Rodin v. Silver CA1/5

Opinion

Filed 9/21/26 Rodin v. Silver CA1/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ELLEN RODIN, Plaintiff and Respondent, A172065 v. JESSICA SILVER, (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 24FL095055) Defendant and Appellant.

Respondent Ellen Rodin obtained a restraining order against appellant Jessica Silver, an alleged squatter on Rodin’s property, under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protections Act (Elder Abuse Act), Welfare and Institutions Code section 15600 et seq.1 Silver contends that the order must be reversed because: (1) there is insufficient evidence to establish elder abuse; (2) her due process rights were violated; and (3) Rodin misused the Elder Abuse Act to evict her. We are not persuaded and affirm. BACKGROUND Rodin owned, through her family’s limited liability company, a multi- unit property in Oakland, California (property). At the time Rodin bought 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

1 the property in May 2022, a number of purported squatters, including Silver, lived in the property’s downstairs unit. On October 11, 2024, Rodin filed a request for a restraining order against Silver pursuant to the Elder Abuse Act. As part of the request, Rodin sought a move-out order. In the request, Rodin alleged, among other things, that Silver was “a squatter tenant” who had “engaged in 100+ acts of major vandalism . . . and other harassment . . . to lower the value and take over the property . . . .” The trial court issued a temporary restraining order, which included an order that Silver “move out from and not return to” the property, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing on November 27, 2024, the trial court heard Rodin’s requests for a restraining order against Silver and Steven Haluchak, another purported squatter who lived in the downstairs unit of the property. Haluchak was represented by counsel. Silver appeared in propria persona but, according to the reporter’s transcript, did not speak. Rodin, Rodin’s husband, and Adelaide Lomavita, Rodin’s realtor, testified on behalf of Rodin. Rodin testified that for years, Silver and the other purported squatters, including Haluchak, had “engaged in a campaign to prevent [her] from managing the property.” According to Rodin, Silver, Haluchak, and the other purported squatters cut “every lock” at the property multiple times, “took down” mailboxes at the property multiple times, “dumped enormous loads of heavy metal garbage” on the property, “moved vehicles onto the property,” and regularly made fun of and laughed at her. Rodin also testified that Silver “pushed [her] in the face.” When she tried to sell the property, Silver and the other purported squatters “never allowed [her] to inspect or allow[ed] buyers downstairs” and “deliberately intimidat[ed] [her] and [her] realtor to try to prevent the sale.” According to 2 Rodin, Haluchuk told her that he wanted the value of the property to drop so he could buy it. Rodin’s husband testified that Haluchak told the husband that “he cut the lock” on the property and wanted to “buy” the property. The husband also testified that Haluchak left garbage, including “tables, chairs, washing machines, [and] dishwashers”, in front of the house to bring its value down. Lomavita testified that when she went to stage the property, there was “furniture, garbage, debris, [and a] toilet out front.” Lomavita also testified that the purported squatters had cut locks, vandalized her sign in the front yard, and refused to speak to Rodin. Haluchak testified at the hearing on behalf of himself and Silver. Haluchak, who had lived at the property for “four and a half years,” denied threatening Rodin, calling her names, dumping garbage on the property, cutting any locks on the property, or damaging any mailboxes. He also denied seeing anybody cause damage to the property, stack debris on the property, or otherwise try to delay the sale of the property. After the close of evidence, the trial court found that Silver, Haluchak, and the other purported squatters were responsible for cutting the locks. The court also found that the evidence “suggests that there was some concerted effort to keep the property in the less appealing condition” in order to “devalu[e] the property or prevent[ ] it from selling so that they can remain there.” According to the court, this amounted to “financial abuse, not to mention possible mental suffering.” The court therefore issued a restraining order against Silver, expiring on November 27, 2027. Among other things, the order required that Silver “stay at least 100 yards away from” Rodin and her husband and Rodin’s home, workplace, and vehicle. It also ordered that Silver “move out from and not return to” the property.

