People v. Jackson CA2/1

Opinion

Filed 9/21/26 P. v. Jackson CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B348018

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24IWCF00645) v.

MARLON DAVID JACKSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Hector M. Guzman, Judge. Affirmed. Kathleen J. Becket, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Sophia A. Lecky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. _______________________________ Marlon David Jackson appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of carrying a concealed, loaded, unregistered firearm in a vehicle. Police officers stopped Jackson’s vehicle for suspected traffic violations, saw a cloud of smoke emit from both sides of the vehicle when Jackson drove it into a parking lot and lowered its windows, detected an odor of recently burned marijuana, and obtained Jackson’s statement that he had recently smoked marijuana or an unspecified substance. An officer then searched the vehicle and a backpack inside it, and found the firearm in the backpack. Jackson moved to suppress evidence of the firearm pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, arguing the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.1 The trial court denied the motion, concluding the search was lawful under both the automobile exception and inventory exception to the warrant requirement. Jackson argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the firearm. We conclude the trial court correctly denied the motion because the automobile exception justified the search. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the automobile exception applies because the smoke emitting from the vehicle, the odor of recently burned marijuana, and Jackson’s statement that he had smoked recently created probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence that Jackson had unlawfully driven while possessing on his person an open receptacle of marijuana. We need not address the trial court’s conclusion that the inventory exception independently justified the search. Jackson further argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting the firearm into evidence over his objection 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 under Evidence Code section 352, and that his conviction and sentence violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA) (§ 745; Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.5). We reject those arguments and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged Jackson with carrying a loaded firearm (§ 25850, subds. (a) & (c)(6); count 1) and carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and alleged as to both counts that the firearm was not registered to Jackson (§§ 25850, subd. (c)(6), 25400, subd. (c)(6)(B)).2 A. The trial court denied Jackson’s motion to suppress the firearm. After a magistrate held Jackson to answer at a preliminary hearing, Jackson moved to suppress evidence of a firearm that a police officer had found in a backpack inside his vehicle during a warrantless search. In opposition, the prosecution argued the search was lawful pursuant to the automobile exception and inventory exception to the warrant requirement. Hawthorne Police Department Officers Tyler Latona and Christopher McPheeters testified at the suppression hearing. On October 11, 2024, around 2:18 a.m., while patrolling in Inglewood, the officers saw an SUV (later determined to be driven by Jackson, who was alone in the vehicle) exit a “high- populated crime hotel” at 3649 West Imperial Highway. Latona 2 The prosecution was unable to proceed on count 3, felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and the trial court granted the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss.

3 testified that based on his experience, he knew most motels in that area are “extremely high-crime motels” known for narcotics sales, firearm possession, prostitution, and gang activity. Jackson’s vehicle had no front license plate, had dark tinted windows, and had a rear license plate that Officer Latona suspected was illegitimate.3 For those reasons, the officers conducted a traffic stop.4 Jackson’s vehicle pulled into the parking lot of the Diamond Inn. Officer McPheeters testified that the Diamond Inn is located in a “high-crime gang area” known for narcotics sales, firearms, and prostitution. Officer Latona testified: “While [Jackson’s vehicle] started to yield in the parking lot, prior to us even activating our lights, the driver rolled down the windows, . . . [and] a cloud of smoke emitted from the car. As I walked up on the car, I smelled the odor of marijuana.” Officer McPheeters similarly testified that before the officers walked up to the vehicle, they asked Jackson to roll down the vehicle’s windows, and after he did so, smoke emitted from both sides of the vehicle. McPheeters testified that based on his training and experience, he detected the odor of “recently smoked marijuana.” Officer McPheeters testified that Officer Latona asked Jackson whether he had been smoking marijuana, and Jackson 3 At trial, Officer Latona testified he eventually determined the rear license plate was a valid temporary Georgia license plate. 4 “ ‘[T]he lack of a front license plate has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for a traffic stop.’ ” (People v. Valle (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 195, 202 (Valle).) Jackson does not argue the traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

