Diaz v. Franco Labor, Inc. CA5

Opinion

Filed 9/18/26 Diaz v. Franco Labor, Inc. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

NORBERTA DIAZ, F090638 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. BCV-25-100940) v. FRANCO LABOR, INC., OPINION Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. T. Mark Smith, Judge. Harris Law Firm, Justin D. Harris and James R. Proctor III for Defendant and Appellant. Protection Law Group, Heather Davis, Ryan T. Kuhn, Christine V. Reyes and Kiryl Karpiuk for Plaintiff and Respondent. -ooOoo- This case involves an employment related dispute between defendant/appellant Franco Labor, Inc. (FLI) and plaintiff/respondent Norberta Diaz. Diaz is a former employee of FLI who brought individual and class action claims against FLI for various Labor Code violations. FLI filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. In this appeal, FLI contends the court erred by finding FLI had not met its burden of presenting prima facie evidence of an existing arbitration agreement. We agree and vacate the order denying arbitration. BACKGROUND Diaz was employed by FLI as an agricultural worker (a picker or packer) between June 2024 and November 2024. FLI contends Diaz was provided with and signed an arbitration agreement as part of her employment. The arbitration agreement was provided to Diaz in Spanish, was entitled “Acuerdo de Arbitraje,” and included a class action waiver. Diaz disputes ever seeing or signing the purported arbitration agreement. In March 2025, Diaz filed a class action complaint against FLI in which she alleged various violations of the Labor Code. Diaz brought the claims in her capacity as an individual and as a class representative. In May 2025, FLI filed an initial petition to compel arbitration. Weeks later, Diaz filed an amended complaint that again alleged individual and class action claims for various Labor Code violations. In early June 2025, the court denied FLI’s initial petition to compel arbitration. FLI’s Second Petition to Compel Arbitration In late June 2025, FLI filed a second petition to compel arbitration. The second petition asserted that: Diaz was provided an arbitration agreement in Spanish, which was entitled “Acuerdo de Arbitraje”; Diaz signed the agreement on July 24, 2024, as part of the onboarding process; the agreement provided that “ ‘any and all disputes, controversies, or claims between the Parties … shall be determined exclusively by final and binding arbitration’ ”; and the agreement included a class and collective action 2. waiver. FLI represented it was submitting declarations, including that of its payroll clerk Maria Bailon, “who personally witnessed and administered [Diaz’s] signing of her arbitration Agreement on July 24, 2024.” As part of the petition, FLI submitted the declarations of Bailon and Maria Cabrera, FLI’s office manager, and an English translation of the purported arbitration agreement. Bailon declared that she supervises the process of new employees signing onboarding documents and that Diaz was provided an onboarding packet with the arbitration agreement in Spanish, the Acuerdo de Arbitraje. Bailon also declared that she was present when Diaz signed the onboarding documents, she explained the arbitration agreement to Diaz in Spanish, and she witnessed Diaz sign all onboarding documents, including the arbitration agreement. Cabrera’s declaration generally described FLI’s routine practices for onboarding new employees and the contents of the standard onboarding packet, which included the arbitration agreement. Cabrera declared that FLI’s records reflected Diaz was provided with the arbitration agreement as part of the standard onboarding process. Finally, the English translation of the purported arbitration agreement (the English translation) included a copy of the Spanish document entitled, “ACUERDO DE ARBITRAJE.” At the end of the Spanish document, a signature block contained the signature of “Norberta Diaz” dated July 24, 2024. The certification of accuracy accompanying the English translation identified the document translated as the “ACUERDO DE ARBITRAJE.” The certification was signed by Omar Kandil as the managing partner of Elite TransLingo. Diaz’s Opposition to the Petition to Compel Arbitration In mid-July 2025, Diaz filed her opposition to the motion to compel. The opposition explained she “challenge[d] the authenticity of her signature on the arbitration agreement, which place[d] the burden on [FLI] to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her signature on the arbitration agreement is authentic.” Diaz challenged 3. the authenticity of her signature by declaring she did not recall receiving, reviewing, or signing the “Acuerdo de Arbitraje” as part of her employment application and she had never seen the arbitration agreement until FLI attached it to the motion to compel. Diaz argued FLI could not meet its burden to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence and, even if FLI could do so, the arbitration agreement was not enforceable due to substantive and procedural unconscionability. To demonstrate procedural and substantive unconscionability, Diaz quoted from the English translation. Diaz did not object to or challenge the accuracy or the propriety of the English translation. Diaz did, however, make evidentiary objections to the Bailon and Cabrera declarations. Trial Court’s Order Denying Petition to Compel Arbitration 1. The Trial Court’s Findings In early August 2025, the court held a hearing on the petition to compel arbitration. In early October 2025, the trial court issued a written ruling denying FLI’s second petition to compel arbitration. In part, the court found:

