In re J.H. CA2/7

Opinion

Filed 9/22/26 In re J.H. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re J.H., et al., Persons Coming B349120 Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25CCJP00234)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JASMINE G., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Dash Talbot, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ________________________

INTRODUCTION

Mother Jasmine G. appeals from jurisdiction findings and disposition orders declaring her three children dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).1 Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s findings that the children were at substantial risk of physical harm or illness at the time of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. We affirm the jurisdiction findings as to the two younger children but reverse the finding relating to the eldest child.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mother has three children. On January 24, 2025, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). At the time, Jama.H. was 14 years old, Jami.H. was three years old, and Jas.H. was a newborn. Count b-1 alleged Mother and the children’s father had a history of 1 All further section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

2 domestic violence.2 On December 28, 2023, Father choked Mother and struck her face. Jama.H. attempted to record the incident with a cell phone but Father grabbed it and took out the SIM card. In count b-2, the petition alleged, as to Jas.H. only, that she tested positive for amphetamine at birth. In count b-3, the petition alleged, as to all three children, that Mother is a current abuser of amphetamine and used it while she was pregnant. The juvenile court detained the three children from Mother. The children were initially placed in foster care but later released to Mother’s cousin, Maurice J. Maurice moved into Mother’s apartment while Mother moved into Maurice’s apartment to allow the children to remain in familiar surroundings. The court granted Mother monitored visitation. In the jurisdiction and disposition report, the Department stated the family was previously referred to the Department in January and December of 2023. In January 2023, the Department received a referral alleging that Mother was 16 weeks pregnant and using methamphetamine in the two older children’s presence. The caller also alleged Jama.H. had been missing school to care for then two-year-old Jami.H because Mother “has been locking herself in her room.” In December 2023, the Department received a referral of domestic violence between Mother and Father. The allegations arising from those reports were deemed inconclusive.

2 Jamal H. (Father) is the presumed father of the two older children. The court found him to be the alleged father of Jas.H. because attempts to conduct genetic testing were unsuccessful. The juvenile court did not sustain any allegations against Father, and he is not a party to this appeal.

3 On December 11, 2024, the Department received the referral that led to these proceedings. The caller reported Mother was 32 weeks pregnant and had been admitted to the hospital for preeclampsia. The caller emphasized Mother appeared “extremely drowsy” during the interview and could not tell the caller Maurice’s last name, where he lived, or his phone number even though he had care of her children while she was in the hospital. Mother stated she had not had a full meal in three days and had been sleeping all day. Although she had diabetes, she “does not want to go through the process of checking (her blood sugar)” every time she eats. Mother also admitted she did not receive any prenatal care until she was 32 weeks pregnant. Jas.H. was born prematurely at 36 weeks and tested positive for amphetamine. Jama.H. reported Mother went into labor after she asked him to turn on the hot water to take a bath. He saw the baby’s head crowning and rushed to call an ambulance. Maurice and Jama.H. helped to deliver the baby. Mother and Jas.H. were later taken to a hospital. Emergency personnel noted that Mother appeared “ ‘altered and confused’ ” when they arrived. Jas.H. was placed in the NICU due to hypoglycemia, poor feeding, mild tremors, and an elevated temperature. At the hospital, Mother agreed to drug testing when asked by the social worker but refused to provide a urine sample to hospital staff. The Department received a second referral after Jas.H. tested positive for amphetamine. Mother denied any drug use aside from marijuana. She alternately blamed the medication the hospital gave to her or the wine she consumed at a party shortly before birth for Jas.H.’s positive toxicology. In an interview shortly after the birth, Mother admitted, “ ‘Maybe I put myself at risk. It was bad 4 judgment on my part. I am not going to spend time figuring out where it came from. I just want to move forward. I might have picked up something but wasn’t aware of it. I’d rather not say more because it is not going to help my case. I just want to say that it was bad judgment on my part.’ ” Jas.H.’s doctor reported that the positive test could have been the result of exposure to amphetamine from as long ago as one month earlier. The doctor affirmed that “[no] medication was given to the child prior to being tested that can cause a false positive.” At the detention hearing, Mother denied using any drugs aside from marijuana during her pregnancy but agreed to the Department’s request for drug and alcohol tests. Mother tested negative on December 9 and 11, 2024; she was a “no show” for a test on December 31, 2024; she tested negative on January 2, 2025; and she tested positive for marijuana but negative for amphetamine on January 21, 2025. She missed scheduled tests on June 13 and 23, and July 2.3 Jama.H. reported Mother was a good mother and they had everything newborn Jas.H. needed, including “ ‘[s]tacks and stacks of diapers, ribbons, clothes, crib, [and a] stroller.’ ” Maurice, Jama.H., and a family friend reported they had never observed Mother using any drugs and did not know how Jas.H. tested positive for amphetamine.

