In so doing, we liberally construe the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in their favor.” (Campbell v. FPI Management, Inc. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1151, 1161.)

DISCUSSION On appeal, Anderson challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on her premises liability claim under Government Code section 835.3 She does not challenge the judgment against her on the negligence cause of action under section 815.2. As an initial matter, Lomita argues Andrews has forfeited her challenges by not providing an adequate record on appeal. Andrews failed to include in the record, for example, the exhibits Lomita submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment 3 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Government Code.

5 and Lomita’s reply to Andrews’ opposition below. Lomita, however, provided the missing documents in a motion to augment the record, which we granted. We therefore proceed to decide Andrews’ challenges on the merits. “[A] public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: [¶] (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or [¶] (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.” (§ 835.) A public entity has actual notice of a dangerous condition “if it had actual knowledge of the existence of the condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character.” (§ 835.2, subd. (a).) A public entity has constructive notice of a dangerous condition “only if the plaintiff establishes that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character.” (§ 835.2, subd. (b).) Evidence relevant to “due care” includes, without limitation, “[w]hether the existence of the condition and its dangerous character would have been discovered by an inspection system that was reasonably adequate . . . to inform the public entity whether the property was safe,” and “[w]hether the 6 public entity maintained and operated such an inspection system with due care and did not discover the condition.” (Id., subd. (b)(1)–(2).) Andrews argues there is a triable issue as to whether Lomita’s negligence “created the dangerous condition.” (§ 835, subd. (a).) Andrews contends Lomita, by establishing its tree inventory system, assumed a duty towards the public. She argues Lomita failed to properly record its tree inventory, and thus “allowed the subject tree to go unmaintained for at least 13 years.” She continues, “There is a reasonable inference that the lack of tree maintenance by . . . Lomita for over a decade permitted and hastened the tree’s decay, ca[us]ally leading to Plaintiff’s injury.” We disagree the evidence supports an inference that Lomita’s exclusion of the subject tree from its inventory created a dangerous condition by leaving the tree unmaintained for 13 years. As the trial court observed, this was not a case in which the tree was ignored or under no supervision whatsoever. Torrance had accepted responsibility for the tree for many years. Torrance serviced the tree in 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2016. Thus, even if arguendo Lomita was negligent for failing to realize the tree was within its jurisdictional boundaries, that negligence did not leave the tree unmonitored or unmaintained, and therefore did not create a dangerous condition under section 835, subdivision (a). Andrews argues there is a triable issue whether Lomita had constructive notice of the tree’s condition (§ 835, subd. (b)), because “[h]ad . . . Lomita properly recorded the subject tree in its inventory, [Lomita] could have maintained the tree and discovered the decay in the tree through their inspection system 7 and be properly informed of any dangerous conditions. The only reason . . . Lomita did not discover the condition of the subject tree is because the tree was improperly recorded in . . . Torr[a]nce’s inventory and not . . . Lomita’s. [Lomita’s] failure to maintain accurate records directly prevented them from acquiring the knowledge necessary to fulfill their duty to remedy the dangerous condition.” The evidence does not support an inference that Lomita, “in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition [of the tree] and its dangerous character.” (§ 835.2, subd. (b).) Again, Torrance had assumed responsibility for the tree and had maintained it over many years. Lomita never received complaints or work requests regarding the tree, and Torrance had not shared any information with Lomita about the tree.4 “[T]he exercise of due care” did not require Lomita to inspect a tree for which another city had long taken responsibility, and about which Lomita had never received complaints or other indications suggesting Lomita needed to care for the tree. (§ 835.2, subd. (b).) It therefore cannot be said that Lomita, in exercising due care, “should have discovered the condition [of the tree] and its dangerous character.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, there was no constructive notice. Andrews argues Lomita did not meet its initial burden to present evidence of a lack of constructive notice. Andrews argues Lomita was unaware of the decaying tree “due solely to [Lomita’s] proverbial head buried in the sand,” and there was little evidence “about the duration of the tree’s condition and its obviousness.”

4 This undisputed evidence also establishes Lomita did not have actual notice of the tree’s condition, a point Andrews does not contest on appeal.

8 Assenting to another municipality’s supervision of the tree is not akin to Lomita burying its head in the sand. Whether any defects in the tree would be obvious upon inspection misses the point. Even exercising due care, Lomita would not have inspected a tree for which Torrance had accepted responsibility. Andrews notes the trial court denied summary adjudication on the premises liability claim as to Torrance, in part because there were triable issues as to whether the tree was in a dangerous condition, whether Torrance should have discovered that condition, and whether Torrance’s inspection system was adequate and operated with due care. The court observed Torrance at the time of the incident had not serviced the tree for over four years. Andrews argues similar triable issues exist as to Lomita, who failed for many years to realize the tree was in the wrong inventory. She states, “[T]he only distinction between the two cities in establishing constructive notice is whether the subject tree was recorded in that city’s inventory.” That distinction, however, is a valid basis for the trial court to rule in Lomita’s favor while denying summary adjudication to Torrance, because the exercise of due care does not require inspecting a tree in another city’s inventory.

9 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The City of Lomita is awarded its costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.