Yanira Trinidad Iriarte-Castillo v. Vernon Liggins, et al.
- Proceeding
- original
- Outcome
- other — (ECF No. 17.) The Government argues Petitioner was 24 only recently taken into custody to effectuate her removal order and that all regulatory 25 requirements were complied with upon arrest. (ECF No. 22.) Petitioner does not respond. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) 28 1 I. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 3 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 525 (2004). “The traditional function of the 4 writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Pr
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cynthia Ann Bashant (author)
Analysis
The court reviewed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion for a temporary restraining order filed by an immigration detainee seeking release from custody. The court denied both the petition and the motion, finding that the detention was presumptively reasonable and that the government complied with regulatory requirements.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Denial of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus“For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Petition (ECF No. 1) and DENIES the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2).” | agree with court The court applied the standard from Zadvydas v. Davis, which establishes a six-month presumption of reasonableness for detention pending removal. The court found that the petitioner had been detained for only just over one month and failed to rebut the presumption that removal was likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Additionally, the court found that the government provided evidence (via declaration) that the petitioner received notice and an opportunity to be heard, and the petitioner did not respond to this evidence. The decision follows from the cited law and the record presented. |
Denial of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order“For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Petition (ECF No. 1) and DENIES the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2).” | agree with court The denial of the TRO is tied to the denial of the underlying habeas petition. Since the court found the detention lawful and presumptively reasonable, there was no basis for immediate injunctive relief. The order does not explicitly state the standard for a TRO (e.g., likelihood of success on the merits), but the outcome is consistent with the finding that the petition lacks merit at this stage. |
The order itself: sound — The order correctly identifies the relevant legal standard from Zadvydas v. Davis for immigration detention pending removal. It applies the presumption of reasonableness to the facts, noting the short duration of detention (one month) and the petitioner's failure to rebut the likelihood of removal. It also addresses the procedural due process claim by noting the government's evidence of compliance and the petitioner's failure to respond. The reasoning is direct and supported by the cited authorities.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 YANIRA TRINIDAD IRIARTE- Case No. 26-cv-04960-BAS-DEB CASTILLO, 12 ORDER: Petitioner, 13 v. (1) DENYING PETITION FOR 14 WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS VERNON LIGGINS, et al., 15 (ECF No. 1); AND Respondents. 16 (2) DENYING MOTION FOR 17 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (ECF No. 2) 18 19 20 Petitioner Yanira Trinidad Iriarte-Castillo filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 21 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order requesting 22 immediate release from immigration custody. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) The District of Maryland 23 transferred the case to this Court. (ECF No. 17.) The Government argues Petitioner was 24 only recently taken into custody to effectuate her removal order and that all regulatory 25 requirements were complied with upon arrest. (ECF No. 22.) Petitioner does not respond. 26 For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the Petition without prejudice and 27 DENIES the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) 28 1 I. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 3 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). “The traditional function of the 4 writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 5 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or 6 she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It 7 applies to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 8 687 (2001). Since Petitioner is in custody and since she is seeking release from custody, 9 she has standing to pursue this Petition. 10 II. ANALYSIS 11 Petitioner has repeatedly entered the United States without inspection and has been 12 previously removed to Guatemala. (Pet. ¶ 17, ECF No. 1.) On February 13, 2023, after 13 withdrawing her claims of fear if again returned to Guatemala, she was ordered removed 14 but allowed to remain in the United States subject to supervised probation. (Id.) On August 15 12, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) notified Petitioner that her 16 supervised probation was being revoked because ICE intended to remove her to Guatemala. 17 (Solares Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 22-1.) She was also given an informal interview during which 18 she was given the opportunity to be heard on her change in status. (Id.) ICE is making 19 arrangements for Petitioner to be returned to Guatemala. (Id.) 20 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court ruled that a six-month period to effectuate removal 21 is presumptively reasonable. 533 U.S. at 701. However, “[a]fter this six-month period, once 22 the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal 23 in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence 24 sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. In addition, “[t]his six-month presumption, of course, 25 does not mean that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To the 26 contrary, an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no 27 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. 28 I In this case, it has been just over a month since Petitioner was taken into custody for 2 purpose of removal. She makes no effort to rebut the presumption that her detention to 3 effectuate removal is presumptively reasonable. Because the Court cannot find, at this 4 ||point, that there is no significant likelihood of removal to Guatemala in the reasonably 5 || foreseeable future, the Court denies the Petition on this ground. 6 Additionally, although the Petition argues Petitioner was not given notice or an 7 || opportunity to be heard before she was taken into custody, the Declaration of Gloria Solares 8 ||submitted by the Government indicates that she was given notice and an informal interview 9 required by the regulations. (Solares Decl. 12.) Petitioner offers no reply to this 10 evidence. Hence, the Court finds ICE complied with all regulations and that, at this point, 11 |/there is a significant likelihood that Petitioner will be removed to Guatemala in the 12 reasonably foreseeable future. 13 CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Petition (ECF No. 1) and 15 || DENIES the Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2). The Clerk of the 16 || Court shall close the case. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 || DATED: September 21, 2026 i ly A (Dipharb 20 Hén. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge 5 United States District Court 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 □□□