“It is the moving party’s burden to provide evidence of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1160.) The Agreement must be authenticated for it to be considered. Here, [Diaz] does not recall receiving, reviewing or signing the purported arbitration agreement. But prior to that analysis, [FLI] must first meet its burden to produce prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy. (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165–166.)

“In this case, [FLI] failed to establish [the] existence of an arbitration agreement in its moving papers. [FLI] submitted declarations by Cabrera and Bailon and a Certified Translation of the [FLI] Arbitration Agreement from Spanish to English. The declarations are insufficient to establish prima facie evidence that a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. (See, rulings on objections to Cabrera and Bailon Declarations below.)

4. “The Certified Translation of [the FLI] Arbitration Agreement from Spanish to English also fails to establish a written arbitration agreement exists for the following reasons:

“(1) The ‘Certification of Accuracy’ states that the translated document is ‘Acuerdo de Arbitraje.’ The only declaration which states this is the Arbitration Agreement at issue is the Bailon Dec., [paragraph] 3, which states that the document was included in the ‘application packet’ provided to [Diaz]. However, [Diaz’s] objection to [paragraph] 3 is sustained; accordingly, this statement is stricken and there is no competent evidence authenticating that the ‘Acuerdo de Arbitraje’ is the agreement at issue.

“(2) The ‘Certification of Accuracy’ does attach an English ‘Arbitration Agreement’ and a Spanish ‘Acuerdo d Arbitraje.’ However, the Spanish version contains a signature block. The agreement is signed by Julian Celaya on behalf of the company and the signature is dated May 17, 2023. [FLI] offers no declaration from Julian Celaya, nor does it explain who he is. Further, there is no explanation why Celaya’s signature is dated over fourteen months before [Diaz’s]. Finally, there is no evidence verifying that the signature on the document is [Diaz]’s. Bailon’s Dec. statement that she ‘witnessed’ [Diaz] sign the agreement does not establish that the signature is [Diaz’s].

“(3) The ‘Certification of Accuracy’ does not identify any person who performed the translation. It only states ‘We at Elite Trans[L]ingo, certify that we are thoroughly familiar with the English and Spanish languages, that we have translated the attached document to the best of our knowledge.’ There is no individual who actually certified the translation.

“(4) As before, the new Certification contains the statement at the bottom that asserts that ‘We do not guarantee that the original presented to us is a genuine document.’ Accordingly, the Certification only states it translated what was given to them, not that it was the agreement that [Diaz] signed.

“The supplemental declarations of Bailon and Cabrera also do not establish the existence of a written arbitration agreement with [Diaz]. Although not necessary to the analysis here, the Bailon declaration does not establish that the arbitration agreement was fully explained to [Diaz] and that she understood it in light of her reliance on the Spanish language. None of the declarations offered by [FLI] address [Diaz’s] statements that 5. she signed certain documents on the threat that she would not receive her paycheck and would not be allowed to return the next day.

“[FLI] failed to present any declaration that the document given to the translators was the document that [Diaz] signed. Failure to provide such a declaration fails to support [FLI’s] burden to show the existence of an Agreement.

“[FLI] failed to present any declaration that [Diaz] signed the Arbitration Agreement. Failure to provide such a declaration fails to support [FLI’s] burden to show the existence of an Agreement.

“As [FLI] has failed to meet its burden of showing [the] existence of an Agreement, the burden does not shift to [Diaz] to dispute the existence of a written Agreement to Arbitrate these claims and raise a defense to the Agreement.” 2. The Trial Court’s Evidentiary Rulings The order denying arbitration also included rulings on Diaz’s evidentiary objections to the Bailon and Cabrera declarations.1 Each objection cited multiple Evidence Code sections. The order denying arbitration simply sustained or denied Diaz’s objections without providing any rationale or clarifying which Evidence Code sections were violated. Concerning Bailon’s declaration, the court sustained objections one, three, and five. These objections corresponded to paragraphs three, five, and seven of Bailon’s declaration. Each objection alleged that the corresponding paragraph was conclusory and nonspecific and that any documents that formed the basis of the paragraph had not been sufficiently authenticated. With respect to objections one and three, Diaz also objected that declaration paragraphs three and five lacked foundation and were speculative. The trial court sustained objections three and six to Cabrera’s declaration. Objection three challenged paragraph six as conclusory and violating the best evidence rule, and that any documents that formed the basis of the paragraph had not been 1 The trial court also sustained almost all of Diaz’s objections to supplemental declarations by Cabrera and Bailon, which were submitted as part of FLI’s reply briefing.