4 “admitted to recently smoking marijuana.” On cross- examination, McPheeters testified that Jackson said he had “recently smoked” (without specifying the substance). Officer Latona advised Jackson of the reasons for the traffic stop and asked for his driver’s license. Jackson then began to reach into a backpack on the front passenger seat.5 The officers ordered him not to reach into the backpack and to exit the vehicle. A records check yielded no return on the vehicle’s rear license plate. A registration check determined the vehicle’s registration (in Georgia) had expired more than six months earlier. The officers decided to impound the vehicle. Officer Latona conducted an “inventory search” of the vehicle at the scene. He found a loaded, unregistered firearm in the backpack inside the vehicle. The backpack also contained two bags of marijuana, two cell phones, approximately $358 in cash, and Jackson’s Florida driver’s license. Elsewhere in the vehicle, Latona found more marijuana and “multiple USPS packaging items.” The prosecutor argued the search was lawful pursuant to the automobile exception and inventory exception to the warrant requirement. Jackson argued the search was unlawful because the odor of marijuana, his statement that he had recently smoked, and his inability to retrieve his driver’s license (because the officers ordered him not to reach into the backpack) did not justify the search.

5 At trial, Latona testified the backpack was not on the front passenger seat but was on the floorboard in front of that seat.

5 The trial court denied Jackson’s motion to suppress the firearm. The court found that because the officers saw a cloud of smoke emit from the vehicle, recognized the odor of that smoke as “recently burned marijuana,” and obtained Jackson’s statement that he had recently smoked, the facts known to the officers supported a reasonable inference that Jackson “had just been smoking marijuana” (implicitly, while driving). The court concluded the automobile exception justified the search because those facts established probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence that Jackson had driven under the influence of marijuana in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (f), and/or driven while possessing on his person an open receptacle of marijuana in violation of Vehicle Code section 23222, subdivision (b)(1).6 The court further concluded that the inventory exception independently justified the search.

B. At trial, the jury convicted Jackson on both counts. The trial court sentenced him to two years in prison. At trial, the jury convicted Jackson on both counts and found the allegations true. We will summarize the trial evidence in our discussion of Jackson’s challenge to the admission of the firearm into evidence.

6 “It is unlawful for a person who is under the influence of any drug to drive a vehicle.” (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f).) “Except as authorized by law, a person who has in their possession on their person, while driving a motor vehicle upon a highway . . . a receptacle containing cannabis or cannabis products . . . which has been opened or has a seal broken, or loose cannabis flower not in a container, is guilty of an infraction . . . .” (Veh. Code, § 23222, subd. (b)(1).)

6 The probation department recommended denying probation and stated that aggravating circumstances justified a high base term. At sentencing, the prosecution requested the middle term of two years on count 1 (carrying a loaded firearm). Jackson argued he had a minimal criminal record with no felonies “despite what the people originally charged,” but did not specify whether he requested probation or the low term. The trial court denied probation, stating: “While he may be eligible for probation, he is not suitable given the underlying facts of this case: the location where he was arrested, under the circumstances [in which] he was arrested, with the particular firearm that he was arrested with that was referred to as a ghost gun.”7 “According to his adult history he has been on probation before . . . for what appears to be a similar offense.”8 The trial court sentenced Jackson to the middle term of two years on count 1. The court imposed and stayed a concurrent two-year term on count 2. Jackson filed a timely notice of appeal.

7 At trial, Latona testified that the firearm was a “ghost gun,” meaning a gun constructed without a serial number, rendering it untraceable by law enforcement. 8 The probation report indicated that in 2012, Jackson sustained a Florida felony conviction for carrying a concealed weapon (in addition to two misdemeanor convictions), was sentenced to 18 months of formal probation, and violated his probation.

7 DISCUSSION

A. The trial court did not err by denying Jackson’s motion to suppress. Jackson argues the warrantless search of his vehicle and the backpack therein violated the Fourth Amendment. He argues the trial court erred by concluding the automobile exception to the warrant requirement justified the search. The Attorney General argues the trial court correctly applied the automobile exception.

1. Standard of review “ ‘ “The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” ’ ” (Valle, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 200.) “ ‘In reviewing factual determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court should “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” ’ ” (People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th 622, 646.) In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on the suppression motion, we disregard the parties’ citations to the preliminary hearing transcript and the trial transcript, which transcripts were not before the trial court when it ruled on the suppression motion. (See People v. Fisher (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 338, 341; People v. Neighbours (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1118-1120.)

