Conservatorship of D.T. CA2/6

Opinion

Filed 9/17/26 Conservatorship of D.T. CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

Conservatorship of the Person 2d Civ. No. B352568 of D.T. (Super. Ct. No. 24MH00213) (Santa Barbara County)

PUBLIC GUARDIAN OF SANTA BARBARA COUNTY,

Petitioner and Respondent, v. D.T., Objector and Appellant.

Under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code1, § 5000 et seq.; LPS Act), persons subject to a proposed conservatorship are entitled to a unanimous jury verdict on whether they are gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. This is the second case before us in as many months involving a proposed conservatee who was not advised of their right to a jury trial. As we recently held in Conservatorship of K.L. (Aug. 25, 2026, B351841) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2026 WL 2490937] (K.L.), where a trial court does not advise a proposed conservatee of their right to a jury trial, and substantial evidence does not establish the proposed conservatee lacks capacity to waive jury, automatic reversal is not required if the totality of the circumstances indicates a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right. D.T. appeals from an order under the LPS Act declaring him gravely disabled and appointing the Santa Barbara County Public Guardian (Public Guardian) as his conservator. We reverse and remand. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY D.T. was the subject of a conservatorship, with the Public Guardian as his conservator, from November 2024 to November 2025. In October 2025, the Public Guardian filed an LPS Act petition to reestablish the conservatorship due to D.T.’s alleged schizoaffective disorder and inability to accept voluntary treatment for his mental illness. The trial court issued a written citation for the conservatorship, which was personally served on D.T. D.T. did not appear at the November 2025 pretrial hearing. D.T.’s attorney appeared and stated D.T. “objects and wishes to set his matter for an in-person court trial.” Counsel did not indicate she had explained to D.T. that he had a right to a jury trial, discussed the mechanics of a jury trial, or explained the differences between a jury trial and a court trial. Counsel also did not indicate D.T. lacked capacity to waive jury.