6. sufficiently authenticated. Objection six asserted that paragraph nine was conclusory, speculative, and lacked an adequate foundation, and that any documents that formed the basis of the paragraph were not properly authenticated. FLI’S APPEAL I. Arguments FLI argues the trial court erred by concluding FLI had failed to meet the first step of the three-step burden shifting process for establishing the existence of an arbitration agreement. It avers it met the first step of presenting prima facie evidence of an agreement to arbitrate when it produced an arbitration agreement that was signed by Diaz and when it submitted declarations from company personnel regarding the agreement. FLI claims the court improperly imposed evidentiary burdens that do not apply at step one, which led to the denial of the petition to compel. It seeks reversal of the court’s order because the court’s erroneous finding at step one caused the court to prematurely end the three-step burden shifting process. Diaz contends the trial court correctly denied FLI’s petition to compel arbitration. Diaz contends the existence of an agreement to arbitrate is a threshold question that must be affirmatively answered before arbitration can be ordered. Considering the evidentiary objections that were sustained by the court, Diaz argues FLI failed to produce prima facie evidence that established the existence of a properly signed arbitration agreement or that demonstrated the existence of an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. Diaz avers that under the deferential standards that apply to the court’s evidentiary rulings and factual determinations, the order must be affirmed. II. Legal Standard Arbitration is a favored procedure under both federal and California law. (Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown (2012) 565 U.S. 530, 533; OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125.) However, arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties can only be compelled to arbitrate when they have agreed to do so. (Pinnacle Museum 7. Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236; Consumer Advocacy Group v. Walmart Inc. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 679, 691.) Therefore, before a court may order the parties to arbitration, the court must determine the threshold question of whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. (Jones v. Solgen Construction, LLC (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1195; see also Fli-Lo Falcon, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 97 F.4th 1190, 1194.) The arbitration proponent bears the burden of establishing a valid agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972; Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, 829 (Ramirez).) If an arbitration agreement is established, the arbitration opponent bears the burden of proving any defense to enforcement of the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. (Engalla, at p. 972; Ramirez, at p. 830.) Although the arbitration proponent bears the ultimate burden of establishing the existence of an arbitration agreement, the trial court is required to determine the existence of an agreement through a three-step burden shifting process that shifts the burden of production. (See Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 51 (Garcia); Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 830; Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755–756 (Iyere).) The first step requires the proponent to present prima facie evidence of a written agreement. (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 830; see Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 804, 814.) By rule, a prima facie showing is met by stating “the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration. The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.” (Cal. Rules of Court,2 rule 3.1330; Ramirez, at p. 830.) Thus, the proponent may make a prima facie 2 All further references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.

8. showing “ ‘ “by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the opposing party’s signature.” ’ ” (Ramirez, at p. 831; Kinder, at p. 814.) To make a prima facie showing at the first step, however, it is unnecessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication. (Ramirez, at p. 831; Kinder, at pp. 814–815; Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218–219 (Condee).) This is because the trial court is only required as a preliminary matter to make a finding of the agreement’s existence, not an evidentiary determination of the agreement’s validity. (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1058 (Espejo); Condee, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 218–219.) If the prima facie burden is met, then the second step requires the arbitration opponent to produce evidence that challenges the authenticity or existence of the agreement.3 (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 830; Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755.) If the evidence produced sufficiently challenges the authenticity of the purported arbitration agreement, then the third step requires the proponent to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties formed a valid contractual agreement to arbitrate.4 (Ramirez, at p. 830; Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 815.)

