gno.law

In re U.G. CA3

California Court of Appeal · C105172 · 2026-09-22 · Unpublished

Area
delinquency
Panel
Boulware Eurie (author)

Analysis

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Opinion

Filed 9/22/26 In re U.G. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (San Joaquin)

In re U.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C105172 Law. (Super. Ct. No. THE PEOPLE, JJCJVDE20240001047) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. U.G., Defendant and Appellant.

The theft of the victim’s car by 16-year-old minor U.G., and his ultimately unsuccessful attempt to evade law enforcement in the car, resulted in the total loss of the vehicle. After the minor admitted several charges in connection with the theft and evasion, the juvenile court ordered $8,086.01 in restitution to the victim—$7,281.05 for the purchase price of the car, $514.46 for new tires installed on the car shortly before the theft, and $290.50 in impound fees. The court apportioned 80 percent of this amount to the minor. On appeal, U.G. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in awarding the victim the full purchase price of both the vehicle and the new tires. We disagree and affirm the order.

1 BACKGROUND In September 2024, sheriff’s deputies spotted U.G. driving a white Hyundai Sonata erratically, with a flat tire. When they initiated contact, U.G. fled, driving through intersections and ignoring traffic signals in an attempt to evade pursing deputies as another teenager (the coparticipant) leaned out of the Sonata’s passenger window and recorded the chase on his phone. Deputies stopped the vehicle with a “Pursuit Intervention Technique” maneuver, i.e., a deliberate collision,1 and detained both teens. The victim, who was the registered owner of the vehicle, subsequently confirmed the Sonata had been taken without permission. U.G. admitted several charges in connection with the incident, including evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) and taking a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), in exchange for deferred entry of judgment (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 790)2 and dismissal of another charge. After U.G. failed to comply with the terms of his deferred entry of judgment, the juvenile court adjudged him a ward of the court. (§ 602.) The juvenile court committed him to juvenile hall for 90 days, with 60 days stayed pending successful completion of 90 days of electronic monitoring; ordered him to serve 40 hours of community service; and ordered restitution in an amount to be determined. The victim submitted a request for $8,086.01 in restitution, which U.G. contested. At the restitution hearing, the victim testified the Sonata had been in “very good” condition before the theft but was “totaled” after. She explained that her request for 1 A pursuit intervention technique maneuver, also known as a PIT maneuver is “a method of forcing a fleeing car to abruptly turn sideways, which causes the driver to lose control and stop. It involves officers using a patrol car to veer into the rear half of either the driver’s side or passenger’s side of a suspect’s car.” (Longoria v. Pinal County (9th Cir. 2017) 873 F.3d 699, 703, fn. 2.) 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 $8,086.01 included $7,281.05 for the price she paid to purchase the car three years before the theft, $514.46 for a set of four new tires she purchased and installed on the car four months before the theft, and $290.50 in impound fees. The victim provided receipts substantiating each amount. She also testified she did not drive the car much after the new tires were installed, which her daughter corroborated. The victim’s daughter testified the Kelley Blue Book (blue book) value of the vehicle was $6,100 to $8,100, with the bottom of the range for “fair” condition, $7,111 for “very good” condition, and the top of the range for “excellent” condition. The victim’s daughter further testified that “excellent” meant “like new” and that the car was in “excellent” condition when stolen. U.G. submitted a printout of a blue book search run with different parameters, which showed a value range of $5,119 to $7,226. U.G. also suggested the victim was not entitled to the cost of the new tires because that cost should be included in the value of the car. Based on his blue book search, U.G. estimated that value to be $6,183. The coparticipant asked the court to apportion financial responsibility for the restitution mostly or fully to U.G. The prosecution agreed with full apportionment to U.G. and asked the court to rely on the victim’s daughter’s testimony that the car was in “excellent” condition when stolen. The juvenile court agreed the victim’s daughter “was an excellent witness” who “explained everything.” It also noted, “[w]e all learned during COVID and everything else, used cars go up in [] value.” The court then awarded the full requested amount of $8,086.01 to the victim and apportioned 80 percent of that amount, or $6,468.81, to U.G. U.G. timely appealed in November 2025. His opening brief was filed in March 2026, and this case was fully briefed on August 10, 2026. DISCUSSION On appeal, U.G. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in awarding both the full purchase price of the vehicle and the full amount for the new tires to the 3 victim. Specifically, U.G. claims that since the vehicle came with a set of tires when the victim originally purchased it, awarding both the full purchase price of the vehicle and the full cost of the new tires resulted in an overcompensation in the amount of the value of the original tires on the vehicle. The People disagree and so do we. Section 730.6 requires the juvenile court to order any minor it finds has violated the law to pay restitution for the economic loss of any victim of that violation. (§ 730.6, subd. (a)(1), (2).) The section requires this restitution to include “[f]ull or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property,” and sets that value as the lesser of the replacement cost of like property and the actual cost of repair. (§ 730.6, subd. (b)(1)(A).) We review a juvenile court’s restitution order for abuse of discretion. (In re Anthony M. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016.) We will reverse only when the order is arbitrary or capricious, or where the amount ordered lacks a “ ‘ “factual and rational basis.” ’ ” (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1132; In re Anthony M., at p. 1016.) Although a victim’s right to restitution is “broadly and liberally construed” (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 500), restitution orders are not intended to provide victims with windfalls (In re Anthony M., at p. 1017). The minor “bears the burden of proving that the amount of restitution claimed by the victim exceeds repair or replacement cost of lost or damaged property.” (In re Travis J. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 187, 204.) Here, the court ordered $8,086.01 in restitution after the victim’s daughter testified that the car was in “excellent” condition at the time of the theft and further testified that the cost of replacing the car in that condition was $8,100. Given the court’s laudatory descriptions of that witness, it appears the court found her testimony on these points to be highly credible. In this context, we cannot say that the amount ordered lacked a factual or rational basis or provided the victim with a windfall.

4 Although the minor argues that awarding both the full purchase price of the vehicle and the full cost of the new tires resulted in overcompensation to the victim, that is not the only logical conclusion here. The amount of restitution that a victim is due under section 730.6 is not the original purchase price of stolen property, but rather the cost to repair or replace it. The receipts and testimony establishing the original cost of the car and tires were therefore not evidence of the victim’s direct losses, but rather evidence of the replacement cost of the vehicle. (See People v. Foster (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 939, 946.) Given the victim’s daughter’s testimony that this replacement cost was approximately $8,100, and the closeness of that figure to the sum of the original price of the car and the cost of the new tires ($7,795.51), the court could have rationally concluded that installing the new tires increased the value of the vehicle by the full purchase price of the tires or that the sum of the original price of the vehicle and the cost of the tires reasonably approximated the appreciated value of the vehicle at the time of the theft. We therefore conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering $8,086.01 in restitution to the victim. DISPOSITION The restitution order is affirmed.

/s/ BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/ MAURO, Acting P. J.

/s/ MESIWALA, J.

Cites, in this corpus