2 The trial court subsequently held a court trial on the petition. The trial court did not take a personal waiver of jury from D.T. Thus, the court did not explain the mechanics of a jury trial or how a jury trial differed from a court trial. After hearing testimony from two witnesses and D.T., the trial court granted the petition and found D.T. gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) The court appointed the Public Guardian as conservator of D.T.’s person for one year, found the least restrictive facility for D.T. was a locked psychiatric facility, and prohibited D.T. from operating a motor vehicle, entering into contracts in excess of $25, possessing firearms, and refusing medical treatment. DISCUSSION The LPS Act The LPS Act governs the involuntary treatment of the “gravely disabled” in California so that they may receive individualized treatment, supervision, and placement. (§§ 5350, 5350.1; Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 139.) A person is “ ‘gravely disabled’ ” if “as a result of a mental health disorder, a severe substance abuse use disorder, or a co-occurring mental health disorder and a severe substance use disorder, is unable to provide for their basic personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, personal safety, or necessary medical care.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) “When a treatment professional determines a person is gravely disabled and unwilling or unable to accept treatment voluntarily, the county’s public guardian may petition to establish a conservatorship. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5352; see Conservatorship of K.P. [(2021) 11 Cal.5th 695,] 708–709.) If the matter proceeds to trial and the person is found gravely disabled, 3 the court appoints a conservator (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350), imposes ‘disabilities’ as needed (id., § 5357), and determines an appropriate treatment placement (id., § 5358). (See Conservatorship of K.P., at pp. 709–710.) A conservatorship terminates after one year but may be extended for additional one-year terms upon petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5361.)” (Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1095–1096 (Eric B.).) A finding of grave disability must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 (Roulet).) D.T.’s right to a jury trial D.T. contends the trial court committed reversible error because it did not advise him of his right to a jury trial and obtain his personal waiver. We agree reversal is warranted here. We review D.T.’s claims de novo. (Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 142; Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894, 904 (C.O.).) A “ ‘civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty . . . .’ (Addington v. Texas [(1979)] 441 U.S. [418,] 425; see [People v.] Blackburn [(2015)] 61 Cal.4th [1113,] 1119.) ‘In addition to physical restraint, “[t]he gravely disabled person for whom a conservatorship has been established faces the loss of many other liberties . . . .” ’ ([Conservatorship of] Ben C. [(2007)] 40 Cal.4th [529,] 540.) Apart from their possible confinement, conservatees may lose the rights to drive, vote, enter contracts, and make decisions about their treatment. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5357.) In light of the potential for such a significant loss of liberty, conservatorship cases are governed by many of the same procedural protections that apply in criminal trials. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350, 4 subd. (d)(1); Ben C., at p. 541; but see Ben C., at p. 538.)” (Eric B., supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 1103–1104.) One such right is a conservatee’s right to a unanimous jury verdict on the issue of grave disability. (§ 5350, subd. (d)(1); Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 235.) Probate Code section 1828, subdivision (a)(6) states “the court shall inform the proposed conservatee of all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] The proposed conservatee has the right . . . to have the matter of the establishment of the conservatorship tried by jury.” A trial court’s failure to advise a proposed conservatee of their right to a jury trial is statutory error. (Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378, 384 (Heather W.); C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 909; § 5350, subd. (d)(1).) “[T]he trial court must obtain a personal waiver of a jury trial from the conservatee, even when the conservatee expresses no preference for a jury trial. Absent such a waiver, the court must accord the conservatee a jury trial unless the court finds the conservatee lacks the capacity to make such a decision.” (Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 381.) “[A] person’s waiver of the statutory right to a jury trial in LPS civil commitment proceedings must be knowingly and voluntarily made.” (K.R. v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 133, 143 [collecting authority].) The failure to obtain a knowing and intelligent jury trial waiver “denies the defendant [or conservatee] his or her statutory right to a jury trial on the entire cause in a civil commitment proceeding.” (People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1132 [jury trial waivers required in proceedings involving offenders with mental health disorders]; see also People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1163 (Tran) [jury trial waivers required in involuntary commitment proceedings 5 where a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI)]; Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250 (Kevin A.) [LPS Act shares same purposes as MDO and NGI commitment schemes].) Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the failure to obtain a valid jury trial waiver “defies ordinary harmless error analysis” (People v. Blackburn, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1134) and is a “ ‘miscarriage of justice’ within the meaning of California Constitution, article VI, section 13,” requiring reversal. (Id. at pp. 1132–1133; Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1169 [invalid jury waiver in commitment proceeding “is not susceptible to ordinary harmless error analysis and automatically requires reversal”].) In the criminal jury waiver context, our Supreme Court has also emphasized that “ ‘knowing and intelligent’ ” means “ ‘ “ ‘ “made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th at pp. 151, 166 (Sivongxxay).) In determining whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent, “we examine ‘the totality of the circumstances’ unique to each case.” (People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 753.) In Sivongxxay, our Supreme Court recommended that trial courts advise criminal defendants of the “basic mechanics of a jury trial” including that “(1) a jury is made up of 12 members of the community; (2) a defendant through his or her counsel may participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, a judge alone will decide his or her guilt or innocence.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.) Sivongxxay confirmed that no “specific method for determining 6 whether a defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial in favor of a bench trial” is required. (Id. at p. 167.) In Heather W., we concluded the trial court’s error in failing to advise a proposed conservatee of their right to a jury trial was not harmless and required reversal. (Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384–385.) There, the trial court “advised Heather W. of her right to testify, but did not advise her that she had a right to a jury trial.” (Id. at p. 381.) We emphasized that “the right to a jury trial to contest an LPS conservatorship is a right guaranteed by the California Constitution.” (Id. at p. 383.) Heather W. is silent as to whether the proposed conservatee was informed by her attorney that she had a right to a jury trial. (Id. at p. 381.) Here, as in Heather W., the record does not indicate that counsel advised D.T. of his right to a jury trial. Nor did the trial court advise D.T. of this right. Nor does the record indicate whether D.T.’s counsel explained the mechanics of a jury trial, including a unanimous finding on grave disability, that a jury is comprised of 12 people from the community, the right to participate in jury selection, and that in a court trial, a judge alone would decide whether D.T. was gravely disabled. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.) Indeed, there is no evidence that D.T. understood what it meant to have a right to a jury trial. Instead, the record reflects that in November 2025, D.T.’s attorney stated her client objected to the continued conservatorship and wanted “an in-person court trial.” Neither D.T. nor his attorney explicitly waived D.T.’s right to a jury trial. The reporter’s transcript illustrates there was no mention of a jury trial whatsoever, let alone D.T.’s waiver of that right, during 7 the proceedings. Thus, there is no indication D.T. knew he was entitled to a unanimous jury verdict on whether he was gravely disabled beyond a reasonable doubt. While D.T. was subject to a previous conservatorship, the record does not disclose whether his lawyer or the trial court in that proceeding advised him of his right to a jury trial. And even if he was, that fact alone would not take away his right to be informed in this proceeding. The Public Guardian contends the trial court’s failure to advise D.T. of his right to a jury trial is subject to a harmless error review under C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 917–919, wherein the court applied the harmless error test set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) (an error is harmless unless it is “reasonably probable” the outcome would have been different in the absence of the error). Based on the citation served on D.T. stating he would have a right to a jury trial upon demand and counsel’s statement that D.T. wanted “an in-person court trial,” the Public Guardian contends the failure to advise D.T. and secure his personal waiver is harmless. We are not persuaded. In C.O., the proposed conservator was previously subjected to an LPS conservatorship, the public guardian petitioned for reappointment, and counsel informed C.O. of the right to a jury trial. (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 901, 908.) C.O. held that a trial court’s failure to personally advise the proposed conservatee of a jury trial right does not, standing alone, warrant automatic reversal, emphasizing that such error is harmless “if the record affirmatively shows, based on the totality of the circumstances,” that the “waiver was knowing and voluntary.” (Id. at p. 918.)

