People v. Ramsey CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 9/17/26 P. v. Ramsey CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B342899

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KA086954) v.

TYRONE ROSHAWN RAMSEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed. Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller, and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. I. INTRODUCTION Defendant Tyrone Ramsey appeals from the trial court’s judgment on resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75,1 arguing the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion under People v. Romero (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero motion) to dismiss his prior strike convictions. We affirm.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

“One of the owners of the Kokho Aquarium in El Monte found defendant sitting at the owner’s desk on December 17, 2008. When questioned as to his purpose of being at the desk, defendant claimed to be looking for a job. He put money belonging to the aquarium into his pocket, pushed the owner aside, ran from the store, and entered a truck. A customer from the store attempted to pull defendant from the truck, but defendant placed the car in reverse, causing the customer to throw himself out of the way of the vehicle. The owner, who was standing behind the truck, was hit and knocked to the ground. Defendant had rented the truck one day before the robbery. The robbery was captured on video cameras at the store. The prosecution also presented evidence of two prior robberies committed by defendant at businesses under circumstances similar to the Kokho Aquarium robbery. Defendant called a 1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The facts are taken from the unpublished opinion in the direct appeal from the judgment, People v. Ramsey (July 19, 2011, B225454) [nonpub. opn.].)

2 psychologist to explain to the jury how memory operates and the factors that go into the reliability of eyewitness identification.” (People v. Ramsey, supra, B225454.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Conviction and Sentencing In an information, the Los Angeles County District Attorney charged defendant in count 1 with second degree robbery in violation of section 211; and, in counts 2 and 3, with assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The District Attorney alleged as to all counts that defendant suffered four prior strike convictions within the meaning of sections 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivision (b) through (i). The District Attorney also alleged that defendant had been convicted of six prior felonies for which prison terms had been imposed within the meaning of section 667.5, former subdivision (b) and had suffered four prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The jury found defendant guilty on counts 1 and 3, found him not guilty on count 2, but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of assault in violation of section 240. The jury also found true all of the prior conviction allegations. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 71 years to life, comprised of the following sentences: on count 1, a 25-years-to-life sentence based on the prior strike convictions, plus a consecutive 20-year term under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) for the four prior serious felony conviction enhancements and a consecutive one-year term under section 667.5, former 3 subdivision (b) for one of the prior prison term enhancements; on count 2, a six-month term with credit for time served; and, on count 3, a consecutive 25-years-to-life sentence based on the prior strike convictions. On direct appeal, a prior panel of this Division affirmed the convictions. (People v. Ramsey, supra, B225454.)

B. Section 1172.75 Petition On March 29, 2023, the trial court noted that defendant’s name appeared in a Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) list of persons eligible for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.).3 (Stats. 2021, Ch. 728, § 3.) The court appointed counsel and set the matter for hearing. On August 15, 2023, the District Attorney filed an opposition, arguing that, other than dismissing the section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement, the trial court should not resentence defendant. Among other documents, the District Attorney attached copies of defendant’s “RAP Sheet,” probation report, and the Department’s rules violations report which indicated that, between January 2004 and December 2018, defendant had 10 prison rules violations.

3 “Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill [No.] 136 amended section 667.5 by limiting imposition of the prior prison term enhancement to prior terms for sexually violent offenses. Then, in Senate Bill [No.] 483, effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature made the change retroactive, enacting section 1172.75 … .” (People v. Terwilligar (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 585, 595.)

4 On April 2, 2024, defendant lodged a copy of a February 12, 2024, pathology report indicating that he had been diagnosed with prostate cancer and documents showing his participation in a “National Crime Victims’ Rights Week” program and Alcoholics Anonymous. On April 18, 2024, defendant submitted a copy of a PET scan report on his prostate cancer. On August 20, 2024, defendant’s appointed counsel filed a petition requesting the trial court to recall his sentence, dismiss the section 667.5, subdivision (b) priors, and conduct a full resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. Defendant argued that, in addition to dismissing the prior prison term allegations under section 667.5, subdivision (b), the court should exercise its discretion under Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 to dismiss his prior strike convictions and also dismiss his four prior serious felony conviction enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). On October 15, 2024, defendant filed a sentencing memorandum that attached additional submissions and other documents, including multiple correctional officer recommendations and certificates showing his completion of several other programs while incarcerated. On October 30, 2024, the trial court held a resentencing hearing, indicating at the outset that it had reviewed the parties’ submissions. Defense counsel argued that, on the assault with a deadly weapon count, defendant did not intend to use the truck as a deadly weapon. Counsel then urged the court to consider defendant’s behavior while incarcerated, characterizing it as “outstanding.” Counsel emphasized that defendant had availed himself of counseling while incarcerated, pointed to the correction 5 officer recommendations, and asserted that defendant was “not the same man that stood before the court in 2010 at sentencing.” Counsel also noted that defendant’s most recent strike had been sustained nine years prior to his original sentencing and that he was 17 and 21 years old at the time he sustained his two other strike convictions. Finally, counsel reminded the court of defendant’s prostate cancer diagnosis. Following his counsel’s remarks, defendant addressed the trial court. He claimed he was “not the same person [he] was when [he] was here before.” Based on the programs he completed during his incarceration, defendant believed he had gained insight and now realized “that crime [did not] pay ... . [He was] not a violent person. [He] never set out to hurt [anyone], none of that.” The prosecutor opposed defendant’s Romero motion, maintaining that “this case squarely falls within the spirit of [the Three Strikes law].” Following further arguments from counsel, the trial court proceeded to resentencing. It began by recalling defendant’s June 21, 2010, sentence and striking the prior prison term enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court also acknowledged that defendant was “entitled to a full re-sentencing … .” But the court rejected defendant’s request to dismiss his prior strike convictions under Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497, based on his history of criminal convictions, prison terms, and parole violations between 1983 and 2001, reasoning as follows: “I do believe that at this time [defendant] does fall within the spirit of the ... Three Strikes law. [¶] ... [¶] So in spite of the fact that years had passed between those strikes, [defendant] was not certainly a law abiding citizen during that, but was, in fact, in 6 prison or released and then sent back to prison. [¶] I believe that this case does fall within the Three Strikes [law].” The trial court acknowledged that defendant had “some mitigation on his side at this point,” including his current age, his age at the time he committed some of the strikes, his recent behavior and progress in prison, specifying that he “brought his points down from 60 to 19,” had “done a lot of programs in prison,” had “a parole plan,” and had “been in [Alcoholics Anonymous] since 2021.” And the court noted defendant’s expressions of remorse during his remarks to the court. But the court also observed that defendant’s most recent filings, including the October 15, 2024, filing, showed he “still seems to be blaming everybody and everything else necessarily besides himself as to why he shouldn’t be held accountable for his actions, and that does cause the court some concern here.” The trial court then indicated that, “in weighing what [was] in the interest of justice,” it intended to dismiss the four prior serious felony conviction enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and to run “concurrently the two 25-years-to- life prison sentences.” According to the court, based on those reductions, defendant’s sentence would “go from 71-years-to-life to 25-years-to-life, which seems a lot more in line with the sentence that would be today.” Accordingly, the trial court resentenced defendant as follows: on count 1, the court imposed a 25-years-to-life term pursuant to his prior strike convictions; on count 2, the court imposed a concurrent six-month term; and, on count 3, it imposed a concurrent 25-years-to-life term pursuant to his prior strike convictions.