3 At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the Department social worker testified she attempted to contact Mother beginning in February 2025 to discuss drug testing but Mother did not respond until April 2025, when she chose a testing site that the social worker was not aware was closed. The social worker attempted to contact Mother the next day to refer her to a different site but did not reach her until June 2025.

5 The Department had difficulty staying in contact with Mother during the proceedings, although Mother regularly visited the children. Mother enrolled in parenting classes and attended nine of thirteen classes. On February 24, 2025, Maurice reported that Mother assaulted him, when she forced her way into the home and bruised his lip and neck. She again attempted to enter the home using force the next day but left after Maurice told her she needed to have her visits scheduled and monitored. Maurice stated “he does not know what was going on with the mother, given that this behavior was out of her character.” When the social worker spoke with Mother about the incident, Mother denied attacking Maurice but acknowledged “ ‘he was being disrespectful and getting in [her] face.’ ” When the social worker stated she observed scratches and bruises on Maurice, Mother responded, “ ‘Those were defense wounds.’ ” Mother refused to discuss the matter further. Sometime in June 2025, Maurice stopped caring for the children and left them with another family member. At the time of the proceedings, Jama.H. was not enrolled in school. Although Maurice and Jama.H. asserted he was enrolled in an online school, they could not tell the Department which program he used. Neither of the older children were up to date on their medical visits, having missed their annual exams for two years. On July 21, 2025, the court conducted a jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Mother urged the court to dismiss all the allegations against her. In the alternative, Mother urged the court to amend count b-3 to state that she was a “ ‘recent user.’ ” Mother also indicated she was willing to submit to weekly drug 6 testing if the court ordered her visits with the children to be liberalized once she tested negative a certain number of times. Minors’ counsel requested the court dismiss the domestic violence allegation under subdivision (a) of section 300, but sustain it under subdivision (b) of section 300. Minors’ counsel urged the court to sustain the substance abuse allegations alleged in counts b-2 and b-3. She argued the court could reasonably infer Mother used more frequently due to her refusal to provide urine samples at the hospital and the difficulty in communicating with her about testing. The Department argued for the court to sustain all allegations. The court dismissed the a-1 and b-1 domestic violence counts. It sustained as pled the b-2 count and sustained the b-3 count after amending it to read that Mother was a “recent” abuser of amphetamine rather than a “current” one. The court noted its ruling was based on minors’ counsel’s arguments, including Mother’s statement that she made mistakes but refused to test. The court also noted there was “quite a difference in age for the children” and stated it was persuaded to assume jurisdiction over Jama.H. because he was not enrolled in school and the older children were two years behind on their checkups. It also ordered Mother to participate in random drug testing, individual counseling, and parenting classes. The court ordered the Department to liberalize visitation once Mother tested clean five times in a row. Mother timely appealed. On January 20, 2026, at the six- month review hearing, the juvenile court placed the children with 7 Mother, retained jurisdiction, and authorized the Department to conduct unannounced visits.4

