Ceballos v. County of Los Angeles CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 9/21/26 Ceballos v. County of Los Angeles CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

RONALD CEBALLOS, B353522

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25STCV00984) v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Joseph M. Lipner, Judge. Affirmed. Ronald Ceballos, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Fuentes & McNally and Raymond J. Fuentes for Defendant and Respondent. ____________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION1 Plaintiff and appellant Ronald Ceballos sued defendant and respondent County of Los Angeles (the County) for malicious prosecution and other state law causes of action. Ceballos alleges the County wrongfully prosecuted him in connection with a $2,169 overpayment from the County’s Department of Public Social Services (DPSS). According to Ceballos, a felony case was filed against him because County administrative personnel failed to update the County’s records to reflect that an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) had determined that the overpayment was only $784 and Ceballos did not engage in fraud or felonious conduct. Ceballos appeals from a judgment of dismissal issued after the trial court sustained the County’s demurrer to his pleading without leave to amend. We conclude most of Ceballos’s causes of action are barred by Government Code2 sections 815.2 and 821.6 because he seeks recovery for injuries caused by an alleged wrongful prosecution. Additionally, Ceballos does not contest the trial court’s ruling that section 818.8 grants the County immunity from liability on his remaining cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. Lastly, Ceballos fails to show there is a reasonable possibility he could amend his pleading to cure these defects. We thus affirm.

1We resolve this case by memorandum opinion because it “raise[s] no substantial issues of law or fact . . . .” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) 2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Government Code.

2 A. Procedural Background3 We summarize only those facts pertinent to our disposition of this appeal.4 On May 13, 2023, an ALJ issued a decision finding: (1) Ceballos had received an overpayment from DPSS of only $784, and not the $2,169 figure the agency had initially calculated, and (2) Ceballos did not engage in any fraud or felonious conduct.5 The County subsequently failed, inter alia, to “[u]pdate or correct the $2,169 figure in its internal systems” or “[c]onvey the ALJ’s findings to County prosecutorial administration staff.” “On May 25, 2023, because of the County’s administrative failures, the [Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office] initiated a felony criminal case against [Ceballos] using the incorrect $2,169 amount. . . . [N]o reasonable filing evaluator 3 We derive our summary of the procedural history in part from undisputed portions of the trial court’s order sustaining the County’s demurrer to the operative third amended complaint and assertions made by the County that Ceballos does not dispute in his reply. (See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 772, fn. 2, 773– 774 [employing this approach].) 4 The next three textual paragraphs summarize certain allegations from the third amended complaint, which we accept as true for the purposes of this appeal. (See Part B, post [discussing the applicable standards of review].) 5 We note that on April 21, 2026, Ceballos filed a notice of lodging concerning an ALJ decision that was released on May 13, 2022. Whether this document is the ALJ decision referenced in the third amended complaint has no impact on our resolution of this appeal.

3 could have concluded probable cause existed had mandatory administrative procedures been followed.” On June 27, 2023, Ceballos’s employer terminated him “after a background check revealed the felony case”; Ceballos had not received any notice of the case prior to that date. On January 10, 2024, Ceballos paid the $784 administrative overpayment at a trial setting hearing. The felony case was dismissed on February 23, 2024. Because the felony matter continued to appear on background checks for several months thereafter, Ceballos was unable to obtain employment until June 2024. On January 15, 2025, Ceballos filed a complaint against the County that did not identify any specific causes of action by name. The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer to the original complaint with leave to amend. The court later sustained, with leave to amend, the County’s demurrers to Ceballos’s first and second amended complaints. In December 2025, Ceballos filed the third amended complaint, alleging six state law causes of action against the County: (1) negligence; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) negligent hiring, supervision, and training; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) abuse of process; and (6) “malicious prosecution (administrative).” (Capitalization omitted.) On February 26, 2026, the trial court sustained the County’s demurrer to the third amended complaint without leave to amend.6 Also on that date, the court filed a judgment 6We detail pertinent aspects of the trial court’s ruling in Parts C–D, post.

4 dismissing the action with prejudice. Ceballos timely appealed from the judgment.

