People v. Shannon CA3

Opinion

Filed 9/22/26 P. v. Shannon CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (San Joaquin)

THE PEOPLE, C102096 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. v. LODCRFECOD20200009558)

SETH PETER SHANNON, Defendant and Appellant.

After a jury found defendant Seth Peter Shannon guilty of multiple crimes, including attempted murder, several counts of attempting to dissuade a witness or victim from testifying, two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, two counts of unlawful possession of ammunition, and two counts of possession of an assault weapon, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of seven years to life plus 30 years. On appeal, Shannon raises numerous claims, including (1) there is insufficient evidence for two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm, two counts of unlawful possession of ammunition, and two counts of unlawful possession of an assault weapon, because those are “continuing offenses”; and (2) there is insufficient evidence for some of his convictions for attempting to dissuade a witness or victim from testifying. We agree with the People that one count of unlawful possession of a firearm and one count of unlawful possession of an assault weapon must be reversed for insufficient evidence. We 1 reject Shannon’s other challenges to his convictions. Because Shannon must be resentenced, we need not address his claims of sentencing error. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I Three Altercations Shannon met A.S. in the spring of 2020. By the summer, Shannon was helping A.S. move her personal belongings into a storage facility in Lodi, their relationship had turned sexual, and A.S. had told Shannon that her ex-boyfriend, Maximiliano Silva, was stalking her. Shannon and Silva had three altercations in August 2020. In the first incident (the storage facility incident), which occurred during the daytime, a witness at the Lodi storage facility where A.S. stored her belongings heard squealing tires, then gunshots, then more squealing tires, before he saw a car speed out of the storage facility while chasing another car. Regarding this incident, Silva testified that he drove to the storage facility at A.S.’s request, but when he got there, she told him to leave and someone driving a Thunderbird chased him out of the facility. Silva further testified that he later realized that a sound he heard while being chased was probably gunfire, though he did not see a gun. Shannon testified regarding this incident that A.S. called him and told him that Silva was at the storage facility and she wanted him to leave. Shannon drove to the storage facility in his Thunderbird and, at speeds reaching 80 miles per hour, chased Silva away. Shannon testified he thought he heard gunfire, but could not be certain because his Thunderbird was extremely loud. He did not shoot at Silva, and he did not have a gun with him during this incident. In a second incident (the Highway 12 incident), Silva approached A.S.’s vehicle, a GMC Yukon, from behind as the cars traveled on Highway 12, near the Lodi storage facility. In Silva’s version of events, A.S. had called him earlier and asked him to help 2 her escape from Shannon, and he thought A.S. was driving the Yukon. When Silva drove up to speak to A.S., he heard a “big loud noise, boom,” like a gunshot. Startled, Silva drove away. He did not see who was driving the Yukon at the time, but moments later he saw Shannon driving the vehicle when it pulled into the storage facility. A short time later, he noticed a new bullet hole in his car. In late August or early September 2020, a deputy sheriff observed a bullet hole in Silva’s car and retrieved a bullet fragment from inside the driver’s seat cushion. In Shannon’s version of this second incident, he was driving the Yukon eastbound on Highway 12, which has one eastbound lane and one westbound lane, when Silva pulled up next to him, rolled down his window and started screaming, and waving his hands. Shannon had no idea who Silva was at that point, and he was worried about the dangerous situation. He cursed at Silva and threw a bottle at Silva’s car. A third incident (the ditch incident) happened on the night of August 19, 2020. According to Silva, he and A.S. planned to spend the night together at a campsite near the Lodi storage facility. She drove her recreational vehicle (RV) there and he drove her Yukon. They were stopped in their respective vehicles outside the campsite when he saw a vehicle speed up from behind and “pin[]” him behind the RV. Shannon got out of the vehicle holding a gun and “getting ready to shoot” at Silva. Silva put the Yukon in reverse and backed over the vehicle. But he accidentally also backed over a nearby levee and into a water-filled ditch. He then got out of the Yukon and ran into an adjacent field as he heard gunshots and Shannon yell that he was coming to get him. According to Shannon, A.S. called him and told him that Silva stole her Yukon, had a gun, and was preventing her from leaving the side of a road. Shannon had an AR- 15 with him because A.S. told him earlier that Silva had threatened to shoot him and because Silva was “stalking” him and A.S. When Shannon approached the scene in his car, he saw the Yukon, the RV, and Silva standing outside the RV with something in his hand. He stopped his car about two feet behind the Yukon and got out of his car. Silva 3 ran toward Shannon and fired two shots at him with a handgun. Shannon got back into his car, thinking Silva was “going to come finish this job off, I’m done.” But instead of continuing to shoot at Shannon, Silva got into the Yukon, put it in reverse, and “just start[ed] burning out in reverse.” Shannon retrieved his AR-15 from the passenger seat of his car and pointed the weapon at the Yukon as it pushed his car backward. The Yukon hit a power pole and went down into a ditch. Shannon turned on the AR-15’s “tactical light,” which “lit up the whole field” by the ditch. Shannon did not see Silva, and his “anxiety just start[ed] hitting.” He wondered if Silva was going to shoot at him again. As he was looking at the Yukon, the power pole that the Yukon struck “popped and made … a small spark. And out of fear,” Shannon “pulled the trigger” of his firearm and a bullet “happened to hit the windshield of the Yukon.” Shannon did not know where Silva was. He testified: “I’m not there to get this guy. I’ve got an AR-15 that’s fully automatic with a 45-round magazine. I mean, if I was there trying to shoot somebody,” “I could have Swiss-cheesed the car, mowed the field down. That wasn’t my intention there. I accidentally shot the windshield of the Yukon.” II Attempts to Prevent Testimony The prosecution introduced recordings of telephone calls that Shannon made from jail to support charges of attempting to dissuade A.S. and Silva from testifying.1 In one October 2020 telephone call, after confirming that his girlfriend had “pen and paper,” Shannon told her Silva’s first and last names and, later in the conversation, after again confirming that she had “pen and paper,” told her, “[t]he Tack Shop in San Carlos” (Silva lived next to the Tack Shop in San Carlos). Also in that conversation, Shannon instructed 1 To help the jurors understand the recordings, the prosecution provided them with transcripts of the conversations. Quotes of the telephone conversations that follow come from those transcripts.

