Doe v. David CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 9/22/26 Doe v. David CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JANE DOE, B341119 consolidated with B345361 Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20STCV37498) ALKIVIADES DAVID, Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from judgments and an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Christopher K. Lui, Judge. Affirmed. Bohm Wildish & Matsen, James G. Bohm and Cecilia Preciado for Defendant and Appellant. Dordick Law Corporation, Gary A. Dordick, John M. Upton, Dustin Z. Moaven; Livingston•Bakhtiar and Ebby S. Bakhtiar for Plaintiff and Respondent. ________________________ INTRODUCTION Jane Doe sued businessman Alkiviades David, alleging that he raped her during her employment with his companies and then fired her. A few years into the litigation, David, who resided in Greece, got rid of his trial counsel and proceeded to represent himself with a lawyer in Greece acting as his agent for litigation- related communications. When the trial court relieved David’s trial counsel, both the Greek lawyer and David were served with documents identifying the trial date. David thereafter sat for his remote deposition, but failed to respond to requests for admission (RFAs), failed to provide further medical information to support his Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) request for accommodations as ordered by the court, refused to meet and confer concerning pretrial documents, and skipped appearing at the trial. Based on Doe’s trial evidence, the court granted a directed verdict in her favor on claims for sexual battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict of $100 million in noneconomic compensatory damages and, upon finding David had acted with malice, oppression, or fraud, $800 million in punitive damages. David filed a motion to vacate the judgment and for a new trial, arguing that he did not receive notice of the trial and the damages awards “shock[ed] the conscience.” The court found David had had actual notice of the trial but agreed the damages awards were excessive. The court conditionally granted a new trial on damages unless Doe accepted reduced compensatory damages in the amount of $10 million and punitive damages in the amount of $80 million. Doe accepted the reduction.

2 David now argues Code of Civil Procedure1 section 594 prohibited the court from proceeding with trial in his absence without 15 days’ notice of the continued trial date. He also argues that he did not receive notice of the motion to deem the RFAs admitted and that the court failed to rule on his ADA accommodation requests. David further argues that the reduced compensatory and punitive damages awards remain excessive or are otherwise infirm. Most of the issues David complains about are of his own making. The record demonstrates that after David fired his trial counsel, he remained informed about key events in the litigation and had actual notice of both the trial date and Doe’s motion to have the RFAs deemed admitted, but chose not to participate or hire counsel to represent him. Further, contrary to David’s contention, the court did not “fail” to rule on his ADA accommodation requests; it exercised its discretion to request medical information supporting David’s final request, which David never provided. We also see no merit in David’s arguments concerning the damages awards. We therefore affirm.2 BACKGROUND We set forth only those portions of the record pertinent to the issues David raises on appeal.

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 Doe filed a motion to dismiss David’s appeal pursuant to the disentitlement doctrine, claiming he has defied discovery regarding his assets while this appeal is pending. We deny that motion and consider David’s appeal on the merits.

3 A. The Operative Complaint In October 2021, Doe filed the operative first amended complaint against David and some of his companies with whom she had been employed, alleging sexual battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other claims. Doe alleged that on different occasions between August 2016 and April 2019, David attempted to kiss Doe, forced her to help him masturbate, and violently raped her. Doe sought economic and noneconomic compensatory damages and punitive damages. B. Pre-trial Litigation While Counsel Represents David 1. The Court Schedules Trial Until February 13, 2024, the law firm of Glaser Weil Fink Howard Jordan & Shapiro LLP (Glaser Weil) represented David and actively participated in the litigation. While Glaser Weil represented David, the court scheduled the trial for August 7, 2023, and later continued the trial date to May 28, 2024. 2. Discovery and Accommodation Requests a. Depositions and Accommodation Requests Doe and David filed dueling motions to compel the other’s deposition. In June 2023, David submitted an ADA accommodation request (the first ADA request) by which he sought accommodations for his deposition and for trial. On August 23, 2023, the court heard the motion to compel David’s deposition and considered the first ADA request. The request included two parts: (1) that David’s deposition occur via written questions or be split into at least two sessions, and (2) that the court allow David to take breaks or appear remotely for trial and advise the jury of David’s disability. The court stated it was inclined to deny the written questions but noted 4 frequent breaks seemed appropriate. But the court observed that Doe’s counsel had not yet received information about the first ADA request or had an opportunity to review the medical record supporting the request. David’s counsel argued the court should permit David to finish a course of treatment before sitting for his deposition and that counsel had additional information that he wanted to submit to the court for its consideration. The court therefore agreed that David would file a new or amended ADA request. On August 28, 2023, the defense submitted a second ADA request, which the court considered at a September 25, 2023 hearing. The court again stated it was inclined towards requiring breaks and multiple deposition sessions but not towards a deposition via written questions. The court noted that the second ADA request was unclear with respect to what trial accommodations David sought. David’s counsel stated David was in Greece and that counsel had spoken with David’s family’s Greek attorney (later identified as Themis Sofos) who had relayed that David was undergoing diagnostic tests in Greece. David’s counsel argued David’s deposition should be postponed for three months to allow him to undergo treatment and that David should not be in the courtroom during trial. The court implicitly granted part of David’s accommodation request by continuing the hearing to January 5, 2024 (thereby preventing David’s deposition from occurring until the court ruled). It also stated that because the treatment might change David’s condition or his needs, a further hearing was necessary before it could rule on the remainder of his accommodation requests.

5 b. David Moves to Compel Doe to Provide Information About Her Medical Providers During discovery, David sought information about Doe’s medical providers from whom she received treatment for any injuries arising from David’s conduct. Those providers included Dr. Craig Snyder, her treating psychologist. In her responses, Doe identified Planned Parenthood (but not Snyder) and objected to providing further information. In an August 9, 2023 meet and confer email, Doe’s counsel argued additional discovery was unnecessary because “[a]t this time, [Doe] will not be calling any treating physicians in connection with her emotional/psychological injuries.” David moved to compel further responses to these interrogatories, which the court granted in large part on September 13, 2023. These supplemental interrogatory responses are not in the record, but it appears they were provided as David’s February 2024 informal discovery conference statement (filed by Glaser Weil) makes no mention that the further responses remain outstanding. 3. David Fires Glaser Weil By a December 18, 2023 email from David to Glaser Weil, David fired the firm for not advocating for him in the manner he wanted. He authorized Sofos to contact Glaser Weil about David’s case files and explained where the files should be sent. As explained post, Glaser Weil remained David’s counsel for approximately two more months before it was relieved.

