In re S.P. CA2/3

Opinion

Filed 9/21/26 In re S.P. CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re S.P., a Person Coming B352283 Under the Juvenile Court Law. Los Angeles County LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 24CCJP03064 AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. V.D., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Tara Newman, Judge. Affirmed. Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Giselle Marie Achecar, for Defendant and Appellant. Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn Louie, Assistant County Counsel, Melania Vartanian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _________________________ Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights under section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code1 as to her child S.P. (born December 2023). She argues the court erred in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to the termination of parental rights did not apply. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 After mother filed this appeal, a different panel of this division affirmed, on May 21, 2026, the juvenile court’s March 11, 2025 order sustaining a section 342 petition filed on S.P.’s behalf, and April 10, 2025 orders removing S.P. from mother and denying mother family reunification services. (In re S.P. (May 21, 2026, B346869) [nonpub. opn.].) We incorporate by reference the facts and procedural history leading up to those orders, which are set forth in our May 21, 2026 opinion. We summarize the facts and procedural history that occurred after the April 10, 2025 hearing. 1. Twelve-month review period On May 20, 2025, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed its status report for the 12-month review hearing. As of that date, then 17-month-old S.P. remained in the licensed foster home of caregivers Mr. and 1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 Father is not a party to this appeal. We do not include facts relating to father unless relevant to the issues in mother’s appeal or as background.

2 Mrs. G., where she first had been placed in September 2024.3 DCFS observed S.P. to have a healthy bond with her caregivers. They provided “excellent care and supervision” for S.P., and had given the child “structure, stability, and [a] safe environment.” On April 10, 2025, the juvenile court had ordered mother to have monitored visits with S.P. three times per week, for three hours each visit. The court’s earlier December 27, 2024 order awarded mother monitored visits twice per week. From February 3, 2025 to May 16, 2025, mother had arrived on time to nine of 22 visits and had arrived late to three visits. Mother was a “no-show” or had canceled nine visits, and one visit had been canceled, apparently not by mother. Mother’s visits were monitored by a DCFS Human Services Aide and sometimes by the caregivers. DCFS noted that, during visits, mother was “attentive” to S.P.’s emotional needs. She was “observed to be able to soothe [S.P.] when she is in distress and work with the current caretakers to ensure emotional stability.” Mother was appropriate with S.P. and “able to maintain a positive bond.” DCFS reported: “Mother has continued to engage the child appropriately with a loving and nurturing bond.” Mother was living with maternal grandmother on whom she relied for transportation to visits. DCFS noted both parents’ family members participated in visits with S.P. and attended court hearings. DCFS recommended the court terminate father’s 3 On December 6, 2024, the court ordered S.P. released to mother’s custody. S.P. again was placed with the G.s a few weeks later when mother and father engaged in the violent altercation—described in our earlier opinion—that led the court to sustain the section 342 petition.

3 reunification services and set a section 366.26 permanency hearing. On June 9, 2025, DCFS updated the court about mother’s visitation in a last minute information report (LMI). After the May 16 visit, mother had four more visits scheduled for May but missed them all. Mother was a no-show to a visit that had been rescheduled to the next day, missed one due to an emergency and one due to illness, and gave no reason for canceling the fourth visit. At the June 11 review hearing, the juvenile court terminated father’s reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. 2. Section 366.26 report DCFS filed its section 366.26 report on September 24, 2025. The report described mother’s visits through June 16, 2025—the last date mother had visited S.P., as of September 11. During the monitored visits, mother was appropriate with and attentive to S.P. Mother brought S.P. food and fed her, changed her diaper, read to her, played and watched videos with S.P., brought her toys, and engaged her in learning activities and coloring. During visits, mother and S.P. were affectionate with each other, and S.P. was happy to see mother. In addition to the missed visits already described, mother failed to show up for her June 4 visit. Mother arrived on time for her visit on June 16 but took a call from father and stayed on the phone for about 30 minutes. The report included a “Caden C. [a]nalysis.”4 From November 1, 2024 through June 16, 2025, mother attended 26 4 In In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.), our high court articulated the factors relevant to determining the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption.