4 his girlfriend to tell A.S. that “if she knows what’s best for her, you know, I wasn’t there.” He continued: “If she just tells my attorney or tells the DA a few simple things, I could be out that night. If she knows what’s best for her, really.” “Tell her she’s being watched,” he said. He told his girlfriend she could “contact some homies,” and explained to her where two brothers, both members of a criminal street gang, lived. After that phone conversation, Shannon’s girlfriend went to the brothers’ residence, showed them a picture of Silva, told them Silva’s name, and explained, “[t]his guy right here said that [Shannon] shot at him.” In another October 2020 telephone call, Shannon told an acquaintance, “the bitch” “just needs to know, you know, in her best interest, you know what I mean? Like just tell her she’s being watched. And tell her fuckin’ to comply.” Shannon advised his acquaintance that “[s]he gotta show up there on … the date.” He continued: “[J]ust wear your COVID mask and then … after that just” “get the fuck outta there.” In January 2021, Shannon called an acquaintance who boasted during the call that before his then-recent release from custody, he “train[ed]” fellow inmates how to be “super criminals.” The acquaintance told Shannon, “I … gotta find these fools.” In reply, and referring to his preliminary hearing in this case, Shannon said, “Yeah, but anyways, they got to, uh, they got to come to my court date on the first.” The acquaintance responded, “The first? I need at least (Unintelligible) so if I can find them.” Shortly after this phone call, when A.S. and Silva walked into a courtroom on February 1, 2021, Shannon exclaimed, “Why the fuck are they here?” During cross-examination, when the prosecutor asked Shannon if he intended to prevent A.S. and Silva from going to the preliminary hearing when he told his acquaintance that “they had to be there on the first,” Shannon answered that he “just 5 wanted to obtain [his] property back” from A.S.2 The prosecutor pressed Shannon: “So in your mind, a woman coming to testify is going to be carrying hundreds of dollars’ worth of tattoo equipment to court; is that correct?” Shannon replied, “No.” Also during cross-examination, Shannon (1) agreed that A.S. was a “snitch,” and snitches may be threatened and “[o]ccasionally” assaulted, (2) admitted that (a) he told A.S. “there was money on her head and … people” were “looking for her” and (b) this statement implied he “put a hit out on her,” and (3) maintained the statement was “an empty threat,” because he was trying to recover his personal property and was angry with A.S. for not returning it. A.S. testified she was contacted at least 10 times and urged not to testify against Shannon. One time, someone held a gun to her head and told her, “ ‘[s]nitches get stitches.’ ” Shannon admitted that (1) he brought his AR-15 and the ammunition for it to San Joaquin County from his house in Solano County, (2) nine-millimeter ammunition that police found in his Solano County house was for a Glock 17 that was hidden at his house, and (3) he was previously convicted of a felony and was prohibited from owning or possessing firearms or ammunition. III Charges, Closing Arguments to the Jury, Verdicts, and Sentencing The prosecution alleged Shannon committed 16 offenses in San Joaquin County: two counts of attempted murder, two counts of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 5 & 6),3 two counts of being a felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd.