6 4. Continued Litigation Concerning Discovery and Accommodation Requests (December 2023 to January 2024) In late December 2023, David filed a third ADA request, seeking to further delay his deposition to permit continued treatment. At the continued January 5, 2024 hearing, Glaser Weil advised the court that it had learned from Sofos that David was undergoing treatment in Greece and required more time for his treatment to take effect before David was deposed. The court observed that it had previously “give[n David] accommodations for the treatment.” However, the third ADA request did not include a “medical prognosis, diagnosis, or treatment update,” which the court required “in order to say that the deposition should be held off until April.” The court scheduled a continued hearing for February 13, 2024. Neither Glaser Weil, David, nor anyone acting on David’s behalf thereafter provided any of the requested medical information to the court substantiating a further need to continue David’s deposition.3 5. Glaser Weil Moves to Be Relieved as David’s Counsel On January 16, 2024, Glaser Weil moved to be relieved as David’s counsel. The motion listed the May 28, 2024 trial date and was served on Sofos by mail and email and on David through his own email address (which the record establishes David used 3 During this hearing, Doe inquired whether David’s claimed disability would be put on as part of David’s defense. Glaser Weil represented that it would provide that information at the February 13, 2024 hearing, but there is no record of Glaser Weil’s answer.

7 during the litigation). The motion informed David that he should appear at future hearings, that the court needed to know how to contact him, and that his failure to keep the court and other parties apprised of his current contact information could adversely affect his interests. In an accompanying declaration served in the same manner, Glasier Weil stated, “David was served both by email and care-of his counsel in Greece. . . . David’s Greek counsel has confirmed that . . . David can be served by email in connection with the service of all case related documents.”4 The declaration listed upcoming proceedings, including trial on May 28, 2024. It further stated, “David has retained separate counsel who is privy to the developments in this case.” 6. Continued Litigation Concerning Discovery and Accommodation Requests (February 2024) On February 5, 2024, Glaser Weil filed a status report concerning David’s treatment, stating it had been unable to obtain information about David’s progress. On February 8, 2024, Doe served RFAs on David via Glaser Weil (who at that point was still David’s counsel of record).

4 At a February 9, 2024 hearing, Glaser Weil stated that this representation about service to David’s email was only intended to mean that Glaser Weil could serve David by email. The court determined that David could be served via mail to Sofos in Greece with a follow-up notice by email until Glaser Weil could better advise on the appropriate method of service.

8 7. The Court Relieves Glaser Weil and David Is Again Notified of the Trial Date On February 9, 2024, the court granted Glaser Weil’s motion to be relieved as counsel, which would take effect upon the firm’s filing of a proof of service of the court’s order. At the hearing, a Glaser Weil attorney stated, “To my knowledge, there’s not anyone who’s immediately intending to substitute in.” The firm represented it would attempt to get additional information. On February 13, 2024, Doe’s counsel and Glaser Weil returned to court. Glaser Weil had been unable to obtain more information. The court concluded that it would proceed with the understanding that David would represent himself and the entity defendants would be in default. Doe’s counsel noted she had served discovery and a deposition notice on David prior to the court granting Glaser Weil’s motion to be relieved and expected Glaser Weil would send that discovery to David. Glaser Weil agreed to contact Sofos “who does represent . . . David at least for certain things[ to] try to get answers to the questions of how . . . David and that counsel want to proceed.” Later that day, Glaser Weil filed and served notice of the court’s order granting their motion to be relieved as counsel on Sofos by email and mail and on David via his email. The order advised David that Glaser Weil no longer represented him, identified David’s current mailing address in Greece, which was care of Sofos, stated formal service on David must be made at that address, and stated the trial was scheduled to begin on May 28, 2024. The order also advised David that as a self- represented litigant, he was responsible for his case, his failure to appear at hearings or comply with court rules could cause him to 9 lose his case, and that it was his duty to keep the court informed of his current address. C. Pre-trial Litigation While David Proceeds In Propria Persona For some time thereafter, David continued to participate in the litigation with Sofos’s assistance. On March 1, 2024, Doe took David’s remote deposition, at which Sofos appeared as an observer and “[f]or [d]efendants.” At deposition, David demonstrated his ability to access the courts and information about litigation. He stated that the day before, he had filed a federal district court case involving Doe’s counsel and against a “syndicate” of lawyers and judges who were colluding against him. David claimed the lawsuit was prepared by, among others, three lawyers in Los Angeles and two lawyers in Texas. On March 12, 2024, Doe moved to have the RFAs that she served on February 8, 2024 deemed admitted as David had provided no response. Doe served the motion on David via Sofos’s email. On May 6, 2024, the day before the hearing on Doe’s motion, David sent several text messages to Doe’s attorney, including addressing him with various slurs and saying, “I’m going to fuck you” and “You will regret ever messing with me.” On May 7, 2024, Glaser Weil attended the hearing to deem the RFAs admitted. The firm stated, “We were asked very recently to come back into the case,” and that they expected to file an appearance within a week. They requested (and Doe opposed) that the court adjourn the hearing for a week. The court declined to continue the hearing but noted Glaser Weil could file a motion for relief after David reengaged the firm.

