Barrett Daffin Frappier etc. v. Garcia CA1/2

Opinion

Filed 9/22/26 Barrett Daffin Frappier etc. v. Garcia CA1/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

BARRETT DAFFIN FRAPPIER TREDER & WEISS, LLP, Plaintiff, A174444 v. (City & County of San Francisco KAYLA GARCIA, Super. Ct. No. CGC-24-613315) Defendant and Appellant; CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO Defendant and Respondent.

The City and County of San Francisco (the City) ran a program providing downpayment assistance to qualified homebuyers, and in 2007, appellant Kayla Garcia took advantage of that program to help her buy a property. In exchange for the City’s assistance, Garcia promised that on sale of the property she would repay the City the amount advanced plus a percentage of the appreciated value of the property. Garcia defaulted on her mortgage payments, and in 2022, Barrett Daffin Frappier Treder & Weiss (Barrett Daffin) foreclosed on the property, ultimately leaving surplus funds of $122,021.79. Garcia filed a claim seeking those funds, as did the City, following which Barrett Daffin filed an interpleader action seeking 1 instruction as to distribution of the funds. The interpleader action proceeded to a bench trial, at the conclusion of which the trial court filed a comprehensive statement of decision holding for the City, and entered judgment for it. Garcia appeals, doing so with an appellate brief that does not comply with the Rules of Court, a brief that fails to demonstrate error by the trial court. We thus affirm. BACKGROUND1 The Downpayment Assistance Loan Program Operating through the Mayor’s Office of Housing and Development, the City has a program designed to provide downpayment assistance to qualified loan homebuyers, described in the briefing as DALP. As described at trial by Maria Benjamin, Deputy Director of the Office of Housing and Development, a DALP loan is intended to be used for the downpayment on a property that will become a primary residence, a silent second loan that requires no monthly payments. When the property is sold or title is transferred, the owners then repay the principal amount of the loan plus an equitable share of appreciation, defined as 30 percent of the increase of the fair market value of the property. Garcia Buys a Property Using DALP In 2007, Garcia sought to purchase the property described as unit 309, 8100 Oceanview Terrace, San Francisco (the property). And in that regard on August 3, 2007, two documents were recorded in the official city records: (1) a grant deed evidencing transfer of title of the property to Garcia; and (2)

1 While Garcia’s briefing is, as discussed below, not helpful in setting forth the background, we are assisted in great part by the 11-page statement of decision by the trial court.

2 a deed of trust evidencing a loan in favor of Bank of America in the amount of $235,600, on which Garcia was the borrower. That same day, August 3, the City loaned to Garcia $114,000, which loan was also secured by a deed of trust signed by Garcia. Somewhere along the way Garcia went into default on her payment obligations to Bank of America, and on August 5, 2022, Barrett Daffin caused to be recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under the Deed of Trust because of Garcia’s failure to pay mortgage payments. On April 6, 2023, the property was sold for $400,000 at a non-judicial foreclosure sale held in accordance with Civil Code section 2924 et seq. And after the payments required by various documents were made, a surplus of $121,021.79 remained. On June 14, Garcia submitted a claim, signed under penalty of perjury, to the surplus funds, a claim that identified the City’s deed of trust. On June 27, the City submitted a claim for the surplus funds in the amount of $120,020. The Proceedings Below On March 21, 2024, Barrett Daffin filed an action in interpleader, seeking instructions as to how the surplus funds should be distributed. As the trial court would come to describe it, Barrett Daffin “held the funds as a disinterested stakeholder for the benefit of those whose interest in the property was extinguished by the foreclosure sale in the order of priority prescribed by Civil Code section 2924k.” Barrett Daffin filed a motion for discharge and payment of its attorney fees, which was granted. And on July 14, 2025, Barrett Daffin deposited with the court the sum of $118,588.77, the remaining amount of the surplus after payment of the fees and costs.

3 In response to the interpleader action, written claims to the surplus funds were filed by Garcia, the City, the California Housing Finance Agency, and the Oceanview Villa Homeowners Association. And at one point, Barrett Daffin was prepared to distribute the surplus funds to the City and the California Housing Finance Agency due to the clear priority enjoyed by these claimants. But Garcia objected, claiming she was the sole and rightful owner of all surplus funds. The case came on for trial on July 28, 2025, with the only participants being Garcia, representing herself, and the City, represented by the City Attorney’s office.2 Garcia and the City made opening statements. The City called one witness, Ms. Benjamin, who was also cross-examined by Garcia. Garcia then provided narrative testimony on her own behalf, and was cross- examined by the City. Garcia and the City then made closing arguments. Then, as the court described: “At the close of the trial on July 28, 2025, the Court considered the evidence, testimony, the parties’ trial briefs and other written submissions, the Court’s file, and other matters of record, and announced its Tentative Decision by an oral statement, entered in the minutes. The Tentative Decision found that [the City] was the prevailing party and entitled to the remaining Surplus Funds of $118,588.77. Before the matter was submitted, prior to the Court’s ruling, and pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 632 and Rules of Court, rule 3.1590, [the City] requested a statement of decision.” On July 30, the City submitted its proposed statement of decision and proposed judgment, and on August 11, the court filed its proposed statement of decision. Garcia filed nine separate documents, most of them in response to the 2 Prior to trial the parties had filed pretrial briefs.