2 Shannon earlier testified that A.S. had valuable tattoo equipment that belonged to him.

3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

6 (a)(1); counts 7 & 8), two counts of unlawful possession of an assault weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a); counts 9 & 10), four counts of attempting to dissuade a witness or victim from testifying (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1); counts 11-14), one count of second degree burglary, and one count of receiving stolen property. Regarding the two identical sets of three offenses concerning possession of weapons and ammunition (the possession offenses), the prosecution alleged one set happened on or about August 18, 2020 (counts 5, 7, & 9) and the other set happened on or about August 19, 2020 (counts 6, 8, & 10). Regarding the four offenses of attempting to dissuade a witness or victim from testifying (the dissuasion offenses), the prosecutor alleged two counts happened in October 2020 (count 11 (A.S.) & count 12 (Silva)) and two counts happened in January 2021 (count 13 (A.S.) & count 14 (Silva)). In closing argument to the jury on the ammunition counts, the prosecutor said: “We know he had the ammunition because he was shooting. We know he had the ammunition because he admitted he had the ammunition.” Regarding the witness dissuasion counts, the prosecutor said: “Counts 11 and 13 are for [A.S.] We charged the October incidents and we charged the January incidents where he’s making these phone calls and he’s got people out looking for [A.S.]” Shannon “knew he was trying to … discourage [A.S.] from attending a judicial proceeding and intended to do so. It’s all on the jail calls, folks. There is little doubt … because, remember, after he calls [an acquaintance] in January to prevent them from coming there on the first, he stands up in open court and yells, ‘What the fuck are they doing here?’ He was trying to prevent them from testifying. 11 and 13 [go] to [A.S.] [¶] 12 and 14 go to [Silva]. Same elements. It’s just now [Silva], and [he] is the crime victim in this case. [He] was the victim of the attempted murder. [Shannon] had every incentive in the world to prevent the witness and the victim from testifying against him…. Snitches get stitches.” Shannon “tried to prevent [Silva] and [A.S.] from testifying against him by calling his associates to have them taken out. He told you on the stand he told [A.S.], There is money on your head 7 and people out looking for you. And what happens to [A.S.]? She has a gun held to her head. He’s not getting his tattoo equipment back. He’s trying to make the case go away.” Defense counsel conceded Shannon’s guilt on the possession offenses. “You should have no problem determining the verdict,” he said. Specifically regarding the ammunition offenses, defense counsel told the jury, “[M]y client’s testimony affirms this allegation.” But defense counsel argued the prosecution failed to prove Shannon tried to prevent or discourage A.S. or Silva from testifying: “Nowhere is there any evidence of any request to communicate to either party that they not show up. In fact, if you look at the evidence, it will say, Tell her to go, make sure she goes, make sure he goes.” After the jury found Shannon guilty on 14 counts,4 the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of seven years to life plus 30 years, which included a term of seven years to life for attempted murder plus a 20-year enhancement for discharging a firearm in the commission of that offense. Regarding the possession offenses, the trial court imposed consecutive eight-month terms for being a felon in possession of a firearm (counts 5 & 6) and, pursuant to section 654, imposed and stayed terms for the other possession offenses. On each of the four dissuasion offenses, the trial court imposed consecutive two-year terms. For burglary, the trial court imposed a consecutive term of eight months. And for receiving stolen property, the trial court imposed a concurrent term of 16 months. Shannon filed a timely notice of appeal in September 2024. His opening brief was filed in January 2026, and this case was fully briefed on June 2, 2026.

4 The jury was unable to reach a verdict on one count of attempted murder and one count of shooting at an occupied vehicle. The trial court declared a mistrial on those counts. And while the jury found Shannon not guilty on one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, it found him guilty of the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon.

