In re D.B. CA1/1

Opinion

Filed 9/21/26 In re D.B. CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re D.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU, A175511 Plaintiff and Respondent, v. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J25-00494) D.B., Defendant and Appellant.

In February 2026, the juvenile court removed D.M.B. from the custody of her parents, D.B. (Father) and E.N. (Mother).1 (Welf. & Inst. Code,2 § 361.) Father contends on appeal that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support removal, (2) substantial evidence did not support the court’s finding that the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau)

1 Because Father and D.B. have the same initials for their first and last names, for clarity we will refer to the child, D.M.B., by her middle initial, M. 2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 1 exercised due diligence to identify, locate, and notify D.M.B.’s relatives, and (3) the Bureau disregarded its statutory mandate to assess relatives for placement under section 361.3. We agree with Father’s latter two contentions and therefore reverse the due diligence findings and remand the matter for further proceedings conducted under proper standards. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. I. BACKGROUND A. Dependency Petition On September 23, 2025,3 the Bureau filed a petition on behalf of D.M.B., a newborn infant, alleging D.M.B. suffered or was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical and emotional harm. The petition alleged that Mother’s substance abuse and lack of consistent prenatal care during her pregnancy resulted in her suffering complications, exposing D.M.B. to a risk of severe brain damage. The petition further alleged that Mother had prior child welfare cases in which she failed to reunify with four of D.M.B.’s half- siblings. B. Detention According to the detention/jurisdiction report, the Bureau received a referral on September 17, after Mother went into early labor and experienced complications in giving birth to D.M.B. After the birth, D.M.B. was unable to breathe adequately on her own, and her neurological exam was abnormal. Toxicology testing of Mother and D.M.B. returned positive results of cocaine for both and of fentanyl and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) for Mother. The care team considered Mother’s drug use to be a potential contributing factor to the early labor, and medical records indicated that Mother was 3 All further dates refer to the year 2025 unless otherwise stated.

2 inconsistent with prenatal care. At the time of the report, D.M.B. remained hospitalized and would undergo testing to determine the extent of the damage to her brain. The report further detailed Mother’s prior involvement with child welfare services, which revealed a history of substantiated allegations for general neglect based on Mother’s substance use. On September 17, the social worker interviewed Mother and Father. Mother claimed she had been clean from all substances other than marijuana for two years. Mother said Father was her boyfriend and did not use any substances. She reported that she was living with a friend at 4119 Macdonald Avenue in Richmond. Father reported that him and Mother had been “involved” for approximately one year. He also identified his current address as 4119 Macdonald Avenue in Richmond but denied that Mother was living with him. He said she would stay with him “on occasion” because he did not want her to be homeless. The social worker stated that the address “looked like a business building rather than a home.” Mother had disclosed her past substance use and involvement with child welfare services to Father. But Father denied observing Mother using any substances during her pregnancy with D.M.B. When the social worker informed Father about the toxicology results for Mother and D.M.B., he “seemed to be surprised” by the information. He acknowledged that D.M.B. may have severe medical needs. Father said he “did not want to be involved in the current process and . . . intended to take the baby home.” He denied having any criminal or child welfare services history. The social worker told Father she needed to verify this information and complete a home assessment before D.M.B. could 3 be placed with him. Father agreed to the social worker conducting the home assessment on the following day. The social worker informed Mother and Father that if D.M.B. went home with Father, Mother could not reside in the same house with them. Mother and Father said they understood, and Mother said she would move out of their “shared” home if D.M.B. went home with Father. On the day of the home assessment, Father told the social worker that he “did not feel comfortable having the home assessment conducted at th[at] time” and asked “how he could take the Bureau to court.” The social worker informed him that he would be able to speak to an attorney and the judge if the Bureau filed a dependency petition. The following day, when the social worker called the telephone number listed in the referral for Mother, Father answered the phone. He provided the social worker with a different telephone number for Mother. At that time, the social worker informed Father that the Bureau had filed a dependency petition and was unable to place D.M.B. with him due to his refusal to undergo a home assessment. After the social worker provided Father with details regarding the detention hearing, Father responded that he would “ ‘be leaving court with [his] daughter.’ ” The Bureau recommended that D.M.B. remain in out-of-home care. At the outset of the detention hearing, the juvenile court stated that a drug test taken by Father that morning “came back for methamphetamine and THC.” Father requested presumed father status. The court deferred the issue of paternity. The Bureau maintained its recommendation to detain D.M.B. from Father, “[g]iven the uncertainty of Father’s status” and that it was unable to conduct a home assessment of Father’s residence. The Bureau was also 4 recommending detaining D.M.B. from Mother. Father’s counsel asked that the Bureau attempt another home assessment. She said Father cancelled the first assessment because “he wanted to do some further cleaning.” The court responded that it was “still a little unclear” as to “what is going on” because it seemed like both Mother and Father were staying at the Macdonald Avenue address. Father’s counsel said the address was Father’s permanent residence, not Mother’s. Earlier in the hearing, however, Mother’s counsel reported that Mother had said “the best address for her place of residence was the Macdonald Avenue address,” though Mother had provided a different address to the court. The juvenile court adopted the recommendations of the Bureau and ordered D.M.B. detained with a minimum of two supervised visits a week for both parents. The court did not find credible Father’s claim that he had never seen Mother use substances, noting their year-long relationship, her long-term substance abuse issues, and the fact that Father recently tested positive for methamphetamine and THC. The court was also concerned that Mother and Father were living together. C. Jurisdiction On October 15, the juvenile court elevated Father to presumed father status. The court also noted that it had asked Mother and Father to take a drug test that day. Mother had tested positive for THC and cocaine and Father had tested positive for THC. At Mother’s request, the court set the matter for a contested jurisdictional hearing. At the contested jurisdictional hearing on October 27, the Bureau amended the petition to reflect the positive toxicology results for Mother and D.M.B. from September. The court sustained the allegations in the petition as amended and took jurisdiction of D.M.B. 5 D. Disposition On December 15, the Bureau filed a memorandum to provide the court with an update on D.M.B. and request a continuance of the disposition hearing. According to the memorandum, both parents had been “inconsistent with confirming their visits” with D.M.B., resulting in “ ‘fairly often’ visit cancellations.” The social worker did not have any information indicating that the parents were “inappropriate” during visits with D.M.B. She had not met with either parent since October 27, due to the holidays and “having other high need case matters,” and neither parent had initiated contact with her. The social worker reported that Father was referred to parenting classes and random drug testing on October 21 but was a “no show” for testing on seven dates between late October and early December. Father was initially engaged in the parenting classes but had recently missed a class. The social worker attempted to contact Father on December 9 and 10, but his phone number was disconnected, and his “Parent Partner” did not have an alternative number for him. The disposition hearing was continued to February 2, 2026, after Mother was arrested for attempting to enter the courthouse on December 15 with a loaded firearm in her purse. In the Bureau’s disposition report, filed on February 2, 2026, the social worker concluded that placement with Father “was not appropriate at th[at] time.” She had completed a home assessment of Father’s residence in September and reported that the home “appear[ed] to be a previous storefront that [was] being utilized as a living space.” The other occupants were not present during the assessment. Moreover, it was unclear whether Father and Mother were currently in a relationship, and Mother’s “continued 6 substance usage remain[ed] a safety concern.” The report also described Father’s criminal history, which included multiple drug convictions from 2004 and earlier. Father denied having a “history of drug usage” other than marijuana. The social worker reported that she had been unable to complete a “biopsychosocial interview” with Father due to his “lack of engagement with services.” He had failed to submit any drug tests and was dropped from his parenting classes in December after incurring four consecutive absences. While Father “engaged well” with D.M.B. during visits, he was “very inconsistent” with visitation and “would frequently not confirm visits on time” or would not show up after confirming visits. Visitation was temporarily suspended after the incident at the courthouse on December 15. On December 30, the social worker contacted Father to address his lack of engagement in services and “see if additional support was needed to help re-engage him.” Father “indicated that he was not interested in continuing to engage in services through the Bureau, as he was going to pursue filing for his indigenous rights.” Father did not attend any visits after the social worker informed him on January 6, 2026, that his visitation was reinstated. Father also did not appear at a “Child & Family Team” meeting that was scheduled for January 27, 2026, and did not answer the social worker’s subsequent calls. The social worker had no additional contact with Father. The Bureau recommended that the juvenile court adjudge D.M.B. a dependent child of the court, bypass reunification services for Mother, and grant reunification services to Father. It acknowledged that Father initially engaged in services and “may have become frustrated over time due to the services that were requested of him” but asserted that his “lack of communication with the Bureau . . . pose[d] an ongoing concern about his 7 priorities.” As for Mother, she was dropped from her in-patient treatment program for substance abuse and failed to engage in drug testing. Father was not present at the contested disposition hearing. At the hearing, the Bureau maintained its recommendations for