4 of 39 scheduled visits but was late 13 times. She canceled three visits and was a “ ‘no[-]show’ ” to 10 visits. For one of those no-shows in March 2025, had mother canceled in advance, the caregiver would not have woken S.P.—who had congestion— and taken her out of the house in the rain. Mother’s visits with S.P. were positive: she interacted appropriately with S.P., showed her affection, and attended to her needs. Mother talked to S.P. “in a soft tone, and calmed her down by holding her.” DCFS noted mother’s missed visits may not have affected S.P. at her young age but could “affect the attachment [mother was] building with [S.P.].” And, as S.P. “grows older, she will become accustomed to visit[ing] her mother, therefore any missed appointments, without any explanation, would eventually affect [S.P.’s] emotional health.” DCFS also noted mother was “limited” in meeting S.P.’s needs as mother had contact with S.P. only during monitored visits and had not had a visit since June 2025. At one year and ten months old, S.P could not express her feelings about her relationship with mother. During visits, S.P. reacted positively to mother, smiling when mother talked to or played with her. S.P. appeared to enjoy her visits with mother. DCFS noted there were times, however, when mother wanted to lie on the couch but S.P. “wanted to get down and continue to play.” Mother also “would take time for herself and go to the restroom for 5–20 minutes” when maternal grandmother joined the visit. DCFS concluded there was “no clear evidence of a significant, positive, emotional attachment from the child to the mother, as the child is young and appears to be friendly with everyone.” S.P. greeted mother “happily” and was “comfortable in her presence during visits.” But S.P. also did “well” when 5 the visits ended and “greets her caregiver in the same manner she greets . . . mother.” Parents raised S.P. during her first nine months. The rest of her short life—save for three weeks when mother temporarily regained custody—had been under the care of the prospective adoptive parents, the G.s. DCFS did not believe mother’s limited and lack of contact with S.P. appeared to have “any detrimental effect” on S.P. Due to S.P.’s young age, DCFS believed there “would be no negative effects to severing the relationship between” S.P. and mother. DCFS noted the opposite—that “continuing contact with the parents would negatively affect [S.P.]’s emotional stability and would likely lead to behavioral issues in the future.” Due to S.P.’s young age, DCFS opined that another permanent plan short of adoption would not be appropriate. DCFS noted S.P. needed “a stable, loving and nurturing home where her needs are being met so she can develop appropriately, without the risk of being abused or neglected.” DCFS acknowledged mother had maintained “partial regular contact with” S.P. but often was late and failed to show up without notice about 10 times. DCFS also noted that, while mother was appropriate during her visits, she did not abide by the rules at some visits, took long restroom breaks without explanation, and stopped scheduling visits in June 2025. DCFS recommended adoption as S.P.’s permanent plan and that the court terminate parents’ parental rights. 3. Mother’s section 388 petition On October 3, 2025, mother filed a request to change court order under section 388, asking the court to reinstate her family reunification services. The petition argued that, since the court 6 terminated her reunification services, mother had “completed multiple parenting classes, an anger management class, [a] domestic violence course, and [wa]s actively participating in individual counseling.” The petition further argued that mother was “showing consistent effort in improving herself and is committed to providing a safe and supportive environment for her children.” The petition also asserted that granting mother further reunification services and visitation would strengthen mother’s and S.P.’s “parent and child bond and relationship, foster a sense of security for the child, and promote social/ cognitive development.” The petition noted mother had been “consistent with her visits throughout this case.” The petition attached certificates of completion for mother’s parenting, anger management, and domestic violence courses. The court set mother’s petition for a hearing on November 14, 2025. On October 31, 2025, DCFS filed a response to mother’s section 388 petition. DCFS stated mother’s visits had “often been inconsistent throughout the life of the case,” but noted, “[m]ost recently” she had participated in visits and arrived timely. DCFS acknowledged mother had completed parenting classes but stated she had “failed to address the issues of the case by maintaining a relationship with” father. The court’s December 6, 2024 order prohibited mother from monitoring father’s visits with S.P. or allowing him to have contact with the child “ ‘outside of DCFS approved visits,’ ” and its April 10, 2025 order prohibited parents from visiting together. DCFS noted that, on October 3, 2025, mother sent father a photograph of mother holding S.P. during her visit with S.P. at the DCFS office. DCFS also noted parents had continued “to engage in a relationship, without addressing their relationship issues” that led to their struggle 7 with domestic violence. DCFS recommended mother’s reunification services remain terminated. DCFS updated the court in a November 13, 2025 LMI. A social worker from the foster family agency (FFA) recently had been assigned to monitor mother’s visits at the DCFS office. On October 30, 2025, mother had made a video call to father during her visit with S.P. DCFS noted mother knew she was not to contact father during her scheduled visits. The social worker met with mother and again told her not to contact father during her visits or to “assist with monitoring” father’s visits.5 Mother said she “ ‘didn’t know’ ” because she had video-called father during visits monitored by S.P.’s caregivers, and they had never said anything. After the November 14, 2025 hearing, the court denied mother’s section 388 petition, finding her circumstances were changing, not changed. 4. Additional section 366.26 reports On November 12, 2025, the local Regional Center informed DCFS that S.P. was eligible for Regional Center services due to developmental delay. On November 20, 2025, DCFS provided an update on mother’s recent visits with S.P. in an addendum report. Mother participated in monitored visits at the DCFS office on October 27 and 30, and November 3, 10, and 17. Except for the video call with father on October 30, and mother not putting S.P.’s pants or shoes on during another visit, the monitors reported no concerns.