8 DISCUSSION I Substantial Evidence for the Possession Offenses In his opening brief, Shannon argues substantial evidence supports only one conviction for each of the three distinct possession offenses (being a felon in possession of a firearm, being a felon in possession of ammunition, and possessing an assault weapon) because they are continuing offenses for which he cannot suffer multiple convictions absent proof that, in San Joaquin County, he (1) temporarily relinquished possession of the relevant contraband or (2) possessed different firearms and “different batches of ammunition.” The People agree that because the prosecutor proceeded under the theory that Shannon used the same AR-15 for his offenses and there is no evidence that he ever relinquished possession of the AR-15, the “continuing offense” rule mandates reversal of one conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and one conviction for possessing an assault weapon. But the People maintain substantial evidence supports Shannon’s two convictions for being a felon in possession of ammunition because he possessed “multiple items” of ammunition at different times and locations. In the reply brief, Shannon asserts the People’s argument (1) contravenes binding California Supreme Court law and (2) misconstrues other case law. Regarding the other case law, Shannon contends the authorities the People invoke contemplate multiple convictions for possession of contraband when a defendant “engage[s] in separate and distinct acts of possession over separate and distinct groups or caches of contraband.” (Italics omitted.) Shannon maintains, “The multiple convictions in these cases were not sustained based on evidence that the defendant possessed the same cache of contraband on separate occasions or at different places.” We accept the People’s concessions and reverse one conviction for being a felon in possession of firearm and one conviction for possessing an assault weapon. But we 9 will affirm the convictions for possession of ammunition because Shannon’s unpersuasive arguments fail to carry his burden to show error on appeal. A. Possession of the AR-15 “[P]ossession of a firearm by a felon is a continuing offense. [Citations.] ‘The concept of a continuing offense is well established. For present purposes, it may be formulated in the following terms: “Ordinarily, a continuing offense is marked by a continuing duty in the defendant to do an act which he fails to do. The offense continues as long as the duty persists, and there is a failure to perform that duty.” [Citations.] Thus, when the law imposes an affirmative obligation to act, the violation is complete at the first instance the elements are met. It is nevertheless not completed as long as the obligation remains unfulfilled. “The crime achieves no finality until such time.” ’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘In the case of continuing offenses, only one violation occurs even though the proscribed conduct may extend over [an] indefinite period.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Mason (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 355, 365 (Mason).) In Mason, the appellate court reversed all but one of the defendant’s four convictions for possessing the same firearm on four different dates, explaining that while the evidence showed possession of the firearm on each of the four dates, “there was no evidence that … possession of the firearm was anything but continuous over the period encompassing the four dates.” (Mason, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 366.) Thus, the “crime was complete” when the defendant “first possessed the gun because he violated the duty imposed by the statute not to do so. [Citation.] But the crime continued—as a single offense—for as long as the same possession continued, i.e., so long as [the defendant] continued to violate his duty under the statute.” (Ibid.) The court rejected the People’s contention that because “possession occurred at various times and places, and with various objectives” all four convictions were proper, reasoning: “[r]egardless of the circumstances of [the defendant’s] possession, [his] crime was not completed until the possession ceased.” (Id. at p. 367.)

10 We agree with the parties that, under Mason, Shannon may suffer only one conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and only one conviction for possession of an assault weapon. This is so because, as the People concede, no evidence at trial indicated Shannon’s possession of the AR-15 was anything but continuous during the relevant timeframe of his offenses. (Mason, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 366.) Accordingly, one of Shannon’s convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm must be reversed and one of his convictions for possession of an assault weapon must be reversed. The parties do not agree on which convictions must be reversed. Because there will be a full resentencing, we need not decide the issue. The trial court can decide on remand. B. Possession of Ammunition 1. The Unpersuasive Contention that the People Misconstrue the Case Law The People contend we should affirm Shannon’s two convictions for unlawful possession of ammunition because “possession of multiple items of a single category of contraband may support multiple … convictions if the contraband is possessed at different times or at different locations.” Shannon argues the People misconstrue the cases they invoke for this proposition. He insists the cases the People cite stand for the proposition that multiple convictions for possession of contraband are proper when a defendant engaged in “separate and distinct acts of possession over separate and distinct groups or caches of contraband,” “not … the same cache of contraband on separate occasions or at different places.” Shannon’s analysis of the cases is not cogent. Therefore, he has not demonstrated error and we will affirm his convictions for unlawful possession of ammunition. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate … 11 error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) “To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis … that support[s] the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; see United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153 [“ ‘to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis’ ”].) “We are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) As framed by the parties,5 the question for us to resolve is who has the better reading of three cases: People v. Sample (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1253 (Sample), People v. Von Latta (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 329 (Von Latta), and United States v. Gann (9th Cir. 1984) 732 F.2d 714 (Gann). Are the cases more supportive of the People’s contention that possession of multiple items of a single category of contraband at multiple locations can support multiple convictions, or of Shannon’s contention that multiple convictions require possession of distinct groups or caches of contraband at multiple locations? The cases are more supportive of the People’s contention. In Sample, police officers discovered child pornography on three electronic devices: two found in the defendant’s backpack and one found in the defendant’s storage shed. A jury convicted the defendant of three counts of possession of child pornography; one count for each device. On appeal, the defendant argued only one conviction for simultaneous possession of multiple images of child pornography was proper. The appellate court agreed with the People that two convictions were proper. (Sample, supra, 5 See Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th 611, 627 and footnote 4 (accepting the parties’ framing of an issue and declining to consider a related, undisputed issue); Mesa Shopping Center-East, LLC v. O Hill (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 890, 903, footnote 6 (“We accept the parties’ framing of the issue”).

12 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1257.) The court reasoned that the defendant could not suffer multiple convictions for the child pornography found on the two devices in his backpack, but could suffer one conviction for the child pornography found on the devices in his backpack and a second conviction for the “separate and distinct” “act of constructively possessing child pornography in the [device] found in his storage shed.” (Id. at p. 1259.) The court further reasoned that while case law teaches that (1) “the simultaneous possession of multiple items of one type of contraband constitutes a single violation” and (2) “the simultaneous possession of two types of contraband in the same location constitutes a single violation,” case law also teaches that (3) “possession offenses occurring at different times and locations, even if they occurred on the same day, are separate and distinct acts supporting separate convictions.” (Id. at pp. 1258-1259.) Contrary to Shannon’s argument, Sample does not stand for the proposition that multiple convictions for possession of contraband are proper only when someone possesses “separate and distinct groups or caches of contraband.” Nothing in the opinion suggests the defendant had distinct images of child pornography on his electronic devices.6 He may have had the exact same images on all his devices. For our purposes, the pertinent holding of the case is that multiple convictions were proper: one for possessing images in a backpack and another for possessing images in a storage shed.