8 C.O. is distinguishable because the record “affirmatively demonstrate[d]” the proposed conservatee “was informed of his right to a jury trial.” (C.O., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 919.) In C.O., there was substantial evidence the proposed conservatee’s waiver was knowing and intelligent, including the citation mailed to him, counsel having explained the right to a jury trial, his presence at the hearing when counsel waived jury, and communications about how the conservatee “wished to proceed.” (Id. at pp. 918–919.) Thus, our colleagues in the Sixth District were “left solely with the error that the trial court did not personally advise [the proposed conservatee] of his jury trial right.” (Id. at p. 919.) C.O. concluded the error was harmless under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, because the record “affirmatively” demonstrated the proposed conservatee “was informed of his right to a jury trial, both in writing and by his counsel.” (C.O., at p. 919.) But that is not the situation here. The record here is silent as to whether counsel informed D.T. of his right to a jury trial, including the mechanics of a jury trial and his right to a unanimous jury verdict on grave disability. Without this information, and without evidence that D.T. read or understood the citation, we cannot conclude the citation was sufficient for D.T. to knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional right to a jury trial. (See Tran, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1170 [“the requirement of an affirmative showing means that no waiver may be presumed from a silent record” (italics omitted)]; Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 383.) The citation’s advisement that D.T. had a “right to a jury trial if you wish” is insufficient to waive jury without, at a minimum, being advised of the right to a unanimous jury verdict on the issue of grave disability. (Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 235.)

9 That D.T. ultimately proceeded with a court trial also does not evince a knowing and intelligent waiver of his jury trial right when the record contains no evidence those rights were explained to him, either by his lawyer or the trial court. As we held in K.L. and Heather W., trial courts must inform proposed conservatees of their right to a jury trial. (K.L., supra, ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2026 WL 2490937]; Heather W., supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384–385; Prob. Code, § 1828, subd. (a)(6).) Given the significant liberty interests at stake, “the critical issue here is [the proposed conservatee’s] fundamental right to decide who hears the evidence to make that [grave disability] finding—a judge or a jury.” (Heather W., at p. 384.) But automatic reversal is not warranted if the totality of the circumstances indicates a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to jury. We conclude the trial court’s failure to advise D.T. of his right to a jury trial here is reversible error. And because the Public Guardian does not contend there was evidence D.T. lacked capacity to waive jury in November 2025, we do not remand for a capacity determination. (Kevin A., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253.) DISPOSITION The order granting the LPS conservatorship petition is reversed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

CODY, P. J. YEGAN, J.

10 Colleen K. Sterne, Judge Superior Court County of Santa Barbara ______________________________ B. Jolene Lewis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant. Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Hudson Hornick, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.