DISCUSSION

Here, the juvenile court sustained the b-2 allegation that Jas.H. “was born suffering from a detrimental condition consisting of a positive toxicology screen for amphetamine. Such condition would not exist except [for] unreasonable acts by the child’s mother . . . The mother’s substance abuse endangers the child’s [] health and safety and places the child at risk of serious physical harm and damage.”5 The court sustained the amended b-3 allegation that Mother is a “recent abuser of amphetamine” which renders her “incapable of providing regular care and supervision of the children.” Mother contends the findings that the children suffered or were at risk of serious physical harm are not supported by substantial evidence. We separately address the jurisdiction findings as to each child because their ages and maturity levels are demonstrably 4 We grant the Department’s request to take judicial notice of the January 20, 2026 orders. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.) 5 Although the language of the b-2 allegation tracks the statutory presumption set out in section 355.1, subdivision (a) (if “the court finds, based upon competent professional evidence, that . . . [a] detrimental condition sustained by a minor is of a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of [the parent] . . . , that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the minor is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of Section 300”), the Department does not contend the presumption applies in this matter. We therefore do not address it.

8 different. (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 559 (N.R.) [court may take into consideration a child’s youth and maturity level as factors to determine whether a parent’s conduct places the child in serious risk of physical harm].) Moreover, the juvenile court’s finding as to count b-2 relates only to the newborn and not to the two older children.

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review “[U]nder section 300, subdivision (b), a child may be subject to dependency jurisdiction if the child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of a parent’s failure or inability to adequately supervise the child, or as a result of a parent’s inability to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s substance abuse. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (D).)” (In re B.D. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 315, 324 (B.D.).) Section 300, subdivision (b) “makes it clear that the government must establish, as separate elements, that (1) substance abuse (2) makes a parent or guardian unable to provide regular care for a child and (3) this inability has caused the child to suffer serious physical harm or illness or creates a substantial risk of such harm or illness.” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 558.) “[A] child’s youth and maturity level can bear upon the care that the child may require and whether a parent’s . . . substance abuse places the child at substantial risk of serious physical harm. Courts can properly take these facts regarding a child into account, together with all other relevant evidence, in deciding whether the government has met its burden at the jurisdictional stage.” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 559.) “It is reasonable for 9 courts to infer that very young children require a substantial degree of close supervision.” (Id. at p. 558.) “A court ‘need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.’ [Citation.] And a parent’s ‘ “ ‘[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions’ if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.” ’ [Citation.] However, ‘ “[t]o establish a defined risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there ‘must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.’ ” ’ ” (In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 712–713; see In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1048 (J.A.); In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 849.) “[I]t is inappropriate to regard a parent’s or guardian’s excessive use of alcohol or an addictive drug as always being sufficient, by itself, to show that the parent or guardian is unable to provide regular care for a young child and that the child is therefore at substantial risk of serious physical harm.” (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 558–559; J.A., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 1046.) Otherwise, key elements of section 300, subdivision (b)(1)(D), go unaddressed. A court may not “shortcut” the inquiry demanded of it by regarding substance abuse as “prima facie evidence” of an inability to provide care, then “look[ing] to the parent or guardian to rebut this presumption.” (N.R., at pp. 559– 560.) Thus, a parent’s drug use, by itself, is not necessarily sufficient to support jurisdiction. However, the Legislature has declared that “[t]he provision of a home environment free from the negative effects of substance abuse is a necessary condition for the safety, protection and physical and emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 300.2.)

10 We review the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings for substantial evidence in light of the entire record. (See In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892 [“the evidence supporting the jurisdictional finding must be considered ‘ “in the light of the whole record” ’ ‘to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence’ ”]; In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633 [“ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them.’ ”].) Substantial evidence is “ ‘evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.’ ” (In re I.C., at p. 892; accord, In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602.) “ ‘[W]e draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.’ ” (In re R.T., at p. 633; accord, In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773; In re Cole L., at p. 602 [“while substantial evidence may consist of inferences, any inferences must rest on the evidence; inferences based on speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding”].) “The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206 (E.E.); accord, In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 328–329.)