3 If the opponent does not dispute the existence of an arbitration agreement after the proponent meets its step one burden, then the existence of an arbitration agreement is established and the remaining two steps fall away. (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165 (Gamboa); see also Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 830.) If the proponent meets its burden and the opponent decides to dispute the agreement, then the steps continue and the opponent must produce evidence under the second step. (Gamboa, at p. 165; see also Ramirez, at p. 830.) 4 Because the burden to authenticate a signature or an agreement does not arise until the arbitration opponent adequately challenges the authenticity of the signature or the agreement at the second step, the arbitration proponent may submit new evidence regarding authenticity or validity as part of a reply in order to meet its third step burden. (See Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060; Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 843–844; see also Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 774 [points or evidence raised for the first time in a 9. Issues regarding the burden of production in this three-step burden shifting framework are reviewed de novo on appeal. (West v. Solar Mosaic LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 985, 992–993; Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 755–756.) However, if the trial court resolves contested facts, the court’s factual determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Decloedt v. Radnet Management, Inc. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 732, 739.) III. Analysis The parties dispute the nature of the order denying arbitration. FLI argues the trial court misapplied step one of the three-step burden shifting process because it erroneously found that FLI did not present prima facie evidence of an agreement’s existence. Although somewhat unclear, we take Diaz to argue the court considered all steps in the three-step burden shifting process and concluded that FLI failed to meet the step one and step three burdens. In essence, FLI argues the court improperly stopped its analysis at step one, while Diaz argues the court conducted a full analysis to step three. To resolve this appeal, we must determine the nature of the court’s order. A. The Trial Court’s Analysis Ended at Step One “ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court.’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609; Jones v. Solgen Construction, LLC, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1191.) This includes resolving any ambiguities in favor of affirmance. (Jones, at p. 1191; In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1069.) “ ‘Only “[w]hen the record clearly demonstrates what the trial court did” will the reviewing court “not presume it did something different.” ’ ” (Jones, at p. 1191; Eli B., at p. 1069.) Stated differently, reply may be considered when the points or evidence are strictly responsive to arguments raised for the first time in an opposition].)

10. “[w]hen the record states what was done, it will not be presumed that something different was done.” (Steuri v. Junkin (1938) 27 Cal.App.2d 758, 760.) Here, there are four aspects of the order that convince us that the trial court determined only that FLI failed to meet step one in the three-step burden shifting process. First, the order at no point stated FLI had met its first step burden of presenting prima facie evidence of an arbitration agreement. Instead, the order initially stated that FLI failed to establish the existence of an agreement in its moving papers and then stated that the declarations failed to establish prima facie evidence of an agreement. The order then immediately described why other evidence besides the Bailon and Cabrera declarations “also fail[ed] to establish” an agreement. The word also is significant. Also means “in a similar way” (www.merriam-webster.com/simple/also [as of September 16, 2026], archived at <http://perma.cc/C9V4-LS83>, or “likewise” (www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/also [as of September 16, 2026], archived at <http://perma.cc/QMC3-PKFS>). Accordingly, if the Bailon and Cabrera declarations failed to establish prima facie evidence of the agreement’s existence, then the other described evidence must have likewise or in a similar way failed to establish prima facie evidence of the agreement’s existence. Thus, the order explained why FLI’s submitted evidence did not constitute prima facie evidence of an arbitration agreement and meet FLI’s step one burden. Second, the trial court’s order contains no finding that Diaz met step two of the burden shifting process, nor did the order acknowledge that the burden had ever shifted to her. While the order noted that Diaz did not recall receiving, reviewing, or signing the agreement, the order explained that an analysis of this evidence had to wait until FLI “first [met] its burden to produce prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.” Because prima facie evidence is the burden at the first step (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 830), and because the order did not address this evidence again, the court must have concluded that FLI never met its step one burden.