4 proposed statement of decision.3 Meanwhile, the City filed its responses to Garcia’s opposition and objections, and on September 3, the trial court filed its statement of decision finding for the City. As noted, it was a comprehensive, 11-page statement setting forth in detail the background of the matter and Garcia’s claim to the surplus funds, followed by four pages of its decision and conclusions of law. On August 26, Garcia filed a notice of appeal stating it was from the August 11, 2025, “Order of Proposed Statement of Judgement [sic]” and “Order of Judgement [sic] In Favor of City & County of SF.” In fact, judgment was entered on September 3.

3 As described by the trial court, they were: (1) “Notification of Proposed Statement of Decision Opposition”; (2) “Notification of Proposed Statement of Decision Opposition. Encumbrance Proof”; (3) “Proposed Judgment. Burden of Proof”; (4) “Notification of Opposition of Proposed Signed Statement of Decision filed & dated 8/11/25 with Intent to Appeal 8/11/25 Signed Statement of Decision”; (5) “Opposition & Objection to Pursuing Surplus Funds of Kayla Garcia pursuant to CA. Civil Code section 2924j immediately 30 day rule . . . ; Vacate 8/11/25 Proposed Statement of Decision/Statement of Decision”; (6) “Kayla Garcia’s Response to City & County of SF District Attorney’s Office dated, filed, executed 8/19/25 Ari Baruth (City), Intent to Appeal Notification and Opposition to 8/11/25 signed Statement of Decision”; (7) “Amended Response 8/21/25”; (8) “Amended Response #2 - 8/25/25”; and (9) “Notice of Claim for Surplus Funds, Appeal for Erred Order of Proposed Statement of Judgment, . . . filed signed 8/11/25 - Injunctive Relief.”

5 DISCUSSION Introduction, and Some Observations About Garcia’s Advocacy As she did below, Garcia represents herself on this appeal, which, of course, is her right. Doing so, however, she is held to the same standard as an attorney. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984–985.) Self- representation is not a ground for lenient treatment and, as is the case with attorneys, a person who represents herself “must follow correct rules of procedure.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) Garcia’s presentation here falls short in many ways, starting with her briefing. Garcia’s opening brief has a three-and-a-half page statement of the case and a 13-page statement of facts. The former, essentially one very long paragraph, has one citation to the record, at the end of the three-and-a-half pages: “CT Page 224-236.” Similarly, Garcia’s 13-page statement of facts has five record references: CT pages 137 to 142 (at page 14); CT pages 22 and 109 (at page 15); CT page 6 (at page 16); CT page 7 (at page 17); and CT pages 87 and 144 to 146 (at page 19). This violates California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), which requires that any reference to a matter in the record, whether factual or procedural, be supported by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears. (Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 970; Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 745.) Not only is the statement of facts unsupported, the lengthy narrative appears to be nothing more than Garcia’s recitation of her position below, all of it skewed to her claimed version of what supposedly occurred. This is a violation of rule 8.204(a)(2)(C), which provides that an appellant’s opening brief shall “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts . . . .” As the leading 6 California appellate practice guide instructs about this: “Before addressing the legal issues, your brief should accurately and fairly state the critical facts (including the evidence), free of bias; and likewise as to the applicable law. [Citation.] [¶] Misstatements, misrepresentations, and/or material omissions of the relevant facts or law can instantly ‘undo’ and otherwise effective brief, waiving issues and arguments; it will certainly cast doubt on your credibility, may draw sanctions [citation], and may well cause you to lose the case.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2025) (Eisenberg) ¶ 9:27, italics omitted.) Such summary is missing here. Garcia’s recitation of “facts” also ignores the precept that all evidence must be viewed most favorably to the City and in support of the judgment. (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925–926; Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) This precept is equally applicable here, where the trial court issued a statement of decision: “Where [a] statement of decision sets forth the factual and legal basis for the decision, any conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved in support of the determination of the trial court decision.” (In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 351, 358.) Garcia’s brief has no argument headings, its only argument a one-page, one-paragraph narrative at the end of her brief—an argument that cites nothing in support. Again, Eisenberg is apt, who, addressing the subject of argument in the “discussion” section of an appellant’s opening brief, says this: “[9:148] Discussion: The discussion portion of the brief sets forth the applicable law, applies the law to the facts of the case, and argues for the desired disposition. Your arguments should be thoughtfully developed with sound reasons for the holding you advocate. [¶] . . .[¶]