5 Father was incarcerated and participated in video calls with S.P., monitored by her caregivers. He was scheduled to be released on November 20, 2025.

8 Mother was appropriate with S.P. during her visits. She was attentive and affectionate toward S.P., played with and read to her, spoke to her in a “calm and loving tone,” brought S.P. food, and changed her diaper as needed. S.P. appeared to enjoy the visits. S.P.’s grandmothers also participated in visits. DCFS also provided an updated Caden C. analysis. DCFS noted that, from November 1, 2024 through November 19, 2025, mother participated in 31 of 44 scheduled visits. She had no new late or no-show visits. Mother’s interactions with S.P. remained positive. DCFS noted, however, that mother went four months— between June 16 and October 27, 2025—without visiting S.P.6 S.P. did not appear to have been negatively affected by mother’s absence, however. When mother began visiting S.P. again, “there was no change to [S.P.’s] behavior.” DCFS reported that during one of mother’s recent visits, she had not corrected S.P. when the child wrote on mother’s shirt and had not ensured S.P. was appropriately clothed during the visit. DCFS noted S.P. was “at an age where she is able to learn boundaries and should be taught about wrong and right behavior. In addition, in order to have a sense of safety, consistent and appropriate discipline is needed for [S.P.’s] caregivers.” Mother had been “more engaging” with S.P. during the “last few visits,” however. DCFS restated its earlier analysis and conclusions. It continued to believe adoption was the best permanent plan for S.P. DCFS noted adoption “would provide stability for” S.P., as parents had not addressed their “relationship issues,” father had not achieved or maintained sobriety, and mother “has never 6 As we discuss below, mother in fact resumed her visits earlier in October.

9 been able to reunify with [S.P.’s] half-siblings.” DCFS again noted mother’s lack of visits for four months. 5. LMIs On December 5, 2025, DCFS provided the court with corrected information about mother’s visits. Mother called the DI (dependency investigator) on November 25 after reading DCFS’s report and said visits monitored by the FFA or by S.P.’s caregivers had been omitted. Mother reported 19 visits monitored by the FFA worker or caregivers during October and November 2025. DCFS verified 16 of them. During the call, the DI asked mother why she had stopped visiting S.P. after June 2025. Mother said the social worker had taken her off the visitation schedule after mother had missed several visits. She said she asked to be put back on the schedule but that wasn’t done until she filed a complaint after September 30. Mother also did not agree with the report’s statement that S.P. did not have any issues when their visits ended. Mother said S.P. “always cried,” but mother “calm[ed] her down by giving her a teddy bear or juice.” DCFS noted that, during a November 13 visit monitored by the FFA worker, when S.P. hit mother after mother would not stop tickling her, mother appropriately disciplined S.P. by taking away the phone and telling her not to hit. During the visit, the Regional Center coordinator arrived. S.P.’s cognitive function had been deemed to be that of a 16-month-old rather than a 23-month-old. The Regional Center thus recommended specialized services for S.P. and mother. Mother appeared to deny the need for any services and “did not believe there were any concerns about any delays or behavior for [S.P.].” Mother nevertheless signed the consent forms for the services.