11. Third, and relatedly, at least as described in the trial court’s order, Diaz’s evidence, her failure to recall, could not have met the step two burden and shifted the burden back to FLI to establish an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 835; Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 758; see also Prostek v. Lincare Inc. (E.D. Cal. 2023) 662 F.Supp.3d 1100, 1114 (Prostek).) The purported arbitration agreement was a paper agreement with a handwritten signature, as opposed to an electronic signature. “[I]f a plaintiff presented with a handwritten signature on an arbitration agreement is unable to allege the signature is inauthentic or forged, the plaintiff’s failure to recall signing the agreement ‘neither creates a factual dispute as to the signature’s authenticity nor affords an independent basis to find that a contract was not formed.’ ” (Ramirez, at p. 835; Iyere, at p. 758; see also Prostek, at p. 1114.)5 Given that the order’s description of Diaz’s evidence was insufficient to meet the step two burden and shift the burden back to FLI at step three, the fact that FLI’s motion was denied shows the court’s analysis never reached step two and must have stopped at step one. Finally, the order concluded by explaining that, because FLI failed to meet its burden of showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, “the burden does not shift to [Diaz] to dispute the existence of a written Agreement to Arbitrate these claims and raise 5 There is a split between the Courts of Appeal regarding how an arbitration opponent may sufficiently challenge the authenticity of a handwritten signature for purposes of the second step of the three-step burden shifting framework. Gamboa concluded that a failure to recall signing an agreement meets the opponent’s step two burden. (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 168.) Iyere disagreed with Gamboa and held that an opponent must allege the signature is inauthentic or forged. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 756–758.) Our court in Ramirez rejected Gamboa and followed Iyere on this point. (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 833–835.) We agree with Ramirez. Because a party knows her own signature, it should take very little to deny signing a document; the absence of such a denial speaks volumes as to the legitimacy of any dispute regarding authenticity. (See Prostek, supra, 662 F.Supp.3d at p. 1114; Iyere, at p. 758; see also Ramirez, at pp. 834–835.)

12. a defense to the Agreement.” This conclusion can only mean that FLI failed to meet its step one burden. The conclusion describes the two necessary and direct consequences that follow from a failure to meet the step one burden. First, if the step one burden is not met, then the second step burden, which requires the opponent to challenge the existence or authenticity of an agreement to arbitrate, never arises. (See Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 830; Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165; Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755.) The burden never shifts to the opponent. Second, because the three-step burden shifting framework is the process by which the existence of an arbitration agreement is determined (Garcia, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 51; Iyere, at p. 755), the failure of the proponent to meet its step one burden necessarily means the proponent failed to meet its ultimate burden of establishing the existence of an arbitration agreement. With no existent arbitration agreement due to a failure at step one, there is no need for an opponent to provide defenses against the enforcement of a nonexistent agreement. (See Ramirez, at p. 830.) If the court had found that FLI failed to meet the step three burden, then it could not have said that the burden never shifted to Diaz to refute the existence of the agreement; FLI has no obligations under step three until Diaz adequately meets step two, and Diaz’s burden at step two does not arise until FLI meets its burden at step one. (See Ramirez, at p. 830; Gamboa, at p. 165; Iyere, at p. 755.) Therefore, the order’s conclusion, and in particular the statement that the burden never shifted to Diaz to refute the existence of the agreement, means the denial of FLI’s petition was based on the finding that FLI failed to meet its step one burden. For these reasons, we conclude the order denying FLI’s petition to compel arbitration is clearly based only on the finding that FLI failed to meet the step one burden of presenting prima facie evidence of an arbitration agreement.