8 2. Fourth Amendment principles “ ‘Warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” ’ ” (Sellers v. Superior Court (2026) 19 Cal.5th 75, 89 (Sellers).) “ ‘The prosecution bears the burden of establishing an exception applies.’ ” (People v. Castro (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 314, 319 (Castro).) “ ‘Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, an officer may search a vehicle if the officer has probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found inside.’ ” (Sellers, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 89.) “ ‘Once an officer has probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile exception, they “may conduct a probing search of compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are not in plain view.” ’ ” (Castro, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 320.) “Probable cause to search exists ‘where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a [person] of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.’ ” (Castro, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 320.) “ ‘[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.’ ” (People v. Fews (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 553, 562 (Fews).) “Probable cause . . . is not a high bar: It requires only the ‘kind of “fair probability” on which “reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.” ’ ” (Kaley v. U.S. (2014) 571 U.S. 320, 338, quoting Florida v. Harris (2013) 568 U.S. 237, 244.) Proposition 64, enacted by the voters in 2016, “broadly legalized marijuana possession for adults 21 and older.” (Sellers, 9 supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 81.) It also enacted Health and Safety Code section 11362.1, subdivision (c), which provides that “[c]annabis and cannabis products involved in any way with conduct deemed lawful by this section are not contraband nor subject to seizure, and no conduct deemed lawful by this section shall constitute the basis for detention, search, or arrest.” (Italics added.) “This provision ‘fundamentally changed the probable cause determination.’ [Citation.] After Proposition 64, ‘the law is settled that the lawful possession of marijuana in a vehicle does not provide probable cause to search the vehicle.’ ” (Sellers, at pp. 89-90, italics added.) “Given other statutory regulations placed on marijuana possession, however, ‘[Health and Safety Code] section 11362.1, subdivision (c) does not apply when the totality of the circumstances gives rise to a fair probability that an existing marijuana regulation was violated when the search occurred.’ ” (People v. Moore (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 291, 300 (Moore).) “Driving a motor vehicle on public highways under the influence of any drug (see Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f)) or while in possession of an open container of marijuana (Veh. Code, § 23222, subd. (b)(1); [citation]) are not acts ‘deemed lawful’ by [Health and Safety Code] section 11362.1. On the contrary, [Health and Safety Code] ‘[s]ection 11362.1 does not permit any person to [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [p]ossess an open container or open package of cannabis or cannabis products while driving, operating, or riding in the passenger seat or compartment of a motor vehicle’ (Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.3, subd. (a)(4)) or ‘[s]moke or ingest cannabis or cannabis products while driving’ a motor vehicle (id., subd. (a)([7])).” (Fews, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 563.) The definition of an “open container” of marijuana 10 includes a usable amount of marijuana wrapped in paper such that it can be smoked. (In re Randy C. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 933, 940-941 (Randy C.) [marijuana blunt was “open container” of marijuana within meaning of Health & Saf. Code, § 11362.3, subd. (a)(4)]; see also Sellers, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 85-87 [describing Randy C.’s conclusion with apparent approval].)