10 The court granted Doe’s motion to deem the RFAs admitted. Doe served a notice of the court’s ruling on David by email to Sofos. The notice included the May 28, 2024 trial date. That same day, Doe’s counsel emailed Sofos to inform David that they wanted to meet and confer concerning joint trial documents and advised of the upcoming final status conference. On May 8, 2024, Doe served on David (via Sofos’s email) a notice to appear at trial and produce documents, which included documents relevant to David’s financial condition. After receiving no response concerning joint trial documents, Doe also filed and served David (via Sofos’s email) with her individual trial documents, each of which identified the trial date. On May 14, 2024, Doe’s counsel declared he had made several attempts to reach Sofos to discuss the trial documents. The declaration also stated that that morning, David had sent multiple text messages to Doe’s counsel. During the exchange, Doe’s counsel stated, “Please don’t text me again. Please sign the pre[]trial documents. Your failure to complete the pre[]trial documents may result in the court sanctioning you.” David responded, “Fuck off idiot,” and then sent approximately 60 more expletive-laden text messages to counsel with demeaning and derogatory insults and threats. Doe served the declaration on David via an email to Sofos. In a May 18, 2024 email to Sofos, Glaser Weil discussed steps that David needed to take to reengage the firm. Glaser Weil stated, “Based on the [j]udge’s demeanor during the May 15 hearing [suggesting that Glaser Weil came before the court a second time after being relieved], we believe that the situation has greatly deteriorated, and that it has become increasingly difficult (if not impossible) for us to take the steps that we feel 11 are necessary to put on an adequate defense of [David] in this case.” Glaser Weil further stated that if it was reengaged, it would “attempt to get a necessary trial continuance which would hopefully permit us with some opportunity to develop a defense at the trial of this matter.” David, acting in propria persona, later attached this email to his new trial motion, thereby confirming it had been provided to him. On May 24, 2024, the court trailed the trial to May 31, 2024. On May 31 and again on June 11, 2024, the court again trailed the trial. In each instance, the court observed that there was no appearance for David or any communication why there were no appearances for him. The court scheduled trial for June 13, 2024. On June 6 and 10, 2024, Doe’s counsel spoke by telephone with Sofos concerning the upcoming trial. Sofos acknowledged that he was aware of the trial date and Doe’s inability to continue it. On June 11, 2024, Doe’s counsel also emailed Sofos to inform him that the trial had been trailed to June 13, 2024. On June 12, 2024, Doe filed and served (via email to Sofos) designations from David’s deposition to be used at trial. D. Trial The court conducted jury selection on June 13, 2024. On June 14, 2024, prior to any testimony, Doe filed amended witness and exhibit lists. The witness list identified Snyder, a “[t]reating [p]hysician,” for the first time. The lists were served on David via an email to Sofos. The record contains no trial transcripts. According to the court’s June 14, 2024 minute order, Doe, Snyder, and another witness testified. The court marked (for identification only) portions of complaints by four other plaintiffs against David for 12 sexual torts and the resulting special verdicts in each trial. Those verdicts included an April 2019 $8 million punitive damages award, an October 2019 punitive damages award of over $4.3 million, a December 2019 $50 million punitive damages award, and a December 2023 $5.5 million punitive damages award. Doe also played excerpts of David’s deposition for the jury. One of those excerpts included David’s testimony that his reference to a “rape room” was a joke. After the presentation of evidence, Doe moved for a directed verdict on her causes of action for sexual battery and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted the motion and dismissed Doe’s remaining causes of action without prejudice. In granting the directed verdict, the court found the evidence established 35 facts and instructed the jury to accept them as true. These included that David attempted to kiss Doe, raped her, pinned her against a wall and covered her mouth with his hands while he raped her; raped Elizabeth Taylor (a former account executive) and a woman named Mahim Khan; fired female employees (including Doe and Chastity Jones) after they refused to engage in sexual activity with him; had sexual relations with Jones against her will; grabbed the throat of an employee named Lauren Reeves, “shoved her chair into a wall, and told her that he needed to buy supplies for his ‘rape room’ ”; wrote an online article where he intentionally revealed Doe’s name with the intent to harass and intimidate her; acted with reckless disregard of the probability that Doe would suffer emotional distress due to David’s unsolicited sexual activity; engaged in sexual misconduct with Doe with the intent to cause injury and with a willful and knowing disregard of Doe’s rights 13 and safety; disregarded the rights of Doe, Taylor, Khan, and Jones “when he forced [each of them] to engage in unwanted . . . sexual activity”; and “knew that forcing his then-employee, . . . Doe, into having unwanted sexual intercourse with him was despicable conduct.” The facts also included that Doe never consented to a sexual relationship with David, “resisted all of . . . David’s attempts to have sexual intercourse, including but not limited to repeatedly yelling ‘No!’ and expressly telling . . . David to ‘S[top],’ ” and that David’s conduct “was a substantial factor in causing . . . Doe’s severe emotional distress.” Finally, the facts included that “[i]n April 2019, a California jury ordered . . . [David] and at least one of his businesses to pay $11[ million] in punitive and compensatory damages for . . . sexual battery against . . . Jones,” and “[w]hile . . . David was on the stand during trial against . . . Jones, he told . . . Jones to ‘take my card. . . . Go and buy whatever you want . . . . It’s a Black Amex from Switzerland, if you would like, madam? Is that interesting? . . . [O]h fuck it, just enter a default judgment.’ ” On June 15, 2024, Doe served amended jury instructions and special verdict forms on David via an email to Sofos. At trial, the court instructed the jury that David’s liability had already been established and that the jury was to determine the amount of compensatory damages, whether Doe was entitled to punitive damages, and the amount of punitive damages, if any. The court instructed the jury that Doe sought noneconomic damages, including past and future pain and suffering. As to punitive damages, the court instructed the jury pursuant to CACI No. 3940. The given instruction differed from 14 the pattern instruction in that instead of advising the jurors they were to decide how much was necessary to punish David in light of his financial resources, the court instructed, “In view of . . . David’s failure to produce documentation regarding his financial condition, what amount is necessary to punish and discourage future wrongful conduct?” The given instruction did not include bracketed optional language in CACI No. 3940 that the jury could not use punitive damages to punish David for the impact of his “alleged misconduct on persons other than” Doe. (Ibid.) During deliberations, the jury asked (1) what their options were as to their own anonymity, (2) the amounts of previous awards against David, separately identifying compensatory and punitive damages, (3) whether David was charged with criminal charges or faced jail time, and (4) “Is the ‘[10] times’ amount for punitive statutorily based or just a suggestion?” The court responded: (1) The jurors’ names would be sealed; (2) “The testimony during trial about the previous awards is the only information available to you. No further evidence or information can be provided once the case has been submitted to the jury for deliberations”; (3) “There was no evidence at trial on this issue, and you should not consider it during your deliberations”; and (4) “Arguments of counsel are not evidence of damages. Instruction [CACI N]o. 3940 provides you with the instruction on how to decide whether to award punitive damages, and if so, how to determine the amount.” On June 17, 2024, the jury returned a special verdict in which it (1) found Doe suffered $100 million in past and future noneconomic damages; (2) found David engaged in conduct with malice, oppression, or fraud; and (3) awarded $800 million in punitive damages.