reunification services. Father’s attorney objected to family reunification because Father wanted D.M.B. returned to him immediately. She argued that Father had raised two other children and had a place to live. “It’s not perfect, but it doesn’t need to be perfect for the child to be safe with him.” Mother requested family maintenance for Father. After the matter was submitted, the juvenile court adopted the recommendations in the disposition report. The court denied the request for family maintenance, citing Mother’s chronic substance abuse issues, D.M.B.’s positive toxicology results, and Father’s knowledge of Mother’s drug use. The court found clear and convincing evidence supporting D.M.B.’s removal from the parents, citing Mother’s “ongoing struggles” with drug abuse and Father’s “apparent” drug abuse. The court further concluded that the Bureau made reasonable efforts to return D.M.B. to a safe home “through the provision of reasonable services” and by “making reasonable efforts to complete any steps necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child.” II. DISCUSSION A. Removal Father challenges the evidentiary basis for removing D.M.B. from his care. By exercising jurisdiction over D.M.B. pursuant to section 300, the juvenile court found that Mother was unable to provide adequate care and supervision due to her chronic substance abuse, placing D.M.B. at risk of serious physical and emotional harm. Specifically, Mother suffered 8 complications during pregnancy and tested positive for cocaine, marijuana, and fentanyl, and D.M.B. tested positive for cocaine. Father does not contest these jurisdictional facts on appeal, and we take them as true in our review of his claim of error. At the disposition hearing, “there is a statutory presumption that [a] child will be returned to parental custody.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308, disapproved on another ground as stated in Nikolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 112.) A child welfare agency has the burden “to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that removal of the child from the parent’s custody is necessary.” (Ibid.) Under section 361, subdivision (c), the provision on which the juvenile court relied, a child may be removed from the physical custody of a parent only under certain circumstances. These include if “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of: (1) parental inability to provide proper care for the minor; and (2) potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.] The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163; see In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 [noting that removal may be proper where the child is “of such tender years that the absence of adequate supervision and care poses an inherent risk to their physical health and safety”], disapproved of on other 9 grounds in In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 629, and superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1436– 1437.) We review a juvenile court’s order removing a child from a parent’s custody for substantial evidence, “ ‘keeping in mind that the . . . court was required to make its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.’ ” (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.) To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding made by clear and convincing evidence, “ ‘the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.’ ” (In re M.V. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 944, 960.) In making this assessment, we must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below” (i.e., the Bureau) and give “due deference” to the juvenile court’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 996.) 1. Substantial Danger to the Minor Father argues there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he posed a substantial danger to D.M.B.’s physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. He points to the absence of jurisdictional allegations against him, the Bureau’s lack of concern regarding the safety and habitability of his home, and the Bureau’s failure to contact the other occupants of his home and maintain contact with him at certain points in the dependency proceedings. He further contends there was no evidence indicating that the nature of his relationship with Mother would pose a risk of harm to D.M.B. if she was placed in Father’s care. Father’s arguments on appeal ignore the concerns the juvenile court had regarding his apparent substance abuse. Father tested positive for 10 methamphetamine and THC shortly after D.M.B.’s birth,4 and there was evidence that he had missed 14 drug tests between late October 2025 and late January 2026. Without an adequate explanation, as was the case here, a missed drug test may be “properly considered the equivalent of a positive test result.” (In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1217, disapproved of on another ground in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 560, fn. 18.) Thus, the record demonstrates a high probability that Father had an ongoing substance abuse problem that predated D.M.B.’s birth. In his reply brief, Father correctly contends his alleged substance abuse, without more, cannot support a finding that he posed a substantial risk of harm to D.M.B. (See In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 213 [“ ‘our case law stands for the proposition that drug use or substance abuse, without more, is an insufficient ground to assert jurisdiction in dependency proceedings’ ”].) This, however, is not a matter involving substance abuse without more. (See, e.g., ibid. [concluding substantial evidence supported a finding that the children were at substantial risk of harm where their mother used drugs during her pregnancy and resisted investigation and help from child services].)