10 The DI also asked mother about “the calls and virtual contact” with father during visits. Mother said the caregivers had asked her to contact father because they had been unable to log into the application required for father’s virtual visits. Mother said she was told on November 6, 2025, after having had several visits since October 3, that she was not allowed to contact father. On December 2, 2025, the DI spoke to the social worker about the misunderstanding about mother’s ability to contact father. The social worker explained that, when mother reached out to re-start her visits, no monitors were available, so FFA staff and caregivers monitored the visits. The social worker had failed to tell them the court order did not allow parents to visit S.P. together. There had been no issues since the November 6 conversation with mother. On December 4, 2025, the DI separately spoke with caregiver Mrs. G. and the FFA worker. Mrs. G. confirmed they had asked mother for assistance because they had not been told parents could not have joint visits. Once they were informed on November 6 about the court order, mother no longer contacted father during her visits. Mrs. G. denied that S.P. cried or was upset after mother’s visits ended. She explained that if S.P. were fussy, it usually was because she was exhausted after the visit. Mrs. G. said that once they returned home from the visit, S.P “takes a nap and is happy when she wakes up.” She stated, “ ‘[S.P.] is always happy to see her mom, but she is always happy to see us, to see her friends, to see others.’ ” The FFA worker also said she hadn’t been aware of the ban on joint visits. Mother reached out to father during three of the visits FFA staff monitored, but no concerns were reported. The 11 FFA worker shared that, although there were “ ‘no immediate concerns,’ ” if parents’ visits were unmonitored, there would be “ ‘concerns.’ ” She mentioned concerns about “parenting choices” during visits: mother giving S.P. unhealthy meals, allowing S.P. to walk barefoot or in socks in the visitation area, and—at the beginning of the case—arguing with father during visits. The FFA worker “never observed [S.P.] being upset when the visits end.” She said, “ ‘Mom says bye and she ([S.P.]) is okay to go.’ ” DCFS again noted that parents began visiting S.P. together, but when issues arose, they were required to visit separately. When parents visited together, mother also “appeared more preoccupied with what . . . father was doing, rather than focusing on [S.P.].” Since father had been incarcerated, mother’s visits had become more regular, and she was more engaged with S.P. But she then stopped visiting S.P. in June, after the court had terminated her reunification services, and did not contact DCFS about reinstating her visits until September. DCFS noted that, since September, mother had been visiting S.P. regularly. By then, S.P. was two years old and had been in parents’ custody for only her first nine months. S.P. had lived with the G.s from September 24, 2024 to December 11, 2024 and since December 23, 2024. DCFS noted mother ensured S.P.’s needs were met during their visits by feeding her, changing her diaper, talking to her in a soft tone, and holding her to calm her. However, monitors had observed mother often fed S.P. unhealthy food, “including junk and fast food,” let S.P. take off her shoes and pants and run around without “grooming her appropriately” when the visit ended, and did not believe S.P. had any delays or behavioral 12 issues that would require services. Although mother had signed the release forms for the services, DCFS stated “mother’s thoughts and feelings about the services can place a barrier in addressing [S.P.’s] development in a timely manner,” if the court were to release S.P. to mother. DCFS’s conclusions and recommendations under its again-updated Caden C. analysis remained the same. DCFS attached the notes of mother’s visits from the FFA. The notes stated mother and S.P. hugged and kissed each other on sight, and S.P. ran toward mother. They expressed their love for one another and were affectionate toward each other. Mother talked to, held, and played with S.P., and read to and cuddled with her. Mother attended to S.P.’s needs: she changed her diaper, brought her food and fed her, did her hair, and groomed her. S.P. called mother “ ‘mommy.’ ” At the end of a visit in November 2025, S.P. told mother she would miss her and loved her and gave mother a hug and kiss. In an LMI filed December 9, 2025, DCFS noted father was parked outside the DCFS office where mother and S.P.’s grandmothers were visiting S.P. for her birthday. Mother had been told father could not participate in her visit with S.P. Mother said she didn’t know he was going to be there. At the December 9, 2025 section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court admitted DCFS’s reports—filed between September and December 2025—into evidence. Minor’s counsel joined DCFS in asking the court to terminate parental rights. She noted S.P. did not “seem to be negatively affected by her mother’s absence or her mother’s presence.” But counsel agreed with DCFS that, as S.P. got older, if mother continued to be “consistent and inconsistent” in her visits, S.P. would be 13 negatively affected. Mother’s counsel asked the court to find that a parental bond existed and to order legal guardianship as S.P.’s permanent plan. Counsel argued the visitation notes showed S.P. was attached positively to mother—she called her “mommy,” was excited to see her, and “respect[ed] and obey[ed] her disciplinary authority.” Counsel argued mother’s relationship with S.P. was “strong enough” that S.P. “would be harmed by its severance.” S.P. was heard telling mother, “ ‘I love you mommy,’ and ‘I miss you mommy.’ ” Counsel noted that, when mother had left S.P. with the monitor to use the restroom, S.P. “kept calling for her mother.” Counsel argued that showed S.P. “[wa]s impacted” even when separated briefly. Counsel didn’t “understand how [DCFS] is willing to risk harming the development of the child by claiming she’s too young to be affected when she is already clearly showing attachment, recognition, and enjoyment with the mother that has been a consistently positive presence for her.” DCFS’s counsel acknowledged mother had visited S.P. but argued her visits were not consistent, as she had missed 10 visits. Counsel argued the interaction between mother and S.P. “confer[red] some benefit” but not enough to constitute “a substantive, positive, emotional attachment.” Finally, DCFS argued the detriment from severing the parental relationship did not outweigh the security and stability S.P. would receive from adoption. Counsel reminded the court that mother had lost custody of four other children, and—when the court gave mother a chance by returning S.P. to her care—“mother promptly got into it with the father,” and the court had to remove the child from mother again.