15 On June 18, 2024, Doe served a proposed judgment on David via Sofos’s mail and email addresses. On July 5, 2024, the court entered judgment in Doe’s favor and against David in the amount of $900 million. The clerk served notice of entry of the order on Doe and the court ordered Doe to give notice. On July 16 and 17, 2024, Doe filed and served a notice of the notice of entry of judgment and notice of judgment on special verdict, respectively, by mail to Sofos in Greece. E. Post-judgment Proceedings and Entry of an Amended Judgment 1. David Challenges the Judgment On July 8, 2024, David filed in propria persona a motion to set aside and vacate the judgment pursuant to section 663, for a new trial pursuant to section 659, and “[o]bjections” to the trial. (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) He argued that, in violation of his due process, the trial proceeded without notice to him and that he was thereby deprived of the opportunity to participate and cross-examine witnesses. David also claimed he “has been awaiting instructions on how to proceed in the litigation, and on May 15[], 2024, was suddenly presented with new facts via email, indicating an upcoming trial, without any dates stated.” He also argued that the court failed to make any ADA accommodation for him during the case. He argued that the $900 million judgment against him (which he claimed to have learned about through media) was a miscarriage of justice, shocked the conscience, and should be set aside. In opposition, Doe argued David had received ample actual and constructive notice of the trial and that there were no errors 16 or irregularities that caused substantial prejudice to David. Doe also argued that the damages award was not excessive. On September 16, 2024, David filed a reply in propria persona. That day, new counsel substituted in for David and presented argument at the hearing on David’s motion. David telephonically appeared for a portion of the hearing. The court shared its view that David’s only argument that had any merit was the issue of excessive damages. Following argument, the court took the matter under submission. 2. Ruling On September 17, 2024, the court conditionally granted a new trial limited to damages unless Doe accepted a remittitur reducing compensatory damages from $100 million to $10 million and punitive damages from $800 million to $80 million. It found the jury’s damages award “ ‘shocks the conscience and virtually compels the conclusion the award is attributable to passion or prejudice.’ ” The court found “the evidence supports a finding of $10 million in compensatory damages” and that $80 million in punitive damages “would preserve the jury’s 8-to-1 punitive damages ratio, which is within the constitutionally acceptable limits.” The court otherwise denied David’s motion. It found, “It cannot reasonably be disputed that [David] had actual notice of the impending trial, and did not take any steps to request a continuance or arrange for participation in the trial.” (Fn. omitted.) As to David’s ADA arguments, the court noted that David’s former counsel was relieved before David provided a complete record of his medical condition and treatment progress to the court. It also stated, “[David] did not pursue a ruling on ADA accommodations regarding his deposition before sitting for 17 the deposition, and did not seek to postpone the deposition so that he could provide the [c]ourt with a full medical record and final proposal for accommodations so that the issue could be decided before the deposition. Since the parties . . . scheduled and completed [David]’s deposition without any involvement by the [c]ourt, the ADA accommodation request was waived with regard to the deposition. Since [David] did not appear at or otherwise participate in the trial, any request for accommodations at trial was moot. [¶] At any rate, a failure to accommodate under ADA does not constitute a basis for a new trial under . . . [section] 657. Moreover, [David] has not presented any evidence of how any disability prevented him from having a trial that comported with due process.” 3. The Court Enters an Amended Judgment On September 25, 2024, Doe accepted the remittitur of damages. In light of the acceptance, the court denied David’s motion to set aside and vacate the judgment. On December 23, 2024, the court entered an amended judgment reflecting the reduction of damages. David filed timely notices of appeal from the July 5, 2024 judgment, the September 17, 2024 order, and the December 23, 2024 amended judgment. DISCUSSION David makes three categories of appellate challenges. The first concerns allegedly deficient notice. David contends that the trial proceedings violated section 594, subdivision (a) and his due process rights because he did not have 15 days’ actual notice of the continued trial date. He also argues that granting Doe’s 18 motion to deem the RFAs admitted occurred without valid service of the motion on him and violated his due process. The second category concerns his ADA requests. David contends we must reverse the judgment because the trial court’s purported failure to rule on his accommodation requests was structural error. The final category challenges the trial court’s reduced compensatory and punitive damages awards. David argues those awards were unconstitutional for lack of fair notice and excessive such that the awards shock the conscience, result from passion or prejudice, and violate due process. David also argues the punitive damages award was not based on evidence of his financial condition, unfairly punished him for harm to third parties, and that the court failed to instruct the jury that it needed to consider his financial condition in awarding punitive damages. A. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Section 594 or Due Process in Proceeding to Trial Without David or Deeming the RFAs Admitted 1. General Legal Principles “The due process clauses of the United States and California Constitutions require that a party be given reasonable notice of a judicial proceeding.” (In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 54.) This notice requirement is codified in section 594, subdivision (a), which states that a party may proceed in the absence of an adverse party with a trial that involves issues of fact upon proof “that the adverse party has had 15 days’ notice of such trial.” Section 594, subdivision (a) applies only to the original trial date and not to subsequent continued dates. (In re Phillip F.

19 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 250, 257; People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. v. Smith (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 113, 126- 127 (Smith).) “[R]equir[ing] repeated 15 days’ notice at every continuance before the taking of evidence” “would cripple court efficiency,” and “[n]o continuance of fewer than 15 days would be possible.” (Smith, supra, at p. 129; see Equinix LLC v. County of Los Angeles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1108, 1116 [“ ‘ “It is blackletter law that the Constitution and statutes must receive practical, common sense construction [citation] and that an interpretation which would lead to an unreasonable result or absurdity must be avoided” ’ ”].) Further, a party who has actual notice of the setting of a trial date has a duty to remain informed of subsequent proceedings, including continued trial dates. (Smith, supra, at p. 129; City etc. of San Francisco v. Carraro (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 509, 518.) 2. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Proceeding to Trial David disagrees with In re Phillip F. and Smith and argues that section 594 does require notice of continued trial dates. In support, he cites Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21 Cal.4th 958. Au- Yang did not involve a continued trial date but an advanced trial date. (Id. at p. 962.) In distinguishing the matter before it from Smith and concluding section 594 requires notice when a trial is advanced, the Supreme Court explained “the significant distinction between” continuances and advances (Au-Yang, at p. 964): “When a trial, previously set for one date, is continued to a later date, the absent party’s opportunities to plan and prepare for trial and to be present at trial are unlikely to be harmed, for it will have completed its preparations by the previously scheduled date. This is true even if the party is unaware of the continuance, for in that case it will have completed its 20 preparations by the original trial date and simply by appearing at that time it will learn of the new time for trial. But if, as in this case, a trial date is advanced, failure to give 15 days’ notice of the new trial date is likely to result in prejudice. A party that receives . . . no notice of the new trial date may discover that the court has already conducted a trial and entered judgment against it.” (Id. at p. 965, italics omitted.) David also argues In re Phillip F. and Smith are outliers and that the following cases held that section 594 requires 15 days’ notice (or, based on earlier versions of section 594, 5 days’ notice) of continued trial dates to the absent parties: Heidary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, Wilson v. Goldman (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 573, Bird v. McGuire (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 702, Simon v. Tomasini (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 115, and Hurley v. Lake County (1931) 113 Cal.App. 291. We are not persuaded. Bird v. McGuire does not stand for the proposition David claims. It instead involved a failure of fair notice of any trial date (including the original trial date). (Bird v. McGuire, at p. 708.) The other cases are also factually distinguishable—none have a fact pattern like the one here, where David remained apprised of litigation events and chose not to participate. But even if these cases can be read to require notice of continued trial dates in every instance, In re Phillip F. and Smith reflect the better approach by both assuring proper notice of the initial trial date and not crippling court calendar management by preventing continuances of less than 15 days. (See Fairbank et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group 2025) § 1:341.11 [“the underlying policy of providing at least 15 days’ notice for final trial preparation has been satisfied when a properly noticed initial trial date is continued”].)

