Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERMI PEREZ-CHINININ, Case No.: 26-cv-4594-RSH-MMP 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION 13 v. FOR HABEAS CORPUS 14 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity as Secretary of Homeland 15 Security, et al., 16 Respondents. 17 18 19 On August 11, 2026, petitioner Ermi Perez-Chininin, filed a petition for writ of 20 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. For the reasons set forth below, 21 the Court grants the petition. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Petitioner is a citizen of Peru who entered the United States on or about September 24 30, 2024. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 18. Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear and placed in removal 25 proceedings after an asylum officer found that he had demonstrated a credible fear of 26 persecution or torture. ECF Nos. 1 at ¶ 18; 4-1 at 2. On November 1, 2024, Petitioner was 27 granted parole for a one-year period. ECF No. 4-4 at 2. The record reflects that both 28 Petitioner’s asylum application and his removal proceedings remain pending. ECF Nos. 1 1 at ¶ 93; 4-6 at 2. 2 Petitioner was subsequently taken into custody on July 27, 2026 by U.S. 3 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) during an enforcement operation in 4 Newark, New Jersey. ECF No. 4-5 at 3. An administrative arrest warrant was issued and 5 served on Petitioner the following day. ECF No. 4-6 at 2. On August 2, 2026, Petitioner 6 was transferred to the Imperial Regional Adult Detention Facility, where he remains 7 detained. ECF No. 4 at 2. 8 On August 11, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. ECF No. 1. Petitioner 9 challenges the legality of his detention, contending: (1) his detention is governed by 8 10 U.S.C. § 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) his re-detention without an 11 individualized finding of flight risk or dangerousness violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due 12 Process Clause; and (3) his re-detention without written notice or a reasoned explanation 13 violates the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Id. ¶¶ 75–104. Petitioner requests his 14 immediate release. Id. at 33. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may 17 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit 18 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A prisoner bears the 19 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 20 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 21 III. ANALYSIS 22 A. Jurisdiction 23 Respondents first challenge this Court’s jurisdiction to hear the Petition, relying on 24 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). ECF No. 4 at 2–4. That provision states that, except as otherwise 25 provided in Section 1252, and notwithstanding any other provision of law including 26 8 U.S.C. § 2241, “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf 27 of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence 28 proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this 1 chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Respondents argue that because Petitioner challenges his 2 detention during removal proceedings, that detention “arises from” the Attorney General’s 3 decision to commence such proceedings. ECF No. 4 at 3–4. 4 The Supreme Court has interpreted the jurisdiction-stripping provision in Section 5 1252(g) narrowly, limiting it to “three discrete actions”: the “‘decision or action’ to 6 ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. Am.–Arab 7 Anti–Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). The 8 Supreme Court noted that “[t]here are of course many other decisions or actions that may 9 be part of the deportation process.” Id. In a later decision, the Court explained that it did 10 not interpret Section 1252(g) “to sweep in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise 11 from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, [the Court] read the language 12 to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 13 281, 294 (2018). 14 Here, Petitioner is seeking to review the legality of his detention, rather than 15 challenging the decision to commence proceedings, the adjudication of his removal case, 16 or an action to execute his removal order. He does not seek to litigate in this Court questions 17 of whether he is removable or whether he is entitled to relief from removal. The relief he 18 seeks here is release from custody that he contends in unlawful. The Court concludes that 19 Petitioner’s claim is not barred by Section 1252(g). 20 B. Petitioner’s Due Process Claim 21 Respondents next contend that Petitioner’s claims fail because he is subject to 22 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and that the absence of written notice of his 23 parole’s expiration does not warrant immediate release. ECF No. 4 at 4–5. In support 24 Respondents cite Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 25 3254999 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025). Id. at 4. 26 Omer, similar to this one, involved a noncitizen’s habeas challenge to his re- 27 detention following the expiration of his parole. The district court determined, first, that 28 the fact that the petitioner was subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1 1225(b)(2)(A) did not prevent the court from hearing the petitioner’s constitutional 2 challenge to his detention. Omer G.G., 2025 WL 3254999, at *3. The court determined, 3 next, that even though the petitioner’s parole had expired, “petitioner’s liberty interest did 4 not expire along with his parole,” and the petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his 5 continued release. Id. at *5–6. The court concluded that in the circumstances of that case, 6 the petitioner was entitled by due process to a hearing as a condition of being re-detained. 7 Id. at *8. Although the Omer G.G. decision is not binding precedent, and may have some 8 factual distinctions, it suggests that Petitioner is entitled to a hearing or at least some 9 process before being re-detained pending his removal proceedings. 10 Here, Petitioner alleges that Respondents re-detained him without an individualized 11 custody determination or an explanation of changed circumstances justifying his return to 12 custody. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 22, 86, 98. Respondents do not separately address whether 13 Petitioner’s prior release gave rise to a protected liberty interest or what procedures were 14 required before that interest could be deprived. Instead, they rely solely on the expiration 15 of his parole and the asserted statutory mandate to detain him. ECF No. 4 at 4–5. On the 16 present briefing, Respondents have not meaningfully addressed Petitioner’s due process 17 claim. In the context of the briefing here, the Court therefore treats Petitioner’s due process 18 argument as unopposed. See Kuvaev v. LaRose et al, Case No. 3:26-cv-00810-RSH-DEB, 19 ECF No. 5 (March 2, 2026) (granting petition under similar circumstances where 20 respondents failed to address petitioner’s due process argument). 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Within three (3) days of the 23 date of this order, Respondents shall release petitioner Ermi Perez-Chininin subject to the 24 terms of his previous grant of parole, or any other conditions that may be appropriate for 25 release on recognizance. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 To the extent Petitioner seeks to recover attorneys’ fees, he must do so by way of a 2 ||noticed motion confirming to the Civil Local Rules of this District as well as the 3 undersigned’s Pretrial Civil Procedures. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 || Dated: September 16, 2026 ‘ 7 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28