B. Standards of Review “A general demurrer tests whether the plaintiff has stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Consumer Protection Group, LLC v. Signal Brands, LLC (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 214, 225 (Consumer Protection Group, LLC).) In ruling on a demurrer, a court assumes the truth of “all material, well-pleaded facts, but not contentions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] . . . A general demurrer may be sustained when the pleading discloses a defense or bar to recovery.” (Ibid.) We review the trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer de novo. (Ibid.) We review a trial court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. (Black v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 677, 685.) Under this standard, the plaintiff has the burden of proving there exists a reasonable possibility that an amendment would cure the defect. (Ibid.) If the plaintiff fails to meet that burden, then the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. (Ibid.) Regardless of the applicable standard of review, “[w]e presume [the] trial court’s judgment or order to be correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (See Consumer Protection Group, LLC, supra, 122 Cal.App.5th at p. 226.) To rebut the presumption of correctness, the “appellant has the burden to show error with cogent argument supported by legal authority and citation to the record.” (Ibid.) The rules of appellate procedure, including the obligation to rebut this presumption, apply to Ceballos even 5 though he is self-represented. (See Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 590, 595.)

C. Ceballos Fails To Demonstrate the Trial Court Erred In Sustaining the Demurrer to His First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action Based on Prosecutorial Immunity The trial court ruled that section 815.2, subdivision (b) and section 821.6 immunize the County from liability on Ceballos’s first cause of action for negligence; third cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and training; fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress; fifth cause of action for abuse of process; and sixth cause of action for malicious prosecution. Section 815.2, subdivision (b) states: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.” (§ 815.2, subd. (b).) In turn, section 821.6 provides: “A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.” (§ 821.6.) In concluding that section 821.6 applies to the first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action, the trial court reasoned, “[E]ach of the claims depends on the actual prosecution.” The court explained, “In the first and third cause[s] of action, the third element of negligence (causation) includes ‘[Ceballos’s] wrongful prosecution.’ The fourth cause of action is premised on a ‘baseless felony filing.’ The fifth cause of action is premised on [Ceballos] being ‘wrongfully subjected to felony prosecution.’ The sixth cause of action says that administrative acts led to the 6 initiation of a prosecution.” As for the sixth cause of action for malicious prosecution, the court further noted, “The only way to sue the County for malicious prosecution is to focus on the initiation of a prosecution, and[,] of course, a public entity is immune from liability for an initiation of a prosecution.” On appeal, Ceballos maintains he alleged in the operative pleading that “County personnel failed to review, verify, correct, and update administrative information during mandatory pre- filing evaluation procedures and failed to comply with internal gatekeeping responsibilities preceding any charging determination.” He asserts these administrative “duties are distinct from courtroom advocacy and are not automatically immune merely because they occur within a prosecutor’s office.” Ceballos complains the trial court’s “ruling improperly expanded prosecutorial immunity beyond its function-based limits” by “eliminat[ing] any meaningful distinction between protected advocacy functions and non-advocacy administrative duties.” Section 821.6’s application does not turn on whether the duty allegedly breached is administrative or concerns courtroom advocacy. Our high court explained, “[I]mmunity under section 821.6 ‘ “is dependent on how the injury is caused[,]” ’ [citation]” and not on “ ‘the nature of the governmental duties performed by the defendant[.]’ [Citation.]” (See Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 918 (Leon).) Leon declared that section 821.6’s immunity covers “any claim of injury caused by wrongful prosecution, even if the prosecution is merely negligent and not malicious.” (See Leon, supra, at p. 926; see also id. at p. 922 [noting that “suits for damages arising from a negligent prosecution are covered” by § 821.6].) Accordingly, “the immunity [the statute] confers can 7 extend beyond ‘ “prosecuting attorneys and other similar individuals” . . . .’ [Citation.]” (See id. at p. 918.) For instance, “[i]f a law enforcement officer has initiated an official proceeding, the officer will enjoy immunity for that conduct under section 821.6, regardless of whether the officer’s conduct may include certain acts described as investigatory. Where, however, the plaintiff’s claim of injury does not stem from the initiation or prosecution of proceedings, section 821.6 immunity does not apply.” (Leon, supra, at p. 924.)7 In the third amended complaint, Ceballos alleges he “suffered lost wages, loss of employment opportunities, reputational damage, emotional distress, and other economic losses.” The pleading suggests these losses are “collateral consequences” of the “felony prosecution . . . .” Indeed, in his appellate briefing, Ceballos acknowledges — and does not dispute — the trial court’s finding that his “alleged injuries . . . depended 7 In Leon, our high court decided whether section 821.6 shielded a county from liability in a widow’s suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of county sheriff’s deputies’ alleged mishandling of her husband’s corpse. (See Leon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 916, 931.) There, after a suspect shot and killed the widow’s husband, deputies dragged the decedent behind a vehicle and unsuccessfully attempted to revive him. (See id. at p. 916.) “The movement had caused [the decedent’s] pants to slide down to his ankles, exposing his naked body. His body remained in that uncovered state for approximately eight hours while officers searched for the shooter and investigated the shooting.” (Ibid.) In rejecting the county’s invocation of immunity, the Leon court remarked, “Because the claim does not concern alleged harms from the institution or prosecution of judicial or administrative proceedings, section 821.6 does not apply.” (Leon, supra, at p. 931.)

