Shell v. Super. Ct. CA2/3

Opinion

Filed 9/18/26 Shell v. Super. Ct. CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ADAM SHELL, B343141

Petitioner, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21STFL02275) v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

CARLA CHRISTOFFERSON,

Real Party in Interest.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Josh Freeman Stinn, Judge, treated as a petition for writ of mandate. Petition granted; order reversed. Adam Shell, in pro. per., for Petitioner. No appearance for Respondent. Carla Christofferson, in pro. per., for Real Party in Interest. _________________________ Before Adam Shell and Carla Christofferson were married, they entered into a prenuptial agreement under which they waived spousal support in the event the marriage ended. When the marriage did end and dissolution proceedings were instituted, the court awarded temporary spousal support to Shell. Thereafter, the court found the waiver of spousal support valid and ordered Shell to repay the temporary spousal support to Christofferson. Shell appeals the order, contending that the court lacked jurisdiction to make it, having failed to reserve jurisdiction when issuing the temporary spousal support order. We agree and reverse the order.1 BACKGROUND Shell and Christofferson were married in 2008. They had a prenuptial agreement that included a waiver of spousal support. In 2021, Shell filed for dissolution of the marriage. On September 24, 2021, the court (Judge Anne Richardson) heard Shell’s request for, among others, child and spousal support orders. The court granted Shell pendente lite spousal support in the amounts of $48,378 for June 2, 2021 to July 31, 2021 and $15,529 from August 1, 2021 going forward. Per the minute order, “The Court orders pendente lite spousal support to preserve the supported spouse’s lifestyle and needs while the dispute is pending and is in no way intended to relate to the merits of the enforceability of the pre-nuptial agreement.” Thereafter, Judge Richardson issued her findings and order after hearing. As relevant to temporary spousal support, the order stated:

1 For reasons discussed in Discussion Section I., we treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate.

2 “A. The Court finds that pendente lite spousal support payable by [Christofferson] to [Shell] is appropriate in light of the huge disparity between [Shell]’s income and [Christofferson]’s income and the need to maintain the status quo for each party and the children during the pendency of this proceeding. “B. The Court understands that there is a dispute over the validity of the spousal support provisions of the parties’ Prenuptial Agreement, but both parties concede that pendente lite spousal support is within the discretion of the Court pending a trial on that disputed issue. This order for pendente lite spousal support is intended to preserve [Shell]’s lifestyle and needs while the dispute is pending and is in no way intended to relate to the merits of the enforceability of the Prenuptial Agreement. “C. [Christofferson] shall pay to [Shell], as and for prospective pendente lite spousal support, the sum of $15,529 per month, payable one-half on the first and one-half on the 15th day of each month, commencing August 1, 2021 and continuing until further order of the Court.” On February 23, 2023, the court (Judge Christine Byrd) found the spousal support waiver in the prenuptial agreement enforceable. On July 3, 2024, the court (Judge Josh Freeman Stinn) ordered Shell to reimburse Christofferson $217,206.47 for the pendente lite spousal support she had paid to him. The court found that a statement Judge Richardson made at the September 24, 2021 hearing—“ ‘if there is anything that needs to be corrected, it will be corrected in the future’ ”—was a “sufficient express reservation to put the parties[’] clear expectations on notice that the premarital agreement, the enforceability, is up for 3 litigation.” In its later findings and order after hearing, the court found that Judge Richardson “made an express reservation of jurisdiction over the Court’s ability to retroactively modify the order for temporary spousal support in the event the spousal support waiver in the parties’ Prenuptial Agreement was found to be enforceable and to order the repayment of temporary spousal support.” However, because the parties disputed the amount Christofferson paid to Shell (she said $249,124, he said $217,206.47), the trial court reserved jurisdiction to decide that issue and “did not set specific terms as to when or how this amount will be paid by [Shell].” Instead, the court found that “this amount (plus any additional amounts later ordered based on the Court’s reservation herein), may be paid from [Shell’s] share of community property and/or any other separate property assets or funds.” DISCUSSION I. Appealability As an initial matter, Christofferson asks us to dismiss the appeal because the court reserved jurisdiction to determine whether she paid $249,124 or $217,206.47 in temporary spousal support to Shell. She thus contends that the order is not final and, as such, not appealable. We do not agree. An order granting, modifying, or denying temporary spousal support is immediately appealable. (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368; In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627, 637–638 (Gruen); see Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1.) Although interlocutory, such orders are appealable as final orders on collateral matters because they are “ ‘dispositive of 4 the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral matter, and directing payment of money or performance of an act.’ ” (Gruen, at pp. 637–638.) This collateral order doctrine of appealability allows for timely appellate review of orders not embraced in a final judgment but that are immediately operative and sufficiently definitive to permit effective appellate review. (See generally Muller v. Fresno Community Hospital & Medical Center (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 887, 898–903.) Here, the order is sufficiently definitive to permit effective appellate review. The substance of the order requires Shell to repay temporary spousal support to Christofferson. At a minimum, that amount is $217,206.47. That Christofferson claims she paid an additional approximately $32,000 does not change that Shell has been ordered to repay (or Christofferson has been given a credit of) $217,206.47. Although we conclude that the order is properly before us, out of an abundance of caution we shall deem Shell’s notice of appeal to be a petition for writ of mandate. (See, e.g., Last v. Superior Court (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 30, 43–44 (Last); People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 928, fn. 4.) II. Reservation of jurisdiction Shell contends that the order directing him to repay temporary spousal support to Christofferson must be reversed because the court did not expressly reserve jurisdiction to modify the support order. We agree. A court may order either spouse to pay any amount that is necessary for the support of the other spouse based on the supported party’s need and the supporting party’s ability to pay. (Fam. Code, § 3600, subd. (a).) The purpose of temporary spousal support is to “ ‘ “ ‘maintain the living conditions and standards of 5 the parties in as close to the status quo position as possible pending trial and the division of their assets and obligations.’ ” ’ ” (Last, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 38.) Although a temporary spousal support order “may be modified or terminated at any time,” such modification generally is prospective only—that is, it cannot modify “an amount that accrued before the date of the filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or terminate.” (Fam. Code, §§ 3603, 3651, subd. (c)(1).) An exception applies, however, if the trial court expressly reserved jurisdiction to modify the temporary support order. (Last, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 43; In re Marriage of Spector (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 201, 208–210; see, e.g., In re Marriage of Freitas (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1073–1074 (Freitas) [jurisdiction over temporary support order expressly reserved]; Gruen, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 639 [jurisdiction over support order not expressly reserved].) Distilled, the rule is a “trial court lacks jurisdiction to retroactively modify a temporary support order to any date earlier than the date on which a proper pleading seeking modification of such order is filed [citation], unless the trial court expressly reserves jurisdiction to amend the support order such that the parties’ clear expectation is the original support award is not final.” (Spector, at p. 210.) Generally, we review an order for temporary spousal support for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Wittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1326–1327.) “A trial court’s decision is an abuse of discretion if it is based on an error of law [citations] or if the court’s factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” (Last, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 37.) However, we review de novo whether a court reserved jurisdiction 6 to modify a support order. (Freitas, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 1073.) Here, whether Judge Richardson reserved jurisdiction over temporary spousal support hinges on her statement at the September 24, 2021 hearing: “I want to hear this motion today. If there is anything that needs to be corrected, it will be corrected in the future.” As we now explain, this comment was not sufficient to constitute an express reservation of jurisdiction. First, vague comments made during a hearing on a motion cannot impeach a court’s subsequent written ruling. (See, e.g., Key v. Tyler (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 505, 539, fn. 16 [court’s comments from bench “were not final findings and cannot impeach its subsequent written ruling”]; Diaz v. Professional Community Management, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1206– 1207 [court’s oral comments are informal statements of view]; Silverado Modjeska Recreation & Park Dist. v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 282, 300–301 [court’s comments at hearing cannot be used to impeach final order].) The court’s subsequent written rulings in both the minute order and the findings and orders after hearing do not contain a reservation of jurisdiction. Nothing in those written orders informed the parties that the temporary spousal support order was nonfinal. Second, the court’s statement by itself or in context is not sufficiently clear to constitute an express reservation of jurisdiction such that we could overlook its absence in the written orders. The statement alone does not refer to the temporary support award or clearly state it relates to modifying that award, as opposed to relating to whether Shell ultimately would be entitled to spousal support generally. In context, the parties were discussing whether spousal support should be ordered and 7 Christofferson’s counsel’s argument that if the prenuptial agreement were ultimately found to be valid, then the court would have to “undo” its order. But the parties were also discussing whether money Christofferson received under a settlement agreement was income. Counsel thus asked for a date in October for hearing, first, whether the settlement money was income, and, second, whether spousal support should be ordered. The court responded it did not have time in October, so “I want to hear this motion today. If there is anything that needs to be corrected, it will be corrected in the future. If there is anything that the parties want to have go to a long cause, you’ll set that up.” Therefore, while the court could have been referring to the spousal support award, it could also have been referring to the accounting of Christofferson’s income. It is unclear. Moreover, the court made the comment at the beginning of a lengthy hearing. The court made its spousal support order at the end of the hearing, 65 pages later in the reporter’s transcript. When it ruled, it did not mention a reservation of jurisdiction. For these reasons, Last is distinguishable. In that case, the parties had entered into a premarital agreement waiving spousal support. (Last, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 36.) The trial court nonetheless granted a request for temporary spousal support, stating at the hearing, “ ‘[T]o be clear, the order regarding spousal support . . . may be reallocated at the conclusion, obviously, of course, for example if the premarital agreement is found to be valid and there’s a determination that there was no spousal support, obviously [Peter] will be given credits at the conclusion of the case.’ ” (Ibid.) Last found that the trial court expressly reserved jurisdiction, observing, “The court had just bifurcated the issue of enforceability of the Premarital Agreement 8 and recognized that resolution of that issue might affect the validity of the award of spousal support. The court expressly and clearly announced its intent to grant Peter credits if the Premarital Agreement was found to be enforceable. The parties’ clear expectation, based on the court’s statements and the circumstances of case, must have been that the issue of spousal support would not be finally decided until the bifurcated trial on the issue of the enforceability of the Premarital Agreement.” (Id. at p. 43.) Unlike in Last, the court here did not make a similar, unambiguous statement about reallocating spousal support or crediting Christofferson should the prenuptial agreement be found valid. Although the parties here clearly had an expectation that their spousal support waiver might ultimately be found valid, the court did not expressly tie that eventuality to a possible order requiring Shell to repay the temporary support he had received. Stated otherwise, the court’s statement was insufficient to give Shell a clear expectation that the support award was not final and that he might have to repay it. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Spector, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 210; Gruen, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 639 [in absence of reservation of jurisdiction, parties are entitled to rely on temporary support without threat of having to repay it].)

9 DISPOSITION The order is reversed. Shell shall recover his costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS DELGADO, J.* We concur:

ADAMS, P. J.

HANASONO, J.

* Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.