21 The trial court here found, “It cannot reasonably be disputed that [David] had actual notice of the impending trial.” Whether a party has actual notice is a question of fact (see Yuba City Unified School Dist. v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 648, 655), for which we review the record for substantial evidence (Vasquez v. LBS Financial Credit Union (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 97, 109). “Under this deferential standard of review, . . . we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) Even assuming arguendo that David did not have knowledge of the trial date before Glaser Weil was relieved as his counsel, substantial evidence establishes that he had actual notice of the May 28, 2024 trial date well in advance of the trial. As part of its motion to be relieved as counsel, Glaser Weil sent to David’s own (and active) email address three documents, each of which identified the May 28, 2024 trial date. Despite having such notice, David did not appear in court on May 28, 2024 or thereafter communicate with the court, suggesting he did not intend to appear at trial. The record indicates that after the court relieved Glaser Weil, David stayed informed about litigation activities. Although Doe’s counsel primarily communicated with Sofos by telephone and email, the record suggests this was an effective way to reach David. This is how Glaser Weil communicated with David before it was relieved and even after when discussing its possible reengagement. And 17 days after Glaser Weil was relieved, Doe coordinated David’s deposition with Sofos appearing as an observer on David’s behalf, from which the trial court could reasonably infer that Sofos was 22 responsive to telephone calls and/or emails and remained a conduit to David of litigation communications. Indeed, in connection with Doe’s opposition to the new trial motion, Doe submitted declarations from two of her attorneys establishing that prior to trial, they had spoken with Sofos by telephone and email, advised him of at least two continued trial dates, including the final date of June 13, 2024. During one such telephone conversation, Sofos confirmed he was aware of a continued trial date. To the extent David relied on information from Sofos to keep him aware of litigation activities, there is no evidence that Sofos failed to perform his duty. The timing of David’s vulgar texts to opposing counsel, Doe’s counsel’s statement in those texts urging David to sign the pretrial documents, Glaser Weil’s appearance at two hearings in May 2024 after they had been relieved, and David’s receipt of the May 18, 2024 email from Glaser Weil concerning its possible reengagement and the need to seek a continuance to prepare an adequate defense, further buttress David’s awareness of the occurrences in the litigation, including the trial date. That the trial court thereafter trailed the trial to June (even without 15 days’ notice) is therefore irrelevant for purposes of section 594, subdivision (a). (Smith, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 126-127.) 3. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Deeming the RFAs Admitted David argues the court violated his due process in granting Doe’s motion to deem the RFAs admitted because he did not have notice of the motion. We disagree. The record supports the trial court’s implied finding that David knew of the motion and related hearing. Doe timely served her motion via an email to Sofos, David sent threatening text messages to Doe’s attorney the day 23 before the hearing, and Glaser Weil attended the hearing on the motion and advised the court that the firm had been asked to come back into the case. Moreover, David could have thereafter sought relief through motions practice or objected to the use of the admitted RFAs at trial. He did neither. B. David Has Not Demonstrated Prejudicial Error Relating to His ADA Accommodation Requests 1. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review “It is the policy of the courts of this state to ensure that persons with disabilities have equal and full access to the judicial system.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100(b).) “To accomplish this goal, [California Rules of Court,] rule 1.100 allows ‘ “[p]ersons with disabilities,” ’ . . . to apply for ‘ “[a]ccommodations,” ’ meaning ‘actions that result in court services, programs, or activities being readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities.’ ” (Friends of South Fork Gualala v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1194, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100(a)(1)-(3).) “Requests for accommodations must include a description of the accommodation sought, along with a statement of the medical condition that necessitates the accommodation. The court, in its discretion, may require the applicant to provide additional information about the medical condition.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100(c)(2).) A court may deny a request for accommodation for only one of three reasons: “(1) The applicant has failed to satisfy the requirements of this rule; [¶] (2) The requested accommodation would create an undue financial or administrative burden on the court; or [¶] (3) The requested accommodation would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or 24 activity.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100(f)(1)-(3).) If the court denies an accommodation request “in whole or in part, the response must be in writing.” (Id., rule 1.100(e)(2).) “The applicable standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion.” (Friends of South Fork Gualala v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1195.) Under this standard, “ ‘the “trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” [Citation.] A “court abuses its discretion ‘ “where no reasonable basis for the action is shown.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) 2. Analysis David argues the trial court “failed” to rule on his accommodation requests. Citing Biscaro v. Stern (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 702, David further argues that this purported failure to rule is structural error that does not require a showing of prejudice for reversal. In Biscaro, the appellant suffered from permanent cognitive disabilities due to a frontal lobe injury, which affected his ability to remember, reason, and communicate. (Biscaro v. Stern, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 706.) At an ex parte hearing on the respondent’s request for a restraining order, the appellant asked the court for a neuropsychologist’s assistance in the courtroom. (Id. at p. 705.) The court denied the ex parte application on the basis that it should proceed as a noticed motion, stated it would rule on the appellant’s accommodation request before the rescheduled hearing, but then never did rule on the request. (Ibid.) The appellant did not appear at the restraining order hearing, and the court granted the order. (Id.