B. Newborn Jas.H. Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that she was a recent abuser of amphetamine. Mother instead contends the evidence is insufficient to support a finding under counts b-2 or b-3 that Jas.H. suffered or was at risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness as required under section 300, 11 subdivision (b). According to Mother, no medical professional confirmed Jas.H. suffered adverse physical symptoms due to prenatal drug exposure; there was no evidence that the reasons Jas.H. was placed in the NICU—hypoglycemia, poor feeding, mild tremors, and elevated temperature—were due to prenatal drug exposure and were not simply the normal condition of a baby born to a diabetic.6 In support of her argument, Mother emphasizes Jas.H.’s normal birth weight—7 pounds, 13 ounces— and the lack of documented withdrawal symptoms. Drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court, the record contains substantial evidence supporting the court’s finding that Mother’s drug use created a risk of serious harm to Jas.H. The evidence shows Mother failed to seek prenatal care even though she was diabetic and she used alcohol and marijuana throughout her pregnancy. She also failed to ensure her older children went to their annual medical exams. Although Mother recognized she exhibited “bad judgment,” she denied any substance abuse and blamed others for Jas.H.’s positive toxicology. The record shows Mother was not forthcoming about the extent of her drug use and its impact on her newborn. Mother’s denial supports an inference that her past use of amphetamine may recur and that she could fail to ensure Jas.H. received medical care. (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 6 In support of her argument, Mother cites two articles from medical journals. The Department, in turn, also cites a medical journal article. There is no indication these articles were admitted into evidence by the juvenile court or otherwise considered by it. Neither party moved for judicial notice of these articles on appeal, and therefore we do not consider them.

12 [denial is a relevant factor in assessing whether parent is likely to change behavior]; In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge”].) Further, Mother exhibited unusual behavior, including appearing “altered and confused” to paramedics; being unable to recall Maurice’s name, address, or phone number at the hospital while she was pregnant; and physically attacking Maurice for “disrespecting” her. This is substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s findings that Jas.H., a baby who required “a substantial degree of close supervision” and who suffered from hypoglycemia, poor feeding, mild tremors, and an elevated temperature was at substantial risk of serious harm or illness. (N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 558.) Mother relies on In re B.D. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 315 (B.D.) and In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036 (J.A.) to argue that evidence of prenatal exposure to drugs alone does not constitute substantial evidence Jas.H. was at risk of or suffered serious physical harm or illness. B.D. and J.A. are distinguishable. In B.D., the child tested positive at birth for prescription opiates. (B.D., supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 319, 320.) The mother had received prenatal care and tested positive for marijuana and a prescription opiate at an early prenatal appointment. (Id. at p. 318.) She admitted taking an opiate early in the pregnancy, and again shortly before giving birth to the child. Mother’s statements led the court to infer she had taken drugs that were not prescribed to her. (Id. at p. 319.) Aside from the positive test, hospital staff raised no concerns about the mother and there was no evidence the newborn suffered any effects from the drug. (Id. at pp. 319–320.) The 13 mother had no prior child welfare history. She also had an older child who attended school and was reportedly “excelling.” Both children were also up to date with immunizations and received regular medical and dental care. (Id. at p. 330.) Social workers visiting mother’s home raised no concerns about the mother’s ability to care for the children. (Ibid.) On these facts, B.D. concluded the evidence was insufficient to support a juvenile court finding that, even if the mother was abusing prescription drugs, that abuse placed the children at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. B.D. reasoned substantial evidence of harm to a child “requires more than speculation or conjecture.” (Id. at p. 329.) Similarly, J.A. held, “the evidence is insufficient to establish mother abused marijuana or that any such substance abuse placed the children at risk of serious harm” where the sole basis of dependency jurisdiction lay in the mother’s use of medical marijuana while pregnant. (J.A., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 1038.) In J.A., the mother explained she consumed edible marijuana to treat pain and swelling during pregnancy. Although she obtained prenatal care, she did not inform her doctor about her marijuana use for fear of being judged. When the doctor told the mother she could not breastfeed until she tested negative for marijuana, she stopped and tested negatively shortly thereafter. Further, the Department’s social worker described her as cooperative and appropriate with the baby. The mother also had a toddler-aged child and there were no prior reports or other problems about her care for him. (Id. at p. 1040.) Instead, the evidence showed the toddler’s doctor recommended she have him assessed for speech therapy, she did so, and the 14 specialist concluded there was no need for therapy. (Id. at p. 1048.) In this case, by contrast, Jas.H.’s positive toxicology was not the sole basis for a finding of risk under section 300. First, the record reflects the newborn tested positive for amphetamine, which is a controlled substance (see People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 358; Health & Saf. Code, § 11055, subd. (d)(1)), not a prescribed drug as in B.D. or medical marijuana as in J.A. Further, in contrast to the mothers in B.D. and J.A., Mother did not obtain regular prenatal care and she continued to deny she used any illicit substances even when confronted with Jas.H.’s positive toxicology. Unlike the older children in B.D. and J.A., Mother’s older children were not “excelling.” Jama.H. was not enrolled in school and both older children had missed two annual medical exams. The family was also the subject of two prior dependency referrals in 2023. These circumstances establish prenatal exposure to amphetamine was not the sole basis for dependency jurisdiction over Jas.H.

