Oscar Fernando Ramos-Guinac v. Christopher J. Larose
- Proceeding
- district
- Area
- civil
- Panel
- Cathy Ann Bencivengo (author)
Analysis
The court considered a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) filed by a detained petitioner. The court denied the IFP motion due to contradictory financial statements, dismissed the petition without prejudice pending payment of the filing fee or a proper IFP motion, and denied the motion to appoint counsel as moot.
| What the court decided | The model |
|---|---|
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP) Denied“The Court therefore DENIES the motion to proceed IFP based on Petitioner’s contradictory statements.” | agree with court The court found the petitioner's claim of regular income ($250/month) contradictory to the claim of no income in the last twelve months. While the court did not explicitly cite the statutory standard for IFP (28 U.S.C. § 1915), the denial based on internal inconsistency in the affidavit is a standard procedural ground for denying IFP status. The court provided a clear path to cure the defect (pay fee or file proper motion). |
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Dismissed Without Prejudice“The Court cannot proceed until Petitioner has either paid the $5.00 filing fee or has qualified to proceed in forma pauperis and so DISMISSES the Petition without prejudice.” | agree with court Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), a court must dismiss a case if the petitioner is not entitled to proceed IFP and has not paid the filing fee. Dismissing without prejudice allows the petitioner to refile upon curing the deficiency, which is the correct procedural mechanism here. |
Motion to Appoint Counsel Denied as Moot“The Court also DENIES AS MOOT the motion to appoint counsel.” | agree with court Because the underlying petition was dismissed, there is no pending case in which counsel could be appointed. Denying the motion as moot is procedurally correct. |
The order itself: sound with gaps — The order is procedurally sound. It correctly identifies the failure to pay the filing fee or qualify for IFP status as a basis for dismissal without prejudice. The footnote correctly cites Ninth Circuit precedent regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies for bond determinations, although this issue was not the primary basis for the dismissal (which was procedural/fee-related). The reasoning for denying IFP based on contradictory statements is defensible, though it could have been more explicit about the requirement for a sworn affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Opinion
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 OSCAR FERNANDO RAMOS- Case No.: 3:26-cv-5304-CAB-DEB GUINAC, 12 ORDER: Petitioner, 13 (1) DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE v. TO PROCEED IN FORMA 14 PAUPERIS, [Doc. No. 2]; and CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, 15 Respondent. (2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION 16 TO APPOINT COUNSEL; and 17 (3) DISMISSING PETITION 18 WITHOUT PREJUDICE 19 Petitioner Oscar Fernando Ramos-Guinac has filed a petition for a writ of habeas 20 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. No. 1 (“Petition”).] Petitioner has not paid the 21 $5.00 filing fee and has instead moved to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). [Doc. No. 22 2.] Petitioner states that before he was detained on July 2, 2026, he was employed as a 23 floor installer and regularly sent $250 per month to family in Guatemala. [Doc. Nos. 1–2.] 24 However, Petitioner also states that he has had no income in the last twelve months. Id. 25 The Court therefore DENIES the motion to proceed IFP based on Petitioner’s 26 contradictory statements. The Court cannot proceed until Petitioner has either paid the 27 28 1 $5.00 filing fee or has qualified to proceed in forma pauperis and so DISMISSES the 2 || Petition without prejudice. 3 The Clerk of the Court shall close the case. Petitioner may re-open the case by 4 || paying the $5.00 filing fee or submitting a properly supported motion to proceed IFP by 5 || October 2, 2026.! The Court also DENIES AS MOOT the motion to appoint counsel. 6 Itis SO ORDERED. 7 || Dated: September 17, 2026 ( (6 — 8 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 9 United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 |j_—_ 25 ' The Court notes that Petitioner has already received a bond hearing. [Petition at 1 (acknowledging 26 || August 2026 bond hearing and denial of bond).] As the Ninth Circuit has explained, seeking habeas review of an IJ’s adverse bond determination before appealing to the BIA is an improper shortcut. 27 |! Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). Instead, “[petitioner] should have exhausted 8 administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district court to review the IJ’s decision.” Jd.