14 The court found mother had regular visits with S.P. and that the visits had gone well. The court also found the notes of mother’s visits showed S.P. “does have a substantial, positive emotional attachment to her mother. She enjoys playing with her, is happy to see her, tells her she loves her, calls her mommy.” The court found the detriment from severing parental rights did not outweigh the benefit of adoption, however. The court said, “Although it is clear that [S.P.] is close to her mother —mother is very much bonded with [S.P.]. I do find that the benefit of a permanent home through adoption does outweigh the detrimental effect that severing the relationship will have. [¶] [S.P.] has been in the same home for almost a year. It is stable and provides a very emotional and safe environment —emotionally safe environment, physically safe environment. I think that, legally, adoption is the preferred plan, particularly for a minor this young and that the harm of severing her relationship with the parents is outweighed by the stability and sense of belonging that can be provided from a permanent adoptive family.” The court found S.P. was adoptable and ordered mother’s and father’s parental rights terminated. Mother appealed. DISCUSSION 1. Applicable law and standard of review “The sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select and implement a permanent plan for the child after reunification efforts have failed.” (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 851– 852 (J.D.); In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 304; see also 15 § 366.26, subd. (b).) At that stage, the “focus shifts from monitoring the parents’ progress toward reunification to determining the appropriate placement plan for the child.” (Marilyn H., at p. 305.) “The dependency statutes embody a presumptive rule that, after reunification efforts have failed, parental rights must be terminated in order to free a child for adoption.” (J.D., at p. 852, citing Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 630–631.) The juvenile court must select adoption as the permanent plan and terminate parental rights unless it finds doing so would be detrimental to the child under one of several statutory exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); Caden C., at pp. 630–631.) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) codifies one of those exceptions, which is commonly referred to as the “ ‘parental-benefit’ ” or “ ‘beneficial parental relationship’ ” exception. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 625, fn. 2.) The exception applies where “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 852.) Our Supreme Court has clarified the three elements a parent must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish the exception: (1) the parent’s regular visitation and contact with the child; (2) the child’s “substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent,” “the continuation of which would benefit the child”; and (3) the termination of “that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., at pp. 631, 636.)

16 Here, the court found mother established the first two elements of the parental-benefit exception. We thus consider only whether the court erred in finding the benefit of adoption outweighed the detriment to S.P. from terminating the parent- child relationship. In assessing whether terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child, the court must perform a “case-specific inquiry,” asking, “does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh ‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]’ [Citation.] When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–634; see also In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 818 [showing child “ ‘ “would derive some benefit continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation” ’ ” is insufficient to apply parental-benefit exception].) Because the child will not be returned to live with the parent, even if the exception applies, “courts should not look to whether the parent can provide a home for the child; the question is just whether losing the relationship with the parent would harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., at p. 634 [section 366.26 hearing is “not a contest of who would be the better custodial caregiver”].) While the substantial evidence standard of review applies to the first two elements of the parental-benefit exception, “the ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights would 17 be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with his parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) We nevertheless review the factual basis for the juvenile court’s exercise of its discretion for substantial evidence. (Caden C., at p. 641.) In doing so, we do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ ” (Id. at p. 640.) We will uphold a court’s factual determinations if supported by substantial evidence, “ ‘even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) And, where the appellant bore the burden of proof in the trial court—as is the case here— we ask “ ‘whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.’ ” (In re M.V. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 486, 508.) 2. The court did not abuse its discretion In deciding whether S.P. would be harmed by the severance of her relationship with mother to such a degree that the detriment would outweigh the benefits of adoption, the juvenile court had to determine “in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Adverse “effects might include emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression.