6 A “cache” is “a hidden store of things, or the place where they are kept.” (Cambridge Dict. Online (2026) <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/cache> [as of Sept. __, 2026], italics added.) A “group” is a “number of people or things that are put together or considered as a unit.” (Cambridge Dict. Online (2026) <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/group> [as of Sept. __, 2026], italics added.) Shannon’s phrase “separate and distinct groups or caches” thus appears to be about the things themselves. To the extent Shannon means something else, it was his burden to present a more developed argument. “We are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)

13 This is more consistent with the People’s position that possession of multiple items of a “single category” of contraband at multiple locations can support multiple convictions. In Von Latta, a case that Sample relied on, “police officers found the defendant in someone else’s home with a marijuana pipe in his hand. The officers found additional marijuana on a table in the same room. [Citation.] Six hours later, the officers searched the defendant’s home, which was approximately 30 miles away from where they arrested the defendant, and found four pounds of marijuana hidden in the defendant’s garage. [Citation.] On appeal, the defendant argued he could not be separately convicted for his actual possession of marijuana at someone else’s home and his constructive possession of marijuana in his garage, as these two offenses constituted a single act. [Citation.] The appellate court disagreed, reasoning that possession offenses occurring at different times and locations, even if they occurred on the same day, are separate and distinct acts supporting separate convictions. [Citation.]” (Sample, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1259.) Contrary to Shannon’s argument, Von Latta does not stand for the proposition that multiple convictions for possession of contraband are proper only when someone possesses “separate and distinct groups or caches of contraband.” The appellate court explained that even if the marijuana in the pipe and on the table in the other person’s home was “a part of the marijuana in the garage” in the defendant’s home, that fact did not undermine the opinion’s reasoning. (Von Latta, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 339.) Thus, Von Latta does not require distinct caches of contraband for multiple possession offenses. In Gann, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s two convictions for “receipt of ammunition under [18 U.S.C.] § 922(h)” because the ammunition was “stored in separate places”: his vehicle and his home. (Gann, supra, 732 F.2d at p. 721.) The court analogized the storage of ammunition in separate places to the “evil described” in other federal cases, which held that receipt of firearms at different 14 times permits multiple convictions, because otherwise convicted felons could “ ‘establish armories where all their weapons would be kept … [and yet] be subject to only a single count of possession.’ ” (Ibid.) While different kinds of ammunition were found in Gann,7 this fact was unimportant to the court’s reasoning. The important thing was that the ammunition was “stored in separate places.” (Ibid. [“We believe the evil described in” other federal cases “applies with equal force to ammunition stored in separate places. Under such circumstances multiple counts charging a violation of [18 U.S.C.] § 922(h) are proper” (italics added)].) Thus, Gann does not stand for the proposition that multiple convictions for possession of contraband are proper only when someone possesses “separate and distinct groups or caches of contraband.” The reasoning of the case is closer to the People’s position that possession of multiple items of a single category of contraband at multiple locations can support multiple convictions. Shannon’s analysis of the common thread running through Sample, Von Latta, and Gann is unpersuasive. Therefore, his analysis does not carry his burden to demonstrate error justifying reversal of his convictions for unlawful possession of ammunition. 2. People v. Bland Also unpersuasive is Shannon’s contention that the People’s argument for affirmance of his ammunition offenses contravenes People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991 (Bland). Specifically, Shannon maintains the People’s argument contravenes the holding of Bland—that the possession of drugs is a single crime that extends over the entire time period that the defendant asserts dominion and control over the contraband— because it would allow a defendant’s continuous possession of contraband to be “fragmented into temporally discrete violations based on evidence that he continued to 7 “[S]hotgun ammunition,” was found in vehicle and “rifle ammunition” was found in the home. (Gann, supra, 732 F.2d at p. 721.)