7 “. . . [9:150] Use of headings: [California Rules of Court, rule] 8.204(a)(1)(B) requires each ‘point’ in a brief to appear ‘under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point . . . .’ Thus, each issue should be addressed independently under a separate heading in the discussion section (¶ 9:91). Failure to do so may result in a waiver of the argument. (See . . . Provost v. Regents of Univ. of Calif. (2011) 201 Cal[.App.]4th 1289, 1294 ‘we do not consider all of the loose and disparate arguments that are not clearly set out in a heading and supported by reasoned legal argument’; Roe v. McDonald’s Corp. (2005) 129 Cal[.App.]4th 1107, 1114 [‘there is no separate argument heading or analysis of the issues. That alone is grounds to deem the argument waived’].)” (Eisenberg, supra, ¶¶ 9:148 to 9:150.) As our Supreme Court explained: “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] . . . .‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court. “[I]f any matters could have been presented to the court below which would have authorized the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were presented.” ’ [Citation.] . . . .’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609, fn. omitted.) In any event, Garcia has not demonstrated any error: the trial court was right, beginning with its findings mandating distribution of surplus funds following a non-judicial foreclosure. The Trial Court Was Right Civil Code section 2924k (section 2924k) provides that surplus funds shall be distributed in this order: (1) “the costs and expenses of exercising 8 the power of sale and of sale”; (2) “the payment of the obligations secured by the deed of trust”; (3) “the outstanding balance of obligations secured by any junior liens or encumbrances in the order of their priority”; and (4) “the trustor or the trustor’s successor in interest. . . .” (Civ. Code, § 2924k, subd. (a)(1)–(4).) After the trustee has been awarded its fees and costs, and the foreclosing lender has been paid the amount due on its lien, section 2924k, subdivision (a) requires the clerk of the court to disburse the remaining proceeds “[t]o satisfy the outstanding balance of obligations secured by any junior liens or encumbrances in the order of their priority.” (Civ. Code, § 2924k, subd. (a)(3); see Caito v. United California Bank (1978) 20 Cal.3d 694, 701; Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp. v. Reed (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1317.) In short, the lien executed and recorded first will receive priority of repayment first. At trial Garcia introduced no evidence of a lien or a priority claim. And nothing in the record on the appeal suggests Garcia enjoys priority to the surplus funds over the City. Indeed, the trial court found that “CCSF maintains a priority right to the Surplus Funds,” and that as “the defaulted borrower and trustor under the foreclosed Bank of America Deed of Trust, Ms. Garcia enjoys last priority to any funds.” During Garcia’s case, she had admitted a document titled, “Discharge of Debtor and Final Decree” filed by the United States Bankruptcy Court. And running through Garcia’s brief is reference to this discharge in bankruptcy. But this is not only irrelevant on appeal, it did not extinguish the City’s lien or its priority to the surplus funds. The order of discharge provides that “[t]his order means that no one may make any attempt to collect a discharged debt from the debtors personally.” As the trial court 9 found, the order is not applicable here because the City is not attempting to collect a discharged debt, but rather, pursuing its claim to the surplus funds following a foreclosure sale. Moreover, the order of discharge provides that, “[h]owever, a creditor with a lien may enforce a claim against the debtors’ property subject to that lien. . . . For example, a creditor may have the right to foreclose a home mortgage.” This describes what happened here: Bank of America, a creditor with a lien, foreclosed on Garcia’s home mortgage, and the City enforced its lien. Again, Garcia presents nothing to the contrary. Finally, Garcia’s brief makes several references to a claimed violation of the Information Practices Act (Civ. Code, § 1798 et seq.), apparently based on some posting of social security information. As the City described what occurred: “Four days before trial Ms. Garcia submitted a filing titled, ‘Entry of Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction Relief & Violation of CA Civil Code 1798.85 Damages.’ The matter related to the purported public release of Ms. Garcia’s social security number on the trial court’s register of actions. The trial court ordered the redaction of Ms. Garcia’s social security number. [Citation.] The trial court denied monetary damages. [Citation.]” Whatever Garcia’s concerns about the posting of her private information on the trial court’s website, the issue has not been properly raised on appeal and is not part of the trial court judgment. We issued this opinion as a tentative opinion, Garcia requested oral argument, and she appeared, presenting her position at some length―indeed over her originally allotted time. However impassioned her presentation, Garcia demonstrated no error by the trial court.

10 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. In the interest of justice, each side shall bear its costs on appeal.

11 RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.

We concur.

MILLER, J.

DESAUTELS, J.

(A174444)