25 at pp. 705, 706.) The appellate court concluded the trial court’s failure to rule on the accommodation request was structural error: “[I]f the record before us led us to conclude that [the] appellant had failed to satisfy the requirements of the rule and that his accommodation should have been denied as a matter of law, the trial court’s failure to rule might be considered harmless” (id. at p. 708), but none of the three reasons to deny the accommodation request applied (id. at p. 710). “[B]ecause an accommodation’s purpose is to help a party meaningfully participate,” the trial court’s failure to rule on the request left the appellate court “unable to assess meaningfully what impact the grant of accommodation would have had on the proceedings and concluded, therefore, the error was structural without a showing of prejudice.” (Ibid.) Unlike Biscaro, the trial court here did not fail to rule on David’s accommodation requests. As the hearing on David’s first accommodation request made clear, an immediate ruling on that request would have been premature, improper, and contrary to the defense’s wishes. Doe had to be “given notice and an opportunity to view the medical records and other material on which [David] relies” in making his accommodation request. (Vesco v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 275, 280.) But at the time of the August 23, 2023 hearing, David had not provided Doe’s counsel with such information. Further, David’s counsel represented, “we have developed some . . . additional information which I think the court should consider. . . . [A]nd I’d like to be able to submit that to the court as well.” During the hearing, defense counsel also recharacterized the request: “It’s more fundamental of a question of timing so that . . . David has the opportunity to complete a treatment protocol that he has begun.”

26 The court therefore agreed to permit David to file a new or amended ADA accommodation request and continued the hearing to September 25, 2023. The second accommodation request sought to continue David’s deposition for approximately three months to permit him to undergo treatment and, as explained by David’s counsel during the September 25, 2023 hearing, to allow David not to be in the courtroom during trial. The court implicitly granted part of David’s accommodation request in continuing the hearing to January 5, 2024, and pragmatically recognized that because the treatment might change David’s condition or his needs, a further hearing was necessary before it could rule on the remainder of his accommodation requests. This, again, is not a “failure” to rule on David’s accommodation request. The third accommodation request, submitted in December 2023, asked the court to further delay David’s deposition to April 2024 to allow for continued treatment. The court indicated the request failed to provide sufficient medical information, continued this hearing for a month, and ordered that David provide a status medical update before it would rule on that request. The court was well within its discretion to require such information. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100(c)(2).) Yet, the record indicates that David never provided any further information, and, thus, David “failed to satisfy the requirements of this rule.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1.100(f)(1).) David argues that the court did not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 1.100(e)(2)’s requirement that the court set forth any accommodation request denial in writing. As discussed above, the court did not deny any of the accommodation requests, implicitly or otherwise. Rather, for good reasons, it continued its 27 determination as to what specific accommodations should be provided at David’s deposition and at trial and whether to continue David’s deposition for another four months. David thereafter failed to provide the required information or pursue the issue with the court. That David fired his counsel and chose to proceed as a self- represented litigant does not excuse his failure to provide the additional required information. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985 [stating self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys].) “[W]hen a litigant accepts the risks of proceeding without counsel, he or she is stuck with the outcome, and has no greater opportunity to cast off an unfavorable judgment than he or she would if represented by counsel.” (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267.) C. David’s Damages Arguments Are Unpersuasive 1. David’s Compensatory Damages Arguments a. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review “ ‘The amount of damages is a fact question, first committed to the discretion of the jury and next to the discretion of the trial judge on a motion for new trial. They see and hear the witnesses and frequently . . . see the injury and the impairment that has resulted therefrom. As a result, all presumptions are in favor of the decision of the trial court [citation]. The power of the appellate court differs materially from that of the trial court in passing on this question. An appellate court can interfere on the ground that the judgment is excessive only on the ground that the verdict is so large that, at first blush, it shocks the conscience and suggests passion, 28 prejudice or corruption on the part of the jury.’ ” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 299, quoting Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1961) 56 Cal.2d 498, 506-507.) Section 662.5, subdivision (a)(2) permits the trial court to “issue a conditional order granting the new trial unless the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered consents to the reduction of so much thereof as the court in its independent judgment determines from the evidence to be fair and reasonable.” (Ibid.) “We must affirm the court’s decision if the court states adequate reasons for the decision and substantial evidence supports the decision.” (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655, 688-689.) “[T]he relevant amount for purposes of our review is not the amount awarded by the jury, but the reduced amount ordered by remittitur.” (Id. at p. 689.) b. The Compensatory Damages Award Is Not Excessive David argues the compensatory damages award is so large that it “shocks the conscience” and is unconstitutional. He claims that the jury heard inflammatory evidence of prior judgments against him and “received a misleading jury instruction” identifying “35 ‘established facts’ ” without being told that the facts were deemed admitted. Even assuming these contentions are true and constituted error, in ruling the compensatory damages award was excessive and reducing it from $100 million to $10 million, the trial court alleviated any prejudicial effect of these purported errors. A trial court is presumed to know and follow the law (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1526; see Evid. Code, § 664) and, thus, we presume the court did not consider the purportedly inflammatory 29 evidence or established facts for an improper purpose. David cites nothing in the record suggesting otherwise. David claims $10 million for Doe’s pain and suffering is still too high and shocks the conscience. We cannot review the evidence presented at trial relevant to this issue because there is no reporter’s transcript. As the appellant, it is David’s burden to provide an adequate record on any challenged issue, and his failure to do so requires that the issue be resolved against him. (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.) David attempts to blame Doe and the court for the lack of a court reporter at trial. But the record leaves no doubt that David chose not to participate in the trial, and he cites no authority for the proposition that under such circumstances, he is relieved of his duty to provide an adequate record. Moreover, the court’s ruling conditionally reducing compensatory damages to $10 million identified evidence that supported that figure: “[Doe] . . . testified to a pattern of workplace harassment that culminated in an instance of rape, which is an obviously heinous act causing physical and emotional injuries for which [Doe] should be justly compensated. [Doe]’s therapist, Dr. Craig Snyder, testified to the ongoing serious distress that [Doe] has faced and will continue to face due to conditions he diagnosed: [p]ost [t]raumatic [s]tress [d]isorder and [m]ajor [d]epressive [d]isorder. These are not minor emotional injuries. The [c]ourt found the testimony of [Doe] and her therapist to be credible.” Thus, David has not demonstrated insufficient evidence supports the $10 million figure or that that award is so out of line with reason that it shocks the conscience. David contends the excessiveness of the award is evident when compared against the verdict in Carroll v. Trump (S.D.N.Y.

