Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LI KUN, Case No.: 26-CV-4669 JLS (MMP)

12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 13 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 14 WARDEN, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al., 15 (ECF No. 1) Respondents. 16 17 18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Li Kun’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1), Respondents’ Return to the Petition 20 (“Ret.,” ECF No. 6), and Petitioner’s Traverse (ECF No. 7). 21 Petitioner previously filed two petitions for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court; 22 both were denied. See Li v. LaRose, No. 26-CV-1614-JLS-MMP (“Li I”), ECF No. 6 (S.D. 23 Cal. Apr. 8, 2026); Li v. Warden, Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 26-CV-2551-JLS-AHG (“Li 24 II”), ECF No. 10 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2026). In the instant Petition, Petitioner alleges he is 25 entitled to habeas relief based on prolonged detention and a material change in 26 circumstances. He requests a second bond hearing and, in the alternative, immediate 27 release under reasonable conditions of supervision. Pet. at 3, 15. 28 / / / 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the Petition for a Writ of Habeas 2 Corpus (ECF No. 1). 3 BACKGROUND 4 On or about February 28, 2020, Petitioner, a citizen and national of China, entered 5 the United States on a B-2 visa. Pet. at 5.; Ret. at 1. Petitioner’s visa expired on August 6 17, 2020. Id. On December 23, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained 7 Petitioner at Camp Pendleton and transported him to the Otay Mesa Detention Center. Id. 8 at 2. Petitioner was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for overstaying 9 his visa, issued a Notice to Appear, and placed in removal proceedings. Id at 1. On January 10 23, 2026, Petitioner had a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) pursuant to 8 11 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id. at 2. The IJ denied bond, finding Petitioner failed to satisfy his 12 burden to show that he is not a danger to the community. Pet. at 5. The IJ’s determination 13 was based partially on a 2022 conviction for driving under the influence. Ret. at 3. The IJ 14 also considered Petitioner’s behavior upon his arrest at Camp Pendleton. Pet. at 5. 15 Petitioner timely appealed the bond denial to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), 16 where it remains pending. Id. at 6. 17 On March 14, 2026, Petitioner filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 18 Li I, 26-CV-1614-JLS-MMP, ECF No. 1. The Court denied the petition, finding Petitioner 19 was properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and Petitioner already received a bond 20 hearing pursuant to the statute. Id., ECF No. 6 at 2–3. On April 22, 2026, Petitioner filed 21 a second habeas petition. See Li II, 26-CV-2551-JLS-AHG, ECF No. 1. This Court also 22 denied that petition, finding it to be duplicative. Id., ECF No. 10 at 2. 23 On May 25, 2026, Petitioner was ordered removed to China. Ret. at 3. Petitioner 24 timely appealed the removal order to the BIA, where it remains pending. Id. 25 LEGAL STANDARD 26 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 27 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 28 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 1 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 2 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 3 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 4 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 5 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 6 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 7 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 8 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 9 (citations omitted). 10 DISCUSSION 11 As an initial matter, Petitioner renews his requests for immediate release. Pet. at 15. 12 The Court again concludes Petitioner is not entitled to immediate release for the reasons 13 set forth in his first writ of habeas corpus. See Li I. 14 Petitioner additionally argues that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 15 requires he receive another bond hearing based on continued prolonged detention and a 16 material change in his circumstances. Pet. at 2. 17 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 18 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 19 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 20 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 21 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles 22 aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 23 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the 24 State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 25 (1990). 26 “District courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied the Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 27 319 (1976), test when addressing due process where a petitioner has already been afforded 28 at least one bond hearing.” Hernandez v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-2676-JES-DDL, 2026 WL 1 1471891, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 26, 2026) (collecting cases); see also Singh v. Barr, 400 F. 2 Supp. 3d 1005, 1020–21 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (applying Matthews to determine whether due 3 process required a subsequent bond hearing after a year and two months since the 4 petitioner’s last hearing); Henriquez v. Garland, No. 23-CV-1025-AMO, 2023 WL 5 6226374, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2023) (“The Court finds persuasive that when 6 significant time has passed since a prior bond hearing, a petitioner may seek a second 7 procedurally compliant bond hearing under Matthews.”) (collecting cases). 