4 Father seems to take issue with the fact that no lab results appear in the record. However, when the juvenile court relied on his positive drug test in making its findings at the detention hearing and again at the disposition hearing, Father failed to object to the court’s consideration of the positive drug test on the ground that the lab results were not admitted into evidence. He has therefore forfeited the issue. (See In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501 [“it would be inappropriate to allow a party not to object to an error of which the party is or should be aware, ‘ “thereby permitting the proceedings to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not” ’ ”].) 11 There was clear and convincing evidence that Father enabled Mother’s use of drugs during her pregnancy with D.M.B. At the time of D.M.B.’s birth, Father and Mother had been in a relationship for approximately one year. Although Father denied that they lived together and denied being aware of Mother’s drug use during her pregnancy, the juvenile court discredited these claims and inferred from the evidence that Mother and Father were both using drugs during the pregnancy. The court was reasonable in disbelieving Father given the evidence that Mother had claimed she was living at the same address Father had claimed as his own, had identified her telephone number as one that appeared to belong to Father, had tested positive for cocaine, marijuana, and fentanyl at D.M.B.’s birth, had failed to submit to drug testing throughout the dependency proceedings, and had a lengthy history of substance abuse, of which Father was aware. These facts and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them support the juvenile court’s finding that Father posed a substantial risk of harm to D.M.B. (See In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135 [reasoning there was a substantial risk of harm to a minor where, among other things, the father “was aware of [the mother’s] substance abuse but nevertheless allowed her in the home”], disagreed with on another ground in In re E.E., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 218–219.) Father’s conduct during the dependency proceedings increased the risk of harm to D.M.B. Father made comments from the beginning of the dependency proceedings that indicated a desire to avoid Bureau intervention. Moreover, in addition to the missed drug tests, Father delayed the home assessment, was inconsistent with visitation, and was eventually dropped from the parenting classes for multiple absences. He told the social worker in late December 2025 that he no longer wanted to engage in services through 12 the Bureau. Thereafter, he failed to attend visits when they were reinstated in January 2026, failed to attend a Child & Family Team meeting, and did not respond to the social worker’s attempts to contact him. Father also denied a “history of drug usage” other than marijuana despite testing positive for methamphetamine and THC. We acknowledge that Father initially cooperated with the Bureau and otherwise appeared to be a loving and willing parent. But “on the whole, [his] resistant behavior and lack of progress in services reflect a desire to avoid investigation into the extent of [his] drug use and a lack of insight into the serious problems parental drug use poses.” (In re E.E., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 217; see also In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044 [“denial is a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without court supervision”].) From the foregoing evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that there was a high probability Father would prioritize his substance use over protecting D.M.B., an infant in constant need of supervision and care. (See In re E.E., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 213 [a parent’s dishonesty about the extent of her drug use, missed drug tests, and failure to take any steps to address her drug use supports a finding that her substance abuse places her child at risk]; In re N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 559 [“a child’s youth and maturity level can bear upon . . . whether a parent’s . . . substance abuse places the child at substantial risk of serious physical harm”].) That there were no jurisdictional allegations against Father does not change our analysis. In fashioning a dispositional order, “ ‘[t]he problem that the juvenile court seeks to address need not be described in the sustained section 300 petition. [Citation.] In fact, there need not be a jurisdictional 13 finding as to the particular parent upon whom the court imposes a dispositional order.’ ” (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1148.) Father also challenges the Bureau’s reliance on his lack of communication as a basis for removal, claiming that it was the Bureau that had “disregarded” him for nearly two months. The portion of the record he cites as support for this argument indicates that after the Bureau referred Father to parenting classes and drug testing, it failed to maintain contact with him due to other “high need[s]” cases. The Bureau re-initiated contact with Father a little over a month after making the referrals, approximately two months before the disposition hearing. The Bureau otherwise made efforts to engage and contact Father throughout the five-month period between D.M.B.’s birth and the disposition hearing. Moreover, the Bureau’s memorandum and disposition report detailed the lack of Father’s communication and engagement that had occurred after the social worker re- initiated contact with him. On this record, we conclude that a gap in Bureau contact of approximately a month does not undermine the Bureau and the juvenile court’s conclusion that Father’s overall lack of communication and engagement was a factor that contributed to the substantial risk of danger posed by Father. Finally, Father points to a few statements the juvenile court made at the disposition hearing that were inaccurate, including that Father failed to engage “since the start of this case,” that Father had not engaged in a single parenting class (even though he initially attended parenting classes), and that Father had tested positive for cocaine (rather than methamphetamine) at the detention hearing. He also claims the court was “mistaken” about visitation, because he visited D.M.B. daily while she was in the hospital, was appropriate during visits, and, at the detention hearing, requested daily 14 visits with her. He notes that it was the Bureau that had cancelled visits that were not confirmed by Father ahead of time. Father’s claims lack merit because he fails to show a reasonable probability that the court would have reached a different ruling had it accurately stated the facts, considering Father’s overall lack of engagement and his express refusal in December 2025 to engage in services through the Bureau. Father also ignores the evidence that after D.M.B. was released from the hospital, he was a “no show” at multiple visits and was aware of the need to confirm a visit ahead of time. In sum, substantial evidence supports a finding that Father posed a risk to D.M.B.’s safety and well-being. 2. No Reasonable Means Next, Father argues there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that there were no reasonable means to prevent or eliminate removal. He notes the Agency was required to “discuss” the reasonable efforts made or considered to eliminate the need for removal (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i)), and the court was required to make a specific finding that “reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal” (§ 361, subd. (d); In re Ashly F. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 803, 809–810). He contends the Bureau and the court failed to meet these standards. Even assuming the Bureau’s reports and the juvenile court’s findings do not strictly comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i), and section 361, subdivision (d), “[r]eversal is justified ‘only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the [petitioning] party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (In re Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1098–1099; see In 15 re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 159 [finding no reversible error where it was not reasonably probable the juvenile court would have reached a different conclusion if it had stated the facts upon which it relied for removal].) Applying that standard here, we conclude any errors were harmless because substantial evidence supports a finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal and it is not reasonably probable the juvenile court would have reached a different conclusion in absence of the errors. As the Bureau’s reports demonstrate, the Bureau was initially concerned that Father’s relationship with Mother would expose D.M.B. to the danger posed by Mother’s ongoing drug problem if D.M.B. was placed with Father. The social worker informed Father that Mother would not be able to return to their shared home if D.M.B. was placed with him, and she conducted a home assessment. Then, after Father tested positive for methamphetamine and THC at the detention hearing, the Bureau referred him to drug testing and parenting classes and assigned him a “Parent Partner.” The social worker also scheduled a Child & Family team meeting. The reports documented Father’s resistance to Bureau intervention and his overall lack of cooperation and engagement in services, as discussed above. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that the risk Father and Mother’s drug use posed to D.M.B. would continue unabated until Father cooperated with the Bureau and participated in services. The juvenile court’s findings at the detention and disposition hearings are consistent with the reports and the reasonable inferences that can be made from them in favor of removal. At the detention hearing, the court stated it was “concerned” that Mother and Father were living together and found not credible Father’s claim that he was unaware of Mother’s substance 16 use. And, at the disposition hearing, the court denied Father family maintenance, citing his knowledge of Mother’s drug use during her pregnancy with D.M.B., his positive drug test, and his “lack of engagement” in services, including his missed drug tests. The court also cited Mother and Father’s drug use as reasons for removal. In light of the court’s express comments and the evidence in the record, it is not reasonably probable that the court would have reached a result more favorable to Father if it’s findings and the Bureau’s reports complied with California Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i), and section 361, subdivision (d). Father contends the Bureau could have considered as alternatives to removal the formulation of a “safety plan” with Father or “a family maintenance plan under which [he] could receive supportive in-home services, regular counseling, or even just regular check-ins from a social worker.” He also contends the Bureau should have assessed the family members who resided with him to determine whether they could provide additional support. However, these alternatives would have been dependent upon Father’s willingness to cooperate with the Bureau and participate in services. Moreover, many of the suggested alternatives would not have alleviated the risk posed by Father’s substance use. (See, e.g., In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“[u]nannounced visits can only assess the situation . . . at the time of the visit”], disagreed with on another ground in In re E.E., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 218–219.) Father further argues that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the Bureau made reasonable efforts to prevent removal because the Bureau “disregard[ed]” him for almost two months, shifted the burden to him to initiate contact, and failed to follow up on the referrals it made for Father. He again relies on the portion of the 17 record showing that the Bureau failed to maintain contact with him for a little over a month in the middle of the five-month period between D.M.B.’s birth and the disposition hearing. In so arguing, Father relies on In re H.B. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 219. There, one of the sources of danger to the well-being of the children was the father’s poor parenting skills. (Id. at p. 244.) The Agency did not promptly refer the father to parenting classes and never followed up on the referral to verify the father’s enrollment or discussed with him his progress. (Id. at p. 246.) The record indicated that the father did not enroll in parenting classes until “days before the disposition hearing,” thereby providing father with insufficient time and opportunity “to make meaningful progress before the disposition hearing.” (Id. at pp. 246–247.) The agency also failed to follow up with father regarding his progress in individual therapy and counseling, “services that the court posited could have helped father address his poor decisionmaking.” (Id. at p. 247.) Based on this record, the appellate court concluded there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal. (Ibid.) Father’s reliance on H.B. is misplaced. Father ignores the efforts the social worker made to contact him and track his progress after the approximately one-month gap in communication. These efforts and Father’s progress were documented in the Bureau’s memorandum and disposition report. Moreover, this is not a situation like H.B. where the Bureau made referrals shortly before the disposition hearing, thereby giving Father little time to make progress. (In re H.B., supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 246–247.) Rather, the social worker referred Father to parenting classes and drug testing over three months before the disposition hearing. “Given the total 18 efforts made to prevent removal of [D.M.B.],” a gap in contact of approximately a month “does not render the overall finding of reasonable efforts unsupported.” (In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 726.) On this record, we affirm the order removing D.M.B. from Father’s custody. B. Relative Placement Father next argues that the Bureau failed to use due diligence to identify, locate, contact, and notify D.M.B.’s relatives for placement of D.M.B. pursuant to section 309 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.534(b)(3), and thus substantial evidence does not support the court’s due diligence findings. Father further contends the Bureau violated “relative placement preference laws.” We agree on both counts. 1. Appealability We first consider and reject the Bureau’s argument that we should disregard Father’s due diligence arguments because he did not appeal from the juvenile court’s due diligence findings. The person who completed Father’s form notice of appeal checked the boxes indicating Father appealed from the “Section 360 (declaration of dependency)” and D.M.B.’s “[r]emoval of custody from parent” (i.e., the disposition order). The notice of appeal further identifies the order appealed from as the “February 6, 2026 hearing denying the father’s request for the court to return the child to his care and instead ordering family reunification services to the father.” Attached to the notice of appeal is the minute order for the February 2, 2026 disposition hearing, which does not expressly mention the court’s due diligence findings. The Bureau seems to argue that Father’s failure to specifically identify the court’s due diligence findings in his notice of appeal amounted to a waiver of his right to challenge those findings. The Bureau is mistaken.