30 2023) 683 F.Supp.3d 302. We disagree. In that case, the jury awarded $2 million as reasonable compensation for the plaintiff’s pain and suffering caused by the defendant forcibly inserting his fingers into the plaintiff’s vagina. (Id. at p. 327; see also Carroll v. Trump (2d Cir. 2024) 124 F.4th 140, 154 [affirming a total of $4.7 million in compensatory damages for sexual assault and defamation].) “While the appellate court should consider the amounts awarded in prior cases for similar injuries, obviously, each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.” (Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 508.) Without in any way minimizing what occurred in the Carroll case, a jury could reasonably conclude that what David did to his employee Doe was worse and, in any event, “[i]njuries are seldom identical and the amount of pain and suffering involved in similar . . . injuries varies widely.” (Seffert, at p. 508; see Bigler- Engler v. Breg, Inc., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 300 [acknowledging the difficulty in assessing noneconomic damages in part because there is no method available to the trier of fact to objectively evaluate such damages].) c. David Has Not Demonstrated He “Lacked Notice” of Compensatory Damages David claims the compensatory damages award is unconstitutional for lack of notice on two grounds. First, citing Roby v. McKesson Corporation (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, David argues he did not receive notice of the “severity of the penalty” he would face with respect to the compensatory damages. The portion of Roby on which David relies concerns punitive damages (id. at p. 712), and David does not explain how it could apply to compensatory damages. The wrongs alleged in the first amended complaint and the prayer for relief by which Doe sought 31 noneconomic damages put David on notice of his potential exposure to a significant damages award due to the heinousness of the alleged conduct and the subjective nature of such damages. Additionally, as Doe states, and David does not contest, section 425.10, subdivision (b) prohibits a personal injury plaintiff from stating “the amount demanded” in the complaint. Section 425.11, subdivision (b) permits a defendant to request a statement of damages to obtain more information about the amount sought. Nothing in the record indicates David did so. Second, David argues he lacked notice that Snyder would testify at trial and implies that the court’s compensatory damages award was impermissibly based, in part, on this testimony. He claims Doe engaged in a bait and switch by seeking to avoid discovery as to Snyder by saying, “At this time, [Doe] will not be calling any treating physicians in connection with her emotional/psychological injuries,” but then calling Snyder as a witness 10 months later. This ignores that after Doe stated she did not intend to call any treating physicians, David successfully moved to compel Doe to provide information about those physicians. It is reasonable to conclude that having had to provide information about those physicians, Doe decided to call one of them as a witness. (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 776- 777 [“ ‘ “all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of [a judgment’s] correctness” ’ ”].) David also argues that Snyder was not identified as a trial witness until the morning that he testified, June 14, 2024. A party challenging the admission of evidence on appeal must make a timely and specific objection to preserve the issue for appellate review. (Jogani v. Jogani (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 823, 870-871.)

32 David made no such objection here, and his challenge to the admission of this testimony for lack of notice is not cognizable. That David decided not to attend the trial did not relieve him of his obligation to timely object. 2. David’s Punitive Damages Arguments a. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review “Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.” (BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559, 568 [116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809].) “The amount of punitive damages offends due process under the Fourteenth Amendment as arbitrary only if the award is ‘ “grossly excessive” ’ in relation to the state’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence.” (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 543, 558.) “A court determining whether a punitive damages award is excessive under the due process clause must consider three guideposts[, known as the Gore guideposts]: ‘(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.’ ” (Ibid., quoting State Farm Mut. Ins. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 418, 429 [123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585].) “Although [the United States Supreme Court] has declined to ‘impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed,’ the court . . . has concluded that ‘in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 33 compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.’ ” (Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 363, 372.) Following the high court’s guidance, the California Supreme Court explained, “ratios between the punitive damages award and the plaintiff’s actual or potential compensatory damages significantly greater than 9 or 10 to 1 are suspect and, absent special justification (by, for example, extreme reprehensibility or unusually small, hard-to-detect or hard-to- measure compensatory damages), cannot survive appellate scrutiny under the due process clause.” (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1182, italics added, fn. omitted.) A defendant’s financial condition is an essential consideration for a court reviewing a punitive damages award under California law, and is a permissible consideration under the due process clause in determining the amount of punitive damages necessary to further the state’s legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence. (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc., supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1185-1186.) “[W]e defer to findings of historical fact if they are supported by substantial evidence, and we independently assess each of the . . . guideposts and determine de novo whether the punitive damages award is excessive under the due process clause.” (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 558.) “An appellate court should keep in mind, as well, that its constitutional mission is only to find a level higher than which an award may not go; it is not to find the ‘right’ level in the court’s own view.” (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc., supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1188.)

34 b. Analysis David argues the punitive damages award of $80 million is excessive and unconstitutional because (1) the 8-to-1 ratio between punitive and compensatory damages is at the upper end of what California allows and is “arbitrary,” (2) Doe failed to present any evidence of David’s financial condition to the jury, (3) the award punishes David for harm to third parties, and (4) the court provided an erroneous instruction to the jury concerning punitive damages. (i) The 8-to-1 Ratio Between Punitive and Compensatory Damages Is Not Excessive or Arbitrary Due to the extreme reprehensibility of David’s conduct, the punitive to compensatory damages ratio of 8 to 1 is not excessive or arbitrary. (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc., supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1182.) “The high court in both BMW [of North America, Inc. v. Gore, supra, 517 U.S. 559] and State Farm [Mut. Ins. v. Campbell, supra, 538 U.S. 408] recognized that ‘the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.’ ” (Simon, at p. 1180.) David’s appellate brief does not address the reprehensibility of his conduct, but we nonetheless consider this factor. Reprehensible behavior is that which (1) may cause physical as opposed to only economic harm, (2) shows indifference to the health or safety of others, (3) is directed at a financially vulnerable target, (4) occurs repeatedly, and (5) is not accidental but based in malice, trickery, or deceit. (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc., supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1180.) Here, all five 35 factors weigh in favor of finding David’s conduct was highly reprehensible. As the trial court recognized, David’s rape of Doe was “heinous,” and Doe and her therapist testified that she suffered physical, mental, and emotional harm as a result. It is undisputed that David, as the principal of the companies for whom Doe worked, was in a position of significant relative power to Doe and knew that she depended on him for her financial livelihood. During his deposition, David acknowledged that he was asked to give her a job as a favor to a friend and Doe “didn’t have much of a resume.” (See Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 374-375 [explaining consideration of the Gore guideposts is not limited to facts that were before the jury because the purpose is for the reviewing court to determine whether the award was excessive].) Further, at the time David raped Doe, four other female former employees had already sued him for sexual battery, evincing a continued indifference to the health and safety of others as well as a so-far undeterred pattern and practice. Finally, the admitted RFAs establish David’s conduct was not accidental but done with malice, including that he covered Doe’s mouth with his hand as she screamed, “No,” and for him to stop. David’s citation to Gober v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 204 does not compel a different conclusion; it in fact suggests that an 8-to-1 ratio in a case involving a high level of reprehensibility like this one is appropriate. In that case, a Ralphs store director engaged in inappropriate touching, used profanity, made inappropriate comments about employees’ sex lives, and threw objects at employees. Six of the employees sued the store director and Ralphs. The jury awarded each of the 36 plaintiffs compensatory damages ranging from $50,000 to $200,000. (Id. at p. 208.) The jury also awarded each plaintiff $5 million in punitive damages against Ralphs, based on Ralphs continuing to employ the store director despite knowledge of his misconduct. (Id. at pp. 209, 219.) The trial court granted a new trial as to any plaintiff who did not consent to a reduction in punitive damages equal to 15 times her compensatory damage recovery. (Ibid.) Four plaintiffs did not accept this reduction. (Ibid.) In evaluating whether the punitive damages were excessive, the appellate court considered the Gore guideposts. It determined Ralphs acted with “a modest degree of reprehensibility” and the “case d[id] not contain any of the factors justifying more than a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages.” (Gober, at p. 222.) It observed, “Ralphs did not act with extreme reprehensibility and the damages were not unusually small, hard to detect or hard to measure.” (Ibid.) The appellate court also determined that comparable civil penalties could not exceed 1.4 times the plaintiffs’ compensatory damages. (Id. at p. 223.) Thus, based on these factors, the appellate court concluded, “a six to one ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is sufficient to punish Ralphs and deter it and others from similar conduct in the future. This ratio is also reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm suffered and to the compensatory damages that the . . . plaintiffs recovered, which already contained a punitive element.” (Ibid.) Here, where David’s conduct was more reprehensible, a greater ratio is permissible.