15 possess the same collection or cache of contraband at different times or places.” We are not persuaded. In Bland, officers who searched the defendant’s home while he was in a police car outside “retrieved from defendant’s bedroom closet 17.95 grams of rock cocaine in a plastic baggie. A nearby duffel bag contained items commonly associated with the sale or manufacture of cocaine base: a gram scale, plastic baggies, and Pyrex glass containers, some bearing white residue. In the same room, under the bed, was a cache of unloaded firearms, including an assault weapon.” (Bland, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 995.) The question presented was whether even though the defendant was outside when the police seized the drugs and gun inside his house, he was subject to a sentencing enhancement for being armed with a firearm in the commission of the offense of illegal possession of drugs. (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court answered in the affirmative (ibid.), explaining: “Drug possession is indeed a ‘continuing’ offense, one that extends through time. Thus, throughout the entire time the defendant asserts dominion and control over illegal drugs, the defendant is criminally liable for the drug possession. [Citations.] And when, at any time during the commission of the felony drug possession, the defendant can resort to a firearm to further that offense, the defendant satisfies the statutory language of being ‘armed with a firearm in the commission … of a felony.’ ” (Bland, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 999; see id. at pp. 1001-1002 [“The crime scene in a drug possession case is the place where the defendant keeps his or her cache of illegal drugs. A firearm kept near the drugs creates an ongoing risk of serious injury or death from use of the weapon to protect the defendant during a drug sale, to guard against theft of the drugs, or to ward off police.”].) One problem with Shannon’s contention that the People’s argument contravenes Bland is that Von Latta is one of the two cases Bland cites for the proposition that a defendant is criminally liable for drug possession throughout their dominion and control of the drug. (Bland, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 999.) Specifically, our Supreme Court cited 16 pages 340 to 341 of Von Latta. (Bland, at p. 999.) And the paragraph of Von Latta that straddles pages 340 and 341 says: “It is proper to note the offense of possession of the marijuana in” the defendant’s “garage was a continuing offense, occurring through conduct constituting actual possession while defendant was in [his] house, and through conduct constituting constructive possession while he was in [the other person’s house]. [Citation.] However, this fact does not furnish a basis for holding the possession incident to the … offense” at defendant’s house “and the possession of the marijuana in” the other person’s house “were parts of an indivisible course of conduct. Each offense was the product of an independent transaction. [Citation.]” (Von Latta, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at pp. 340-341, italics added.) This paragraph is one link in a chain of reasoning regarding why multiple convictions for possession of the same contraband can be proper, a notion that is in tension with Shannon’s apparent understanding of Bland. Further, and contrary to Shannon’s suggestion, Bland says nothing one way or the other about the possession of “the same collection or cache of contraband at different times or places.” The case is concerned with possession of a cache of illegal drugs in the same place as a firearm. Nor does Bland discuss the question of when it may be proper or improper to suffer multiple convictions for possession of the same contraband. Cases are not authority for points not considered. (People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 945, fn. 7.) Accordingly, we will reverse one of Shannon’s two convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm (for which the trial court imposed consecutive eight-month terms) and one of his two convictions for possession of an assault weapon (for which the trial court imposed and stayed consecutive two-year terms). But we will affirm his convictions for unlawful possession of ammunition (for which the trial court imposed and stayed consecutive two-year terms). This disposition means Shannon must be resentenced. (People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 45-46 [“The full resentencing rule … dictates that ‘when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for 17 resentencing “a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.” ’ ”].) II Alleged Instructional Error Regarding the Possession Offenses Shannon contends the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the essential elements of the three distinct possession offenses he was charged with, and therefore only one conviction for each offense is proper. Specifically, Shannon contends the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it could not return guilty verdicts on two separate counts of the same possession offense unless it found Shannon temporarily relinquished possession of the contraband or had separate firearms and separate “quantities of ammunition.” Having conceded that one of Shannon’s convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm must be reversed and one of his convictions for possession of an assault weapon must be reversed, the People argue—consistent with their argument regarding the substantial evidence for the convictions—that both of his convictions for unlawful possession of ammunition can stand because Shannon ignores the exception to the continuing offense rule when someone has “multiple items of a single category” of contraband. To the extent Shannon’s argument on this issue relies on the same understanding of the case law that his substantial evidence argument relies on, we reject the argument for similar reasons: Shannon’s analysis of the case law is not persuasive. To the extent Shannon’s argument on this issue rests on his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as elucidated by Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, we explain below why we reject the argument. Shannon’s Apprendi argument appears to be that (1) because Apprendi stands for the proposition that (other than the fact of a prior conviction) “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and, proved beyond a reasonable doubt” (Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. at p.

18 490), and (2) because a jury finding of temporary relinquishment of the ammunition or possession of separate “quantities” of ammunition “permits the prosecution to obtain” a second conviction for violating section 30305, subdivision (a)(1), then (3) such a finding “increases the statutory maximum punishment (i.e., it permits a second conviction)” and (4) therefore must be submitted to the jury. This argument is forfeited on appeal because it was not raised in the trial court.8 And on the merits, the argument (specifically, its third step) is unpersuasive because it rests on a flawed understanding of Apprendi: the punishment for a crime is not the same thing as the number of times that a defendant can be found to have committed the crime. In other words, a second conviction does not increase the penalty for a crime; it increases the potential aggregate punishment due to multiple crimes. In this way, Shannon appears to be conflating Apprendi concepts and Double Jeopardy Clause concepts. (Cf. People v. Izaguirre (2007) 42 Cal.4th 126, 131-133 [explaining that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against, inter alia, multiple 8 The parties did not address forfeiture of this issue in their briefing. But “the parties had the opportunity to brief forfeiture, a rule always implicated when an argument is raised for the first time on appeal. (See People v. Alice (2007) 41 Cal.4th 668, 679 [‘The parties need only have been given an opportunity to brief the issue decided by the court, and the fact that a party does not address an issue, mode of analysis, or authority that is raised or fairly included within the issues raised does not implicate the protections of [Government Code] section 68081’ (italics added)].)” (People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 798, fn. 6.)

