Ogassian v. Ogassian CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 9/22/26 Ogassian v. Ogassian CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

RONALD LEE OGASSIAN, B351445

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24STPB10840) v.

DANIEL OGASSIAN,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Stephanie C. Santoro, Judge. Affirmed. Ronald Lee Ogassian, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Daniel Ogassian, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION1 Helen M. Ogassian placed real and personal property into a trust which was revocable while she was alive but became irrevocable upon her death. While alive, Helen2 later disposed of all the property initially placed in the revocable trust such that the trust had no assets upon her death. After Helen’s death, her son Ronald filed a petition seeking, in part, an accounting of trust assets. After holding four evidentiary hearings and receiving documents, the probate court concluded that Helen had disposed of all the property held in the trust prior to her death and denied Ronald’s request for an accounting. Ronald now appeals that decision, and we affirm. A. Factual and Procedural Background On January 21, 2020, Helen executed a trust titled the Restated Helen M. Ogassian Living Trust (the trust). According to its terms, Helen could revoke the trust at any time before her death but it became irrevocable upon her death. Helen was the trustee with her son Daniel being identified as the successor trustee and her daughter Nadine Jakovich as an alternate successor trustee if Daniel did not assume the role. The trust assets initially included five pieces of Southern California real estate located on (1) El Caminito in La Crescenta (El Caminito property), (2) Winchester Avenue in Glendale 1 See California Standards of Judicial Administration section 8.1. 2 Because they share the same surname, we refer to Helen M. Ogassian, her children Ronald Lee Ogassian and Daniel Ogassian, and her grandson Jared Ogassian by their first names for clarity and the reader’s ease. We intend no disrespect.

2 (Winchester property), (3) N. Louise Street in Glendale (Louise property), (4) Pioneer Drive in Glendale (Pioneer property), and (5) Tujunga Canyon in Tujunga (Tujunga property). The assets also included unspecified accounts, investments, and personal property. Upon Helen’s death, Ronald was to receive the Winchester property and the Tujunga property, Daniel the Louise property, Jakovich the Pioneer property, and Ronald’s son Jared would receive $50,000. The residue of the trust was to be distributed “so that each child receives equal net value in respect to the real estate specifically given.” On January 16, 2021, Helen executed deeds transferring the Winchester and Tujunga properties to Ronald, the Pioneer property to Jakovich, the Louise property to Daniel, and the El Caminito property to Jakovich and Daniel. On June 6, 2022, Jakovich, Daniel, and Helen (individually and as trustee) entered a confidential settlement agreement in a partition action filed by Jakovich. Ronald was not a party to the settlement. Under the agreement, the El Caminito property would be listed for sale with Jakovich as the listing agent, Daniel would “continue to support Helen” until the El Caminito property was sold, and the proceeds from the sale would be distributed as follows: $20,000 to Helen; Jakovich would be reimbursed sales expenses up to $15,000; 30 percent of the net proceeds would be reserved to pay taxes (with any excess amount to be divided by Jakovich and Daniel); Daniel would be reimbursed for mortgage payments and Helen’s assisted living expenses for the period March 1, 2022 to the sale date; and the remaining proceeds would be invested and held for Helen’s benefit, with any amount remaining at Helen’s death to be divided equally between Jakovich and Daniel.

3 The El Caminito property was sold in November of 2022; Jakovich and Daniel each received various reimbursements plus payouts of approximately $262,000 each; in addition, various bills were paid from the proceeds, including several from a “[s]enior [l]iving” facility. Helen died on August 1, 2023. On September 24, 2024, Ronald filed a petition under Probate Code3 section 17200 for an order removing Daniel as trustee and directing Daniel to provide an accounting and other information about the trust assets. According to the petition, on July 17, 2024, Ronald’s counsel sent Daniel a letter requesting “basic information about the . . . [t]rust, an accounting, timeline for distribution etc.” Ronald and his counsel then spoke with Daniel by phone and “Daniel explained that he and [Jakovich] were involved in a lawsuit against . . . Helen . . . a few months before she passed away. Daniel stated that the three of them entered into a settlement agreement without [Ronald’s] knowledge.” Ronald sought orders for Daniel to provide “an accounting . . . detailing his acts as [t]rustee,” a copy of the settlement agreement, “and . . . statements for all assets held in Helen’s [t]rust and [e]state from the time of the alleged settlement agreement until her passing”; for “a complete accounting of all rental income from the [Winchester and Tujunga properties] . . . from the date of transfer until the date that Ronald learned of the transfer and assumed management and control over said properties”; and for “the return of all [t]rust property improperly taken by Daniel and [Jakovich] under . . . [section] 856, if any is so determined.”

3 Unspecified statutory references are to the Probate Code.

4 On December 12, 2024, the probate court received testimony and ordered Daniel to provide an accounting of the trust by March 1, 2025. The hearing was not reported. On April 8, 2025, Daniel filed a statement indicating that Helen had revoked the trust on January 16, 2021, and submitted copies of the deeds of trust dated January 16, 2021, transferring the Winchester property and Tujunga property to Ronald, the Pioneer property to Jakovich, the Louise property to Daniel, and the El Caminito property to Jakovich and Daniel. Daniel also submitted a copy of the settlement agreement he had entered with Jakovich and Helen in June of 2022 and the escrow instructions for the November 2022 sale of the El Caminito property. On April 10, 2025, the probate court heard testimony and ordered Daniel to “file a statement . . . regarding aspects of the estate that were managed or marshaled while Daniel . . . was [t]rustee.” The court appointed Ronald as successor trustee, finding that Daniel had resigned as trustee and Jakovich had declined to act as successor.4 The hearing was not reported. The day of the hearing, Daniel filed a statement indicating that “[he] never marshalled any assets of the . . . trust[]” and “[a]ll of the assets of the . . . trust were gifted in January of 2021.” On May 5, 2025, Ronald filed an “[o]bjection” in which he made claims about the transfers of the real property formerly subject to the trust and about the settlement agreement among Jakovich, Daniel, and Helen. Ronald also objected to being 4 The court denied Ronald’s petition to remove Daniel as trustee as moot.