18 Yet . . . a new, stable home may alleviate the emotional instability and preoccupation leading to such problems, providing a new source of stability that could make the loss of a parent not, at least on balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.) Based on the visitation notes included with DCFS’s reports, the court found S.P. and mother had a substantial, positive emotional attachment. Mother details her visits with S.P. at length, arguing the weight of the evidence showed they have “a strong and close parent-child bond” and to sever it would greatly harm S.P. The interactions between mother and S.P. described in the visitation notes show they had a positive parent-child bond. Mother provided for S.P.’s needs, played with her, and taught and encouraged her. Mother and S.P. showed each other affection, engaged with each other during visits, and expressed their love for each other. S.P. called mother “mommy.” She was happy to see mother at visits and would run to her. At the end of a visit, S.P. was heard telling mother she’d miss her. Mother didn’t visit S.P. for four months, from June until October 2025—a significant length of time for the young toddler. Yet, as DCFS argues and minor’s counsel noted at the hearing, S.P. did not appear to have been negatively affected by mother’s absence. Mother points to no evidence indicating S.P., for example, began acting out or exhibiting emotional instability or other behavioral issues during that period. Nor does the record suggest S.P.’s behavior changed when mother resumed her visits with S.P. in October. Substantial evidence also shows S.P. easily transitioned back to her caregiver when visitation time with mother ended. DCFS reported S.P. did well when visits were over and “greet[ed] her caregiver in the same manner she greet[ed] . . . mother.” Mother told the DI that S.P. always 19 cried at the end of their visits, but she was able to calm her. When the DI asked Mrs. G. about it, however, she denied that S.P. was upset after ending a visit with mother. She said that if S.P. were fussy, it usually was due to her needing a nap after the visit. After getting home and taking a nap, S.P. woke up happy. Mrs. G. said S.P. was always happy to see mother, but she was also always happy to see friends and others. The FFA worker also had never seen S.P. upset after a visit. After mother told S.P. “ ‘bye,’ ” S.P. was “ ‘okay to go.’ ” S.P. may have had initial sadness when visits came to an end, but the court could reasonably find S.P. remained largely unaffected by having to leave mother. Moreover, as with mother’s four-month absence, nothing in the record suggests S.P. exhibited any behavioral issues or was upset between her visits with mother. And, save for a few weeks in December 2024, S.P.’s interactions with mother since she was nine months old had been limited to monitored visits. On this record, although S.P. may have cried momentarily when her visits with mother were over, and told mother she missed her, the court reasonably could conclude S.P.’s attachment to mother was not so strong that “it would be destabilizing to lose that relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) In short, the evidence did not compel the court to find S.P.’s relationship with mother “promote[d] the well-being of [S.P.] to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being [she] would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) Rather, the record supported the juvenile court’s implicit finding that the security and stability S.P. would receive through adoption would make the loss of her relationship with mother, 20 on balance, not detrimental. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) At only two years old—and suffering from cognitive delays, which mother did not acknowledge—S.P. needed a stable, permanent home where she could develop appropriately. By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, S.P. had spent more than half her life with the G.s. Except for the few weeks S.P. was placed with mother in December 2024, the G.s had been caring for her since she was nine months old. They were attending to her mental, physical, and emotional needs, and had provided her with a stable, nurturing, and safe home where she could thrive. DCFS noted S.P. reached for the G.s when she needed something and was loving toward them. The social worker observed S.P. to be happy, playful, and thriving in the G.s’ care. Although S.P. would lose what the court had found to be a substantial, positive emotional attachment to mother, she would gain stability and permanency from her adoption by the G.s, with whom she also had a positive and loving relationship. On this record, there was more than sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision that termination of S.P.’s beneficial relationship with mother would not harm S.P. “to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) We find no abuse of discretion.

21 DISPOSITION We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ASHWORTH, J. We concur:

ADAMS, P. J.

HANASONO, J.

 Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.