3. The search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The officers’ testimony at the suppression hearing established that after they initiated the traffic stop, Jackson drove his vehicle into a motel parking lot and lowered its windows, and the officers saw a cloud of smoke emit from both sides of the vehicle. The officers detected the odor of marijuana, and Officer McPheeters testified, based on his training and experience, that he recognized the odor of “recently smoked” marijuana. The officers obtained Jackson’s statement that he had “recently smoked” in response to Officer Latona asking whether Jackson had recently smoked marijuana. Based on that evidence, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the facts known to the officers at the time of the search supported a reasonable inference that Jackson had just been smoking marijuana while driving. We further agree with the trial court’s conclusion that in light of that reasonable inference, the facts known to the officers supported probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence that Jackson had driven while possessing on his person “a receptacle containing cannabis or cannabis products . . . which ha[d] been opened or ha[d] a seal broken,” in violation of Vehicle Code section 23222, subdivision (b)(1). The facts supported a fair probability that such a receptacle supplied the marijuana that Jackson had been 11 smoking while driving, and that Jackson had possessed the receptacle on his person while driving but had hidden the receptacle in the backpack or elsewhere in the vehicle between the initiation of the traffic stop and the officers’ approach. We further conclude the foregoing facts known to the officers supported probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence that Jackson had violated Health and Safety Code section 11362.3, subdivisions (a)(4) and (a)(7). The facts supported a fair probability that the vehicle contained marijuana that Jackson had been smoking while driving, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(7). They further supported a fair probability that the vehicle contained an open container of marijuana—such as a marijuana-containing cigar or blunt—that Jackson had possessed while driving, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4). (See Randy C., supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 940-941.) The trial court therefore correctly concluded the automobile exception justified the search. Jackson’s reliance on Blakes v. Superior Court (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 904 (Blakes) is misplaced. In that case, sheriff’s detectives conducted a traffic stop and a warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle. (Id. at pp. 908-909.) Although the lead detective smelled an odor of burned marijuana coming from the vehicle, he “admitted he had no information indicating . . . how recently the marijuana had been burned.” (Id. at p. 909.) The opinion does not mention any evidence that the detectives saw smoke emit from the vehicle or that the defendant stated he had smoked recently. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in the search. (Id. at pp. 909-910.)

12 The appellate court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to grant the motion to suppress. (Blakes, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 915.) The appellate court concluded the odor of marijuana alone did not support probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence that the defendant had violated the Vehicle Code by driving under the influence of marijuana or in possession of an open container of marijuana. (Id. at p. 912.) The court observed: “Neither detective could determine if the marijuana was freshly burnt, removing any support for an inference that petitioner was smoking the marijuana while driving.” (Ibid., italics added.) The court concluded the automobile exception did not apply because “[t]he smell of burnt marijuana in a car, where there is no indication it had been recently smoked within, cannot by itself provide probable cause [to believe the car contains evidence] of driving under the influence of marijuana.” (Id. at pp. 912-913, italics added.) Here, in contrast, the officers’ observation of Jackson driving, the cloud of smoke that emitted from the vehicle when Jackson lowered its windows, Officer McPheeters’s detection of the odor of recently burned marijuana, and Jackson’s statement that he had smoked recently, taken together, supported a reasonable inference that Jackson had recently smoked marijuana within the vehicle while driving. Thus, the facts known to the officers supplied the “indication [marijuana] had been recently smoked within” that Blakes implied could support probable cause and justify a search pursuant to the automobile exception. (Blakes, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 912.) For the same reasons, People v. Johnson (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 620 does not assist Jackson. In Johnson, there was “no evidence of driving” (the defendant’s vehicle was parked when 13 officers first saw and approached it). (Id. at p. 631.) Although an officer detected an odor of marijuana and saw marijuana in a plastic baggie that was knotted at the top (id. at p. 627), the opinion did not mention any evidence that the officers recognized the odor of recently burned marijuana, that smoke emitted from the defendant’s vehicle, or that the defendant said he had smoked recently (or at all). Jackson argues the automobile exception does not apply because the evidence does not support a finding that the officers subjectively “believed they had probable cause to search appellant’s vehicle because 1) they suspected appellant had been smoking marijuana while driving; was 2) under the influence of a controlled substance; or 3) had an open container of marijuana in his vehicle.” (Italics added.) As Jackson acknowledges, however, “the automobile exception . . . relies on an objective analysis of probable cause . . . .” (See, e.g., People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853, 862 [“A probable cause inquiry relies on an objective standard; we do not consider an officer’s subjective beliefs”].) The officer’s subjective beliefs regarding the “particular legal theory” that authorized the search are immaterial “so long as the objective facts, when fully determined, afford probable cause.” (People v. Le (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 186, 193; see also id. at pp. 190-191, 193-195 [automobile exception justified search even though officer subjectively relied on defendant’s wife’s consent as basis for search].) We have concluded the objective facts supported probable cause. Finally, Jackson appears to argue that even if the automobile exception justified the search of his vehicle, it did not justify the search of the backpack inside the vehicle. He does not address the rule (cited by the Attorney General) that “ ‘[o]nce an 14 officer has probable cause to search the vehicle under the automobile exception, they “may conduct a probing search of compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are not in plain view.” ’ ” (Castro, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 320; accord, Moore, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 297.) We conclude that rule justified the search of the backpack inside the vehicle because, as Jackson acknowledges, “the contents of the backpack could not be seen without opening it first; phrased differently, the contents were not ‘in plain sight.’ ” (See Moore, at p. 302 [probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle justified search of backpack in vehicle].) In short, we conclude the trial court correctly denied Jackson’s motion to suppress.