While a failure to object to a jury instruction does not forfeit the issue on appeal if the alleged error concerns elements of the offense (People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-1012), Shannon’s Apprendi argument is at least one step removed from an argument about the elements of section 30305, subdivision (a)(1). And the general rule is that an argument not raised in the trial court is forfeited on appeal, including constitutional arguments. (See People v. Marchand (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1060- 1061 [ruling an Apprendi argument was forfeited because it was not raised in the trial court].)

19 punishments for the same offense, whereas Apprendi “is not grounded on principles of federal double jeopardy protection”]; Pollack v. Duff (D.C. Cir. 2015) 793 F.3d 34, 39-40 [correctly “[i]dentifying the relevant source of [a] right … invoked in a particular case is essential because” courts have “developed different doctrines to analyze” those different sources].) Accordingly, we reject this claim. III Jury Unanimity on the Possession Offenses Shannon contends only one conviction for each possession offense is proper because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it had to reach unanimous agreement as to the pertinent act of possession for each offense. Specifically, Shannon argues the prosecution failed to elect a factual theory concerning Shannon’s conduct that the operative charging document alleged happened on or about August 18, 2020 (counts 5, 7, & 9), and the jury could have based its convictions on those counts on either the storage facility incident or the Highway 12 incident. The People contend the prosecutor did make a clear election of a factual theory and, in any event, any error is harmless because defense counsel admitted in closing argument that Shannon was guilty of all the charged possession offenses. Shannon is silent regarding his trial counsel’s admission during closing argument. We agree that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “[W]hen the evidence suggests more than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) But if the defendant does not deny his guilt on the offense, instructional error on this concept is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Deletto (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 458, 463-464, 470, 473.) Here, as noted above and apparently for tactical reasons, defense counsel conceded Shannon’s guilt on the ammunition offenses and offered nothing in defense of them in closing argument, stating, “[M]y client’s testimony affirms this allegation.”

20 Accordingly, any instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Deletto, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 470, 473.) IV Substantial Evidence for the Dissuasion Offenses Shannon argues his convictions for the October 2020 dissuasion offenses (counts 11 & 12) are not supported by substantial evidence, because while his acts may show an intent to influence testimony (“If she just tells … the DA” “[I] wasn’t there” “I could be out”), they do not show an intent to dissuade either A.S. or Silva from testifying. In the reply brief, he concedes that his exclamation (“Why the fuck are they here?”) at the February 1, 2021 hearing when A.S. and Silva entered the courtroom for his preliminary hearing “might provide evidence of [his] state of mind” in October 2020, but he maintains the exclamation “cannot change the nature of [his] phone calls and the outcome he directed his associates to attempt to achieve—to get [A.S.] to lie,” not to dissuade her from testifying. We are not persuaded. A. Legal Background “Section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2) prohibits ‘[k]nowingly and maliciously attempt[ing] to prevent or dissuade any witness or victim from attending or giving testimony at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law.’ ” (People v. Wahidi (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 802, 806 (Wahidi).) “The circumstances in which the defendant’s statement is made, not just the statement itself, must be considered to determine whether the statement constitutes an attempt to dissuade a witness from testifying. [Citation.] If the defendant’s actions or statements are ambiguous, but reasonably may be interpreted as intending to achieve the future consequence of dissuading the witness from testifying, the offense has been committed.” (Ibid.) Section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2) does not criminalize attempts to influence testimony; section 137 does that. (See People v. Morones (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 721, 738.)