5 named successor trustee because he claimed his attorney failed to properly inform him about his potential liability as a trustee. On July 9, 2025, Ronald substituted out his attorney and began representing himself. On August 1, 2025, the probate court heard testimony. The hearing was not reported. On October 15, 2025, Ronald filed a statement in which he claimed, “For more than 30 years, my siblings have acted in ways that concealed assets, diverted income, and failed to provide any clear record of trust property or income. A proper accounting is not just a procedural formality—it is the only way to uncover the truth of decades of financial misconduct.” Ronald requested the court to reject Daniel’s accounting and “compel him to file a proper, verified accounting in compliance with the Probate Code.” On November 10, 2025, after receiving testimony, the probate court denied Ronald’s petition with prejudice. The court concluded that Ronald “[had] no right to an accounting from Daniel . . . or . . . Jakovich, as neither served as trustee while settlor Helen . . . was alive. Instead, settlor served as trustee until her death and during her tenure as trustee, she entered into a settlement agreement by which she distributed the assets of the trust, including the two pieces of real property.” The court found that no assets remained in the trust. The hearing was not reported. B. Discussion The trust established by Helen was revocable, meaning it was “a trust that the person who creates it, generally called the settlor, can revoke during the person’s lifetime. The beneficiaries’ interest in the trust is contingent only, and the settlor can eliminate that interest at any time. . . . When the 6 settlor dies, the trust becomes irrevocable, and the beneficiaries’ interest in the trust vests.” (Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058, 1062, fn. omitted.) During the time such a trust is revocable, the trustee does not owe any duties to the beneficiaries. (Ibid.; see § 15800.) Section 17200 authorizes a trust beneficiary to petition the court “concerning the internal affairs of the trust,” including for an order “[c]ompelling the trustee to . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [a]ccount to the beneficiary.” (Id., subds. (a), b(7)(C).) “Although the beneficiaries of [an] irrevocable trust have standing to petition the probate court for an accounting and information after the settlor dies and the trust or a portion of the trust becomes irrevocable, the probate court does not have authority to order the trustee to provide an accounting or information regarding trust assets and transactions while the trust was still revocable” where the settlor was the trustee before his or her death and “there is no claim that the deceased settlor was incapacitated or subject to undue influence during the period of revocability.” (Babbitt v. Superior Court (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1139.)5 The probate court found that Helen was the trustee of the trust until her death and prior to her death disposed of all the parcels of real estate held in the trust. This finding is supported by substantial evidence. Daniel adduced evidence that all five parcels were transferred in January of 2021, during Helen’s lifetime. Ronald concedes that the two parcels which were to be distributed to him through the trust were transferred to him in January of 2021. There is also substantial evidence (including 5 Ronald made no claim that Helen’s disposition of assets was the result of incapacity or undue influence.

7 the settlement agreement disposing of nonreal property) supporting the probate court’s finding that Helen disposed of all other assets in the trust before her death. To the extent Ronald contends the court’s findings are unsupported, his claim fails because he failed to provide a record of any of the four hearings at which the court received testimony. “[A] trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) “ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court. . . .’ [Citation.] ‘ “A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Based on the probate court’s findings that all the assets in the trust had been disposed of prior to Helen’s death, it did not err in denying the accounting requested by Ronald. “Because assets held in a revocable trust essentially belong to the settlor, the settlor may dispose of the trust’s assets and effectively eliminate the beneficiaries’ interest altogether ‘with no need to justify or explain’ . . . her actions.” (Babbitt v. Superior Court, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.) Thus, a would-be beneficiary such as Ronald cannot petition under section 17200 for an accounting covering the period when Helen was trustee. (Babbitt, at p. 1146.) Ronald contends he adduced evidence of financial irregularities and that Daniel and Jakovich exercised control over “trust-related assets and financial matters,” but none of the 8 evidence Ronald adduced nor the claims he made about it relate to conduct occurring after Helen’s death. Daniel could not have owed any trustee duties to Ronald based on events occurring before Helen’s death because Helen was the trustee at that time. Estate of Giraldin, upon which Ronald relies, is distinguishable because in that case the settlor was not the trustee and the court only held that after the settlor died, the beneficiaries could sue the trustee for breaching his duties owed to the settlor while the settlor was alive. (Estate of Giraldin, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 1062, 1067-1068.) Lastly, we reject Ronald’s contention that the probate court violated his due process rights by initially denying his petition without prejudice and then later, outside the presence of the parties, denying the petition with prejudice. The court provided Ronald with due process by holding an evidentiary hearing. “[S]ome kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests” (Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539, 557-558 [94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935]), and the probate court held such a hearing. Nothing required it to issue its ruling after that hearing in the presence of the parties.

9 DISPOSITION We affirm the probate court’s order denying Ronald’s petition for an accounting. Daniel is awarded his costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.