B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the firearm into evidence. Jackson argues the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting the firearm into evidence, because the court allegedly failed to weigh the firearm’s probative value against the risk of undue prejudice to Jackson. The Attorney General argues that Jackson forfeited the objection, that the objection lacks merit, and that the admission of the firearm did not prejudice Jackson. “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) “ ‘The “prejudice” which section 352 seeks to avoid is that which “ ‘ “uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the 15 issues.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 29, italics omitted.) “We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of discretion, and ‘do not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or made in a “ ‘patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 424 (Lamb).) Before addressing the parties’ arguments, we summarize the relevant proceedings.

1. Additional background Before trial, the prosecution moved in limine for permission to have Officer Latona display the firearm to the jury. At the hearing on the motion, the trial court stated it would allow the prosecution to do so. Jackson objected that displaying the firearm to the jury would be more prejudicial than probative (implicitly invoking Evidence Code section 352) and offered to stipulate that the firearm had no serial number. The court responded, “My ruling stands.” The court granted the motion, subject to the conditions that the bailiff would inspect the firearm and the firearm would be rendered safe for display. The next day, Jackson asked if the trial court had ruled on the motion. The court confirmed it had granted the motion and asked if Jackson had concerns. Again, implicitly invoking Evidence Code section 352, Jackson argued displaying the firearm would be prejudicial and that a photograph of the firearm would “do just as well.” The trial court responded: “I don’t believe it’s prejudicial. It’s evidence in the case. . . . [T]he standard is beyond a reasonable doubt. We have 12 jurors. You never know if the[re]

16 might be a juror that says ‘I want to see the actual gun.’ ” “I can understand why showing them the gun which is such an important part of this case, it’s the case, should be shown to them.” “If at any point you feel that we’ve gone beyond our discussions on how it’s supposed to be handled in the courtroom, go ahead and object and we’ll go to side bar and talk about it. But I’m satisfied that they know the procedures and that they’re not going to do something that would be inflammatory or dangerous in this courtroom.” Officer Latona was the sole witness at trial. The prosecutor played a video from Latona’s body-worn camera for the jury. Officer Latona testified about the traffic stop in a manner consistent with his and Officer McPheeters’s testimony at the suppression hearing. He testified that the stop occurred in a “high-crime area” known for narcotics sales, illicit firearms, and prostitution. Officer Latona testified that when he asked for Jackson’s driver’s license, Jackson reached for a backpack, and he (Latona) ordered Jackson not to reach for the backpack and to exit the vehicle. When the prosecutor asked why he ordered Jackson out of the vehicle, Latona testified: “Because based on my training and experience I know that suspects often conceal firearms in backpacks, and based on the fact that he tried to reach inside of that [backpack] we wanted to do the stop outside.” Officer Latona testified that he searched the vehicle and found a loaded firearm, among other items, in the backpack. The prosecutor published to the jury two photographs of the firearm and a photograph of a loaded magazine (which photographs were later admitted into evidence).