21 A defendant’s statements made after the commission of a criminal act may be probative of the defendant’s intent during the commission of that act. (See People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 250; People v. One 1948 Chevrolet Convertible Coupe (1955) 45 Cal.2d 613, 621.) And the case law recognizes that spontaneous statements made while under the stress of excitement caused by an event perceived by the declarant are more trustworthy than nonspontaneous statements. (People v. Brenn (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 166, 172-173.) Whether the prosecution relies on direct evidence or circumstantial evidence, we review a claim of insufficient evidence by viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1117-1118.) A conviction may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a finding contrary to the one the jury made. (Ibid.) We must affirm unless sufficient substantial evidence does not support the finding under any hypothesis and we must accept any logical inferences the jury could draw from the circumstantial evidence. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established, but it may not be based on speculation. (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 360.) B. Analysis Here, the jury heard evidence that in one October 2020 telephone call, after confirming that his girlfriend would be able to write down what he was about to say, Shannon told her Silva’s first and last names and where he lived. And in that same conversation, Shannon instructed his girlfriend to tell A.S. that “if she knows what’s best for her, you know, I wasn’t there.” He continued: “If she just tells my attorney or tells the DA a few simple things, I could be out that night. If she knows what’s best for her, 22 really.” And: “Tell her she’s being watched.” He then explained to his girlfriend where members of a criminal street gang lived. After that phone conversation, Shannon’s girlfriend went to see the gang members, showed them a picture of Silva, told them Silva’s name, and told them Silva said that Shannon shot at him. The jury heard evidence that in a different October 2020 telephone call, Shannon told an acquaintance, “the bitch” “just needs to know, you know, in her best interest, you know what I mean? Like just tell her she’s being watched. And tell her fuckin’ to comply.” Shannon advised his acquaintance that “[s]he gotta show up there on … the date.” He continued: “[J]ust wear your COVID mask and then … after that just” “get the fuck outta there.” Shannon admitted to the jury that he told A.S. “there was money on her head and … people” were “looking for her” and that this statement implied he “put a hit out on her.” And A.S. testified she was contacted multiple times and urged not to testify against Shannon; once at gunpoint. Given this evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that, in October 2020, Shannon attempted to dissuade A.S. and Silva from testifying. (Wahidi, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 806 [“If the defendant’s actions or statements are ambiguous, but reasonably may be interpreted as intending to achieve the future consequence of dissuading the witness from testifying, the offense has been committed.”].) Regarding A.S., the combination of (1) her testimony indicating that she was urged not to testify at least 10 times, including at least once at gunpoint; (2) Shannon’s admissions on the witness stand that he told A.S. “there was money on her head and … people” were “looking for her”; and (3) the two October 2020 jail telephone conversations wherein Shannon instructed his girlfriend and an acquaintance to tell A.S. that she was being watched, permit the determination that, in October 2020, Shannon purposely set the wheels in motion so that others would (and did) threaten A.S. not to testify.

23 Even if a statement to his girlfriend in October 2020 might reasonably be reconciled with a finding that Shannon wanted A.S. to give false testimony (and say that he “wasn’t there”), that is not a basis for concluding the evidence was insufficient to support the dissuasion finding. (People v. Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1118.) And contrary to Shannon’s suggestion, the jury reasonably could have determined that his spontaneous February 2021 exclamation when A.S. and Silva entered the courtroom during his preliminary hearing (“Why the fuck are they here?”) was probative of the intent animating his October 2020 conduct (People v. Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 250; People v. One 1948 Chevrolet Convertible Coupe, supra, 45 Cal.2d at p. 621; People v. Brenn, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 172-173), and indicated his surprise and disappointment that his efforts to dissuade A.S. from testifying, which began in October 2020, had apparently failed. Regarding Silva, the fact that Shannon gave Silva’s name and address to his girlfriend during the same jail telephone conversation in which he made statements that support a finding that he was directing his girlfriend to dissuade A.S. from testifying, permits the inference that he gave Silva’s name and address to his girlfriend for the same reason. (Wahidi, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 806 [“The circumstances in which the defendant’s statement is made, not just the statement itself, must be considered to determine whether the statement constitutes an attempt to dissuade a witness from testifying.”].) And evidence that, after Shannon hinted at it, his girlfriend later visited members of a criminal street gang—and showed them a picture of Silva, told them Silva’s name, and told them Silva said that Shannon shot at him—buttresses that inference and permits other inferences: Shannon expected his girlfriend to convey this information to the criminal gang members who, in turn, would try to find Silva and dissuade him from testifying. Accordingly, this claim is not persuasive.

24 V Shannon’s Other Contentions Because the trial court must resentence Shannon, we need not address his contention that the trial court improperly failed to stay the punishment for either the burglary offense or the receiving stolen property offense. (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 425 [“A court conducting a full resentencing also may, as appropriate, revisit sentencing choices such as a decision to stay a sentence”].) Similarly, we need not address Shannon’s contentions (which the People agree with) regarding (a) his custody credits (see People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37 [“having modified defendant’s sentence on remand,” the trial court “was obliged, in its new abstract of judgment, to credit him with all actual days he had spent in custody … up to that time”]), (b) the trial court’s order prohibiting him from owning or possessing “any weapon,” and (c) errors in the abstract of judgment. DISPOSITION One of Shannon’s convictions for being a felon in possession of a firearm is reversed, as is one of his convictions for possession of an assault weapon. His other convictions are affirmed. Shannon’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for a full resentencing.

/s/ BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/ MAURO, Acting P. J.

/s/ KRAUSE, J.