Correia v. Yim CA5

Opinion

Filed 9/17/26 Correia v. Yim CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

VERONICA CORREIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent, F090712 v. (Super. Ct. No. BFL-25-003547)

ROBERT YIM, MODIFICATION OF OPINION [No Change in Judgment] Defendant and Appellant.

BY THE COURT:

On the court’s own motion, it is ordered that the following modification be made to the opinion filed herein on September 15, 2026:

1. On page 1, in the first sentence of the first paragraph, the “Superior Court of Stanislaus County” is deleted and replaced with the “Superior Court of Kern County.”

Except for the modification set forth, the opinion previously filed remains unchanged. This modification does not effect a change in the judgment.

MEEHAN, A.P. J. WE CONCUR:

HARRELL, J.

GUERRA, J. Filed 9/15/26 Correia v. Yim CA5 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

VERONICA CORREIA, F090712 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. BFL-25-003547) v. ROBERT YIM, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT* APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Tanya R. Richard, Judge. Robert Yim, in propria persona, for Defendant and Appellant. Veronica Correia, in propria persona, for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- * Before Meehan, Acting P. J., Harrell, J. and Guerra, J. INTRODUCTION Appellant Robert Yim appeals from the grant of a domestic violence restraining order where he is the restrained party. The order protects Veronica C., and her two daughters V.Y. and A.C. Appellant argues he was denied meaningful access to the courts, the trial court violated his due process rights when the court did not arrange to have appellant appear at the evidentiary hearing despite appellant’s written request, and the restraining order unlawfully abridges his custody rights. Based on the record provided, it appears the trial court abused its discretion when it did not rule on appellant’s request to appear or provide an alternative means for appellant to be heard at the restraining order hearing. As such, we reverse and remand to the court, to exercise its discretion and fashion an appropriate remedy affording appellant meaningful access to the courts. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Appellant is incarcerated in state prison and serving a life sentence. On September 19, 2022, in Alameda County, appellant appears to have been granted visitation with his daughter V.Y., where he was permitted to call V.Y. once a week for 30 minutes, and to write letters when he is able. On August 21, 2025, Veronica moved for an emergency ex parte temporary restraining order and a domestic violence restraining order. The request for the emergency order was denied, with the trial court ruling the “[e]mergency [ex parte] orders are not appropriate as there is no immediate danger. The [r]espondent is incarcerated in state prison serving a life sentence. No information presented in petition concerning recent abusive contact.” A hearing was scheduled and ultimately continued to September 23, 2025. On September 12, 2025, appellant was served with the restraining order documents and prepared a written opposition. Appellant denied Veronica’s allegations, requested the trial court to “email a video court order with zoom passcode” to the 2. prison’s litigation coordinator, and included the email address. Appellant’s letter was marked received by the court on September 18, 2025. There are no documents in the record indicating the trial court addressed appellant’s request for a video appearance, and no order was issued for appellant to appear by video at the hearing. The hearing was held on September 23, 2025, with only Veronica attending. On October 2, 2025, the court issued a restraining order after hearing. The order restrained appellant, listing Veronica and minors V.Y. and A.C. as protected persons. The order directed appellant not to harass or abuse the protected persons, not to contact them, to stay away, and prohibited appellant from purchasing, owning or possessing firearms, ammunition or body armor. The order made an exception allowing appellant to have contact with his child, V.Y., during court-ordered contact or visits. Appellant filed a timely appeal on November 7, 2025. DISCUSSION Appellant argues his inability to attend the hearing and absence of accommodation resulted in him being denied meaningful access to the trial courts, violated his due process rights, and that the restraining order interferes with his previous custody order. Primarily, it appears that the restraining order does accommodate appellant’s prior custody order and makes an exception allowing appellant to have contact with V.Y. during court-ordered contact or visits. This is denoted on page five of the restraining order, section 15, subsection (b)(2). On appeal, we review the trial court’s grant or denial of a domestic violence restraining order request for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 933.) “ ‘ “If the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. [Citation.]

3. Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a state from depriving any person of property without due process of law.” (Payne v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 914.) “Thus, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized a constitutional right of access to the courts for all persons, including prisoners.” (Ibid.) A denial of this right constitutes a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. (Id. at p. 923.) Although a prisoner may not compel the trial court to appoint counsel on his or her behalf, and ordinarily may not compel his or her appearance, courts have wide discretion and a wide variety of measures at their disposal to ensure a prisoner is provided access to the courts. (Apollo v. Gyaami (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1483 (Apollo).) These remedies include but are not limited to, “ ‘(1) deferral of the action until the prisoner is released [citation]; (2) appointment of counsel for the prisoner [citations]; (3) transfer of the prisoner to court (Pen. Code, §§ 1567, 2620); (4) utilization of depositions in lieu of personal appearances (Code Civ. Proc., § 1997; Pen. Code, §§ 2622–2623; [citations].); (5) holding of trial in prison [citation]; (6) conduct of status and settlement conferences, hearings on motions and other pretrial proceedings by telephone [citation]; (7) propounding of written discovery; (8) use of closed circuit television or other modern electronic media; and (9) implementation of other innovative, imaginative procedures [citations.]’ ” (Apollo, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1483.) “Generally, a trial court has discretion to choose among these and other remedies in safeguarding a prisoner litigant’s right of meaningful access to the courts to prosecute or defend against a civil action threatening his or her interests. [Citations.] However, a 4. trial court does not have discretion to choose no remedy in cases where the prisoner’s civil action is bona fide and his or her access to the courts is being impeded.” (Apollo, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1483–1484.) In this case, it is undisputed that appellant was in prison when Veronica filed the restraining order. After appellant was served, he filed a response contesting the restraining order, which was received by the trial court on September 18, 2025, prior to the restraining order hearing. Appellant requested to make a video appearance and provided the court with the prison litigation coordinator’s email address. Upon receipt of his request, the court was required to “(1) ‘first determine whether appellant is indigent’; (2) next determine whether the lawsuit involved a bona fide threat to his personal or property interests, and (3) consider what measures were available to protect appellant’s right of meaningful access to the courts if the first two conditions (i.e., indigency & bona fide claim) existed.” (Smith v. Ogbuehi (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 453, 466–467.) The record does not reflect the trial court responded to appellant’s request, and appellant ultimately did not appear at the hearing in any manner. The only conclusion we can reach from the record provided is that the court chose “no remedy” and made no determination regarding appellant’s meaningful access to the court. (Apollo, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1483–1484.) Thus, the court abused its discretion when it failed to consider and rule on appellant’s request before holding the evidentiary hearing without him, or craft an alternative remedy to safeguard appellant’s access to the courts. “A court is not under a duty to exercise its discretion in a particular manner [citation], but may be compelled to exercise its discretion in the first instance.” (Payne v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 925.) The remedy for the trial court’s error is a new hearing that comports with the principles of due process and equal protection, and safeguards appellant’s access to the courts. On remand, the court must determine whether appellant is presently indigent, whether he is incarcerated or otherwise subject to restrictions on his liberty that 5. necessitate assistance with meaningful access to the courts, and if so, the court shall exercise its discretion to select or fashion an appropriate means of affording appellant meaningful access. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Neither party shall recover costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

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