17 At that point in Officer Latona’s testimony, he confirmed that he possessed the firearm in the courtroom, had rendered it safe, and had cleared it with the bailiff. Before allowing Latona to display the firearm to the jury, the trial court informed the jury that the court had discussed safety procedures for the firearm’s display with Latona, the attorneys, and the bailiff, and that the firearm was unloaded and would not be pointed at anyone. The court also informed the jury that the firearm would be brought to the jury room during deliberations only if the jury requested and, if so, would remain in the bailiff’s possession and control. One juror asked, “If the jury asks for it to be brought in the room they are not going to just leave it? I am terrified of guns.” The trial court responded, “No. No. No.” The court repeated that the firearm would remain in the bailiff’s possession and control. The court asked if there were other questions, and there were none. Latona then removed the firearm from an evidence bag and displayed it to the jury. The trial court observed that a zip tie had been applied to the firearm as an additional safety precaution; Latona explained that even if the firearm were loaded (which it was not), the zip tie would prevent it from firing. Latona testified the firearm’s barrel was approximately four inches long. The firearm had no serial number and thus could not have been registered. Officer Latona placed the firearm back in the evidence bag. The prosecutor then played another portion of the video, which, according to Latona’s testimony, showed Latona retrieving the firearm from the backpack, removing a loaded magazine from the firearm, and searching the firearm for a serial number. Latona 18 testified that an Automated Firearms System search using Jackson’s name and date of birth returned “no hits found,” indicating that no firearms were registered to Jackson. Jackson presented no defense evidence. The prosecution initially moved all exhibits except the firearm into evidence. At the trial court’s suggestion, the prosecution moved the firearm, too, into evidence. Defense counsel stated: “No objection.” The court admitted the firearm. In instructing the jury, the trial court reminded the jury that unlike the other exhibits, the firearm would not be sent to the jury room (unless requested). The jury did not ask to see the firearm during deliberations.

2. Jackson preserved his objection to the firearm’s admission but fails to show an abuse of discretion. The Attorney General argues Jackson forfeited his Evidence Code section 352 objection for appeal, even though he raised the objection in opposition to the prosecution’s pretrial motion in limine for permission to have Officer Latona display the firearm to the jury, because Jackson did not renew the objection at trial. We conclude Jackson preserved the Evidence Code section 352 objection by raising it in opposition to the prosecution’s motion in limine, which motion the trial court granted over Jackson’s opposition. (See Paige v. Safeway, Inc. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1108, 1119-1120 [plaintiff’s opposition to defendant’s pretrial motion in limine preserved issue for appeal despite her failure to renew objection at trial, because trial court granted defendant’s motion in limine over plaintiff’s opposition].) That the trial court invited Jackson to object if the prosecution transgressed the conditions the court had placed on the manner 19 in which the firearm would be handled in the courtroom (which transgression did not occur) did not render the trial court’s ruling on the motion tentative. In light of the trial court’s ruling on the motion, Jackson’s defense counsel reasonably could have believed it would be futile to renew the Evidence Code section 352 objection when Officer Latona displayed the firearm to the jury (or when, at the trial court’s own suggestion, the People moved the firearm into evidence). “[I]ssues are preserved for review when it would be fruitless or an idle act for an attorney to object.” (City of Long Beach v. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Long Beach (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 780, 784, disapproved on another ground by Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512; accord, Mundy v. Lenc (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406 [“a party need not object if it would be futile”].) On the merits, however, we conclude Jackson fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion. “[W]hen ruling on a[n] [Evidence Code] section 352 motion, a trial court need not expressly weigh prejudice against probative value, or even expressly state it has done so. All that is required is that the record demonstrate the trial court understood and fulfilled its responsibilities under Evidence Code section 352.” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 214; accord, People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1315.) Here, in granting the prosecution’s motion in limine over Jackson’s objection, the trial court explained that it believed the firearm was probative and that the conditions it had placed on the manner in which the firearm would be handled in the courtroom mitigated the potential for undue prejudice. That explanation demonstrates the trial court conducted the required balancing. (See Williams, 20 at pp. 213-214 [rejecting defendant’s argument that trial court’s comments about challenged evidence “were too short and conclusory to demonstrate the balancing required by Evidence Code section 352”].) The trial court acted within its discretion by concluding that the potential for undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh the firearm’s probative value. The firearm was probative of the length of the firearm’s barrel, which was relevant to an element of count 2, i.e., that the firearm was capable of being concealed on the person.9 The firearm was also probative of the absence of a serial number, which was relevant to the allegations as to both counts that the firearm was unregistered. That the prosecution could have relied instead on photographs and descriptions of the firearm, and/or Jackson’s proffered stipulation regarding the absence of a serial number, did not deprive the firearm of probative value. (See People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 894 [“That the prosecutor could have relied on other testimony and evidence of defendant’s demeanor . . . does not diminish the probative value of the challenged evidence or require its exclusion under Evidence Code section 352. As we have observed, the prosecutor is not required ‘to present its case in the manner preferred by the defense’ ”]; Lamb, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 425 [“ ‘the “persuasive power of the concrete and 9 The jury’s instruction on the elements of count 2 provided that Jackson must have “carried within a vehicle a firearm capable of being concealed on the person,” and defined a “firearm capable of being concealed on the person” as any device that, among other requirements, “has a barrel less than 16 inches in length.”