37 (ii) Evidence of David’s Financial Condition “Because the quintessence of punitive damages is to deter future misconduct by the defendant, the key question before the reviewing court is whether the amount of damages ‘exceeds the level necessary to properly punish and deter.’ ” (Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 110.) “A reviewing court cannot make a fully informed determination of whether an award of punitive damages is excessive unless the record contains evidence of the defendant’s financial condition.” (Ibid.) “However, a defendant who thwarts a plaintiff’s ability to meet this obligation may forfeit the right to complain about the lack of evidence of his or her financial condition.” (Garcia v. Myllyla (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 990, 995.)5 David argues the court’s punitive damages award must be reversed because Doe failed to provide evidence of his financial condition at trial. We have no way of knowing whether this is true. David may not have provided evidence of his financial condition, but this does not necessarily mean that the jury heard 5 Under section 1987, a plaintiff can compel a defendant to attend trial and produce documents at trial. Such notice has the same effect as a subpoena (id., subd. (b)), which “for purposes of requiring attendance and the production of documents at trial, . . . is equivalent to a court order” (Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1338). A defendant who, “ ‘[b]y his disobedience of a proper court order, . . . improperly deprived [the] plaintiff of the opportunity to meet his burden of proof on the issue,’ ” is estopped from “ ‘complain[ing] about the absence of such evidence.’ ” (Garcia v. Myllyla, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 995, quoting Mike Davidov Co. v. Issod (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 597, 609.)

38 no testimony from which it could have inferred David’s approximate net worth. Although we have no reporter’s transcript for the trial, the trial court’s ruling on David’s motion for new trial states, “Because the issue of punitive damages was not bifurcated, the jury made its determination of noneconomic compensatory damages after it heard evidence of [David]’s net worth . . . .” (Italics added.) In any event, David’s failure to provide an adequate record on appeal means we resolve this issue against him. (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc., supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 187.) Further, as Adams v. Murakami, supra, 54 Cal.3d 105 counsels, one reason to require financial condition evidence is to allow a reviewing court to make an “informed determination of whether an award of punitive damages is excessive.” (Id. at pp. 110, 120.) This does not require that the evidence be put before the jury, only that it be in the record. (See Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 374-375.) The record here contains substantial evidence supporting a determination that an $80 million punitive damages award is not beyond David’s ability to pay. At deposition, David acknowledged stating in a court filing that he was a billionaire. David also testified that his companies, FilmOn.TV and Hologram USA, each “make[] millions of dollars every month.”6 6 Because David has failed to show that evidence of his net worth was not presented at trial and that the punitive damages award exceeds his ability to pay, we need not consider whether David is estopped from arguing that there was no evidence about his financial condition as a result of his failure to produce documents at trial.

39 (iii) David’s Remaining Punitive Damages Arguments Lack Merit Following the Trial Court’s Reduction of Damages “[T]he Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation.” (Philip Morris USA v. Williams (2007) 549 U.S. 346, 353 [127 S.Ct. 1057, 166 L.Ed.2d 940].) David claims the punitive damages award improperly punished him for harm to third parties. He argues, “The jury heard overwhelming evidence about multiple rapes of other women, bad acts, sexual assault, [and] other graphic sexual misconduct” against other women. The jury also heard other purportedly inflammatory facts, including that David publicly ridiculed and mocked his prior victims. As David acknowledges in his brief, evidence of prior bad acts is admissible and relevant to the determination of reprehensibility. (Philip Morris USA v. Williams, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 355.) But David further contends that because the trial court here failed to instruct the jury with the portion of CACI No. 3940 that states “[p]unitive damages may not be used to punish [the defendant] for the impact of [his] alleged misconduct on persons other than [the plaintiff],” the jury likely used the evidence to punish David for his misconduct against other women. In response, Doe argues that other language in the instruction given to jurors signaled to them that punitive damages could only be awarded for David’s conduct that harmed Doe.

40 David also argues that the punitive damages jury instruction given to the jury was erroneous because it failed to include standard language in CACI No. 3940 about the defendant’s financial condition. We need not determine whether the given version of CACI No. 3940 was erroneous. Even assuming error, instructional error in a civil case warrants reversal only where “ ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’ it appears the error caused a ‘miscarriage of justice.’ ” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 574.) The operative punitive damages award is not the one the jury awarded, but the reduced amount set forth in the trial court’s remittitur. Regardless of whether the instruction may have impacted the jury’s consideration, a trial court is presumed to know and follow the law (In re Marriage of Davenport, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1526; see Evid. Code, § 664), and David has not made any reasoned argument that the court’s reduced punitive damages award erroneously included an amount to punish David for his misconduct against third parties or failed to consider David’s financial condition.

41 DISPOSITION We affirm the judgments and order. Doe is awarded her costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED WEINGART, Acting P. J.

We concur:

M. KIM, J.

ZUKIN, P. J.* * Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.