8 Under Matthews, courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be affected 9 by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 10 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 11 safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved and the 12 fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 13 would entail.” Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334–35. 14 Regarding the first factor, “it is indisputable that ‘the private interest here is 15 fundamental: freedom from imprisonment is at the core of the liberty protected by the Due 16 Process Clause.’” Hernandez, 2026 WL 1471891, at *2 (quoting Hernandez v. Sessions, 17 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017)). However, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that courts 18 should not “overstate the strength of [Petitioner’s] showing under the first Matthews 19 factor.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2022). The Ninth 20 Circuit also reasoned that in evaluating the private interests under the first factor, courts 21 “cannot simply count [the petitioner’s] months of detention and leave it at that.” Id. at 22 1208. Courts “must also consider the process he received during this time, the further 23 process that was available to him, and the fact that his detention was prolonged due to his 24 decision to challenge his removal order.” Id. Additionally, Courts have recognized that 25 this interest is “somewhat diminished” where petitioners have had a prior bond hearing. 26 See Alvarez v. Beccerra, No. 26-CV-00008-DC-SCR, 2026 WL 295552, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 27 Feb. 4, 2026). Here, Petitioner’s detention has not become unduly prolonged. Petitioner 28 has been in custody for almost nine months, and he received a bond hearing about eight 1 months ago. Pet. at 5. Petitioner timely appealed the bond denial to the BIA where it 2 remains pending. Id. at 6. Considering the process already provided, the Court finds that 3 this factor weighs slightly against Petitioner. But see De La Torre-Duran v. Blanche, No. 4 26-CV-3129-JLS-(MSB), 2026 WL 1998873, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 10, 2026) (finding this 5 factor weighed “slightly in favor” of the petitioner based on ten months of detention since 6 his last bond hearing). 7 Considering the second factor, “where a noncitizen has been afforded some process, 8 ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of his liberty interest and the value of additional 9 procedures is very low unless he can demonstrate a material change in circumstances since 10 his last bond hearing.’” Hernandez, 2026 WL 1471891, at *3 (quoting Rubin v. U.S. 11 Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 24-CV-260-TL-TLF, 2024 WL 3431914, at *8 (W.D. Wash. 12 June 28, 2024)). Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner has already been afforded the process 13 owed to him, an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Petitioner argues 14 there has been a material change in his circumstances since that hearing, warranting a 15 second custody redetermination. Pet. at 2–3. Petitioner states that he has been dealing 16 with worsening medical issues affecting his throat or vocal cord area and has not received 17 the specialized outside examination he believes is necessary. Id. at 6–7. Petitioner also 18 contends that his confinement aggravates severe claustrophobic symptoms. Id. at 7. 19 However, Petitioner has not alleged any material changed circumstances relevant to the 20 IJ’s determination that he posed a danger to the community. See Hernandez, 2026 WL 21 1471891, at *3 (weighing this factor against petitioner because he “has not articulated any 22 changed circumstances that may affect the bond determination.”). Thus, the Court 23 concludes that this factor weighs against Petitioner. 24 As to the third factor, the government has a strong interest in enforcing the INA’s 25 statutory framework for detention of “noncitizens whom Congress has deemed pose a flight 26 risk or danger to the community based on their offenses.” Rubin, 2024 WL 3431914, at 27 *7. “[T]he Government interest at issue is the ‘ability to detain [an immigrant detainee] 28 without providing him with another bond hearing, not whether the government may 1 ||continue to detain him.” Henriguez, 2023 WL 6226374, at *4 (quoting Lopez Reyes v. 2 Bonnar, 362 F. Supp. 3d 762, 777 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (emphasis in original)). This 3 || distinction implicates a lower interest than the government’s immigration enforcement 4 ||interest generally. See id. (citing Zerezghi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 955 F.3d 5 810 (9th Cir. 2020)). However, in the context of whether a second bond hearing is 6 required, “the [g]overnment’s interest is not meaningfully diminished.” Jd. (collecting 7 citations). “This interest may increase as a noncitizen’s removal ‘becomes more 8 |}imminent.’” /d. (quoting Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208). The Court finds that, while 9 ||“generally courts have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively 10 |}/minimal,” this factor weighs in favor of Respondents. Eliazar G.C. v. Wofford, No. 24- 11 |} CV-1032-EPG-HC, 2025 WL 711190, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2025) (citations omitted). 12 Therefore, after weighing the Matthews factors, the Court finds that due process does 13 require ordering another bond hearing for Petitioner at this time. 14 CONCLUSION 15 Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the Petition 16 || for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1). If Petitioner can demonstrate material changed 17 || circumstances affecting the IJ’s bond determination at a later date, he may file an amended 18 || petition. As this concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk SHALL CLOSE the file. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || Dated: September 18, 2026 . tt f Le 21 on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28