19 If a child is removed from a parent’s custody at the disposition hearing, as was the case here, the juvenile court is required to make a finding as to whether the social worker exercised due diligence in identifying, locating, and notifying the child’s relatives regarding placement of the child. (§§ 309, subd. (e)(1), 358, subd. (b)(2).) Any challenge to the court’s due diligence findings must be raised in a timely appeal from the disposition order, the order appealed from here. (See In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 196 [“the dispositional order is the adjudication of dependency and is the first appealable order in the dependency process”].) Given that Father appealed from the disposition order, that the court made due diligence findings at the disposition hearing in conjunction with its removal order, and that the notice of appeal in a dependency proceeding must be liberally construed (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.405(a)(3)), we do not consider Father’s failure to specifically identify the due diligence findings in his notice of appeal a waiver of his right to challenge the due diligence findings. 2. Additional Facts Regarding Relative Placement According to the Bureau’s detention/jurisdiction report, the social worker asked Father whether he had any relatives who could be considered for placement. Father said he would “look for family members.” The report noted that the social worker contacted the adoptive parents of D.M.B.’s siblings, but they chose not to be considered for placement. In the subsequent memorandum filed by the Bureau, the social worker reported that there “[were] no maternal relatives that [were] available for placement” at that time but did not explain why or describe the efforts she undertook to identify and contact the maternal relatives. The memorandum further stated that Father had identified a paternal relative but that the social worker had not yet contacted the relative. Additionally, an out-of-state 20 paternal relative had contacted the social worker. The memorandum provided no further information regarding the Bureau’s efforts to identify and locate D.M.B.’s relatives. The Bureau’s disposition report noted that Mother had two brothers and two sisters but stated, without explanation, that there “were no maternal relatives to consider for placement.” The report further stated that two paternal relatives indicated interest in placement. The Bureau received contact information for a paternal cousin around October 17, 2025, and the social worker contacted her on December 23, 2025. The cousin told the social worker that she wanted to confirm with Father that the social worker was, in fact, the assigned social worker for D.M.B. The social worker texted the cousin her business card but received no response. A week later, on December 30, 2025, the social worker confirmed with Father that he had spoken to his cousin. Father agreed to have his cousin contact the social worker. While the social worker was on vacation from January 8, 2026, to January 20, 2026, the cousin left several voicemails for her. The social worker followed up with the cousin on January 21, 2026 to explain the “Resource Family Approval (RFA) process.” She told the cousin that she would e-mail her “the information to sign up for the next orientation.” The social worker e-mailed the cousin with “the information” the following day. She texted the cousin “to confirm receipt of the email.” The cousin never responded. As for the other paternal relative, Father’s sister, the report stated only that she lived in Louisiana and that “the ICPC process would need to be initiated following the Disposition hearing in order to place out of state.” The disposition report further stated that the social worker had asked Father for information about his alleged Cherokee heritage so that the 21 Bureau “could conduct further inquiry with the relatives’ names and dates of birth.” Father said he was “still getting the information together.” The report provided no further details regarding the Bureau’s efforts to identify, locate, and contact D.M.B.’s relatives. At the disposition hearing, Father’s counsel argued that the Bureau was “not making real efforts” to place D.M.B. with a relative, noting that it took the social worker over two months to contact the paternal cousin. The social worker responded that it was “obviously our bad for the delay” but that the cousin had not responded to the social worker or initiated contact after the social worker sent her “all the information.” Father’s counsel further questioned why the Bureau had not started the ICPC process for the paternal aunt. The Bureau’s counsel explained that starting the ICPC process “would really make reunification difficult. . . . [I]f Father continues to not be engaged, then we can move forward in that direction.” The court ultimately found that the Bureau had exercised due diligence in identifying, locating, and contacting D.M.B.’s relatives. 