21 particular is often essential to the capacity of jurors to satisfy the obligations that the law places on them” ’ ”].) In sum, we conclude the trial court acted within its discretion by admitting the firearm. We need not address the Attorney General’s argument that the firearm’s admission was harmless.

C. The record does not demonstrate an RJA violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Jackson did not make any objection or motion pursuant to the RJA in the trial court. “[S]ection 745, subdivision (a), a provision of the Racial Justice Act, sets forth four categories of conduct that, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, establish a violation of the act.” (People v. Lawson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 990, 998.) Because “we are not reviewing any Racial Justice Act findings by the trial court, of which there are none,” “we independently review the record to determine if defendant has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, a violation of section 745, subdivision (a).” (Id. at p. 999.) Jackson, who is Black, argues his conviction and sentence violated the RJA because (1) Officers Latona and McPheeters allegedly “racially profiled” Jackson by targeting him for an allegedly pretextual traffic stop because of his race; (2) at trial, Officer Latona referred to Jackson as a suspect (by explaining that he ordered Jackson to exit the vehicle when Jackson reached for a backpack because he knew “suspects” often concealed firearms in backpacks); and (3) the officers referred to Jackson’s presence in a “high-crime area” several times during the suppression hearing and once during trial, the prosecutor referred to the same in opposing the suppression motion, and the trial court referred to the same in denying probation. Jackson 22 does not dispute the Attorney General’s observation that his arguments appear to rely on subdivisions (a)(1) and (2) of section 745. Those subdivisions provide: “A violation is established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following: [¶] (1) The judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin. [¶] (2) During the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.” (§ 745, subd. (a).) “ ‘Racially discriminatory language’ means language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).) The Attorney General argues that pursuant to People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804 and published cases that have agreed with Lashon, Jackson forfeited his RJA claims by failing to raise them in the trial court. (See id. at p. 815, rev. den. [“we conclude a defendant may be found to have forfeited a section 745 claim of racial bias made for the first time on direct appeal in the absence of a showing that an exception to the forfeiture doctrine applies”]; accord, People v. Gomez (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 384, 23 391 [“As several courts of appeal have now held, where a defendant could have raised a Racial Justice Act claim below but failed to do so, the claim is forfeited”]; People v. Wagstaff (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1207, 1219, rev. den.; People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76, 114, rev. den.) Jackson argues those cases were wrongly decided. In the alternative, Jackson asks us to exercise our discretion to consider the forfeited claims. As we did in Lawson, “we decline to address the parties’ arguments concerning forfeiture, because assuming arguendo defendant’s challenge is properly before us, we conclude it fails on the merits, as we discuss post.” (Lawson, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.) We conclude the record does not demonstrate an RJA violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The record contains no reference to Jackson’s race, ethnicity, or national origin except in the police report, the probation report, and the abstract of judgment, each of which documents contained only a single demographic note that Jackson is Black. The police report and probation report were not admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing or at trial. The abstract of judgment did not exist until after Jackson was convicted and sentenced. The record contains no other reference to race, ethnicity, or national origin except in a jury instruction prohibiting bias on those bases. We conclude the record does not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that in conducting the traffic stop of Jackson’s vehicle, the officers exhibited bias or animus towards Jackson because of his race, ethnicity, or national origin. (§ 745, subd. (a).) Officer Latona testified the officers conducted the stop because Jackson’s vehicle had no front license plate, had dark tinted windows, and had a rear license plate that Officer Latona 24 suspected was illegitimate. As noted, “ ‘the lack of a front license plate has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for a traffic stop.’ ” (Valle, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 202.) Jackson’s assertion that the officers did not investigate any of the suspected traffic violations is contradicted by Officer Latona’s trial testimony that he determined, as Jackson himself emphasizes, that the rear license plate (a temporary Georgia license plate) was not, in fact, illegitimate. To the extent the officers did not investigate the other suspected traffic violations or cite Jackson for them, their failure to do so does not raise an inference of racial bias on this record, especially given that the officers found a concealed, loaded, unregistered firearm during the lawful vehicle search on the scene. (Cf. People v. Esparza (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1098, fn. 13 [officers could rationally forego citing or warning defendant for tinted windows after discovering, through lawful detention and search, evidence that defendant was guilty of felonies].) We further conclude Officer Latona did not use racially discriminatory language about Jackson’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibit bias against Jackson because of his race, ethnicity, or national origin, when Latona explained at trial that he ordered Jackson to exit the vehicle when Jackson reached for a backpack because he knew “suspects” often concealed firearms in backpacks. At the time Latona ordered Jackson to exit the vehicle, Latona suspected Jackson of several traffic violations, including the missing front license plate that, as noted, supplied a lawful basis for the traffic stop. (Valle, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 202.) Latona’s single reference to Jackson as a suspect did not suggest that Latona suspected 25 Jackson of those violations (or more serious violations) because of his race, ethnicity, or national origin. Nor did Officer Latona exhibit bias against Jackson because of his race, ethnicity, or national origin merely by indicating that he (Latona) was concerned about the potential presence of a firearm in the backpack during the traffic stop. The United States Supreme Court “has recognized that traffic stops are ‘especially fraught with danger to police officers.’ ” (Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323, 330.) “[T]he risk of a violent encounter in a traffic-stop setting ‘stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a [traffic] violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop.’ ” (Id. at pp. 331-332.) Finally, although the record contains several references to Jackson’s presence in a “high-crime area” at the time of the traffic stop, no evidence in the record links either that specific area or high-crime areas generally to Jackson’s race, ethnicity, or national origin. Absent such evidence, we conclude those references do not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a law enforcement officer, an attorney, or the trial judge “exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin” within the meaning of section 745, subdivisions (a)(1) and (2). We further conclude those references do not constitute “ ‘[r]acially discriminatory language’ ” absent any evidence in the record that an objective observer would perceive those references as appealing to racial bias. (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).) Jackson’s reliance on Finley v. Superior Court (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12 (Finley) is misplaced. In that case, the defendant filed an RJA motion in the trial court and supported the motion 26 with an expert declaration opining that the officer who stopped and searched the defendant’s vehicle demonstrated racial bias by referring to the defendant’s presence in a “ ‘high-crime neighborhood.’ ” (Id. at p. 18.) The trial court denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of an RJA violation. (Ibid.) In explaining its ruling, the trial court referenced unspecified evidence that the defendant was present in a “ ‘high-crime area,’ ” implicitly relying on evidence that the defendant had not proffered. (Id. at pp. 18, 24.) The appellate court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to hold a new prima facie hearing, concluding the trial court “applied an incorrect standard of review at the prima facie stage” because, among other reasons, the trial court relied on evidence that the defendant had not proffered and did not address the defense expert’s opinion. (Finley, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 23-25.) “The [trial] court should have reviewed the opinion to determine if it was conclusory, speculative, or unsupported. [Citation.] If the court determined the opinion passed this preliminary threshold, it was required to accept the truth of the opinion at this [prima facie] stage and consider it as part of [the defendant’s] prima facie case.” (Id. at p. 24; see also id. at p. 22 [“The prima facie threshold is . . . lower than the preponderance of the evidence standard required to establish an actual violation of the Racial Justice Act”].) Here, in contrast, Jackson did not present expert opinion or other evidence that any reference to his presence in a high-crime area demonstrated racial bias. Moreover, because Jackson did not make an RJA motion in the trial court, we independently review the record to determine whether he has demonstrated, by 27 a preponderance of the evidence, an RJA violation (Lawson, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 999)—not whether he has merely made a prima facie showing of such a violation. For the reasons we have explained, we conclude he has not demonstrated an RJA violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.