People v. Robinson CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 9/17/26 P. v. Robinson CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B349205

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KA118180) v.

BRADLEY CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

Bradley Christopher Robinson (defendant) appeals from the order denying reinstatement of probation and ordering execution of a previously imposed six-year state prison sentence. His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues and asking this court to independently review the record. On June 1, 2026, we notified defendant of his right to file written argument on his own behalf, and he has done so. We have reviewed the record and considered defendant’s contentions. We find no arguable issue warranting reversal and affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In early February 2018, defendant drove with a blood- alcohol concentration of 0.33 percent and collided with a sheriff’s patrol car. The patrol car went airborne and landed on the center median of the roadway. On April 11, 2019, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more and causing injury, in violation of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (b), and also admitted an allegation under 1 Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a), that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. Under the agreement, the court imposed a six-year state prison sentence—three years for the offense and a consecutive three years for the great bodily injury enhancement—but suspended execution of that sentence and placed him on five years of formal probation. Before accepting the plea, the court explained the charges, enhancement, negotiated disposition, probation conditions, and consequences of a serious violation. Defendant stated that he understood the court’s advisements and waived his constitutional rights before pleading guilty and admitting the enhancement. His counsel joined the plea and stipulated to a factual basis for it. The court found the plea and admission knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and factually supported. Included in the terms of probation was that defendant must (a) obey all laws and (b) not drive with any measurable alcohol in his system.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 In January 2022, while defendant was on probation, he was charged in case No. BA513707 with another alcohol-related driving offense. The new case involved a collision with a parked vehicle. At a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor informed the court that defendant was found asleep in the driver’s seat while the vehicle was in drive, displayed signs of intoxication, and had two breath test results of 0.29. The court summarily revoked probation in the present case pending further proceedings in the new case. In August 2025, the court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion to reinstate probation. Defendant asked the court to reinstate probation rather than execute the suspended six-year sentence. The court acknowledged defendant’s efforts and the favorable material submitted on his behalf, but denied his request. The court considered defendant’s prior driving under the influence (DUI) history—the January 2022 incident was his 2 fifth DUI conviction since 2004; the seriousness of the 2019 offense; the terms of the original negotiated disposition; and the new felony DUI committed while defendant remained on felony DUI probation. It found the new violation was not minor or technical and concluded that execution of the previously suspended sentence was warranted. Defendant was sentenced to six years in prison in case No. KA118180: three years for the Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (b), offense and three additional years for the admitted section 12022.7, subdivision (a), enhancement. The 2 On July 1, 2025, defendant pleaded guilty to driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b).

3 court stated that it was selecting the upper term “pursuant to the plea agreement.” A two-year concurrent term in case No. BA513707, was also imposed per a negotiated plea. Defendant timely appealed and obtained a certificate of probable cause. DISCUSSION When a trial court imposes a sentence but suspends its execution and places the defendant on probation, the court has discretion, after revoking probation, to reinstate probation or terminate it. (Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subds. (a), (b)(1), (c); People v. Medina (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 318, 321.) We review the court’s decision whether to reinstate probation for abuse of discretion. (People v. Bolian (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1421.) If the court terminates probation after having previously imposed a sentence and suspended only its execution, it must order that sentence into effect; it does not select a new sentence. (People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1095; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.435(b)(2).) A defendant who pleads guilty or no contest may not ordinarily challenge the factual basis of the conviction as though the matter had proceeded to trial. (People v. Palmer (2013) 58 Cal.4th 110, 114–115 [defendant who pleads guilty may challenge the trial court’s procedure in eliciting a factual basis for the plea but may not challenge issues relating to guilt, such as whether the conviction is supported by sufficient evidence].) Although defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause, that certificate does not establish the merits of his challenges to the plea or enhancement admission. (§ 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304.)

4 In his two-page supplemental letter filed June 24, 2026, defendant raises three arguments. First, defendant contends that the court and his lawyer’s appellate brief inaccurately stated that he struck or broadsided the patrol car, asserting instead that the deputy’s vehicle struck defendant’s vehicle while he was making a legal turn. He claims the error affected sentencing. To the extent defendant seeks to relitigate the facts underlying his 2019 conviction or enhancement admission, his guilty plea, express waivers of a preliminary hearing and trial, and stipulation to a factual basis foreclose the claim. To the extent he claims the court relied on materially false information in denying reinstatement of probation, the record shows no reversible error. The court relied on multiple considerations, including defendant’s DUI history, the seriousness of the 2019 offense, the plea agreement’s terms, and—most significantly—his new felony DUI, collision, and reported high alcohol readings while on felony-DUI probation. Nothing in the record suggests the court’s decision depended exclusively or materially on whether defendant struck or was struck by the patrol car in 2018. Defendant has not shown that the court abused its discretion in declining to reinstate probation. Second, defendant contends the three-year enhancement was improper because he did not personally inflict great bodily injury, asserting that the patrol car struck him and that the injury was not sufficiently serious to qualify as great bodily injury. Defendant’s contention fails because he expressly admitted personally inflicting great bodily injury within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). A knowing and voluntary 5 admission is binding on the defendant. (People v. Thomas (1986) 41 Cal.3d 837, 844 & fn. 6.) The prosecutor stated the allegation, defendant confirmed that he understood it, admitted its truth, and stipulated to a factual basis with counsel. The court found the admission knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Defendant identifies no basis for withdrawing or invalidating that admission. His present disagreement with the underlying facts and unsupported assertion that the injury did not qualify as great bodily injury do not overcome it. Third, defendant argues that the court was required to impose the middle term for the Vehicle Code offense because it did not identify aggravating circumstances supporting the upper term. The contention misconstrues the sentence. The record establishes that the upper term was part of the negotiated disposition. In 2019, defendant agreed to a disposition consisting of the three-year upper term and the three-year great bodily injury enhancement, for an aggregate six-year sentence. The court suspended execution of that sentence and placed defendant on formal probation. When the court later denied reinstatement, it ordered the previously imposed sentence into effect. It did not select a new base term. The court’s statement that it was selecting the upper term “pursuant to the plea agreement” confirms this understanding. Defendant was not entitled to renegotiate the agreed sentence after violating probation. Lastly, defendant asks this court to consider his service in the United States Navy, his efforts in rehabilitation, and other mitigating circumstances and impose an appropriate lesser punishment. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the superior court merely because defendant identifies circumstances 6 that might have supported a different discretionary decision. Defendant has not shown that the court relied on an impermissible factor, applied an incorrect legal standard, or acted arbitrarily or irrationally in declining to reinstate probation and ordering execution of the previously suspended sentence. We therefore find no arguable issue that warrants reversal. DISPOSITION The trial court’s order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

KUMAR, J.* We concur:

MOOR, Acting P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

* Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.