3. Identification, Location, and Notification of Relatives We first address the Bureau’s purported failure to act with due diligence in identifying, locating, and notifying D.M.B.’s relatives regarding potential placement of D.M.B. Section 309, subdivision (e)(1) provides that, if a child is removed from parental custody, the social worker must conduct an investigation in order to identify and locate all adult relatives of the child. The social worker must use “due diligence” in investigating the names and locations of these relatives. (§309, subd. (e)(1), (3)(A).) Section 309, subdivision (e)(1)(A) requires the social worker to provide written notification within 30 days of the initial removal to all adult relatives 22 who are located (with certain exceptions not applicable here) that the child has been removed from parental custody. The notice must include, among other things, “[a]n explanation of the various options to participate in the care and placement of the child and support for the child’s family, including any options that may be lost by failing to respond.” (§ 309, subd. (e)(1)(A), (B).) In addition to the notice set forth in section 309, California Rules of Court, rule 5.534(b)(3) requires the social worker to give any located relative a copy of the “ ‘Important Information for Relatives’ ” document as distributed in the California Department of Social Services All County Letter No. 09-86, as well as Judicial Council Forms, form JV-285 (Relative Information) and form JV-287 (Confidential Information). Among other things, form JV-285 asks relatives to identify ways in which they may want to help the child, parents, or the court, and to provide contact information for other relatives who might be able to help the child. As mentioned, if the child is removed from parental custody at the disposition hearing, the court “shall make a finding as to whether the social worker has exercised due diligence in conducting the investigation, as required pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section 309, to identify, locate, and notify the child’s relatives.” (§ 358, subd. (b)(2).) When making this finding, the court may consider examples of due diligence, including whether the social worker has (1) obtained information about the location of relatives; (2) reviewed the case file for any information regarding relatives; (3) telephoned, e-mailed, or visited all identified relatives; (4) asked located relatives for the names and locations of others; and (5) used online search tools. (§ 358, subd. (b)(3)(B)–(F); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.695(e)(1), 5.637(d)(2) & (d)(3).) 23 The record here does not demonstrate substantial evidence that the Bureau used due diligence to identify, locate, contact, and notify D.M.B.’s adult relatives pursuant to section 309 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.534. Although the Bureau asked Father to identify relatives for potential placement and contacted two paternal relatives, the record does not show that the Bureau did anything else to further investigate D.M.B.’s adult relatives, such as conducting an online search or asking Mother or the located relatives about unidentified relatives. Moreover, the Bureau’s memorandum and disposition report stated that there were no maternal relatives available for placement despite Mother mentioning a maternal grandmother, maternal grandfather, and four maternal aunts and uncles. The record offers no explanation for why those maternal relatives could not be considered for placement. Thus, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that the Bureau exercised due diligence in identifying, locating, and contacting D.M.B.’s adult relatives. Further, the record does not reflect that the two paternal relatives who expressed interest in being considered for placement were provided sufficient notice under section 309, subdivision (e)(1) and California Rules of Court, rule 5.534(b)(3). As explained above, the social worker was required to provide the identified relatives with “written” notice of the options to participate in the care and placement of the child. (§ 309, subd. (e)(1)(A).) Oral notice is insufficient. (In re R.T. (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1296.) The social worker was also required to provide those relatives with certain documents, including form JV-285. Here, at most, the record shows that the social worker orally explained the RFA process to the paternal cousin and 24 sent her information on how to sign up for an orientation to the process.5 The record does not indicate the extent of the information, if any, provided to the paternal aunt. This falls short of the notification requirements in section 309, subdivision (e)(1) and California Rules of Court, rule 5.534(b)(3). Because the record establishes that the Bureau failed to exercise due diligence in identifying D.M.B.’s relatives and did not provide the required notice to the identified relatives regarding their options for participation, we must reverse the juvenile court’s due diligence findings. (See In re K.B. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 689, 700 [reversing due diligence findings under similar circumstances].) On remand, the juvenile court shall order the Bureau to exercise due diligence to identify, locate, contact, and notify D.M.B.’s relatives pursuant to section 309. 4. Assessment of Identified Relatives Citing sections 309 and 361.3, Father argues that the Bureau’s failure to refer the paternal aunt and cousin for “RFA or ICPC assessments” violated the relative placement preference laws. He further argues that the Bureau failed to prepare a social study documenting its efforts to assess the relatives and describe the “ ‘appropriateness of any relative placement pursuant to section 361.3,’ ” as required by section 358.1, subdivision (h). He urges us to remand the matter with instructions to the juvenile court to order the Bureau to assess relatives in accordance with the law. We agree in part that there was prejudicial error.