C. Four-year-old Jami.H. Mother asserts the same argument—that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of risk of serious physical harm or illness under section 300, subdivision (b)—as to Jami.H. For the same reasons, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings of risk of harm to Jami.H., who had just turned four at the time of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Like Jas.H., Jami.H. required a high level of supervision, care, and protection. He thus faced a substantial risk of harm from a mother who ingested alcohol, marijuana, and amphetamine during pregnancy, who failed to acknowledge the extent of her 15 substance abuse, who was apparently under the influence of alcohol or drugs while proceedings were pending, and who failed to ensure he received regular medical care.

D. 14-year-old Jama.H. The juvenile court stated at the jurisdiction hearing it assumed jurisdiction over Jama.H. despite the age difference among the children because he was not enrolled in school and the two older children were behind on their annual well-child visits. We conclude this is an insufficient basis on which to assume jurisdiction over a 14-year-old child. (See In re Rebecca C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 720, 728 [mother’s substance abuse and failure to ensure child regularly attended school and completed homework did not justify jurisdiction over 13-year-old child]; In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 388–389.) As In re Janet T. explained, “It is also no doubt true failing to go to school regularly is very detrimental to the children. Failing to attend school regularly not only deprives the children of an education, but also of the social interaction and ‘peer relationships necessary for normal growth and development,’ as alleged in the petition. It is a very serious allegation and a factual circumstance which needed immediate correction. However, that is not the same as saying the failure to attend school created a ‘substantial risk’ of suffering ‘serious physical harm or illness.’ The lack of education may well cause psychic or emotional or financial or social harm. But there are no facts alleged or suggested by the supporting documentary evidence to indicate mother’s failure to ensure the children’s regular school attendance subjected the children to physical injury or illness, serious or otherwise. We thus fail to see how this factual ground 16 can support the court’s order sustaining the petition under section 300, subdivision (b).” (In re Janet T., at pp. 388–389.) Nor is Mother’s failure to ensure Jama.H. was up to date on his annual medical exam sufficient to justify jurisdiction of a healthy 14-year-old child. (Cf. In re Eric B. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 996, 1005-1006 [substantial evidence supported continued jurisdiction to permit medical monitoring of child’s potential life-threatening illness].) Under these circumstances, we reverse the juvenile court’s orders as to Jama.H.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivision (b), regarding Jami.H. and Jas.H. and the disposition order removing Jami.H. and Jas.H. from Mother are affirmed. The court’s jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivision (b), regarding Jama.H. and its disposition orders relating to Jama.H. are reversed. The juvenile court is directed to set aside its jurisdiction finding regarding Jama.H. and vacate its disposition orders relating to Jama.H.

MARTINEZ, P. J. We concur:

SEGAL, J. STONE, J.