7 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment after resentencing.

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Romero motion. According to defendant, his “criminal record is a static factor. But [his] dynamic factors, including his demonstrable rehabilitation, evidenced by his educational, self-help, work, and disciplinary records (all while serving a sentence of 71-years-to life), and his community support now place [him] firmly outside the spirit of the habitual offender law.”

A. Legal Principles 1. Section 1172.75 “Subdivision (a) of section 1172.75 declares ‘[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020’ for a prior prison or jail sentence under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), other than for a sexually violent offense, to be ‘legally invalid.’ If a court determines that an individual is serving a term based on a judgment that ‘includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (c); see id., subd. (b).) In other words, a prior-prison-term enhancement ‘imposed’ before 2020 is now invalid, and any prisoner whose judgment includes such an enhancement is entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75.” (People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1058.)

8 In People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, the court concluded that, once a trial court recalls a sentence and proceeds to resentence a defendant under section 1172.75, it has the authority to exercise its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (a) and Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 467 to strike any or all of the defendant’s strike priors. “But section 1385[, subdivision] (c), by its terms, applies only when a trial court is considering whether to dismiss ‘an enhancement,’ and a sentence under the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement.” (People v. Dain (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 235, 247.) In People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, our Supreme Court “instructed: ‘[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law, on its own motion, “in furtherance of justice” pursuant to … section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.’ (Williams, [supra, 17 Cal.4th] at p. 161.) [The Court] contrasted factors ‘intrinsic’ to the Three Strikes law with ‘extrinsic’ factors, such as ‘“‘judicial convenience’”’ or ‘bare antipathy to the consequences for any given defendant,’ that cannot be considered in deciding whether to strike a prior strike. ([Id.] at pp. 161, 159.)” (People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 256–257.) “[A] court’s failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction allegation is subject to review under the deferential abuse of 9 discretion standard.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.) “[A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to dismiss [citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss [citation].” (Id. at p. 378.) “But ‘[i]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations. [Citation.] Where the record is silent [citation], or ‘[w]here the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance’ [citation.]” (Ibid.) A trial court’s failure to strike can only constitute an abuse of discretion in an extraordinary case “where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme … .” (Ibid.)

B. Analysis Defendant argues that the trial court “abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider what furthers justice as individually and holistically applied to [defendant] now, rather than [defendant] circa 2008, at the time of the offense, or 2010, at the time of the original sentencing.” Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the record of the resentencing hearing reflects that, in ruling on the Romero motion, the trial court weighed not only the nature and circumstances of defendant’s current felony convictions and prior 10 strike convictions but the particulars of his background, character, and prospects. (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) At the outset of its analysis of the motion, the court confirmed that it had considered the authorities cited by the parties in their submissions “in weighing what is in the interest of justice … .” The court then reviewed defendant’s criminal record, from his first robbery conviction in 1983 through his current offenses in 2008. But the court also acknowledged mitigating factors, including the age of the most recent strike, his current age, and his age when he committed his first strike as a juvenile. The court also noted defendant’s recent behavior and progress in prison and weighed defendant’s recent statements in his submissions, concluding that he was still blaming “everybody and everything else” instead of taking responsibility for his own actions. On this record, we find no abuse of discretion. In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion on the motion, defendant emphasizes his recent conduct in prison, his current age, and his health issues, arguing that the trial court largely ignored those factors while focusing almost exclusively on defendant’s criminal history. According to defendant, the court “denied [defendant’s] Romero request because [he] was previously incorrigible. And while the court acknowledged certain mitigating factors, the court did not sufficiently concern itself with [defendant’s] current character and was not overly concerned with his rehabilitative prospects.” Defendant’s argument, at bottom, urges us to reweigh the relevant factors on the Romero motion under section 1385, subdivision (a). But our review is only for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, and here there was none. We therefore affirm the ruling on the Romero motion.

11 V. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

MOOR, J.