5 “RFA” refers to the resource family approval process, through which in-state relatives are assessed for placement of a child who has been removed from the physical custody of his or her parents. (§ 16519.5.) 25 The Bureau was required to “promptly[] and diligently assess any interested family members for placement when a child is removed from parental custody.” (In re N.J. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 96, 102–103; see § 309.) Where a child is removed from a parent’s physical custody, “preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a relative of the child for placement.” (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) Thus, if a child’s relative requests placement of the child prior to the disposition hearing, the social worker is required “to evaluate the relative[] for placement under the relevant standards.” (In re R.T., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300; In re Rodger H. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1185; § 361.3, subd. (a).) “[U]pon receipt of the evaluation and the agency’s placement recommendation, [the juvenile court should] exercise[] its independent judgment to consider if relative placement was appropriate.” (In re R.T., at p. 1300.) In determining whether relative placement is appropriate, the social worker and juvenile court shall consider several factors, including the child’s best interests, the parents’ and relative’s wishes, placement of siblings in the same home, the nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the relative, and the safety of the relative’s home. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(1)– (8); In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 11–12.) Out-of-state relatives must be assessed pursuant to the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC). (Fam. Code, § 7900 et seq.) The ICPC “is a statutory agreement between states that governs the placement of children from one state to another state.” (Amber G. v. Superior Court (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 465, 472, fn. 1.) “ ‘ “The purpose of the ICPC is to facilitate cooperation between participating states in the placement and monitoring of dependent children.” ’ ” (In re C.B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031–1032.)

26 Here, the record demonstrates that the paternal aunt was interested in being considered for placement and that the Bureau did not initiate the ICPC process to evaluate her for placement because “it would really make reunification [with Father] difficult.” However, nothing in the relevant statutes permit the Bureau to delay the assessment required under section 361.3 for out-of-state relatives until after reunification services are terminated. (See Fam. Code, § 7900 et seq.) Rather, prompt evaluation is required considering the Legislature’s “strong preference to place children who have been detained from their parents with family members whenever possible.” (In re N.J., supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 102–103.) Moreover, initiating the ICPC process does not mean that D.M.B. will be placed with the paternal aunt; the results of the evaluation merely enable the juvenile court to evaluate the relevant factors (see In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 320–321), one of which is the ability of the relative to “[f]acilitate court- ordered reunification efforts with the parents” (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(7)(E)).6 In short, when Father’s counsel challenged the Bureau’s failure to initiate the ICPC process for the paternal aunt at the disposition hearing, the juvenile court should have directed the Bureau to begin the ICPC process for the paternal aunt. (See In re R.T., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300.) We will therefore remand for the Bureau and the court to assess the paternal aunt for placement of D.M.B., as well as any other adult relatives that express interest in placement when the Bureau carries out its duties under section 309 to identify, locate, and contact D.M.B.’s relatives. (See In re 6 Based on this factor in section 361.3, the Bureau contends that any error in failing to assess the paternal aunt was harmless. Because this is only one of several factors the juvenile court is required to consider in determining whether a relative placement is appropriate, we reject the Bureau’s argument. (See § 361.3, subd. (a)(1)–(8).) 27 Rodger H., supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1185–1186 [remanding to the juvenile court “for the limited purpose of investigating and considering the grandparents’ request for placement” where the agency failed to evaluate the grandparents under § 361.3].) We do not reach the same conclusion for the paternal cousin. The record demonstrates that the Bureau explained the RFA process to the cousin and e-mailed her information to sign up for the next RFA orientation. After the cousin did not respond to the e-mail, the social worker texted her to confirm receipt of the e-mail. The cousin again failed to respond. Father does not explain with citation to legal authority what additional actions the social worker was required to take in these circumstances. At the disposition hearing, his counsel focused on the Bureau’s failure to initiate contact with the cousin for approximately two months after the cousin first expressed interest in being considered for placement. We acknowledge that the Bureau failed to promptly contact the cousin, but Father has not shown that the delay was prejudicial in light of the cousin’s lack of response to the social worker after receiving the RFA information.7 (See In re Cristian I., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1098–1099 [error is reversible only if “ ‘it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the [petitioning] party would have been reached in the absence of the error’ ”].) III. DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s February 2, 2026 disposition findings that the Bureau exercised due diligence in identifying, locating, and contacting D.M.B.’s relatives are reversed. We remand the matter with directions for the juvenile court to (1) order the Bureau to comply with the requirements of 7 In light of this conclusion, we need not and do not consider the Bureau’s argument that the paternal cousin was not D.M.B.’s blood relative. 28 section 309, subdivision (e), and California Rules of Court, rule 5.534(b)(3); (2) order the Bureau to evaluate any interested adult relatives, including the paternal aunt, for placement under section 361.3; and (3) set a hearing under section 361.3 to review any requests for relative placement as soon as practicable. In all other respects, the February 2, 2026 disposition orders are affirmed.

_________________________ LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________ HUMES, P. J.

_________________________ SMILEY, J.

Contra Costa County Children & Family Services Bureau v. D.B. / A175511