8 upon the prosecution . . . .” Because Ceballos’s first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action are “claim[s] of injury caused by wrongful prosecution,” they fall within the scope of section 821.6. (See Leon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 926.) We note Ceballos cites the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons (1993) 509 U.S. 259 for the following propositions: (1) “Prosecutorial immunity is function- based and depends upon the nature of the conduct being challenged rather than the identity of the actor performing it”; and (2) “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether the challenged conduct constitutes protected advocacy activity or instead involves administrative or investigative functions occurring outside the prosecutorial role traditionally protected by absolute immunity.” (Citing Buckley, supra, at pp. 269, 273–276.) Buckley, however, addressed whether prosecutors in Du Page County, Illinois were immune from liability for damages under title 42 United States Code section 1983 for certain alleged federal constitutional violations. (See Buckley, supra, at pp. 261–262.) We fail to discern how Buckley is instructive on section 821.6’s application to the state law causes of action before us. In sum, Ceballos does not show the trial court erred in sustaining the County’s demurrer to his first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action.

D. Ceballos Forfeits His Challenge to the Trial Court’s Order Sustaining the Demurrer to His Second Cause of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation The trial court concluded that section 818.8 bars Ceballos from maintaining his second cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against the County. Section 818.8 provides: “A public entity is not liable for an injury caused by 9 misrepresentation by an employee of the public entity, whether or not such misrepresentation be negligent or intentional.” (§ 818.8.) Ceballos does not mention this ruling in his appellate briefing. Instead, he addresses only whether prosecutorial immunity under section 821.6 applies to this case. Accordingly, Ceballos forfeits his challenge to the ruling sustaining the County’s demurrer to his second cause of action. (See Consumer Protection Group, LLC, supra, 122 Cal.App.5th at p. 235 [holding that if an appellant fails to support a claim of error with cogent argument, the reviewing court may deem the claim forfeited].)

E. Ceballos Does Not Show the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Leave To Amend Ceballos argues he “should have been afforded an . . . opportunity to further specify the administrative nature of the challenged conduct, further distinguish pre-filing gatekeeping functions from advocacy-related prosecutorial conduct, and further clarify that liability was premised exclusively upon alleged non-advocacy administrative failures occurring before any charging determination.” Even if Ceballos were granted leave to file an amended pleading that includes these new proposed averments, Ceballos would still be seeking recovery for injuries caused by the allegedly wrongful felony prosecution against him. Consequently, Ceballos fails to discharge his burden of showing a reasonable possibility of curing the defects in his first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. Furthermore, absent from Ceballos’s briefing is any argument that he could allege facts demonstrating that section 818.8 does not shield the County from liability on his second cause of action for negligent 10 misrepresentation. In sum, Ceballos has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend.

DISPOSITION We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing this action with prejudice. In the interests of justice, we order each party to bear its own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).) NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.