13. B. FLI Met the Step One Burden Understanding that the trial court denied the petition to compel arbitration because FLI failed to meet its step one burden, the question becomes whether that finding was correct. We conclude that it was not. FLI’s petition to compel arbitration alleged an arbitration agreement existed between itself and Diaz. FLI submitted that purported agreement as an exhibit. More specifically, FLI submitted both an English translation and a Spanish version, with the Spanish version containing the handwritten signature of Diaz. At that point, FLI complied with rule 3.1330 and met its step one prima facie burden. (Rule 3.1330; Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 832; Garcia, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 51; Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755; Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 218–219.) Diaz’s opposition to the petition, notably, did not argue that FLI failed to meet the first step burden. In fact, Diaz’s opposition stated she was challenging the existence of an arbitration agreement, which she contended then shifted the burden back to FLI, and then used the terms of the English translation to argue in the alternative that the submitted arbitration agreement was unenforceable as procedurally and substantively unconscionable. If FLI had not met its first step prima facie burden, then Diaz would have expressly pointed this out and then challenged the authenticity or existence of the agreement in the alternative. Therefore, Diaz’s opposition accepted that FLI met its first step burden of presenting prima facie evidence and that the English translation was accurate. Given the rulings on Diaz’s evidentiary objections, the order shows the trial court was not satisfied that FLI’s evidence was sufficient to constitute even prima facie evidence of an arbitration agreement. However, at the first step of the three-step burden shifting process, rules regarding authenticity are relaxed. (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 831–832; Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058; Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 218–219.) Again, under rule 3.1330, the step one burden of 14. presenting prima facie evidence of an arbitration agreement may be met simply by submitting a signed copy of the alleged arbitration agreement. (Ramirez, at pp. 831–832; Espejo, at pp. 1058, 1060; Condee, at pp. 218–219.) The court’s imputation of additional evidentiary or authenticity requirements for meeting the first-step burden beyond rule 3.1330 was improper. (See rule 3.1330; Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 831–832 [holding that the defendant had met its step one burden “as a matter of law” by alleging the existence of an arbitration agreement and then complying with rule 3.1330].) Accordingly, because FLI alleged the existence of an arbitration agreement and submitted a signed copy of the alleged agreement, both the Spanish version and the English translation, the trial court erred by both imposing additional admissibility requirements and by concluding that FLI did not meet its first step burden. (See Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at pp. 830–832.) C. Remand Is Appropriate FLI’s opening brief requests we reverse the order denying arbitration and remand this matter with instructions for the trial court to grant arbitration. We cannot do so. All FLI did in this appeal was demonstrate the court did not properly apply the three-step burden shifting process because the court erroneously stopped its analysis at step one. FLI has not adequately addressed steps two or three or established that there are no viable defenses against the enforcement of the agreement. Therefore, there is no basis to remand this matter with instructions to grant FLI’s petition. On the other hand, Diaz’s briefing implies that we should affirm the order because the trial court’s findings and evidentiary rulings show FLI cannot meet its step three burden. However, there have been no step two findings or analyses by the court, and, as discussed above, the order’s characterization of Diaz’s evidence as showing a failure to recall is insufficient to meet her step two burden. (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 835; Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 756–758; see also Prostek, supra, 662 15. F.Supp.3d at p. 1114.) If Diaz’s evidence is insufficient to meet step two, then the burden never shifts back to FLI at step three. (Ramirez, at p. 830; Iyere, at p. 755.) Further, findings in the order that would be relevant to the step three burden were influenced by observations concerning the English translation and evidentiary rulings. However, in the context of step three, the propriety and accuracy of the order’s evidentiary rulings and discussion of the English translation6 are unclear, and we cannot state with sufficient certainty that the court’s analyses are consistent with this opinion. Therefore, we cannot affirm the order. Under the circumstances, we believe that the appropriate course is to vacate the order denying arbitration (including the evidentiary rulings) and to remand the matter back to the trial court to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion. This will give the court the opportunity to reconsider and/or make additional clarifications regarding Diaz’s evidentiary objections (as may be appropriate) and to consider and make express rulings in the first instance regarding Diaz’s burden under the second step and FLI’s burden under the third step (assuming Diaz meets her second step burden). Of course, if the result of the three-step burden shifting process is that an agreement to 6 For example, the trial court faulted the English translation in part for not identifying the specific person who translated the Spanish document. This appears to raise a question regarding the accuracy of the translation and to implicate the California Rules of Court, which require a party to submit a certified English translation of any evidence that is written in a foreign language. (Rule 3.1110(g).) However, where an English translation is provided and accompanied by a certification, if the parties accept the accuracy of the translation, then it is appropriate for courts to also accept the accuracy of the translation. (See Safieddine v. MBC FZ, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1092, fn. 7 [“[The d]efendants submitted a certified translation of the text of that video, as well as certified translations of the text of the two website articles. ([R]ule 3.1110(g).) [The p]laintiff does not question the accuracy of [the] defendants’ exhibits; we therefore use the certified translations.”].) Here, Diaz’s opposition did not argue that the English translation was somehow inaccurate or inadequate. Rather, Diaz’s opposition extensively quoted from the English translation. Because FLI and Diaz relied on and accepted the English translation as accurate, the court should have done so as well. (Ibid.)

16. arbitrate exists, the court then will have to determine if Diaz established a defense to the enforcement of the agreement.7 We express no opinion as to what the result of the proceedings should be. DISPOSITION The trial court’s order denying FLI’s petition to compel arbitration is vacated. This matter is remanded to the trial court to conduct further proceedings to resolve FLI’s petition to compel arbitration consistent with this opinion. FLI is awarded its costs on appeal.

HARRELL, J. WE CONCUR:

MEEHAN, Acting P. J.

GUERRA, J.

7 Nothing in this opinion prevents the trial court from accepting new briefing or additional evidence if it believes that additional evidence or briefing would be beneficial or advisable (except of course as to the step one burden which FLI met as a matter law).

17.