3 Silver timely appealed. DISCUSSION Silver makes a number of arguments that can be grouped into three categories: (1) that the restraining order was not supported by substantial evidence, (2) that she was denied due process, and (3) that Rodin used the Elder Abuse Act as an improper means of eviction. Silver also raises a number of arguments for the first time in her reply brief. We reject all of Silver’s arguments and affirm the restraining order. A. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s issuance of a restraining order under the Elder Abuse Act for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 524 (Tanguilig).) In doing so, “[w]e resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of respondent . . . and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the . . . court’s findings.” (Bookout v. Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1137–1138 (Bookout).) “[W]e will only find an abuse of discretion when the . . . court exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards the uncontradicted evidence.” (Id. at p. 1140.) “Under the substantial evidence standard, the testimony of even one witness may support a finding based thereon.” (Newman v. Casey (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 359, 375 (Newman).) Although Silver appeared here and below in propria persona, she “is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638.) Accordingly, “[w]e may disregard legal arguments that are not supported by citations to legal authority . . . or are conclusory,” as well as “factual contentions that are not supported by citations to the record.” (Tanguilig, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 520.) We may also disregard “[a]rguments raised for the first time in 4 the reply brief,” which are “considered untimely.” (Hernandez v. Vitamin Shoppe Industries Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1461, fn.10 (Hernandez).) B. Substantial Evidence Silver contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the restraining order. We disagree. “Under the Elder Abuse Act, a trial court may issue a restraining order to protect an ‘elder’ who has suffered ‘abuse.’ ” (Newman, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 374.) As part of the restraining order, the court may “exclude a person from a residence or dwelling” if it finds that “physical or emotional harm would otherwise result to the petitioner.” (§ 15657.03, subd. (h).) “ ‘Abuse of an elder’ ” includes “treatment with resulting . . . mental suffering,” as well as “[f]inancial abuse” within the meaning of section 15610.30. (§ 15610.07.) Here, there is ample evidence to support the trial court’s finding of financial abuse and treatment resulting in mental suffering. Rodin testified that Silver, together with other purported squatters, left debris all over the property, cut locks, and took down mailboxes. She also testified that Silver “pushed [her] in the face.” Finally, she testified that Silver and the other purported squatters sought to intimidate her and her realtor to prevent the sale of the property. Rodin’s husband and realtor confirmed that Silver and the other purported squatters left lots of garbage on the property and that they sought to depress the value of the property. This is more than enough to support the court’s finding of “mental suffering” and financial abuse due to Silver’s conduct. Indeed, the facts in this case are similar to Tanguilig, where the Court of Appeal upheld a restraining order under the Elder Abuse Act. In that 5 case, the petitioner testified that his neighbor placed trash cans in his driveway every trash day, blocking him from exiting, and sprayed him with water from a hose “ ‘[s]everal times.’ ” (Tanguilig, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 517–519.) The Court of Appeal found that this evidence was sufficient to establish treatment resulting in “mental suffering” and was therefore sufficient to support the restraining order against the neighbor. (Id. at p. 527.) Silver’s conduct, particularly when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the restraining order, is just as egregious, if not more so. Nonetheless, Silver contends that the evidence is insufficient because Rodin did not provide “any medical records, police reports, or neutral witness corroboration supporting allegations of abuse.” According to Silver, the trial court erroneously relied upon “uncorroborated, false statements, along with multiple contradictions to [Rodin’s] testimony.” But Rodin’s husband and Lomavita independently corroborated much of Rodin’s testimony, including that the purported squatters cut locks and left debris on the property. Lomavita also confirmed that the purported squatters tried to devalue the property and delay its sale. In any event, we must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of Rodin under the substantial evidence standard. (Bookout, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1137–1138.) And the testimony of a single witness may “support a [court’s] finding.” (Newman, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 375.) Thus, Rodin’s testimony, even though it was disputed, is enough, by itself, to support the restraining order. C. Due Process or Misuse of Elder Abuse Act Claims Silver raises various due process claims. She also contends that Rodin misused the Elder Abuse Act. We are not persuaded. Silver first contends that the trial court “limited [her] ability to participate [in the hearing], including restricting [her] attempts to present 6 documents, testify fully, and question [Rodin].” But she provides no record citations or legal authority to support this contention. Instead, she only cites to instances at the hearing where she was referred to by name. Her failure to support her contention with any record evidence confirms what we discovered upon our own review of the record: Silver never spoke at the hearing and the court never prevented Silver from presenting any evidence. For this same reason, we reject Silver’s contention that she “was not clearly sworn for testimony at critical stages” and that the court “imposed time limitations preventing [her] from fully explaining [her] position.” Silver also contends that the trial court “never clarified . . . whether [she] understood her right to independent representation or knowingly waived it.” Again, she provides no legal authority to support this contention. And we are aware of no duty on the part of the court to ensure that a civil litigant has legal representation. In any event, the court’s minute order makes clear that Silver was representing herself at the hearing. Finally, Silver contends that Rodin misused the Elder Abuse Act “as a shortcut to remove [her] from the residence, rather than filing a proper eviction action.” In support, she claims that the trial court “acknowledged on the record that elder-abuse proceedings are ‘not meant for landlord-tenant issues.’ ” We could not, however, find the quoted language in the record. Although the court did acknowledge that there was “some merit” to Haluchuk’s counsel’s claim that the “restraining order process is not meant to . . . substitute for an unlawful detainer,” it never stated that Rodin had misused the Elder Abuse Act. In any event, the Act expressly authorizes a 7 move-out order (§ 15657.03, subd. (h)), and there is substantial evidence to support that order here. D. New Arguments on Reply Silver also raises a number of arguments for the first time on reply that we reject as “untimely.” (Hernandez, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1461, fn. 10.) The arguments are also not persuasive on their merits. Silver first contends that Oakland ordinances “require . . . substantial relocation benefits before a tenant can be required to vacate.” Even assuming that the ordinances apply here, they are irrelevant because the trial court properly issued a move-out order under the Elder Abuse Act. Silver then contends that the court abused its discretion by issuing the move-out order without making a “specific finding that physical or emotional harm would result if [she] remained.” But she cites no legal authority requiring that the court expressly make such a finding, and we presume that the court followed the law. (Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 299, 333 [“Normally, we must presume the . . . court was aware of and understood the scope of its authority and discretion under the applicable law”].) Finally, Silver contends that there were numerous “late and defective filings,” as well as “incomplete court forms” but points to nothing in the record to support these contentions. In any event, she fails to show any prejudice.

8 DISPOSITION2 The restraining order issued on November 27, 2024 is affirmed.3 CHOU, J.

WE CONCUR.

JACKSON, P. J. BURNS, J.

A172065/ Rodin v. Silver 2 Rodin’s request for judicial notice is denied as moot.(Miller v. Zurich American Ins. Co. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 247, 255, fn. 5 [request for judicial notice denied as moot because documents were not necessary to resolve appellate issues].) 3 At oral argument, Rodin asserted that, as requested in the conclusion of her respondent’s brief, the matter should be remanded so the trial court could consider an award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and damages. But the court did not award any fees, costs, or damages to Rodin, and she did not cross- appeal from the court’s order. Moreover, she provided no legal argument or authority to support her assertion. Thus, she has forfeited the issue. (See People v. Sorden (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 582, 603 [“failure to present reasoned argument and legal authorities” forfeits issue on appeal]; Preserve Poway v. City of Poway (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 560, 587 [“absent a cross-appeal,” respondent “cannot appeal from adverse determinations . . . that involve different portions of the judgment from which appellants have appealed”].)