Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SAIKOU YAYA DIALLO, Case No.: 26-cv-4985-RSH-JLB 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION 13 v. FOR HABEAS CORPUS 14 JEREMY CASEY, et al., [ECF No. 2] 15 Respondents.

16 17 18 On September 2, 2026, petitioner Saikou Yaya Diallo, proceeding pro se, filed the 19 instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. For the 20 reasons set forth below, the Court denies the petition. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Petitioner has previously sought habeas relief in this District. See Yaya-Diallo v. 23 Casey, No. 3:26-cv-2167-RSH-BLM (S.D. Cal.) (the “Prior Action”). In the Prior Action, 24 Petitioner alleged that his detention without a bond hearing pending removal proceedings 25 had become unduly prolonged in violation of his due process rights. Case No. 3:26-cv- 26 2167-RSH-BLM, ECF No. 1 at 2, 4. Respondents filed a return stating that they did not 27 oppose a court-ordered bond hearing at which the government would bear the burden of 28 establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner posed a flight risk or a 1 danger to the community. Case No. 3:26-cv-2167-RSH-BLM, ECF No. 4 at 1. That same 2 day, the Court granted the petition and directed the government to “arrange a bond hearing 3 for petitioner before an immigration court within seven (7) days of this order, at which the 4 government bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that 5 Petitioner is a flight risk.” Case No. 3:26-cv-2167-RSH-BLM, ECF No. 6 at 2. 6 Petitioner received a bond hearing on April 23, 2026, at which the immigration judge 7 denied bond concluding Petitioner posed a significant risk of flight, based on, among other 8 things, Petitioner’s lack of community ties, the absence of supporting evidence regarding 9 his proposed sponsor, and lack of work history in the United States. ECF No. 5-1 at 11. On 10 May 26, 2026, Petitioner moved to enforce the Court’s order and Respondents opposed. 11 Case No. 3:26-cv-2167-RSH-BLM, ECF Nos. 9, 11. The Court denied the motion, 12 explaining that Petitioner’s generalized allegations that the immigration judge had 13 misapplied the burden of proof raised claims of error that were more properly addressed 14 through Petitioner’s pending appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Case 15 No. 3:26-cv-2167-RSH-BLM, ECF No. 13 at 3. 16 Petitioner subsequently requested another custody redetermination hearing before 17 the immigration court. A custody redetermination hearing was held on August 14, 2026, 18 and the immigration judge again denied bond finding that Petitioner posed a flight risk 19 based in part on his lack of a fixed address apart from housing offered by a distant relative, 20 as well as his lack of employment history or other community ties. ECF No. 5-1 at 14. On 21 September 2, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ECF 22 No. 1. 23 II. LEGAL STANDARD 24 Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may 25 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 26 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A prisoner bears the 27 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 28 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 1 III. ANALYSIS 2 In the instant Petition, Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his continued 3 detention, alleging that his detention has become unduly prolonged in violation of the Fifth 4 Amendment. ECF No. 1 at 4–5. Petitioner also challenges the immigration judge’s bond 5 determinations. Id. at 5–7. Respondents argue Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted. ECF 6 No. 5 at 1, 3–4. 7 As discussed above, the Court already addressed Petitioner’s due process challenge 8 to his prolonged detention and ordered the government to provide Petitioner with a bond 9 hearing. Case No. 3:26-cv-02167-RSH-BLM, ECF No. 6 at 2. To the extent Petitioner is 10 again challenging the immigration judge’s April 23, 2026 bond determination, the Court 11 declines to revisit those alleged errors for the same reasons explained in its prior order. See 12 Case No. 3:26-cv-02167-RSH-BLM, ECF No. 13. Indeed, Petitioner acknowledges in this 13 petition that his grounds for relief have “been presented to this Court previously.” ECF No. 14 1 at 7; see Pinson v. Gutierrez, No. 23-15027, 2023 WL 8714902, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 15 2023) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the [§ 2241] petition as 16 duplicative because it raises the same claims and is based on the same factual allegations 17 as those in [prior action].”); Mikhail v. Warden of Golden State Annex, No. 1:25-CV-01414 18 JLT SKO, 2026 WL 165392, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2026) (“[T]he instant petition is 19 subject to dismissal because it is identical to a previously filed § 2241 petition[.]”) 20 To the extent Petitioner challenges the immigration judge’s subsequent August 14, 21 2026 bond determination, this claim has also not been exhausted. As the Court had 22 previously set forth, the Ninth Circuit “require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas 23 petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief 24 under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on 25 other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). A court may require 26 prudential exhaustion when: 27 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate 28 a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the 1 requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow 2 the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for 3 judicial review. 4 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 5 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). “When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative 6 remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or 7 stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is 8 excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). A court may excuse 9 prudential exhaustion, however, “if administrative remedies are inadequate or not 10 efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury 11 will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 13 The Ninth Circuit has applied these principles in analogous circumstances, where a 14 noncitizen seeks habeas review of an immigration judge’s adverse bond determination. See 15 Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160 (“Here, [the petitioner] pursued habeas review of the IJ’s 16 adverse bond determination before appealing to the BIA. This short cut was improper. 17 Leonardo should have exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before 18 asking the federal district court to review the IJ’s decision.”). 19 Here, the immigration judge denied bond at the August 14, 2026 custody 20 redetermination hearing finding that Petitioner posed a flight risk, citing, among other 21 things, Petitioner’s lack of a fixed address apart from housing offered by a distant relative 22 and his lack of employment history or other community ties. ECF No. 5-1 at 14. Petitioner 23 disputes this determination. ECF No. 1 at 6–7. However, Petitioner’s arguments are 24 directed to the immigration judge’s assessment of the evidence and are more appropriately 25 addressed through an appeal to the BIA. Petitioner’s unsupported assertion that the same 26 immigration judge granted bond to “similarly situated” individuals likewise does not 27 establish a basis for bypassing administrative review. Id. at 6. Finally, Petitioner’s 28 contention that an appeal would be futile because the BIA cannot decide constitutional 1 issues is also unpersuasive. /d. at 3. Characterizing his claims in constitutional terms does 2 ||not establish that the BIA cannot address any underlying alleged errors in the immigration 3 ||judge’s consideration of the evidence. 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is DENIED. The Court also DENIES 6 || Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [ECF No. 2], as Petitioner has not shown 7 ||“exceptional circumstances” warranting such an appointment here. See Palmer v. Valdez, 8 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009). The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: September 17, 2026 ‘ Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28